Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics

Volume 16, 2024

Edited by Vítor Moura and Christopher Earley

Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics

Founded in 2009 by Fabian Dorsch

Internet: http://proceedings.eurosa.org
Email: proceedings@eurosa.org
ISSN: 1664 – 5278

Publisher

The European Society for Aesthetics

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Framing Resemblances: Puy, Young, and Goodman on Musical Expressiveness[1]

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ABSTRACT. This paper addresses James Young's critique of Goodman's views on musical expressiveness, as well as Nemesio Puy's response to Young, which both accepts and partly challenges that critique, while also engaging Stephen Davies's earlier objections. I argue that contrary to Young's claim that Goodman's theory collapses into a variant of resemblance theory, resemblance theory is better seen as an incomplete form of "frame theory" – of which Goodman's own exemplification theory is a special case. Resemblance theory is a frame theory without the "frame": a contextual conceptual device that shapes and directs experience. While Puy hints at this idea, its full significance remains underexplored. I propose that a frame theory of expressiveness stands independently of orthodox Goodmanian commitments.

1. Young's Critique of Goodman

James O. Young's recent critique of Goodman's views on expressiveness in the arts, particularly in music (Young, 2023) together with his earlier critique (Young, 2001, pp. 70-80) can be condensed into a dilemma: either the theory of expressiveness as metaphorical exemplification collapses into a version of the resemblance theory, or it is flat-out unintelligible. The unintelligibility, for Young, lies in the notion of "metaphorical properties" whose existence he believes is presupposed by the notion of metaphorical exemplification. If a metaphorical description could be true, it would have to be made true by the described thing's possessing metaphorical properties, which is absurd.

Young thinks that the concept of metaphorical exemplification adds nothing to a bare formulation of the resemblance theory. He finds evidence of this in a passage from Goodman (1968, p. 91): "Music and dance alike may exemplify rhythmic patterns, for example, and express peace or pomp or passion; and music may express properties of movement while dance may express properties of sound." Here, he sees the implication that "music can exemplify tones of voice and patterns of movement of the voice under the influence of emotion." (Young, 2023, p. 261) In sum, Young aims at a *reductio* to sheer possession of co-instantiated properties, equating then possession with expressiveness.

For Young, what best explains that we seem to hear sadness in a piece of music is that it resembles the behavior of people under the influence of sadness. Sad music moves similarly to how sad people move, or sounds similar to how sad people sound when emoting. Hence, descriptions of music in emotional terms are literal, not metaphorical. Young concludes that Goodman's theory of expressiveness lacks motivation.

2. Puy on Young's Critique of Goodman

Nemesio Puy (2023, pp. 269-270) provides his own reconstruction of Young's objections to Goodman in three main claims:

1. Goodman's theory of expressiveness is a version of the resemblance theory.
2. If the discourse on expressive musical properties is literal (as Young argues), then Goodman's theory, as a description of our appreciative practices, lacks motivation.
3. Goodman's version of the resemblance theory offers no advantage over standard versions of that theory.

Puy argues that Goodman's "revisionism" could retain its motivation were it to offer theoretical payoffs over standard formulations of the resemblance theory. Puy concedes 1 and 2, but rejects 3: Goodman's revisionism does offer theoretical payoffs. I do not think we should grant 1 and 2. While there is more to be said about this, let us stick for now with Puy's reasons for rejecting 3.

Both Young and Puy speak of standard versions of the resemblance theory, but no version is explicitly mentioned. For the benefit of the reader, I quote here a version presented as "standard" by Andrew Kania (2020, p. 40): "A passage of music, M, is expressive of an emotion, E, if M is heard, by competent listeners, as resembling the phenomenology, or vocal or bodily behavior, typical of someone experiencing E." Proponents of different versions of the resemblance theory emphasize different aspects mentioned disjunctively in this formulation.

According to Puy, Goodman's distinction between literal and metaphorical exemplification helps us to deal with an important piece of empirical evidence: that people tend to agree much more about the properties they think music *doesn't* express than about the properties they think it does express. The formalist considers such disagreement about positive attributions evidence that music neither represents nor expresses emotions. Puy responds to this using Goodman's distinction: there is broad agreement on the properties literally exemplified by music, but disagreement about its expressive properties. In a performative context, musical works exemplify "combinations of sound frequencies, timbres and rhythms, as well as the structural properties" of the relevant genre (Puy, 2023, p. 275); the context selects for our attention those properties the work literally possesses. This contextual selection will bring out resemblances to different objects that literally possess some expressive features. For instance, the performative contexts of the symphonic genre, minimalist, or serialist musical works select different properties for our attention.

Puy sees these examples as special cases of a more general principle: resemblance relations are not dyadic but triadic, that is, they are not relations between two particular objects or sets of objects, but between two or more particular objects and a context. The identification of expressive properties – i.e., those properties that are "beyond the score" – involves reference within a dense and replete system (Goodman, 1968, pp. 252-255; 1978, pp. 57-70) and, therefore, is also a matter of "infinitely fine adjustments." In such cases, disagreement about expressive properties is not anomalous but rather expected, not differing, in this regard, from the infinitely fine adjustments involved in the interpretation of a painting.

This applies to the interpretation of a simple metaphor: the properties relevant to understanding the metaphor "Juliet is the Sun" are not the same as those governing the description of Louis XIV as the "Sun King" (Carmo d'Orey, 1999, pp. 425-426). This would be puzzling if resemblance relations were dyadic instead of triadic, as Puy rightly argues. In some contexts, the resemblance between the Sun and bleach (the Sun bleaches or fades colors) will be more salient than the resemblance between the Sun and a lit candle.

At this point, the musical formalist might raise the problem of normativity: why should we be placed in contexts that select these expressive properties rather than others, or none at all? Puy's Goodmanian answer is that we should be placed in those contexts "in which we can make sense of the work's point in light of the normative background of our musical practice as a whole." (Puy, 2023, p. 277) For example, listening to minimalist works as expressive of emotion would be to misunderstand those works. Therefore, we should place ourselves in contexts that proscribe the identification of such resemblances. In contrast, to understand the purpose of a Baroque concerto, we must be placed in contexts where such identification is prescribed rather than proscribed. Goodman's distinction frees us from the illusion of a non-contextual response to the problem of normativity.

Puy's use of the distinction between "purely musical" properties – "those that are not beyond the score" (2023, p. 276) – and expressive properties, correlating them with the theory of expressiveness as metaphorical exemplification, is quite ingenious and insightful. My objection to Puy doesn't concern the soundness of his inferences but rather how he represents their scope. He fails to see how this allows him not to grant Young claims 1 and 2. Puy's discrimination of the vital

role played by contexts in expressiveness allows him to reject the idea that the literalness of emotional predicates applied to music deprives Goodman's theory of motivation. The reason for this is that metaphorical resemblance itself is context-dependent.

3. Frames and *Droodles*

In his autobiography, Frank Zappa makes a humorous observation about a "humble appliance" being "the most important thing in art". He was speaking of *frames*. The frame marks the boundary between art and "the Real World": "You have to put a 'box' around it because otherwise, what is that shit on the wall?" (Zappa & Occhiogrosso, 1990, p. 140). The frame doesn't have to be literal or a physical object; it can be a conceptual device, e.g. as when we treat a recording of someone's (say, John Cage's) gurgling carrot juice as a musical composition.

The notion of a "conceptual frame" – one that, when applied to objects and their properties, transforms the way we perceive them – is particularly interesting. It reminds me of an album cover of Zappa's, *Ship Arriving Too Late to Save a Drowning Witch*, which employs a "droodle" by Roger Price, who invented droodles in the 1950s.[3] The word "droodle" is a portmanteau of "doodle" and "riddle." It names a popular form of visual entertainment in that decade and consists of a minimalist drawing that explores pareidolia, the human tendency to impose meaning on visual stimuli. Each droodle is accompanied by the implicit question "What is this?", and the puzzle is solved by uncovering a title revealing the image's "true" meaning. The droodle on the album cover is formed by five lines: four of which make up two triangular shapes, one larger and one smaller, positioned over another horizontal line in the lower region of the image. Upon reading the title, we cannot help but see one of the shapes as the bow of a ship and the other as the (yet) unsubmerged tip of a pointed witches' hat. The psychological vividness of the effect could not be achieved with just any shapes, nor could any title achieve the same vividness. In Price's original book, the humorous effect is heightened with an alternative interpretation: "This, of course, appears to be 'A Mother Pyramid Feeding Its Child,' but it isn't." (Price, 1972, p. 3) In droodles, the title or subtitles provide a context that selects the relevant resemblances. The phenomenological vividness of the selected

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[3] Zappa, Frank (1982), *Ship Arriving Too Late to Save a Drowning Witch*, Barking Pumpkin Records.

resemblances is indifferent to the absurdity of some interpretations. The lines evoke the strange image of a pyramid behaving like a bird feeding its offspring just as clearly as they evoke the bow of a ship and a witch's hat, or even the jaws of a fish emerging from the sea[4]. This suggests that context has great power even over a prior disposition to bring out some resemblances rather than others. Any such disposition is merely part of a context. We are as much producers of new frames as we are inheritors of evolutionary dispositions to see, e.g., a willow as a sad human being, rather than a frozen waterfall (Davies, 2011ᵃ, p. 10), although we can also see it that way.

Let us shift to a musical example. There is a long-standing association between the minor mode and minor triads (three-note chords) and the expression of sadness. Young (2012) argues that the role of convention is smaller than it seems, even in such cases. However, it is misleading to attribute expressive character to isolated intervals and chords. Both major and minor triads include a minor third interval. If we arpeggiate a D major chord, the second interval will not sound "sad" on account of it being a minor third; but when arpeggiating a D minor chord, the second interval will sound more "subdued" than the second interval of the D major chord, even though it is a major, not a minor third. The arpeggio of a major triad will sound "brighter" and "more open" than the arpeggio of a minor triad, yet both chords contain minor thirds. The lesson is that context is more relevant than any supposedly inherent characteristic of intervals or scales, defined by more or less dissonance and chromaticism when we listen to melodies in the minor mode.

Consider now the acoustic phenomenon called "enharmony." Enharmony is the relationship between any two musical entities (interval, chord, scale, etc.) that are acoustically identical but "syntactically" distinct in virtue of harmonic context. An interval described as a minor third can also be described as an augmented second depending on the harmonic context. A scale where the latter interval occurs is the "double harmonic" scale. An example of the augmented second is found in the opening of the *Cántico de San Francisco de Asís* by the Spanish composer Joaquín Rodrigo, specifically in the flute melody. The presence of an augmented second rather than a minor third there *makes a phenomenological difference*, and yet they are acoustically the same if taken in isolation.

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[4] I thank Monika Jovanović for the latter interpretation.

4. Possession, Exhibition, and Reference

Any painting literally exemplifies many pictorial properties: it has certain combinations of lines, pigments, shapes, and textures. These are not merely possessed but selected for our attention, highlighted, emphasized, referred to – in short, they are exemplified. Literal exemplification plays a fundamental role in some paintings: the viscosity and gesturality of the applied paint, as seen in abstract expressionism, for example.

However, this cannot be all that paintings do through exemplification if we want to use exemplification to explain how works of art can have considerable cognitive value. Metaphorical exemplification is required. We can clarify this notion by considering how the so-called "formal" properties of a painting are often described with non-literal vocabulary: the painting expresses a certain rhythm that depends on the layout of its pictorial elements (e.g., Mondrian's *Broadway Boogie-Woogie*); we talk about visual balance, clashes of forces, tensions, a struggle for dominance between colors and volumes in the pictorial space, or how certain elements resolve the conflict introduced by others, harmonizing or balancing them out. We cannot avoid this fundamentally anthropomorphic way of describing formal relationships, lest our descriptions of artworks become bland, utterly losing sight of what matters in any work.[5] These descriptions make sense, yet they are not literal nor can they be reduced to combinations of literal descriptions. However, such use is underpinned by the pictorial properties the painting genuinely possesses. The "rhythm" of *Broadway Boogie-Woogie* is no less a property of the painting, than the shapes and pigments on its canvas.

As Carmo d'Orey (1999, p. 429) emphasizes, Goodman's theory of metaphor reverses the explanatory order between symbolization and resemblance: metaphorical resemblance is explained in terms of exemplificational co-reference. There is nothing in the idea that recognition generates resemblance that compels us to avoid that perspective, which happens to be the core of the theory of expressiveness as metaphorical exemplification. Hence, the idea that Goodman's theory is a mere version of the resemblance theory can be reversed: Goodman's theory does not collapse into

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[5] Carmo d'Orey's observations about Arnheim and Gestalt psychology are, in this regard, very enlightening (1999, pp. 469-470).

a verbose version of the resemblance theory; properly understood, it is the resemblance theory that turns out to be a severely restricted version of the frame theory. Although this may seem strange, Goodman once almost put it in these words, in his exchange with Beardsley regarding the latter's difficulty in digesting the idea of properties of artworks not simply possessed or exhibited but also referred to and, thus, exemplified. The debate occurs in two articles by Beardsley (1975; 1978) and an epistolary response from Goodman, part of which Beardsley reproduces in the first article.[6] I believe Young's resistance to the concept of metaphorical exemplification is similar to Beardsley's. Against the theory that relevant properties of artworks are those they exemplify, Beardsley contrasts his own theory, which he names "exhibition theory," that artworks possess or exhibit their relevant properties but don't refer to them. Goodman's response (Beardsley, 1975, pp. 25-26) is illuminating and ironic. He ripostes: "the Exhibition theory is the Exemplification theory under another name," but also that while Beardsley infers from this that "the Exemplification theory contains something superfluous (the reference to reference)," he thinks that "in setting forth the Exhibition theory," Beardsley "overlook[s] something essential (the fact of reference)." The crucial aspect is that exhibiting, highlighting, emphasizing, and calling attention to are, for Goodman, forms of reference not to be mistaken for denotation.

The difficulty in clearly distinguishing denotation from exemplification is at the root of the confusions perpetuated by some of Goodman's critics who are also advocates of the resemblance theory. The first confusion introduced by Stephen Davies (1994, p. 9), for example, is that between reference and denotation. This is precisely why he incurs the very same *faux pas* as Beardsley in stating (Davies, 1994, p. 137): "Usually the cloth doesn't denote or refer to blueness; simply, it possesses and displays an instance of the quality without denoting the property it possesses." Some of Davies's criticisms (1994, p. 140) leave no doubt that, for him, mere possession of properties is sufficient for expressiveness, while reference is a "surplus" symbolic function, subsumed in denotation (as if pointing to a bee as a sample of *Apis mellifera* falls short of an ulterior symbolic function the bee would perform). Davies (2011b, p. 22) formulates Goodman's concept of expressiveness thus: "an artwork is expressive if it metaphorically possesses a property and that metaphorical property is used to denote its literal equivalent." This illusion of an ulterior symbolic

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[6] See Carmo d'Orey (1999, pp. 242-246).

function modelled on denotation pervades Davies's objections to Goodman (e.g., that the theory presupposes rather than explains expression, because possession must precede the referential function).

Beardsley's idea that works of art exhibit properties but don't refer to them (and so don't exemplify them) overlooks what is essential, which is precisely the salience of some properties relative to others as an inescapable element of representation, artistic or otherwise. Young himself brings out the missing element: "giving an account of what makes a property salient will be difficult." (2023, p. 259) Exemplification theory seeks to address this difficulty: non-denotative reference is the key to expression. Even Young (2001, p. 82), when describing his list of techniques for generating the perspectives[7] afforded by artistic representations, does so with the following revealing words: "The use of these techniques makes it possible for such representations to *draw attention to* features of objects, *place* them in context, *display* their consequences and draw comparisons between them." (my emphases). Young's own distinction between semantic and illustrative representation requires exemplification. Ironically, Young is more Goodmanian than he thinks, and certainly no less than Beardsley in his *faux pas*.

Another aspect of framing concerns the placement of the work in a given symbol system rather than another. Carmo d'Orey (1999, p. 482-497) illustrates this compellingly with the example of Mondrian's *Broadway Boogie-Woogie*, placed within the system of his previous works or within the system to which the *Dynamic Hieroglyphic of the Bal Tabarin* by Gino Severini belongs. In one system, that painting "expresses vibrancy, joy, and rhythm because we consider it in the context of Mondrian's works, which are rigid, sober, and austere"; considered in the other system, "we might say that it expresses restraint, rigidity, and austerity" (1999: 486). The power of framing is also clearly seen in examples such as Mozart's *Musikalischer Spaß* (K522). This music ingeniously exemplifies a series of compositional "mistakes", "blunders," inelegancies, and clichés of poor musical thinking. Failing to listen to this piece as a parody is to misunderstand it. If the music possessed these properties without referring to them, it would not be a clever parody of bad music but an example of bad music.

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[7] Young (2001, pp. 82-85) distinguishes several techniques through which artists generate perspectives: *selection*, *amplification*, *simplification*, *juxtaposition*, *correlation*, *connection*.

5. Literal Possession, Metaphorical Ascription

The second claim conceded by Puy overlooks some crucial aspects of Goodman's view of metaphor. For instance: the boundary between the literal and the metaphorical is a "floating" (Carmo d'Orey, 1999, p. 432), context-dependent one. The debate about whether descriptions of music with emotional predicates is metaphorical or literal turns out to be less relevant than Young's own recognition that such attributions involve a shift in domain, i.e., cross-domain mapping or "the transfer of concepts derived from one sensory modality to experiences derived from another sensory modality" (Young, 2014, p. 19). Goodman's extensionalism makes the distinction between literal and metaphorical, to which Young gives far too much emphasis, a matter of degree; that is, a metaphorical phrase doesn't function abnormally, as in the Davidsonian conception preferred by Young (Davidson, 1978). This corollary of Goodman's theory of metaphor cannot be used as evidence that his theory of expressiveness lacks motivation. Using it that way suggests misunderstanding the third of Goodman's four metaphors to explain metaphor: the bigamous marriage (Goodman, 1968, p. 73; Carmo d'Orey 1999, pp. 432-444).

According to Goodman, a musical piece expresses only a subclass of the properties it possesses and metaphorically exemplifies (Carmo d'Orey, 1999, pp. 474-482). These properties must be properties the music possesses *as an aesthetic symbol and as music*, that is, music can only express properties that depend on its acoustic properties. A painting expresses only those properties that depend on its pictorial properties. Both a musical piece and a painting can be metaphorically described as warhorses; they can even exemplify (metaphorically) that property (by being used as samples of the class of artworks often cited as examples in disputes), but they never express it. This is where Young digs his heels: if emotional predicates applied to music are literal, then music cannot express properties that belong in the domain of pathos or affect, for it cannot metaphorically exemplify what it possesses literally – Young thinks that nothing metaphorically exemplifies anything, for exemplification can only be literal. His objection to Goodman follows Goodman's criterion: only what is metaphorically exemplified is expressed. If literal exemplification is of

literal properties, it makes sense to think that metaphorical exemplification is of metaphorical properties. If there are no such properties, there can be no metaphorical exemplification.

Goodman himself has contributed to the confusion, with his talk of "metaphorical possession" of properties (1968, p. 68). Objects only have the properties they actually possess; it is descriptions of objects that can be literal or metaphorical. From the fact that the sharing of properties is the key to metaphorical attribution, Young infers that Goodman's theory of expressiveness is a version of the resemblance theory. He clearly sees how shared properties are properties that both extensions, literal and metaphorical, of the predicate in question possess literally. The lake is metaphorically and appropriately described as a sapphire (Goodman, 1979, pp. 125-126) because (just like the sapphire) it is literally blue, translucent, iridescent, coruscant, etc. None of the lake's properties is metaphorical; only the representation of the lake is. "Metaphorical possession" is a confused notion that breeds confusion. Even the terminology of "literal properties" contains a seed of confusion: both "literal" and "metaphorical" apply only to modes of representing properties (to the "labels" that refer to them), not to properties themselves. Strictly speaking, these are neither literal nor metaphorical.

Some metaphors "wear out with use," becoming dead metaphors. In such cases, two facts always remain: 1) the distinction between being a dead metaphor and never having been one is not a volatile distinction; 2) a dead metaphor is as much a result of cross-domain mapping as a living one. The boundary between being a living metaphor and a dead one is volatile, but the boundary between there being cross-domain mapping or not is not volatile.

Now consider the practice of calling certain buildings "wedding cakes." Famous examples of architectural "wedding cakes" would be: 1) the Palace of Parliament in Bucharest; 2) the Monument to Vittorio Emanuele II in Rome; 3) Moscow State University, among others. It is not difficult to understand why someone would call any of these buildings a "wedding cake." No "metaphorical property" is described or generated by this practice. Nothing but the building's actually possessed architectural properties is described. By describing a building as a "wedding cake," are we speaking literally or metaphorically? If describing a piece of music as "sad" is literal because it describes the music's "contour", based on a resemblance between the appearance of the music and the appearance of emotionally expressive behavior, then we could argue that "wedding

cake" is a literal predicate in the architectural context, since all that is at stake is an analogy between appearances, contours, or shapes. *Sicut in musica et in architectura*. How to respond to this? On the one hand, it's clearly a bad argument, because it would lead us to reclassify as literal many metaphorical expressions whose adequacy is based on appearances. Such reclassification would be a true clinical case of what Puy calls "revisionism." On the other hand, even if it seemed plausible to reclassify the architectural use of "wedding cake" as literal, that wouldn't alter the fact that using it involves cross-domain mapping – from the confectionery to the architectural. In Young's words, an appropriate vocabulary for the experience of one type of thing is applied to the experience of another type of thing. One way to explain this would be through one of the four metaphors Goodman uses to explain how metaphors work: the idyllic relationship between "a predicate with a past and an object that yields while protesting" (1968, p. 69); that despite the attraction that makes things work in the new application, there is also a resistance, responsible for the vividness of the metaphor. But the third of Goodman's four metaphors brings out how negligible the literal-metaphorical distinction is in fending off metaphorical exemplification. This is the metaphor of the bigamous marriage: the idea that the relationship between the predicate and its literal and metaphorical extensions is unlike the amalgamation of a legitimate monogamous marriage with an extramarital relationship, that is, metaphorical and literal uses do not differ in kind or epistemic legitimacy. I am not saying that we have to accept Goodman's theory of metaphor and that, in light of such dogmatic imposition, Young's critique fails. I am saying that Goodman's extensionalist approach makes the presence or absence of cross-domain mapping the determinant feature to know which properties an aesthetic symbol expresses *qua aesthetic symbol of a certain type*, instead of whether a description is literal or metaphorical according to the *vox populi*.

In any case, the distinction between "the metaphoric description of a literally possessed property and the literal description of a metaphorically possessed property." (Davies, 1994, p. 148) is irredeemably confusing, and Goodman is not blameless in breeding that confusion, due to his condescension with a *façon de parler* that includes the notion of metaphorical possession. Nevertheless, this oversight of Goodman's doesn't determine the success of Young's critique, as Puy acknowledges, by turning a blind eye to the second crucial point of the objection. Here is a much more interesting aspect: when we describe those buildings as "wedding cakes," just as when

we describe music as "dark," "melancholic," "sad," and "gloomy," we are not perforce relying only on resemblances between appearances or visual experiences of things. The purpose of the architectural metaphor is not simply to awaken in us the resemblance between the building's shape and the shape of a wedding cake. It alerts us to an open set of characteristics united not by the mere shape or contour of a cake, but by the incongruity between the building and the rest of the urban fabric in which it is inserted. It serves as a corrective, making us see pompousness, ostentation, and arrogance as misplaced, and perhaps even as alien, where the "innocent eye" might see only another example of grandeur, without the large-scale political *kitsch* made painfully evident by the metaphor (I am not saying that this is necessarily the case with all buildings thus described). There are no metaphorical properties here, nor any properties "metaphorically possessed." There are only the real architectural properties that determine this peculiar type of incongruity. This incongruity is the property described, which a building can express, but a musical piece cannot (no musical works are wedding cakes). It doesn't stem from a simple correspondence between the contours of objects, but rather a complex cluster of properties, each of whose descriptions would allow for an adequate but incomplete and unsatisfactory paraphrase of the metaphor. This is why a building can, despite the intentions of those who commissioned or designed it, express arrogance rather than magnificence. It is also for this reason that Young and Davies ask in vain for the rules that would allow them to single out genuine cases of metaphorical exemplification. There are no such rules, just as there are no rules for interpreting metaphors. Young was right in his original critique based on the non-existence of metaphorical properties, although he was wrong in thinking that this provides a reason to reject metaphorical exemplification. He is wrong, I think, in his recent critique, which sees Goodman's theory as a mere version of the resemblance theory, not because resemblance should not feature in the theory, contrary to what Goodman himself believed, but because what is truly effective here is the (conceptual) frame, not the experienced resemblance (i.e. the effect). The Goodmanian theory is therefore not a resemblance theory, but a frame theory. The frame is the invisible device that selects properties and creates the relevant resemblances.

Without a frame, metaphor doesn't work; i.e., without exemplification, there is no metaphorical resemblance. Here is how Carmo d'Orey explains it:

> What basically happens in metaphor is that objects *that do not usually function as symbols are proposed as symbols*. In Romeo's metaphor, Juliet and the Sun are presented as *exemplificational symbols* of one and the same property. This is why they come to resemble. So, by creating the metaphor, Romeo creates the resemblance. (...) Explaining Romeo's metaphor in terms of resemblance between Juliet and the Sun is not to say that Juliet resembles the Sun in *any* property, nor that she resembles the Sun in *all* properties. It is to say that she resembles the sun in *certain* properties. Such properties are those that Juliet and the Sun exemplify in the context in which they function as symbols. It is knowledge of the context that allows us to identify, based on its relevance, what those properties are. (1999: 427)

The point is that metaphor cannot work unless both the metaphorical and literal extensions are taken as exemplificational symbols of the relevant common properties on which the metaphor rests, which always consist of properties literally possessed by both extensions.

6. Conclusion

Young places excessive emphasis on the starting point of musical experience, whereas the endpoint – or rather the endpoint as shaped by the development triggered by the start – is where true interest lies. Musical experience depends on more than a "contour" revealed at first impact, shaped by biological or evolutionary dispositions. Resemblance itself evolves with experience. Goodman's theory captures this, without collapsing into a resemblance theory or being held hostage by the literal/metaphorical distinction. I conclude that Puy had good reasons to refuse all three of Young's central claims.

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