

The Notion of the Maximum in Kant's Aesthetic Ideas

Thanos Spiliotakaras¹

ABSTRACT. Despite the rich scholarship on Kant's theory of aesthetic ideas, the full thrust of the Kantian notion has not yet been fully revealed. I argue that aesthetic ideas are defined as counterparts of rational ideas, because they share a formally analogous constitution, defined by the notion of the maximum. Starting from Kant's statements that explicitly link imagination to the maximum, I propose two senses in which productive imagination attains to a maximum in the creation of an aesthetic idea. The first is the symbolic or analogical demonstration of a maximum in intuition through the generation of a counter-image of a rational idea. The second is found in the maximal extension that an aesthetic idea bears as an unbounded field of representations. The notion of the maximum fully justifies the status of aesthetic ideas as counterparts of rational ideas, and restricts what can be presented through an aesthetic idea. Therefore, an amendment of the inclusive interpretation of aesthetic ideas is warranted.

1. Introduction

Despite the immensely rich scholarship on Kant's theory of aesthetic ideas, the full thrust of the Kantian notion has not yet been fully explored. In explaining the relation between aesthetic and rational ideas, existing accounts refer to two aspects explicitly mentioned by Kant in §49 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. First, their inverse nature in the intuition-concept dipole: just as ideas of reasons are concepts that do not have a corresponding intuition (indemonstrable), aesthetic ideas are intuitions that cannot be captured by any determinate concept (inexponible). Second, the necessary role of the former in making the latter sensible: it

¹ aspiliot@buffalo.edu

is through aesthetic ideas that rational ideas can acquire objective reality and can be exhibited in intuition. However, as long as a justification for both of the above aspects is not given, the relation between the two kinds of ideas lacks full elucidation. Why is an aesthetic idea the counterpart of an idea of reason? Why (and not how) does an aesthetic idea make a rational idea sensible? What legitimizes the relation between them?

In what follows, I will attempt to specify the grounding condition of the relation in the notion of the maximum. I claim it is that very notion which eventually justifies the position that each is the counterpart of the other. The cue that leads to the above thesis is constituted by two statements given by Kant in §49: in the creation of an aesthetic idea, productive imagination is said to “emulate the precedent of reason in attaining to a maximum” (CPJ 5:314), and to transform nature “in accordance with principles that lie higher in reason” (CPJ 5:314).² The question of how the maximum features in aesthetic ideas has not been investigated, with the above crucial statements explicitly linking productive imagination to the maximum being minimally (if not at all) discussed in the literature.

I propose two senses in which productive imagination attains to a maximum when creating aesthetic ideas. The first draws on Kant’s account of symbolic presentation, where intuition and concept operate as relata of an analogy. In the symbolic presentation of a rational idea, the analogy rests on the notion of the maximum, with imagination fostering in intuition an analogical counter-image of the maximum connoted by the rational idea. The second sense emerges when attending to the extension an aesthetic idea grants to the idea of reason it presents. According to Kant’s account in §49, an aesthetic idea is an incalculable field of representations that aesthetically enlarges the presented concept. An aesthetic idea constitutes, therefore, the maximal extension of a concept, mirroring thus the maximal conceptual intention of a rational idea.

Finally, the proposed reading invites a reconsideration of the inclusive interpretation of aesthetic ideas, which is popular within Kant scholarship. Since the link between an aesthetic

² All quotations from Kant’s original works follow the English translations in *The Cambridge Edition* series, unless otherwise noted. Pagination and volume number of the *Akademie* edition is cited, with the exception of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where A and B editions pagination is used. Abbreviations: CPJ for the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (2000), CPR for the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1998), Pr for the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics* (2002), Refl for the *Reflections on Anthropology* from Kant’s *Nachlass* (vol.15-16 of the *Akademie Ausgabe*), and Met-L1/Pölitz for the transcript from the *Lectures on Metaphysics* (vol.28 of the *Akademie Ausgabe*).

idea and its semantic content rests on the notion of the maximum, any candidate for presentation through an aesthetic idea has to bear an idea-like formal structure. I call this the condition of adequation. That is paradigmatically satisfied by a rational idea, but it can also be satisfied by other representations if transformed accordingly. I argue that the inclusive interpretation, as it stands, is not attentive to this condition and needs to be amended.

2. Symbolizing the Maximum

The first sense in which productive imagination attains to a maximum in the creation of an aesthetic idea comes to the fore by virtue of the symbolic or analogical way of relating intuitions to concepts, which Kant develops in §59. There, the power of judgment is claimed to be able to present or exhibit [*darstellen*] a concept in intuition through a symbol – an object that indirectly presents according to “mere analogy” (CPJ 5:352). In an analogy, the power of judgment applies the mere rule of reflection on an object to an entirely different object, and, when this happens, there is a “transportation of the reflection” (CPJ 5:352) from the first to the second.³ According to the above definition, a despotic state ruled by a single absolute will is symbolized by a mere machine, like a handmill. Whereas there is no similarity between a despotic state and a handmill, there is one in the rule for reflecting on both (CPJ 5:352): the causal nexus of the contents of a handmill in operation is identical to the causal nexus imposed on the citizens of a despotic state by the single absolute will. While the mechanical structure of a tool and the political organization of a state are wholly dissimilar domains, the patterns of relation (the causal determination) witnessed within each are perfectly similar. Analogy can thus be said to be an isomorphism between two different entities belonging to different domains, as long as a totally similar pattern of relation between elements comprising each domain holds.

In §49, Kant uses the term ‘aesthetic attribute’ (CPJ 5:315) to denote precisely an intuition that symbolically or aesthetically presents a concept, while in his various anthropological lectures and notes one finds the very apt term ‘counter-image’ [*Gegenbild*] for any sign in general that stands in for another, or represents something else.⁴ An image, therefore, that exhibits a concept

³ In similar fashion, Kant claims in the *Prolegomena* that analogy does not signify an imperfect similarity between two things, but rather “a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things” (Pr 4:357-8).

⁴ The term *Gegenbild* can be found in his early Reflections (Refl 15:123-4), and lectures on Metaphysics (Met-L1/Pölitz 28:237), as part of explaining the faculty of characterization [*Bezeichnung*], or *facultas signatrix*.

through an analogy in the rule of reflection could then be interchangeably called a symbol, a counter-image, and an aesthetic attribute of that concept.

Now, Kant claims in §59 that ideas of reason, like God, can only be presented indirectly in intuition through symbols, since a logical or direct presentation is impossible (CPJ 5:351-3). However, ideas of reason are defined in the *Critique of Pure Reason* not merely as concepts lacking a corresponding intuition, but as concepts with a specific logical structure or form. They are formed in the attempt of reason to syllogistically comprehend the whole series (the absolute totality) of conditions subordinated to each other for a given condition, and thus capture the unconditioned (CPR A321-32/B378-89). Because of such logical form, any direct exhibition in intuition is impossible. In Kant's words, ideas are "concepts of a *maximum*," for which "nothing congruent can ever be given *in concreto*" (CPR A327/B384). Thus, the rational idea of the world is defined as the absolute whole or the unconditioned of appearances – the infinite or maximal totality of appearances – and, as such, it can never be brought into an image. Despite the different content that can be stipulated for a rational idea, one can always assume that the content connotes some kind of maximum, because it must bear the logical form of a comprehended unconditioned. For instance, the Platonic republic rests on the rational idea of the "*greatest* human freedom," and the "idea of this *maximum*" (CPR A316/B373) is employed as an archetype in judging human legislative constitutions.

Therefore, if an intuition is to symbolically present an idea of reason, if an intuition is to become a counter-image or an aesthetic attribute of an idea of reason, it has to analogically bear the form of the unconditioned or the maximum in intuition. That is the necessary trigger in order for the power of judgment to transport its reflection to a wholly dissimilar domain, and to eventually deem the former as a symbolic presentation of the latter. Such an analogical relation between an intuition and an idea of reason based on the maximum is prefigured before §49. For instance, in Kant's account of the mathematical sublime, the formal constitution of a maximum in intuition – in the magnitude of certain objects – evokes the bare idea of the maximum within the faculty of reason as the logical form of an idea of reason (CPJ 5:250). The evocation is precisely the transportation of reflection Kant talks about in §59, prompted by the analogical relation between an intuitable magnitude that is absolutely great, beyond comparison (potentially infinite number of units to be apprehended), and the bare logical form

of the conceptually unconditioned (a conceptual whole made up by an infinite number of grounding conditions).⁵

In the relevant sections in §49, the examples of images sensibilizing ideas of reason bear the same rationale: Jupiter's eagle with the lightning in its claws is an aesthetic attribute of the mighty king of heaven, giving symbolic manifestation to the rational idea of the sublimity of creation; Juno's peacock, likewise, is an attribute of the splendid queen of heaven symbolizing the idea of the majesty of creation (CPJ 5:315-6). Each image constitutes an aesthetic attribute, or a counter-image, of the corresponding rational idea, precisely because it manages to present a form of some maximum that analogically relates to the maximum connoted by said idea. The eagle, for example, as the most powerful (of the greatest strength) being in the kingdom of birds, analogically evokes the ideal of a being of maximal power or might in general – found in the very idea of God and his utmost sublimity; while the greatest finery (in the context of animals) of the peacock analogically evokes the ideal of a being of utmost magnificence.⁶

One can see why the second aspect in the relation between rational and aesthetic ideas – namely the ability of the latter to sensibilize the former – is grounded in the notion of the maximum: since a rational idea connotes by definition some kind of maximum, and since the presentation of rational idea in intuition is conducted by the power of judgment on analogical grounds, then the intuition in question has to also be formed according to a maximum. Thus, it becomes the analogical counter-image, aesthetic attribute, or symbol, of the rational idea.⁷

3. The Maximal Extension of a Concept

However, the content of an aesthetic idea is not restricted to a singular symbolic image, to the original intuition given in sense perception.⁸ According to Kant's definition of an aesthetic idea,

⁵ The symbolic presentation of the maximum in intuition also features in Kant's treatment of the Ideal of Beauty in the often-neglected §17, which I will omit here due to length limitations.

⁶ Similar qualifications can be given for the other examples of rational ideas in §49, such as the rational idea of cosmopolitan disposition, or the ones Kant mentions in passing – “the kingdom of the blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity, creation” (CPJ 5:314) – since each one denotes some kind of maximum (greatest virtue, greatest blessing, maximum suffering, infinite time, etc.).

⁷ See Makkreel (1990, 122-8) for similar view of the aesthetic idea as analogical counter-image of the rational idea, without reference to the role of the maximum though.

⁸ The point has been frequently made. See Pillow (2001, 200) Chignell (2007, 423-4) and Geiger (2021, 189-90) for instance.

the free activity of productive imagination brings about a “multitude of related representations [*verwandten Vorstellungen*]” (CPJ 5:315), or a “manifold of partial representations [*Teilvorstellungen*]” (CPJ 5:316), or “supplementary representations [*Nebenvorstellungen*]” (CPJ 5:315) in inner intuition, which in turn occasion a host of indescribable and ineffable thoughts. The above formulations indicate that the aforementioned representations are part of the content of an aesthetic idea.⁹ Thus, in the above example, the aesthetic idea presenting the rational idea of the sublimity of creation is not merely the image of the eagle with the lightning in its claws, but that image coupled with all the related supplementary representations that the productive imagination brings about on the occasion. The related representations Kant alludes to range from emotions to empirical images, and are brought about in the mind of the beholder, as long as they are unified by the theme in question.¹⁰ Hence, an image of an eagle soaring higher than all birds and of the night sky during a powerful thunderstorm may be the first such related representations with which the beholder’s imagination accompanies the initial intuition of Jupiter’s statue featuring the eagle and the lightning. However, countless other empirical images (including personal memories) can also be evoked, as long as they are instances of an utmost power or might, together with their respective feelings of awe resulting from an overwhelming dominion (even derived from personal experiences of the beholder). The freedom of productive imagination amounts to the absence of restrictions – apart from the thematic – as to the kind of intentional content generated or re-created in association with the initial representation.

Let me now return to the starting question. If an aesthetic idea constitutes such a multitude of related representations, what legitimizes its status as a counterpart of a rational idea? I believe the key to the answer lies in Kant’s characterization of the field of representations of an aesthetic idea as “immeasurable [*unabsehlich*]” (CPJ 5:315), and of the aesthetic enlargement the presented concept undergoes through them as “unbounded [*unbegrenzte*]” (CPJ 5:315). Put differently, an aesthetic idea constitutes a field, whose limit (*Grenze* in the stem of *unbegrenzte*) one is not able to discern or see, made up of elements one is not able to foresee or calculate (*absehen*

⁹ I can only briefly note there are highly exclusive accounts of the contents of an aesthetic idea – see typically Guyer (1997, 358-9), who argues that the partial representations created by imagination are not part of the aesthetic idea proper – as well as overly inclusive – see typically Berger (2024, 8-9), who sees even the rational idea itself as part of the aesthetic idea. I use a not overly thick, but not entirely thin either, definition of an aesthetic idea: it does not include concepts (even though it occasions them), but strictly lower-level representations, like empirical images and emotions; the characterization of an aesthetic idea as a counterpart of a rational idea can, in my opinion, stand only under this definition.

¹⁰ See Pillow (2001, 199-203) and Berger (2024, 8-15) on the role of the beholder in completing the contents of an aesthetic idea.

in the stem of *unabsehlich*). Both formulations converge to the point that the constituent elements of the field cannot be enumerated or run through, as they are indeterminable, and in principle unlimited; thus, an aesthetic idea, as a totality of representations, does not have a defined limit, and is, thus, in principle, inexhaustible.

Kant does not give an explicit justification for the above thesis, but an explanation can be inferred from what has already been said about the supplementary representations. As stated above, the supplementary representations are unified by the theme in question – thus, by the rational idea that the original representation of the artwork strives to express in intuition. That is the reason Kant calls them ‘related’ [*verwandten*] representations. Hence, they themselves are part of the process of exhibiting the rational idea in question. In the guiding example, the empirical images of an eagle soaring higher than all other birds, and of the night sky during a powerful thunderstorm, as well as the feelings of awe in the sight of an overwhelming dominion, are related precisely because they serve the same purpose of aesthetically enlarging (of offering sensible manifestations to) the principal idea of an utmost power or might.

Nevertheless, such a process of generating related representations does not have a defined endpoint, and the field has the propensity to expand boundlessly. There is no fixed number of representations that completes the task of aesthetically enlarging the rational idea in question: more (and different, depending on the beholder) such representations can always be added, only on the condition that they are thematically related and that they sensibelize the concept in question. Even more than that, the task is never completed, no matter the number of representations generated. The last point is inherent in the nature of a rational idea: its cognition (even in a symbolic manner) can never conclude, but is rather an asymptotic process of approximation.¹¹ Even the most productive and inventive imagination cannot claim the ability to exhaust the field of representations aesthetically manifesting a rational idea. Thus, the field is, in principle, inexhaustible. Therefore, the beholder is able to sense the partial and incomplete nature of their introspective experience of the field; its very inexhaustibility and boundlessness are implicated. Yet, at the same time, the beholder has become acquainted with the very field that sensibilizes the idea in question; the field has opened up for them.

¹¹ Halper (2020, 859) makes a similar point on the asymptotic access to the supersensible given by aesthetic ideas.

Defining an aesthetic idea thus yields the second, and crucial, sense in which the notion of the maximum features in it: an aesthetic idea is a field comprising, in principle, an infinite (an absolutely maximal) number of constituents. That aspect in the nature of an aesthetic idea holds the answer to why the latter is the counterpart of an idea of reason. Kant highlights their inverse nature in the definition of ideas of reason as indemonstrable concepts (concepts that cannot be demonstrated in intuition), and of aesthetic ideas as inexponible intuitions (intuitions that cannot be expounded to concepts) (CPJ 5:342-3). One can reformulate the definitions in the language of logic, where the intention of a concept is called its logical content – in terms of conceptual marks – while the objects it applies to constitute its extension. Rational ideas can, then, be defined as concepts of infinite or maximal intention, but of no logical extension (thus indemonstrable). Aesthetic ideas, on the other hand, are intuitions of an unbounded (maximal) extension that cannot, nevertheless, logically become the extension of any determinate concept (thus inexponible). Hence, each kind of idea inversely mirrors the other in the intuition-concept dipole. Commentators have paid attention only to one side of that mirroring: the fact that the absence of logical extension (absence of corresponding intuition) of a rational idea is mirrored in the absence of conceptual intention (absence of corresponding concept) of an aesthetic idea.¹² However, the other side is equally important: a rational idea's maximal intention is mirrored in the maximal extension (of a potential concept) of an aesthetic idea.

Their inverse symmetry prompts their connection in the case of an aesthetic or non-logical presentation. An aesthetic idea offers aesthetic extension to a concept that has no logical extension, while a rational idea offers intention to an intuition that has no logical correspondence to any conceptual intention. That connection occurs because each one provides the other with what is lacking. But it also occurs because each one connotes a maximum in the pole it possesses. The inverse of a concept of maximal intention and no extension is no other than a concept of maximal extension and no intention (which is no concept at all, but an intuition). By virtue of such complete mirroring, an aesthetic idea is legitimized and named the “counterpart [*Gegenstück*]” (CPJ 5:314) of the rational idea.¹³

¹² Lütke (1984), despite being one of the first Kant commentators who talked about the “structural parallelism [*Strukturparallelität*] in the form” (70-1) of the two kinds of ideas, saw only the one side of the parallelism.

¹³ Interestingly, the entry *Gegenstück* in Grimm's dictionary reads: “two figures of one size, which are placed as if they were looking at each other” (Grimm 1984, Bd. 5, Sp. 2270), and proceeds to cite Kant's very passage that defines the aesthetic idea thus as an example of the term.

4. Amending the Inclusive Interpretation

In scholarship on Kant's aesthetic ideas, the inclusive interpretation, proposed by Matherne (2013), has become very influential. According to it, there are aesthetic ideas that present rational (and moral) ideas, as well as the so-called experience-oriented aesthetic ideas that present empirical concepts, or affects and emotions, associated with our ordinary experience of the world and deepen our understanding of it (Matherne 2013, 29-30).¹⁴ The scope of what can be presented through an experience-oriented aesthetic idea is declared to be substantially wide: almost anything exemplified in experience, apart from that which arouses loathing, qualifies for such a presentation (Matherne 2013, 30; 33).

In line with the argument presented so far in this paper, I object to the wide scope assigned to the so-called experience-oriented aesthetic ideas. An aesthetic idea, by definition, does not merely constitute a certain way of presentation that can be applied to any representation whatsoever. An aesthetic idea presents, first and foremost, only the kind of representation which admits – which is *adequate* (not in a logical sense) – to that type of presentation; the presentation through an inexhaustible (maximal in number) field of related representations, and through an intuition analogically manifesting a maximum. As the preceding sections illustrated, the paradigmatically suitable – or prototypically adequate – representation for that kind of presentation is the rational idea due to its symmetrical and complementary nature as the counterpart of the aesthetic idea. I call this the condition of suitability or adequation and claim it must always be met by a representation in order to qualify for a potential presentation through an aesthetic idea.

The inclusive interpretation is correct, though, to argue that not only rational ideas can be presented through aesthetic ideas. Kant's explicit inclusion of empirical concepts in §49 attests to the fact. A careful reading, nevertheless, shows that the aforementioned condition of adequation not only remains intact, but is the very reason the specific empirical concepts Kant mentions become suitable. Kant notes that there exist some empirical concepts, like “death, envy, and all sorts of vices, as well as love, fame” which can very well be rendered sensible

¹⁴ For the opposite claim that aesthetic ideas must always either present, or be eventually linked to, rational or moral ideas, see typical examples in Guyer (1978, 63), Allison (2001, 256-9), Chignell (2007), Rogerson (2008, 26-9), Reiter and Geiger (2018).

through aesthetic ideas, but in such a case they are made sensible “beyond the limits of experience, with a *completeness* that goes beyond anything of which there is an example in nature” (CPJ 5:314).¹⁵ Now, if Kant’s sentence is translated into the above language of concept-logic, we can say that a concept that has no example in nature is a concept without a logical extension. But a concept without a logical extension can only be a concept connoting a maximum – the only concept that cannot have an extension. That means that the empirical concepts referred to in the passage are not merely the empirical concepts of envy or love, for instance, in their usual employment, for which empirical examples can be found. Rather, the concepts of maximal, utmost, or absolute envy or love, which cannot have empirical examples, are implied. In other words, the nominal empirical concepts have been transformed. While they do not nominally belong to the faculty of reason, they have acquired a formal structure that resembles the formal structure of a rational idea. They have turned into quasi-ideas.¹⁶ That is why they can be presented with a completeness that defies empirical examples – meaning the maximal degree of completeness, which only productive imagination (and not nature) can attain in a representation. The argument here repeats the already-discussed justification of the link between aesthetic and rational ideas, between intuition and concept, based on formal mirroring.

In the expansive transformation of empirical concepts into quasi-ideas, the condition of adequation is met. An empirical concept that cannot be thus expanded cannot likewise be presented through an aesthetic idea.¹⁷ I contest that the condition applies even to representations like emotions or affects;¹⁸ what is important is not the kind of representation, but whether it can meet the standards paradigmatically set by reason through transformation. The inclusive interpretation is not attentive to the condition of adequation, as evidenced by the position that almost any representation, apart from that which arouses loathing, is suitable for presentation through an experience-oriented aesthetic idea. Hence, it needs to be amended.

¹⁵ Matherne (2013, 29) quotes this passage, but, as many commentators do, without drawing an interpretative clue from it, or explaining what kind of condition it stipulates. Similarly, she mentions in passing (Matherne 2013, 29 fn32) that she understands all aesthetic ideas to involve a rational element, without explaining what this element is, and how it features in the experience-oriented aesthetic ideas. My proposed amendment to the inclusive interpretation can be seen as an attempt to rectify that omission.

¹⁶ Commentators have not developed this point. Several – e.g., Halper (2020, 859), Berger (2024, 8) – note that these empirical concepts are somehow linked to rational ideas, but they do not explain how they are linked and why this link exists.

¹⁷ Although I cannot pursue this here, it seems that certain abstract concepts are particularly susceptible to that kind of transformation. See Küplen (2019) for an informative discussion.

¹⁸ There is no space to develop the point in detail, but I read Kant’s wording regarding the theme of the dominant affect in music (CPJ 5:329) as implying its expansion into an idea-like representation.

Nevertheless, I would like to conclude by declaring that my criticism does not suggest a dismissal of the inclusive interpretation, which deserves a lot of merit for highlighting the cognitive role of art in deepening our understanding of the often-overlooked empirical concepts and emotions of ordinary experience (Matherne 2013, 33-8).¹⁹ A question for further investigation, based on the argument defended here, is the question of why certain empirical concepts or emotions require the said transformation or expansion into idea-like representations in order to be fully or completely understood or cognized. That, however, shall be a topic for future consideration.

References

- Allison, Henry (2001), *Kant's Theory of Taste*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berger, Larissa (2024), 'Kant's Account of Emotive Art.' *Inquiry*, pp. 1-26,
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2024.2348817>
- Chignell, Andrew (2007), 'Kant on the Normativity of Taste: The Role of Aesthetic Ideas', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 85 (3), pp. 415–433.
- Grimm, Jakob and Wilhelm (1984), *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, Bd. 5, München: dtv-Verlag.
- Geiger, Ido (2021), 'Kant on Aesthetic Ideas, Rational Ideas, and the Subject-Matter of Art', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol.19 (3), pp. 186–199.
- Guyer, Paul (1977), 'Formalism and the Theory of Expression in Kant's Aesthetics', *Kant-Studien* vol. 68, pp. 46–70.
- (1997), *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Halper, Aaron (2020), 'Rethinking Kant's Distinction between the Beauty of Art and the Beauty of Nature', *European Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 28(1), pp. 857–875.
- Kant, Immanuel (1900), *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, Hrsg.: Bd. 1–22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademieder Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Berlin.
- (1997), in: G. Hatfield (Ed.), *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁹ See Küplen (2019) and Vaccarino Bremner (2021) for recent works further developing the topic of the cognitive import of aesthetic ideas for ordinary empirical state of affairs, which the inclusive interpretation introduced.

- (1998), in P. Guyer & A. W. Wood (Eds.), *Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 - (2000), in P. Guyer (Ed.), *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Küplen, Mojka (2019), 'Cognitive Interpretation of Kant's Theory of Aesthetic Ideas', *Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. 56 (1), pp. 48-64.
- Lütke, Rudolf (1984), 'Kants Lehre von den ästhetischen Ideen', *Kant-Studien*, vol. 75 (1), pp. 65-74.
- Makkreel, Rudolf (1990), *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Matherne, Samantha (2013), 'The Inclusive Interpretation of Kant's Aesthetic Ideas', *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. 53 (1), pp. 21-39.
- Pillow, Kirk (2001), 'Jupiter's Eagle and the Despot's Hand Mill: Two Views on Metaphor in Kant', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 59 (2), pp. 193-209.
- Reiter, Aviv & Geiger, Ido (2018), 'Natural Beauty, Fine Art and the Relation between them', *Kant-Studien*, vol. 109 (1), pp. 72-100.
- Rogerson, Kenneth (2008), *The Problem of Free Harmony in Kant's Aesthetics*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Vaccarino Bremner, Sabina (2021), 'On Conceptual Revision and Aesthetic Judgement', *Kantian Review*, vol. 26 (4), pp. 531-547.