MONDAY, 21. 6. 2021

**Philosophy of Photography**

Mark Windsor: Photography and Pictorial Style

This paper explores the concept of style in relation to painting and photography. I aim to make sense of and defend Roger Scruton’s claim that photographs lack ‘all except the grossest features of style’ (1981: 593). To do this, I draw on Richard Wollheim’s (1987) account of individual pictorial style, according to which pictorial style is a manifestation of a painter’s psychology. I claim that photographs may exhibit style, but that this is limited to certain ‘gross’ features (choice of subject matter, the way that depicted objects are arranged within an image, and global vehicle properties). In contrast, style in painting is, borrowing terms used by Nelson Goodman (1968), both dense and replete. Photographs can have pictorial style, but only paintings have what I call ‘manugraphic’ (Friday 2002) style. As a corollary to the negative thesis, I propose a positive one: the absence of manugraphic style contributes to the distinctive value of photography as an art, since it accounts for the phenomenal sense of contact that photographs afford with their depicted objects.

Lewis Wang: How Are We Morally Affected by Photographs of Violence and Suffering?

The goal of this paper is to sketch a theoretical framework with which we can understand and assess the moral impacts of viewing photographs that depict violence and human suffering. I will divide these impacts into two kinds: the impact these photographs of violence and suffering (PVS) may have on the kind and intensity of one’s affective responses towards scenes that involves violence and suffering, and the impact PVS may have on one vis-à-vis one’s moral beliefs and knowledge. Call the former kind affective impact and the latter cognitive impact. I will develop my view of both kinds of impact through a critical discussion of the relevant views of Susan Sontag.

**Philosophy of Music I**

Elze Sigute Mikalonyte: Canberra Plan Methodology for Revisionary Ontology of Musical Works

An impressive multiplicity of different theories of musical ontology that has been offered in the last half of the century has encouraged ontologists to focus their attention on methodological issues and the determination of criteria for a good theory. The main methodological disagreement revolves around the determination thesis, according to which the ontological status of musical works is determined by the way we think about them. All of the methodological positions can be sorted into those who accept the determination thesis and those who don’t. This paper agrees with the latter perspective, as it sides with revisionary metaphysics and Dodd’s (2013) arguments for metaontological realism. Dodd often appeals to intuitions and even mentions intuitiveness among the theoretical virtues of a theory. At the same time, he reduces the importance of folk beliefs to a minimum and leaves it unexplained. This paper aims to defend a position that is, in agreement with Dodd’s arguments, revisionary of our ordinary talk about musical works, but also transparent about the role of the folk theory. I propose the Canberra plan methodology for the ontology of musical works. While Killin (2018) has offered it for descriptive ontology, I defend the view that it should complement the revisionary approach. I also argue for empirical methods in the first step of the plan.

Uku Tooming: Learning from Musical Expression

In this paper, I analyze an experience of unworthiness (EU) – an experience of encountering expressively rich musical performance which makes one compare oneself with the artist’s expressive capacity and realize that there is something lacking in oneself – and make explicit its puzzling aspects. The first question is: what does a musician express by their performance to which EU is the response? Importantly, in the present case it is not the music that expresses emotion, it is the artist that does. Identifying the attitude that is expressed is nevertheless not as easy as identifying the attitude expressed in ordinary behavior (in laughing, crying, frowning, etc.). The musician’s performance is a form of artistic expression which uses a particular medium and is therefore still distinguishable from an everyday expression of attitudes. The second question is: in what sense does a listener take themselves to be unworthy of the performance? My suggestion is that by experiencing the musical expression, the listener realizes that they need to change their ideal conception of who they want to be, to incorporate the expressed state of mind. The third question is: what is the fitting response to EU? My suggestion is that EU is a signal that one should change somehow in order to approximate the state of mind that is expressed.

**Aesthetics of German Idealism I**

Christina George: Good Taste and the Ideal. An Appeal to the Philosophical System of F.W.J. Schelling in a Renewed Examination of Good Taste

In the past decade, there has been a resurgence of publications—both academic and popular—which grapple with the question, “what is good taste?” A philosophical conception of good taste has been, since the early 17th century, motivated by factors which are bound, ultimately, to questions which pertain directly to a proper understanding of the role of the self in the realm of aesthetics. At its fundamental level, a consideration of taste is a metaphysical investigation of the object of one’s admiration and of the self—one’s predilections, habits, powers of perception, virtue, and vices. It is this issue of the self which has come to the fore with special energy in recent years. The question which will be dealt with directly in this paper is: do I like something because it is beautiful (or intrinsically tasteful), or is it beautiful (or tasteful) because I experience pleasure when I encounter it? As a response to this query, this paper will recommend the particular philosophical construct of F.W.J. Schelling in his *Philosophie der Kunst*, which I will argue is uniquely fit to equip us with the intellectual tools needed to interact with this idea of good taste, particularly because his systematic philosophy of art builds upon (but also diverges in a crucial manner, as we will see) his *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* (System of Transcendental Idealism), which deals chiefly with how the self is able to know what there is to be known (similar to the way in which the self “tastes” the beautiful with which he is confronted). In doing so, he unifies the actions of the self and the beautiful nature of the object (other), highlighting the possibility for either harmony or disharmony between the two.

Flora Geerts: *Sensus Communis* and Aesthetic Normativity in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*

The notion of *normativity* has become an unavoidable concept in the contemporary debate on Kantian aesthetics. Indeed, this concept has been at the core of many attempts to actualize the «subjective universality», that is peculiar to Kantian aesthetics. Nevertheless, it is often unclear what is meant by *aesthetic normativity*, and, in the academic debate, there is certainly no univocal interpretation. The aim of the talk will be, first of all, to define the notion of *aesthetic normativity* in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, also referring to the contemporary debate (Chignell, Feloj, Zangwill, Zuckert etc.). I will focus in particular on the notion of *sensus communis* - referring also to the three maxims of *sensus communis*, that Kant presents in §40 - interpreting it as an indeterminate norm, that only directs judgements without providing objective criterions. I will show how – in accordance with the Kantian text – aesthetic normativity can be interpreted as a weak normativity, which allows us to overcome both relativist and absolutist perspective by emphasizing more the intersubjective validity and the communitarian dimension.

**Aesthetic Matters I**

Alice Hellivell: The Aesthetics of AI Art

Art produced by Artificial Intelligence (AI) has garnered a great deal of popular interest in recent years. Despite this, there has been little philosophical work on AI art, beyond broad questions of whether such works actually qualify as art, or whether computers might be creative. This paper aims to dig deeper into AI art, examining the aesthetics of the works produced by these computational systems. This paper focusses on a key feature of many works produced by AI: their weirdness. It is undeniable that many artworks produced by Artificial Intelligence are downright weird. What, then, is this weirdness? This paper aims to examine the exact nature of this weirdness, and asserts that weirdness is of aesthetic interest to us as viewers. The reactions to weirdness in AI works suggest that it is a form of norm violation which, as Noël Carroll has convincingly argued, is a key part of comedy and horror. This paper argues that norm violation is insufficient to explain AI weirdness. When we describe AI outputs as weird, we are often pointing to a specific failure of the AI to seem human. I will explore this ‘non-humanness’, considering some examples from image-producing AI. I will then examine reasons why this non-humanness manifests, looking at the aims of the AI systems that produce images. Finally, I will explore potential implications of this characterisation of AI weirdness, followed by offering brief responses to objections.

Ryan Wittingslow: Using Philosophy of Technology to Talk about Art

Despite the fact that philosophy of technology and philosophy of art are both materially-oriented disciplines, there is remarkably little overlap between the two subfields—at least within philosophy proper. This should strike us as strange. There are few principled reasons as to why philosophers of technology and philosophers of art should have so little to do with one another. After all, philosophers of technology and philosophy of art share a number of foundational questions: questions about how and why material objects look the way they do; the ways in which meaning is expressed and/or communicated by those objects; the functions they fulfil and their appropriateness for those functions; the ways in which they both influence and are influenced by the cultures in which they are embedded. In this paper I will explore one example wherein methods from philosophy of technology can be used to meaningfully address an open problem within the philosophy of art: in this case, how to speak meaningfully about the cognitive functions of artworks.

**Philosophy of Literature, Poetry and Fiction I**

Washington Morales Maciel: Literary Cognitive Benefits as Undecidable Mental Models

This contribution aims to defend the necessity of elucidating the concept of *narrative opacity* as defined by Peter Lamarque. The proposed elucidation model is the mental model's theory by Philip Johnson-Laird. The general objectives are, firstly, to offer a strategy of a solution to a counter-intuitive consequence inferred from the narrative opacity thesis, and, secondly, to defend a cognitive value for literature not ruled by truth. Finally, this contribution also questions the Lamarquean objections to psychology's theoretical value for literary criticism. Unlike Derek Matravers, this contribution argues that imagining is a cognitive condition of literary reading. However, it agrees with him concerning the cognitive processes involved in any non-literary reading, modeled by theories such as Jonhson-Laird or Teun van Dijk and Walter Kintch’s ones, since they operate in literary reading as well without any particular distinction.

Salvador Rubio Marco: Novels and Moral Knowledge. Henry James Evaluating Guy de Maupassant

Jacques Bouveresse in *La connaissance de l’écrivain* (2008) addresses the question of whether literature (novels in particular) can provide moral knowledge and of what kind, entering into discussion with the answers of Nussbaum, Pippin, Diamond, Lamarque & Olsen, etc. about it. I will start underlining three theses about Bouveresse’s book. The first thesis is that "the best way in which literature can serve the cause of moral truth is by combating moral lies par excellence, in other words moral idealism". The second thesis is that novels are not simple mental experiments, but rather that they entail an aesthetic experience for the reader, and that their characteristic contribution to moral knowledge is based on this feature. The third thesis is that the power of this value for moral knowledge lies in the inseparability of form and content in novels. My aim in this paper is to focus on one of the examples that Bouveresse mentions in his book and that has always intrigued me personally: Henry James’s evaluation of Guy de Maupassant’s literature, that is an ambiguous mixture of admiration and reproach. James admires Maupassant’s “prodigy” of writing, but he reproaches him for his “alarming” negativity, in terms of his characters’ lack of moral reflection and a certain delight in the “vile, petty and sordid”. James’s opinion of Maupassant is already intuitively explicable from James’s own mood (of his taste, his personal world, his *Weltanschauung*) as opposed to Maupassant’s mood. But I think that this opinion can also be explained in terms of Bouveresse’s theses, delving a little deeper into the brief reflections on them that Bouveresse himself offers about them in his book.

**Aesthetic Judgments**

Gerard Vilar: Lyotard, Kant and Judgement

One of the traditional problems of philosophical aesthetics is that of clarifying the nature of the normativity of aesthetic judgments. Despite multiple attempts to defend realistic strategies (Bender, Levinson), quasi inferentialists (Dorsch), rationalists (Godoreiky & Marcus, Schellekens) or irrationalists (Scruton, Tilghman), none seems more productive than the return to Kant (Ginsborg, Appelqvist). That is, to the thesis that aesthetic judgments are judgments that we make without being able to appeal to a norm or principle, which Kant called reflective, and that represent a specific way of exercising the ability to judge, a fundamental kind of rationality. My goal is to draw attention to how one generation ago Hannah Arendt and Jean-François Lyotard each developed their own continuations of the Kantian theory of judgment with special emphasis on the fact that aesthetic judgment and political judgment have the same logic and that imagination and creativity have a fundamental role in the activity of judging.

Jeremy Page: Aesthetic Judgement and Aesthetic Understanding

According to what has been called the ‘traditionalist objectivist conception’ of aesthetic judgments, aesthetic judgments are ‘simply belief with aesthetic contents’ and are theoretical judgments. Recently, objections have been raised to this traditional picture because of its perceived inability to account for our intuitions relating to autonomy, testimony and aesthetic judgment. This paper sketches a conception of aesthetic judgments as theoretical judgments tied to understanding: the Understanding View (UV). UV avoids the objections raised against traditional theoretical views and aims to give a plausible explanation of the place of testimony and autonomy in our aesthetic practices.

**Aesthetics and the Sublime**

Hyo Won Seo: A Tenable Theory of Sublime

A definitive account of the experience of the sublime has yet to be attained. Jane Forsey (2007) slates canonical efforts by Kant and Schopenhauer for presupposing a transcendent notion of reality. A similar but less emphatic blow is leveled against Edmund Burke’s *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1757). This essay defends Burke from Forsey’s accusations on grounds that she misclassifies Burke as a transcendentalist akin to his successors. Section I contextualizes Kant and Schopenhauer’s theories of the sublime, Section II details Forsey’s objections, and Section III attempts to absolve Burke of ontological commitments.

Ghoncheh Azadeh: The Phenomenal Sublime

While 18th century literature of the sublime predominantly concerns itself with the forces of nature, countless theorists have since revisited the sublime to critique or support its historical iterations, justify its continued relevance in the modern day, or argue for taking it more seriously as a category of aesthetic judgment (e.g. Newman 1948; Forsey 2007; Clewis 2009; Brady 2013). My contribution to these debates is the proposal for a new category of sublime, what I call the “phenomenal sublime.” The phenomenal sublime highlights the specific phenomenal character of present-day encounters with landscapes, whether they are natural, industrial, suburban or otherwise while also underlining the unique paradoxical structure of conscious experience that is common across various instantiations of the sublime insofar as the embodied phenomenology remains a common thread. Examples of said experience might include finding oneself captivated by a fire’s burning embers, the sensation of walking through large crowds in a bustling city or witnessing natural disasters.

**Aesthetic Matters II**

Jean Lin: The Nature of Categories Resembling Art. The Difference between Hybrid, Appropriation, and Assimilation

The boundary of art is becoming ever more ambiguous throughout the past decades. One reason behind it is the demand for a more comprehensive definition of art that can incorporate artworks that do not possess aesthetic properties. Another is that the institutional critique that arose in the 1960s has stimulated a move to break down the exclusive framework in art. Along with such trends, there has been debate on the artistic status of the categories historically not regarded as art—the artistic status of food, for example. In particular, molecular gastronomy has been drawing attention among philosophers who see its formal and functional similarities to art. However, including category A in category B for exhibiting similar properties to category B seems somewhat hasty. Before coming to that conclusion, the nature of such similarities must be clarified. This paper distinguishes hybrid, appropriation, and assimilation as the patterns in which different categories may come to show resemblance. Consequently, it will argue that the similarity shown between molecular gastronomy and art is the result of art appropriating from cuisine and cuisine assimilating to art.

Šárka Lojdová: External Beauty vs. Beauty as an Inflector in Arthur Danto’s *The Abuse of Beauty*

My paper aims to challenge Arthur Danto's position concerning beauty held in his book *The Abuse of Beauty*. Danto introduced three independent, albeit overlapping theses 1) there are more aesthetic qualities in art apart from beauty; 2) there exists a distinction between internal and external beauty in art; and 3) there is a class of qualities in art responsible for modification of an emotional attitude of a viewer (called inflectors) there. Several philosophers recently addressed Danto's arguments; however, to my knowledge, nobody paid attention to the possible tension in Danto's book. In my contribution, I will argue that beauty (and any other aesthetic quality) cannot be inflector (a quality modifying attitude of a viewer) and external at once. In the first part of my paper, I will clarify Danto's position in *The Abuse of Beauty*, especially concerning the three previously identified theses. In the second section, I will focus on the criticism of Danto concerning the tension outlined above. My argumentation will consider Michael Dummett's understanding of Gottlob Frege's notion of coloring since Danto based his inflecting on Fregean theory. I aim to demonstrate that associations tied with inflectors enter our process of artwork's interpretation and impact our emotional response.

**Philosophy of Literature, Poetry and Fiction II**

Philip Mills: Parasites and Viruses. Poetry as Performative *Dispositif*

How can Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) offer a framework for approaching poetic phenomena? Despite Austin’s (in)famous characterisation of poetry as a parasitical use of language, which has caused much trouble to Derrida, a certain tradition, including Stanley Cavell and Toril Moi among others, attempts to reintegrate literary uses of language within OLP. However, while these attempts do much to accommodate speech acts to a theory of literature as fiction or drama, the multifaceted poetic practices have been somehow left aside. I aim to fill this gap and to consider poetic phenomena seriously by reconfiguring Austin’s initial evaluation. Indeed, Austin’s exclusion of poetic utterances from the realm of the performative sounds somewhat strange when one considers that a rather common conception of poetry argues that it is a form of language that does what it says, i.e. coinciding—at least seemingly—with Austin’s definition of the performative. There is a space for poetry within the framework of OLP and it is this space that I aim to outline.

Nils Franzén, Karl Bergman: The Force of Fictional Discourse

Consider the opening sentence of Tolkien’s *The Hobbit*: (1) In a hole in the ground there lived a hobbit. By writing this sentence, Tolkien is making a fictional statement. Fictional statements are not meant to be taken as reports about what the world is like. Notwithstanding the fact that (1) is written in the indicative mood, Tolkien is not asserting that there really was a hobbit living in a hole in the ground. If someone wanted to hold Tolkien accountable for having misdescribed the world with (1), we would say that she had not understood the concept of a fiction. This raises the issue of the nature of the author’s speech act. Since fictional statements are not straightforward assertions, how are we to think of their illocutionary force? In this paper, we argue that the two dominating theories of the nature of fictional speech acts – the pretense view and the make-believe view – face important problems. To address these problems, we introduce our own positive proposal, “the stipulation view”.

**Aesthetic Production, Creativity and Authorship I**

Bettina Bohle: What Is (the Purpose of) Artistic Innovation?

Innovations are usually associated with an advance in knowledge, e.g., new medical findings that make it possible to cure a disease that was previously considered incurable. Innovations in the arts, on the other hand, seem to be less characterized by such a progress in and striving for knowledge. Certainly, there are new techniques in art as well. But the focus of artistic activity seems to lie less on this kind of progress. Still, the notion of artistic innovation and „the new“ is still an open question because no one would deny that contemporary art differs, e.g., from Ancient Greek art in many respects if only in that respect that today’s artworks have as their reference point potentially all previously created artworks and are, potentially, also judged against these. This is, and cannot be, true conversely. But what does artistic innovation consist in, then? I will first examine why creativity, as it is often understood today, namely as making something new which is valuable, is not a helpful concept to understand innovation in art. This notion of innovation neglects the extent to which artistic creations rely on previous works of art and cultural products in general. More appropriate is, as will be shown, an account which looks at such processes as transformation of pre-existing material.

María José Alcaraz León: Not on My Name. On Some Conditions for Having an Artistic Voice

There is a certain agreement on the idea that an artwork’s moral character is grounded upon the moral character of the perspective projected upon the events and characters represented in the work. Further, an artwork’s moral perspective is captured in terms of the kind of attitude or response the work prescribes to the audience towards the representational content. Thus, it is often claimed, neither the moral character of the represented content per se nor any moral issues concerning the artist’s biography or identity are relevant for the work’s moral character. On the other hand, some issues that have a clear moral overtone – such as the problems of artistic or aesthetic appropriation or the significance for the artwork’s assessment of the artist’s genre, race or political identity- have been recently attracting much attention within aesthetics, art history, and communications studies. These issues have opened up new questions that bear on the moral significance of art and the relationship between moral and aesthetic values. In this presentation, I will try to assess the extent to which certain concerns about the artist’s racial or genre identity can matter to our assessment of the moral character of a work and whether there might be some aspects, over and above the expression of a particular moral attitude, that may be relevant for determining an artwork’s moral outlook.

**Philosophy of Pictures I**

Caitlin Dolan: Pictorial Realism, Information, and Specificity

*Cancelled.*

Sara Matetich: S.o.S. – Simulation of Sight

It is not my intention to linger on the peculiarities that characterize the *Site Specifics*, a label by which for sixty years have been catalogued different forms of art, united mainly by the need to be specifically conceived and, sometimes, made for\in a given location. For what I am going to say, I have to point out that it is the very relationship with the place where these ‘ambiguous’ art forms are set up, that will become substantially significant of the work\project itself. Space, in fact, is a ‘significant environment’, a work that works in the Work that re-means, in its transformation, the very connotations of performing action. To contain the never-ending process of meaning to which such a work would be subjected, will be Time: yes, exactly that granitic categorial essence that philosophy, together with Space, indicates as fundamental for any cognitive and speculative exercise.

**Aesthetic Matters III**

Michael Young: Making Us Wait… The Harmonic of Suspense

While recent philosophic work on harmony tends to focus on the Confucian notion of harmony where harmony is taken almost exclusively as concord rather than a dynamic process, there is no clear and generally accepted definition of harmony in audiovisual studies. As a branch of media studies, television aesthetics refers to close stylistic analysis and philosophical aesthetics as applied to television. I propose looking at harmony through the (often interchangeable) lenses of film and television and drawing on the musicological view (at least in the Western musical tradition) that harmony is premised on the idea of consonance and its counterpoint dissonance. My hope is that this paper will elucidate on and encourage research on novel ways of considering aesthetic harmony.

Jacopo Frascaroli: Do We Need a Predictive Processing Account of Aesthetic Experience?

Predictive processing (PP) is an emerging framework at the cutting edge of theoretical cognitive science and its philosophical implications are currently being hotly debated. This wide-ranging approach describes the human brain as an embodied probabilistic model of the world, constantly generating and updating predictions about the causes of its sensory states to maintain a sustainable exchange with its environment. This predictive process is increasingly said to be an imperative of every biological system and a possible unifying principle for understanding “perception, action, reason, attention, emotion, experience and learning” (Clark 2015, 9). Recently, PP has attracted the attention of a number of scholars working in philosophical aesthetics and in the psychology of art. In fact, a growing body of research is linking aesthetic pleasure with the need of the predictive agent to minimise uncertainty about the causes of its sensory states. The aim of this paper is to take stock of the so-far intriguing but scattered stream of research linking PP to aesthetic experience and to assess its prospects. I will begin by presenting the PP story about aesthetic experience as it has been developed so far and as I think it should be further articulated. I’ll then point to several ways in which PP and aesthetics could fruitfully inform one another. In the end, I hope to show that the encounter is a promising one and that it deserves further exploration.

 TUESDAY, 22. 6. 2021

**Philosophy of Pictures II**

Maarten Steenhagen: Minimalism about Images. Mirrors, Photographs and Paintings

In this paper I will develop the suggestion that mirror images are images in just the way photographs and paintings are images. This is controversial, as it is typically assumed that images require some kind of surface configuration (‘design’) and that mirror surfaces are distinctive precisely because they lack such a surface configuration (the mirror itself isn’t coloured). I will argue that current image theory tends to overlook a conception of images that is sufficiently general and abstract to render the configuration requirement spurious. I think this can be achieved by using a couple of available concepts and some further distinctions that are well motivated independently. The result is not only a better understanding of the optical properties of mirrors, but a new take on the puzzle of imagery and representation in aesthetics.

Luca Marchetti: Grounding Predictions. Streaks, Speed-Lines and the Depiction of Motion in Static Images

The purpose of this paper is to give an account of the experience we have when looking at particular kinds of static images that are normally taken to represent motion and temporal extension: ‘streaky images’ – that is, images streaked with motion marks, in which the subject of the photo moves a good distance during its exposure time – and cartoon’s motion-lines – that is, lines attached to a moving object to show the path of an action. The starting point of the paper is Gombrich’s (1961) discussion of the depiction of motion in static images in relation to its concept of ‘the beholder’s share’. The framework in which I situate my analysis is that of perceptual theories of depiction (for example, Briscoe 2016; Nanay 2011, 2016; Newall 2011) and draws on empirical data issued from experimental psychology and cognitive sciences. What I argue for, in developing Gombrich’s insights on the depiction of motion in static images and in analyzing the viewer’s perceptual responses to streaks and motion-lines, are three conclusions: first, that depicted motion is a promising domain within which it is possible to study the ways in which active inference and top-down processes in Predictive Processing inform the spectators’ pictorial experiences, supporting in a way the claim about the historicity of vision; second, that these peculiar images are genuine depictions of motion, not merely representations of it: perceptual theories of depiction have to concede that motion and temporal extension can be depicted - not merely represented - in static images; third, that answering questions about which properties can be genuinely said to be depicted should be tackled with reference to the overall perceptual capacities of a suitable viewer.

**Philosophy of Music II**

Asmus Trautsch: The Joyful Experience of our Expressive Power in Poetry and Music

The talk will reflect on the relationship of music and poetry and develop an argument that music and poetry constitute a formal continuity in time which doesn't just emerge from the grammatical and semantic organization of the transmission of meaning. The connection of sounds produced by poets/singers/musicians can be experienced as manifestation of the power to express at all, which allows the audience to dwell on sounds and leave them expecting new sounds (e.g., of words or tones) in the next moment.

Rosa Fernández: Hermeneutic Truth in Contemporary Opera

While an enormous number of aesthetic texts have been produced in recent times, opera continues to occupy a very limited space, one that is even more reduced when thinking about contemporary opera. However, few art forms pose as many questions to the formulation of aesthetic thought as current musical creation, and specifically opera. It is here that an ecosystem of cultural actions is brought together that, in light of hermeneutics, opens up to truth in different possibilities. As Gadamer manifested in his body of thought, a work of art has an anthropological base that we believe is unfolded in contemporary opera with all its interrogative force, since new integrations of artistic experience are incited within it.
At this conference, we will reflect on two closely related fundamental questions:
1. The notion of hermeneutic openness in contemporary opera, especially regarding the possibility that it opens up to the truth from avant-garde operatic writing: is current opera a language open to universality and with that, to the truth, or is it, on the contrary, a closed language and with that, veiled?
2. Does the fusion of three art forms -such as theatrical dramaturgy, the music and the libretto- rematerialize and orient the truth displayed in the work with more force? We reflect on this aesthetic experience, if it is linked to a new audience and generated by a new conception of art.

**Aesthetics of German Idealism II**

Monika Jovanović: Beyond Internalism-Externalism Dispute on Aesthetic Experience. A Return to Kant

The question of what is distinctive for aesthetic experience, compared to other types of experiences, can be approached from two different perspectives. We may ask what is characteristic of the experience itself, as a psychological state, or wonder what causes that experience. The first approach is internalistic; the second externalistic. What is essential about our aesthetic experience and what defines it, according to internalism, has to do with its psychological features: what the aesthetic experience consists of, what it is like to be in such an experiential state. This perspective is an instance of an overall introspective approach to the human experience that has long been the dominant view. The fact that this mentalistic picture is largely rejected certainly influenced the abandonment of aesthetic internalism. However, a more immediate aesthetic reason for turning toward the opposite, externalistic approach, pertains to the Beardsley-Dickey debate. By analyzing Kant’s view of aesthetic experience, I will try to show that internalistic and externalistic views of aesthetic experience are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary approaches. The merit of such an integrative approach is apparent when we judge it not only by its coherency and its extensional adequacy but also by its explanatory force. This can be seen when, for instance, aside from analyzing aesthetic experience itself, we also have a more general goal, i.e., answering the question whether aesthetic evaluation has inferential structure or arguing for the thesis that aesthetic judgments have universal validity. Plausible answers to these central aesthetic questions require that in analyzing aesthetic experience, we consider both the elements of the experience itself and the causes and conditions under which it occurs.

Larissa Berger: Kant’s Account of Emotional Art

It is often supposed that Kant’s transcendental philosophy has little room for emotions. Even when it comes to beauty, only disinterested pleasure seems to have a constitute function whereas other emotions, at best, seem to make beauty impure. I will show that emotions play an important but overlooked role for art: they contribute to aesthetic ideas by being a driving force for the imagination’s activity of playing. I will show that emotions can contribute to aesthetic ideas in either of three ways: (1) The given concept, which should be made sensible via the artwork, can be the concept of an emotion. (2) Emotions can be among the attributes associated by the artist. (3) Emotions can be among the partial representations associated by the beholder. In sum, I will present a more emotion-oriented view of art than is commonly attributed to Kant.

**Aesthetic Matters IV**

Onerva Kiianlinna: Contradiction That Never Was. Epigenetics versus Modularity in Evolutionary Aesthetics

Coevolutionary aesthetics has been forming since early 2010s. Its contribution of great value to evolutionary aesthetics has been including cultural evolution into theories of the origins of art and aesthetic judgement. Coevolutionary aesthetics—or non-modular evolutionary aesthetics, as it is sometimes called—suggests that evolutionary aesthetics drawing from evolutionary psychology that explains our adaptive emotions has ignored that aesthetic behavior, no matter how innate, develops epigenetically, in a specific social environment. This criticism stems from the widely accepted notions that humans adapt plastically to changing conditions, and that there is no aesthetic module in the human mind. What has been forgotten is that modularity itself is at the moment considered the very cause for plasticity of the mind. This presentation shows that coevolutionary and evolutionary psychological aesthetics are more complimentary than contradictory. Thus, combining modular and epigenetic thinking could be the most consilient way forward in evolutionary aesthetics.

Mateusz Salwa: Gardens. Ontology and Aesthetic Experience

The aim of my talk is to reflect upon existing definitions of garden and to offer my own. In order to do this I would like to refer to contemporary aesthetics of gardens (Cooper 2006, Leddy 1988, Miller 1993, Powell 2019, Ross 1998), however my definition will be based on the ideas of Rosario Assunto (1988) and Malcolm Budd (2002). There have been only few philosophical attempts at defining a garden (Hunt 2000, Jagger 2015, Le Dantec 2006, Macdonald 2016, Miller 1993, Powell 2019, St Denise 2007). It seems that on the one hand a definition is not really needed as everyone knows ‘what it is we want to discuss when we speak of the garden” (Leslie 2013), whereas on the other the variety of gardens is such that one can only think of a family resemblance between them (Ross 1998). I contend, however, that it is possible to offer a definition that will respect the openness of the concept of the garden and at the same time will account for what we have in mind when ‘we speak of the garden’. My idea is that it is possible to suggest an ‘ontology of the garden’ (Assunto) based on ‘the aesthetic experience of nature’ (Budd). In my view, such a definition is useful since it allows, among other things, to reconsider gardens as works of art, i.e. to reassess a traditional approach to gardens.

**Philosophy of Pictures III**

Jakub Stejskal: What Is an Image Format?

I take issue with the standard understanding of image format, according to which image formats are frames that delimit, but do not themselves design figurative content. Frame-less images such as rock art would thus be format-less. I argue against the identification of formats with frames because formatting can be achieved also by figurative means. However, a notion of image format that would allow for formatting to involve figuration faces the danger of collapsing the difference between depicting and formatting. To avoid this outcome, I propose that we understand image formatting as delimiting figurative content to align it with the standards of the image’s intended communicative context. On this understanding, image formats are public, prescriptive, replicable, and relatively objective means of delimiting figurative content.

Federico Fantelli: Pictorial Presentation: esse est percipi?

The topic of this paper can be straightforwardly introduced with question (or two): what is the nature of pictorial experience? What differentiates the pictorial space from the three-dimensional space? To address these broad issues, I will first reconstruct the threefold account of pictorial experience (Husserl 1904/2005; Nanay 2018, Voltolini 2018), given that it is generally agreed that a threefold structure is the most comprehensive structure for describing pictorial experience. However, such a generosity in terms of folds brings along some critical aspects, and I will argue that the third level, the level that describes what a picture is about, is not a necessary condition for an image to appear in our visual field. In the second part, I will outline the phenomenology of the pictorial space, pointing out the essential differences between three-dimensional objects and pictorial objects. I will then conclude by showing how this phenomenological characterisation is able to generate a conceptual couple – that of perceptual closure and imaginative openness – that aims at capturing the logic of pictorial experience.

**Philosophy of Music III**

Alessandro Bertinetto: Failure as Success. The Aesthetic Paradox of Artistic Improvisation

I explore aspects of the relationship between artistic improvisation and aesthetic normativity and deal with an aesthetic paradox that happens in the experience of so-called “free improvisation”: forms of improvisation (especially in music, theatre, and dance) that are not based on themes, plots or choreographies. The paradox is this: when improvisation is perceived as successful (or felicitous) is not perceived as an improvisation. Hence, the artistic success of improvisation appears as the failure of the performance as improvised. What is (paradoxically) unforeseen here is the fact that the unforeseen does not show up. As I will argue, self-reflexivity and (trans)formativity of the normativity of improvisation are responsible for this paradoxical aesthetic unforeseen: the appearance of a successful improvisation as (performance of) a previous prepared artwork.

Marcello Ruta: Pragmatism without Descriptivism. An Externalist Account of Musical Ontology

The presentation will be structured into two main sections: 1) A first section, where the distinction between pragmatism and descriptivism in musical ontology, and ontology of art more generally, will be clarified, and where Robert Brandom’s normative pragmatics, as being able to distinguish between norms explicit in rules and norms implicit in practices, will be identified as an approach satisfying a pragmatic constraint without collapsing into a mere repetition of our beliefs generated in such practices. 2) A second section, in which a first tentative step of application of such an approach in the domain of musical ontology is developed by trying to make explicit the rules governing our treating a sound event A as a performance of a specific musical work A, specifically in the context of the dominant practice of Western instrumental music that held sway for the whole 19th century and after, a practice designated by Lydia Goehr as the Beethoven-Paradigm.

James Lewis: The Musicality of Speech

In speech, a speaker’s intended meaning can make sense of the sound she makes, but only to a certain extent. Much of the sound of our speech – its prosodic profile – has little or nothing to do with the words we utter, or what we mean to communicate by uttering them. For instance, you and I could each speak the same sentence, and in uttering it, we could mean the same thing as one another. And yet, our two utterances will sound quite different as a result of the unique timbres of our two voices, our accents, and our idiosyncratic styles of expressing words through melody and rhythm. All speech can be heard as music, as song. Any evaluative criteria for assessing the aesthetic merit of singing can, it seems, also be applied to speaking. Speech can be musically beautiful, and it can also be kitsch. The combination of pitch, rhythm, tempo, timbre and dynamics in any given vocal performance can strike one as lovely, as intriguing, or in one way or another as tone-deaf or displeasing or perhaps even clichéd. Indeed, the possibilities for musical evaluation of speech is multiplied further by the aesthetic significance of the interaction between the semantic and pragmatic significance of speech on the one hand, and its strictly prosodic features on the other. There could be aesthetic quality, for example, in the way the melody of a person’s accent can be heard more clearly when they speak of matters closer to their heart. Attention to this interaction too can yield aesthetic experiences. Many of us are in the habit of allowing aesthetic impressions made by a person’s speech to affect how we are inclined to feel about them. At the extremes of this habit, we may allow the impressions of a person’s speech to lead us to distrust them, dislike them, or, indeed, to be strongly endeared to them. This raises a question. Can such feelings ever be acceptable? That is, can it be legitimate to value or disvalue a person on the basis of the apparent aesthetic qualities of their speech? My goal in this paper is to defend an affirmative answer to this question.

**Aesthetics of German Idealism III**

Jennifer Dobe: Moral Spectatorship in Kant’s Aesthetics

It goes without saying that moral interests dominate the final sections of Kant’s *Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment*. Kant insists, for instance, that aesthetic experience “prepares” us for becoming morally good because we learn to “love” something without interest; he also argues that beauty “symbolizes” the morally good (das Sittlich-Gute) (§59), or the unconditional good to be realized through freedom, namely, holiness of will (Munzel, 1995). However, we may grasp the multifaceted moral significance of beauty best, I believe, when we acknowledge that it does not unsettle, indeed is consistent with, the object-oriented perspective of the judgment of beauty itself. This is not the case in the sublime: the moral significance of the sublime is inconsistent with what is initially an object-oriented perspective. In judging the sublime, the subject, first orientated toward nature, finally turns inward. Considering beauty and the sublime in this way, we may relate his mature aesthetic theory to his moral pedagogy: the transition from moral spectatorship to moral agency (and thus the transition from judgment to practical reason). Beauty’s moral significance, though indispensable, is importantly fastened to (and thus limited by) its particular point of view (object-orientation) and signifies the subject’s distance from the good that is to be realized through freedom.

**Aesthetics and Pandemia**

Mojca Puncer: Virus as Metaphors. The Art World under Pandemia

This paper considers the role of the virus as metaphor in art, culture and society, drawing on both historical definitions and contemporary philosophical and aesthetic interpretations of metaphor in general and visual metaphor in particular. The introductory discussion of illness (virus) as metaphor in the writings of Susan Sontag is followed by a brief history of metaphor theory from aesthetics and rhetoric to contemporary cognitive theory. This is followed by a chapter in which metaphorical thinking is considered in the context of the art world. Using the conceptualization of illness as metaphor (Sontag), we show how the metaphor of particular illnesses (characterized by the metaphor of illness as war) is used in visual arts. We are particularly interested in how the viral metaphor shapes the art world at the time of the coronavirus pandemic. The treatment of examples of visual metaphor in art (metaphorizing the experience of quarantine and other consequences of the virus) through aesthetic concepts of the familiar and the strange, is accompanied by a question about the possibility of a new ethics and politics of care. The discussion concludes with a reflection on what can be considered not only in the field of artistic metaphorics of the virus, but in the broader discursive field of art and aesthetics.

Marta Maliszewska: Reclaiming Public Space – Street Art as a Tool of Social Change in the Pandemic Times

The current pandemic affected nearly all aspects of our social and private life. It was no different with public space. I claim that the current crises, epidemiological and socioeconomic, create another type of breakdown: the crisis of public space. Referring to Margaret Kohn (2004), Jacques Rancière (2013), Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (1985) I present the political aspect of public space and its significance to representation of marginalized voices. In this light the crisis of public space is understood broadly as a danger not only to material space but primarly to public life. Recalling theories of street art by Andrea Baldini (2016, 2020) and Sondra Bacharach (2018) that emphasize its subversive nature, I analyze how in the face of the pandemic street art is gaining significance as a voice of political dissent against the appropriation of public space. By claiming the right to public space, street art claims it for those who protest on the streets despite the restrictions and those deprived of this right by force or fear. In place of the absent bodies, it symbolically marks the existence of social struggles and marginalized voices.

**Aesthetic Matters V**

Christopher Earley: What Is ‘Contemporary’ in Contemporary Art?

Over the past decades art institutions across the world have taken up the convention of calling recently produced artworks contemporary art. But though the term circulates widely, upon inspection there appears to be little consensus about exactly what changes this shift in terminology is supposed to capture (Foster, 2009). From the perspective of philosophy, what should we make of this puzzling concept? In this presentation, I claim that many current philosophical attempts to say what differentiates contemporary art from other kinds of art have been unsuccessful because they shy away from targeting what is ‘contemporary’ in these artworks. I will argue that this task is central, and that we can make sense of it by understanding the way artworks engage with the issues of contemporaneity. If this holds water, then it marks out a novel research project in philosophy of art: one which puts the notion of ‘artistic engagement’ front and centre.

Aurélie Debaene: Object of Attention. On the Inescapable Objectifying Nature of Modelling

The treatment of a human being as an object is a morally objectionable harmful attitude and behaviour. Modelling is an activity, however, that depends upon the objectification of the model’s body by both the model and those interacting with it. I argue that this form of objectification, or, objectification in this context, lacks the morally objectionable character. I first situate objectification in the work by Martha Nussbaum (1995), expanded upon by Rae Langton (2009), and importantly in Anne Eaton’s writing on visual mechanisms of objectification in artworks (2012). I distinguish between ‘mere’ objectification, which encompasses the objectionable, harmful effects of objectification, and ‘aesthetic’ objectification as a morally benign form present, and crucial, to the art-making process. I secondly claim that modelling is inescapably objectifying due to the ongoing (self-)scrutiny of the model by those present, and those viewing the artwork she is represented in. Third, I argue ‘aesthetic’ objectification mitigates harmful effects by focussing on the model’s bodily labour, subsequently recognising and collaborating with her expertise. Finally, I muse that ‘aesthetic’ objectification can introduce artistic opportunity to subvert objectifying visual mechanisms, and stimulate a rich, further discussion of how different modes of objectification within the studio and artworks interact.

Remei Capdevila-Werning and Sanna Lehtinen: A First Approach to Intergenerational Aesthetics: Theoretical Stakes, Practical Examples, and Future Research Avenues

This paper introduces the relatively new philosophical sub-specialty of intergenerational aesthetics, which centers in the study of aesthetic values and aesthetic choices taking into account the aesthetic appreciation of future generations. The study of aesthetic issues of our surroundings from an intergenerational point of view stems from a pressing concern regarding our present situation in terms of environment and sustainability, as our current exploitation, building, and living practices seem clearly unsustainable in the long run. Acknowledging a temporal dependency between the present and the future in aesthetics offers a new perspective to explore aesthetic values, perception, and judgments as well as practical aesthetic decisions. This paper discusses the main concerns of intergenerational aesthetics, including its theoretical stakes, its normative aspect, the role of intergenerational thinking in theory and practice, and presents an example to illustrate the pressing importance of introducing intergenerational considerations to our current aesthetic practices. It also proposes a series of potential avenues of research for further investigations in the field.

**Aesthetics and Morality**

James Hamilton: One Moral Problem about Theater

I will present a case, which I call “cue change,” that raises one moral problem about theater
— although of course there are others, a problem about why performers can and do rely on
their fellow performers to go on and why spectators are right to expect this. I will give several
reasons why philosophers should care about this problem. And finally I make a suggestion —
derived from evolutionary game theory — about how to solve the problem. The case itself is deceptively
simple and apparently trivial; but the problem it raises is not.

David Collins: A Collingwoodian Take on the Moralism/Autonomism Debate

Whether or not moral values are relevant to the artistic value of artworks has been much debated, with Moralists (or Ethicists) arguing that moral defects in artworks can count against their value as art, Immoralists arguing that such defects sometimes count positively towards artistic value, and Autonomists maintaining that the moral status of a work’s content is unrelated to its artistic value. Recently, the debate has reached what seems like an impasse, with support for each side coming down to a difference of ‘intuitions’ with no obvious way to convince interlocutors whose intuitions about particular cases differ from one’s own. This paper suggests a way out of this impasse by examining the presuppositions of the Moralist, Immoralist and Autonomist positions from the perspective of R.G. Collingwood’s aesthetics. I argue that the established positions in the debate all treat moral value as a property of a work that may or may not count as a pro tanto aesthetically good/bad-making property, whereas the Collingwoodian approach takes positive artistic value to be itself morally valuable (and negative artistic value to itself be morally disvaluable). An advantage of this Collingwoodian perspective is that it is able to account for intuitions on both sides of the existing debate insofar as it allows that moral and artistic value are importantly related, where an intuition to this effect is one of the motives for Moralism, and that the moral value of a work’s content or of its use does not itself affect its artistic value, where intuitions to this effect are part of the motive behind Autonomism.

**Philosophy of Music IV**

Darío Loja: A Brief Insight into the Musical Role of Non-tonal Aspects

Our experience of music, similarly to how Richard Wollheim (1980, 1987) describes representational seeing, could be described as a simultaneous attention to a ‘musical object’ and the medium through which it is presented to us. I would like to consider this dichotomy in terms of perceiving in music elements with a structural role and elements that do not have one (Hamilton, 2009). In particular, my aim is to assess the role of the later in our musical experience, in order to defend the importance of this dimension and to evaluate the extent to which our configurational capacity is permeated by attention to these elements which might at first sight appear to be extra-musical. The study of musical aspects on which I focus here, have as a background objective to support the perspective according to which musical experience is best explained in terms of musical understanding (Arbo, 2013; Defez, 2013; Kaduri, 2006; Scruton, 2004), a stance on meaning, influenced by Wittgenstein's texts.

Andrés Luna: What Is Wrong with Appearance Emotionalism’s Account of Emotional Response (to Musical Expressiveness)?

This paper is focused on the account of the relationship between expressive perception of music and the emotional response to it provided by appearance emotionalism, the view defended by Stephen Davies. My claim is that appearance emotionalism does not offer an adequate explanation of that relationship. More precisely, appearance emotionalism misconstrues that relationship by imputing to the emotional response a rol completely extraneous to the very experience of understanding the expressive qualities of music. To give support to this claim, I will submit three arguments: the first one aims to show that Davies’ explanation lacks normative force, the second one is a thought experiment based on some phenomenological insights, and the last one points out that Davies is not justified at all in restricting the understanding of music’s expressiveness to perception, since emotional response could be count as evidence of someone’s understanding of music’s expressiveness.

**Aesthetics of Design**

Judith-Frederike Popp: Aesthetic Self-determination – Becoming a Person through Art and Design

At first glance, it appears to be self-explanatory that human beings need some kind of aesthetic engagement in order to realize their potential as agents with capacities both of self-consciousness and personal striving. Philosophers like Theodor W. Adorno (1973), Herbert Marcuse (1977) or Martin Seel (1997) have emphasized the idea that epistemic and teleological forms of orientation need an aesthetic corrective that is able to break up dogmatic rationalizations in private and public contexts. Furthermore, these positions entail the thought that aesthetic perspectives and experiences are major parts of living well. More recently, Dominic McIver Lopes has underlined this point by characterizing human agency and life being permeated with aesthetic appreciation (McIver Lopes 2018). McIver Lopes’ combination of ethics and aesthetics hints towards an important task: There is a an ongoing need to concretize the forms in which aesthetic engagement can be practiced under the living conditions of contemporary subjects. It is my aim in this talk to concretize this thought by discussing two ideas: Firstly, that an aesthetic perspective has to be integrated into the ethical outlook of human agents by recognizing it as a part of determining oneself as subject and person. Secondly, that in order to comprehend this combination of ethical and aesthetic dimensions, one has to include receptive and productive dimensions of engaging in the aesthetic realm. This cooperation of dimensions, in turn, can be illuminated in its complexity by taking the overlapping areas of contemporary art and design into account. By discussing self-determination as an aesthetically driven process depending on ongoing encounters and engagements with phenomena of art and design, the aim is to shed further light on the idea that the ethical thought of living a good life and concrete ways of interacting with oneself and the world in an aesthetic way have to be discussed interdependently in order to develop an appropriate picture of aesthetic phenomena being of main relevance for human thriving and emancipation.

Lucía Jiménez Sánchez: Fittingness, Patterns of Use, and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Design

The aesthetic character of functional objects has been widely understood in terms of form’s ‘fittingness’ for a function (Parsons and Carlson, 2008) (Forsey, 2014) (Panos, 2019). In this paper, I will suggest an alternative, enriched, account of the aesthetic value of design. I will challenge the Functional Beauty Accounts arguing against the idea that the aesthetic value of functional objects is to be primarily understood in terms of looking “fit”. Thus, I will propose a shift into a new interactive model of aesthetic appreciation to show how an accurate aesthetic understanding of design depends upon recognizing ‘patterns of use’.

**Aesthetic Production, Creativity and Authorship II**

Emanuele Arielli: Creativity and the Machine

In this paper I will argue that developments in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) applied to aesthetics have relevant implications for philosophical aesthetics, in particular regarding the discussions about the nature of creativity and authorship. According to some observers, the automatic generation of aesthetic artifacts, as well as the development of software that increasingly supports the work of artists and designers, call into question the uniqueness of individual creativity and artistic imagination in an unpreceded way. Moreover, in a scenario in which formal properties of artifacts seem to be easily replicable by machines, the debate on the relationship between aesthetics and the nature of art seems also revitalized. Overall, diverging positions on this issue oscillate between a view of the machine as an Other competing with human capabilities, and, on the contrary, an interpretation of technology as extension of human potentialities by means of the externalization of complex mental processes. AI and machine learning would be in this sense a direct practical manifestation of an “extended aesthetic mind”, in which traditional cognitive limits of the biological mind can be overcome even in areas related to aesthetic creation. This is a controversial stance that also philosophical investigation needs to deal with.

Jochen Schuff: Art as Making and Performing. Paul Valéry

What does it mean to make art? What does it mean to perform art? To discuss these questions, I will draw on Paul Valéry’s aesthetics. Valéry’s aesthetics not only emphasizes construction and processuality rather than any notion of self-contained works; his own writing incorporates processuality rather that conclusiveness. Thus, it is a particularly useful resource for understanding the performing arts, and thus the performative aspects of the arts in general. But Valéry’s self-critical writing moreover links aesthetics to critical thinking.

 WEDNESDAY, 23. 6. 2021

**Philosophy of Music V**

Eran Guter and Inbal Guter: Let’s Face the Music. Nested-Worlds, Thoughtwriting and Enactivism

In regarding musical experience, contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of music tends to show allegiance to the main tenets of representational cognitivism. Cognitivism amounts to rendering musical experience as consisting of, or constituted by propositional attitudes. Musical experience requires concepts and have rich conceptual structure, and these cognitive components are disembodied. Yet representational cognitivism has been seriously challenged over the last three decades by enactivism. Enactivism sees mentality as rooted in engaged, embedded and embodied activity as opposed to detached forms of thought. It prioritizes and highlights the primacy of ways of acting or “doings”, what is done in the world, over ways of thinking, what is thought about the world, or how the world is represented. Such natural ways of acting both foster and come to be shaped and developed by customs, practices and institutions. Enactive accounts of musical experience underscore the richly interactive, explorative, world-engaged, embodied and embedded nature of musical experience, stirring away from the dominant tendency in philosophy and psychology to treat musical experience as a relatively passive affair.
In this paper we explore the thrust of enactivism concerning musical experience in the rather unexpected context of Kendall Walton’s intriguing account of ornamentality in terms of nested-worlds of make-believe. Walton’s own account of musical experience stirs away from this notion of ornamentality. Thus, our attempt to explicate musical experience in terms of ornamentality amounts to reading Walton’s theory somewhat against the grain. Still we argue that this affords not only a theoretically viable way to open up a possibility for an enactive view of musical experience in terms of musical ornamentality, but also one which surprisingly complements Walton’s more recent suggestion to understand music and music-making in terms of what he calls “thoughtwriting”, that is, as sort of texts which are composed for others to use in expressing their thoughts, feelings or attitudes.

Charles Lebeau-Henry: Nietzsche’s Critique of Religious Affects in Music

*Cancelled.*

**Aesthetics, Politics and Morality**

Jessica Jaques: On Deconstruction and Construction in Picasso’s *Las Meninas*. Political Reason and Death Exorcisms in 1957 Barcelona’s Suite

On the tricentennial of Velázquez's *Las Meninas* (1656-7), Picasso made a peculiar and titanic tribute to the major work of Spanish painting, deconstructing it in fifty-eight oil paintings between August 14 and December 30, 1957. It was possible for me to uncover the date of its inception thanks to pointing out the creative hybridization that Picasso exercised between this series and his long contemporary poem El entierro del Conde de Orgaz. In 1971, the American philosopher Nelson Goodman went to Barcelona. There, he discovered Gaudí’s Sagrada Família (begun in 1882 and not yet finished) at the same time as Picasso's series *Las Meninas*. Goodman considered Picasso's *Las Meninas* as “the most impressive variations ever done in painting”, as he writes in his article “Variations on Variation – Or Picasso back to Bach …” (1988). This critical judgment entails two theoretical approaches developed in his article “Variations on Variation”. The first one is especially important to the philosophy of art, and consists of two issues: first, it expands the use of the term variation from music into painting and, consequently, makes it suitable for the understanding of further creative processes; second, it establishes a bridge between the notion of variation and the notion of series, which provides a theoretical statement of the first term to philosophy of painting, variation being considered from now on as an indirect mode of reference. But, beyond this clarifying statement, what where the reasons of Picasso's creative process in his variations on Velazquez's *Las Meninas*? The aim of this proposal is to put forward some of these reasons. We could reach a consensus in accepting that two creative processes are at play in Picasso’s *Las Meninas*: (1) the deconstruction of the Velazquez’s work in a series and (2) the construction of a total of 58 oil paintings that deserves to be appreciated qualitatively as a totality, an aspect which I will refer to using the term suite, which (like Goodman’s variation) I will borrow from the field music. For the creative process of deconstruction, I will present a political reading of Picasso’s *Las Meninas* in their concurrence with the tricentennial of the work of Velázquez. Next, I will present the reason for the creative procedure of the suite’s construction, and also for its presence in its final location in the Picasso Museum in Barcelona, the exorcism of two deaths; respectively: that of Picasso's father, José Ruiz y Blasco (who passed away in Barcelona in 1913), and that of Jaume Sabartés (deceased in Paris in 1968).

Lisa Schmalzried: Deception, Lie, and Sentimentality. The Immorality Criticism of Kitsch

Pauzarek publishes one of the first treatise on kitsch in 1912 and thereby sets the tone on how others thought about kitsch in the following decades. He describes kitsch as the anti-pole to true art, as tasteless trash for the masses, as ignorant of any ethical, logical, or aesthetic demands, as indifferent to any crimes committed against the material, technique, or art form, and as cheap while pretending to be valuable. In Pauzarek´s spirit, kitsch has been understood as an aesthetic category which should be defined dependent on and compared to art. A common way of such an art-based kitsch definition sees kitsch as low-grade (anti-)art. But not every kind of bad art is kitsch. This leads to the question in which respect kitsch fails as art? One default answer is that kitsch inter alia shows moral deficits which art does or should not display. Kitsch is under moral general suspicion. Broch, for example, claims that kitsch is the evil in the value system of art. The first aim of this paper is to better understand this immorality criticism and its second to reject it. Although some kitsch objects might display moral deficits (as do some works of art), not all kitsch is immoral. Based on morality, one cannot distinguish art from kitsch.

**Aesthetic Matters VI**

Elisa Caldarola: The Medium of Installation Art

Contra Gemma Argüello (2020), I argue that it is not controversial to claim that we use the term "installation art" to refer to works that share the same art medium - once we have identified an appropriate notion of art medium. I then proceed to sketch out two alternative views of the medium of installation art, one inspired by Thi Nguyen's work on games and the "arts of agency" (2020a; 2020b), and one inspired by Dom Lopes' (2010) and Berys Gaut's (2010) accounts of interactive computer art. I argue that the latter view presents explanatory advantages over the former.

Kenneth Wilder: The Locative Function of Situated Art

This paper proposes a locative function for situated art, a category that admits contemporary intermedial forms such as installation art, but also earlier situated painting. Artworks (all artworks) orientate the beholder towards their worlds, but with situated art this orientation enters into the work’s semantic content. Indeed, this might arguably be thought of as a defining feature: a better definition, as we shall see, than the mere presence of a ‘literal’ beholder, in that this orientation encompasses both the ‘real’ situation and the work’s ‘virtual’ realm. Certainly, installation art might be said to represent an ideological rejection of the very notion of context-independent art. But how does this locative function operate? And might it operate differently with respect to situated painting, sculpture or installation art?

**Aesthetic Matters VII**

Yi Ding: A Brief History of the Reception of *Laocoon* in China. From the Perspective of “Poetical Picture”

In this presentation, I will focus on literature scholars Wu Mi and Qian Zhong-shu to examine the reception of *Laocoon* in China through the perspective of “poetical picture (poetisches Gemälde)”. “Poetical picture,” indicating description or image in poetry, is a shared concern among Chinese scholars and touches upon the very essential question in *Laocoon*: compared to painting (plastic art), to what extent can poetry (literature art) describe objects? In 1929, Wu published “The 200th anniversary of the birth of Lessing” in *The Critical Review*, where he, with a good understanding of the limited framework (mimetic illusionism) used by Lessing, holds great interests on detailed arguments related to literature expression in *Laocoon*. This is in sharp contrast to Irving Babbitt’s, who has been Wu’s professor at Harvard University (1919-1921), criticism toward *Laocoon*. On the other hand, Qian Zhong-shu, having been the student of Wu at Tsinghua University (1929-1933), recognized that “poetry’s holding a wider sphere of expression than painting” is an opinion originated from Lessing and tried to develop it in “Reading *Laocoon*” (1962). There, Qian referenced to the theory from E. Burke and K. O. Erdmann to argue that the “emotional atmosphere” and “the value of feeling of the word” can only be expressed by words. Between Wu and Qian, the progress in understanding western art theory to bring out the very essence of *Laocoon* in China is clearly manifested.

Karel Stibral: Johann Georg Sulzer – A Forgotten Father of Environmental Aesthetics

The main topic of the paper will be an introduction and analysis of the Johann Georg Sulzer’s views as described in his *Dialogues on the Beauty of Nature* (*Unterredungen über die Schönheit der Natur*, 1750), situating it within the body of Sulzer’s work, and highlight the theme of the aesthetic appreciation of nature which appears, albeit in a variety of contexts, throughout Sulzer’s works. From today’s perspective, Sulzer’s contribution is intriguing when considered in relation to the ideas of Enlightenment natural philosophy but also beacuse of similarities between Sulzer’s approach, based on the knowledge of environmental sciences, and Carlson’s environmental aesthetics.

**Aesthetics and the Limits of Representation**

Piotr Kozak: What Cannot Be Imagined?

In the theory of imagination, there are two contradicting claims. On the one hand, it is claimed that imagination is free, and we can imagine whatever we want to. On the other, there are certain constraints put on imagination, for example, we cannot imagine logically impossible objects, such as a round square, or some morally deviant cases, such as that it is perfectly fine to kill people. In the paper, I will try to reconcile these two contradicting claims. The main thesis of the paper is that everything is imaginable, though not all imaginings have sense. I will present The Standard View on imaginative impossibility and the reasons that support the Standard View. Next, I will sketch an alternative view – a measurement-theoretic account of imagination and show how the measurement-theoretic account solves the problems of the Standard View. My assumption is that an answer to the question on the nature of limitations of imagination could partially reveal the nature of imagination.

Federica Mure: Unthinkable Images – Visual Representation and the Limits of Knowledge in Martin Heidegger’s Aegean Goddess and Walter Benjamin’s Winged Creatures

What does it mean, for philosophy, to think via image and not merely to think the image? How do we understand the potential, inherent in certain images, to unsettle the limits of what is known? This paper examines the interlacing of image and thought by looking at two specific examples, in the tradition of philosophical aesthetics, where philosophy’s confrontation with visual images resulted in the acknowledgement of the image’s potential to problematise the limits of the thinking act: Martin Heidegger’s comments on the votive bas-relief *Pensive Athena* (*Die Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens*, 1967) and Walter Benjamin’s writings on Dürer’s *Melencolia I* (*Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*, 1928). Both images depict two pensive figures, a winged creature and a Greek goddess, caught in the act of contemplating seemingly limited objects - the world of material things (Melencolia) and the boundary-stone (Athena). Arguably conceivable as allegories of brooding and visionary thinking, these two images present Benjamin and Heidegger with an occasion to reflect on the agency of art images and the influence they yield on philosophical discourse. While evidencing the fundamental differences between the glances of Benjamin’s winged creature and Heidegger’s goddess, this paper will be significant in demonstrating that to think via image, following Benjamin and Heidegger, is to admit that image and thought are caught in the net of a vacillating and unsettling dialectic, one which does not admit theoretical sovereignty over visual appearance.

**Aesthetic Rationality and the Value of Art**

Matilde Carrasco-Barranco: Functional Beauty and the Appreciation of Art

 “Does the notion of Functional Beauty enrich our aesthetic appreciation of art and, if so, how?” This is the question that Glen Parsons and Allen Carlson (in what follows P&C) address at the end of their highly influential *Functional Beauty* (2008, 223). In a nutshell, their answer to the first part of the question is yes, at least “in the case of much art”. Their challenge is not only to argue that knowledge concerning function is important to aesthetic appreciation of but show, as they claim, that it actually translates into aesthetic appreciation insofar as qualities that emerge from function are integral to the object’s aesthetic character. And, secondly, to demonstrate how “functionality”, since it is present in every realm of aesthetics, constitutes “a central aspect of aesthetic appreciation” and helps to fight “the lack of comprehensiveness and lack of unity” that, due to its recent developments beyond art, current aesthetics show (P&C 2008, 60-61, my emphasis). Assuming that the former “problem of translation” can be solved once certain further conditions are met (see Sauchelli 2013 and Paris 2020), this paper addresses the so far less discussed second challenge. My thesis is that the concept of functional beauty, as developed by P&C, cannot play the central and structural role in aesthetics that P&C attribute to it, for several reasons. In the first place, because P&C indeed acknowledge significant limits to the selected effects theory as a method to identify the proper function of artworks beyond that “much art” that clearly has utilitarian purposes, since artworks are often not only non-functional but also too innovative to count on any “ancestors”. However, if functional beauty is meant to play any central conceptual role in aesthetics, its presence in art (as presumably in other fields of aesthetic appreciation as well) should be more pervasive than that. As I will argue, integrating functional beauty in a minimal conception of aesthetic experience (see Stecker 2012) shows more promise when aiming to achieve certain unity among the different realms of aesthetics.

Ingrid Vendrell Ferran: Aesthetic Pleasure and Aesthetic Value

As is the case with other aesthetic concepts, including beauty, the concept of aesthetic pleasure almost vanished from the aesthetic discourse during the second half of the last century. On the one hand, the significance of aesthetic pleasure was challenged by those authors inspired by Brecht and Adorno’s materialist aesthetics, who considered that the main function of art is not to please but to move us to social and moral action. On the other hand, the rise of aesthetic cognitivism after Beardsley and Hospers led to a shifting of attention toward the cognitive powers of art, relegating the notion of pleasure to the background. In addition, the few contemporary accounts of aesthetic pleasure that do exist have tended to explain its function in terms close to emotivist and projectionist views, arguing that aesthetic pleasure confers value on those objects able to elicit it. Against this backdrop, Gorodeisky (2019a, 2019b) has drawn attention to a blind spot in contemporary research by considering aesthetic pleasure to be revelatory of aesthetic value. In this paper, my aim is to advance the debate on aesthetic pleasure in the objectivist direction highlighted by Gorodeisky. In particular, I will focus on the following question: How is pleasure connected to values? The answer that I will develop in response to this question goes as follows. First, I will I distinguish two kinds of aesthetic pleasure: liking and enjoyment. Next, I will suggest that liking is a form of feeling elicited by the cognition of aesthetic value and I will distinguish it from both the grasping of values and emotional responses.

Irene Martínez Marín: Akrasia and the Structure of Aesthetic Rationality

One cannot be rational whilst being akratic. Though philosophers typically claim that aesthetics falls within the scope of rationality, a non-akrasia requirement is yet to be developed in aesthetics. This, I argue, is because the main views on aesthetic appreciation have either rejected or ignored the phenomenon of aesthetic akrasia (e.g., ‘S judges x to be beautiful and yet S dislikes x’, or ‘S judges that x has low aesthetic merit, yet S enjoys x’.). According to affectivists, aesthetic character is revealed through affect, so what is judged and what is liked cannot diverge. Thus, akrasia never occurs. For cognitivists, akrasia is possible. However, akrasia does not interfere with appreciation because an agent’s judgment, not their liking of what is judged, marks the agent’s relation to value. I plan to show that both views mischaracterize the relationship between aesthetic judgment and the affective components of appreciation. This leads to a discussion on how a non-akrasia requirement could be articulated, and opens the door to a new appreciation account in line with this norm. Ultimately, this paper pushes for the idea that aesthetic rationality is no different from other domains in that it requires mental coherence between an agent’s mental states.

**Philosophy of Film**

Diana Neiva: Cinematic Thought Experiments and the Bold “Film as Philosophy” Thesis

My main argument, in this presentation, is that some films are good philosophical thought experiments (TEs), sometimes better than traditional philosophy TEs found in texts. In arguing so, we can respond to the rationality objection, since films can be at least special and in the best case better for thought experimentation. And we should also see how films resort to their specific cinematic nature, in such a way that we can defend a “bold thesis”. I will use Tom McClelland's arguments for cinematic TEs, such as the argument for the “Socratic model” (“The Philosophy of Film and Film as Philosophy”, 2011), and how he addresses several problems in cinematic TEs that can actually be opportunities for a bold thesis: the problem of a film lacking an explicit philosophical framework (usually an argument in a book or paper); the lack of detail that can be found in textual philosophical TEs (an accusation made by Kathleen Wilkes in Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments, 1993); the problem of bias that lead us towards specific conclusions (e.g. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991); and the “problem of proper domains” – a sceptical position about the value of TEs upheld by Edouard Machery (“Thought Experiments and Philosophical Knowledge”, 2011). All of these problems are addressed by McClelland in “Film as Philosophical Thought Experiment Some Challenges and Opportunities” (2019). I will analyse how his solutions for these problems may not only solve some scepticism towards the cognitive value of TEs in general, but they can contribute for a bold film as philosophy thesis, recurring to the analysis made by Wartenberg of *The Matrix* as an example of a case of film as philosophy through thought experimentation.

Enrico Terrone: Observers and Narrators in Fiction Film

The philosophical debate on the audience’s engagement with fiction films focuses on two theses, namely, the Imagined Observer Thesis (IOT) and the Film Narrator Thesis (FNT): (IOT) Viewers of fiction films are meant to imagine being observers of fictional events. (FNT) Viewers of fiction films are meant to imagine that fictional events are told by a narrator. The two theses are usually taken as the two components of one theoretical package, which philosophers such as George Wilson (2011) and Jerrold Levison (1993) defend while philosopher such as Gregory Currie (1995) and Berys Gaut (2010) reject. I argue that the two theses can be disentangled: the second thesis entails the first but there is no entailment the other way around. However, I also argue that, if we endorse the first thesis, endorsing the second provides us with a more compelling explanation of our engagement with and appreciation of fiction films.

**Aesthetic Matters VIII**

Laura Di Summa: The Way We Collect. Looking for the Personal in the Rise of Private Collections

Collecting, and especially the collection of art, can be traced back to the Hellenistic period; it became pervasive in the XVII and XVIII centuries, with the rise of the bourgeoisie, and grew exponentially in the nineteenth and twentieth century when collectors became the unofficial promoters of the emerging avant-garde. Today collecting is inevitably associated with the booming art market and with the fortunes of a restricted number of people who have amassed incredible pieces and extended their power, as a quick look at the MoMA’s board of trustees shows, to the very administration of museums, raising concerns with regards to the independence of both artists and professionals within the arts.
While aware of the implications of the current scenario, I will focus on a more positive look at collecting, one that stems from the relation between our own identity and desires and the very act of acquiring, curating, and pursuing objects. Human beings collect virtually everything, and collecting can be viewed as a virtually daily practice that is significant in tracing our identity and expressing emotions and values. I argue that a reflection on such topics can shift our understanding of present private collections and pave the way for a more inclusive way of collecting art.

**Philosophy of Music VI**

Nemesio G. C. Puy: Interpretive Authenticity. Performances, Version and Ontology

Julian Dodd argues that interpretive authenticity and score compliance authenticity are two fundamental performance values within Western practice of performing works of music (Dodd 2020). Given the work-focused nature of the practice of work performance, both kinds of authenticities usually go hand in hand: an insightful presentation of W in performance commonly requires the performer’s full compliance with its score’s instructions. Dodd notes, however, that both performance values may sometimes come into conflict: following accurately the instructions of W’s score may prevent from offering performances that shed light into W’s content (Dodd 2020, 145). At this point, Dodd defends a polemic thesis: in those cases of normative conflict, performers should compromise compliance with the score (intentionally departing from tempi, nuances, instrumentation or notational marks) in benefit of producing performances that evince understanding of the works performed (Dodd 2020, 164). Stephen Davies and Andrew Kania have questioned Dodd’s thesis. According to Davies, score compliance authenticity cannot be compromised because it is ‘an ontological requirement, not an interpretive option’ to perform a work (Davies 2013, 74). In this vein, Kania argues that a performance intentionally departing from W’s score is either a non-authentic performance of W, or it is not a performance of W at all, but of ‘a very minimal transcription or arrangement’ of it (Kania 2020, 191).  The thesis I defend in this paper is that the ontological problem faced by Dodd’s account on authenticity is merely apparent. Even if musical works are norm-types, for a non-fully compliant performance with W’s score to count as an authentic performance of W, it is not sufficient for that performance to be a mere token of W. It also needs to be a properly formed token of W. Or, in normative terms, maximizing interpretive authenticity in performing W must imply maximizing properly tokening W. The nested types theory explains how the correct performances of, for example, the two versions of Tchaikovsky’s Second Symphony are properly formed tokens of a same work, despite both versions having different scores (cf. Puy 2019, 248–251). In other words, it can explain how performances that are not compliant with the work’s original score (that of the 1872 version) can be properly formed tokens of the same work of which the perfectly compliant performances with that score also are properly formed tokens.

**Aesthetics of Architecture**

Zsolt Batori and Borbala Jasz: Architectural Objects and Their Meaning Types

We propose a new conceptual framework for architectural meaning on the basis of the speech act theory (Austin, 1962, Searle, 1969) and its application to pictorial meaning, the picture act theory (Kjørup, 1974, 1978, Novitz, 1975, 1977). We extend the theory of speech acts and picture acts to include objects in general and buildings in particular. Our theory of object acts accounts for the construction and interpretation of architectural meaning on the basis of how we interpret architectural locutionary acts (buildings) in the context of their production and use. In our ontological account architectural objects, such as buildings or larger coherent units (blocks, districts or even cities) are understood not merely as physical objects, but also as architectural locutionary acts. An architectural locutionary act is the architectural object that is produced and presented not only for its utility, but also for the interpretation of its communicative content. Accordingly, the architectural illocutionary act is the architectural locutionary act interpreted in the specific context of its production and use. Similarly to speech acts, the interpreter understands not only the intended meaning (in the given contexts), but also that the producer of the architectural locutionary act intended her meaning-producing intention to be recognised. The basic components of architectural illocutionary acts are: object recognition, visual processing of spatial relations and arrangements, utterer’s (producer’s) intention, and context.

**Philosophy of Pictures IV**

Alberto Voltolini: Seeing in Shadows

If one is in a Platonic mood, shadows (along with highlights, mirrors and reflections more in general) are seen as the paradigmatic case of pictures. Yet this mood is no longer shared nowadays. Either because shadows are the mere causally inert items that causally, if not also existentially, depend on the objects that cast them (Matthen 2018, Kim 1996), or because they are flat immaterial individuals (Casati and Cavanagh 2019, Matthen 2018): pure visibilia like lights and rainbows, which instead of presenting visible properties of other objects, merely instantiate such properties (Martin 2012). In this paper, I will try to vindicate the venerable Platonic standpoint, by claiming that shadows determine pictures just in case, appearances notwithstanding, they elicit to adequate spectators an ordinary experience of seeing-in basically conceived along Wollheim’s (1980, 1987, 1998, 2003) lines. Indeed, the experience of seeing-in is a twofold sui generis perceptual experience. As to it, in the recognitional fold (RF) of that experience, the relevant perceiver discerns the picture’s subject, viz. what that vehicle presents, in the picture’s vehicle, i.e., the physical object flanking that perceiver, who also sees it in the configurational fold (CF) of the experience.