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Plot and Imagination Schemata, Metaphor and Aesthetic Idea — A Ricoeurian Interpretation of the Kantian Concept of Imagination

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ABSTRACT. The aim of the paper is to analyse connections between Kantian theory of productive imagination and Ricoeurian conception of linguistic imagination and expanding it with the concept of aesthetic idea. Paul Ricoeur uses Kant's concept of imagination which synthesizes and schematizing, the object of experience in his description of productive powers of language. Telling stories consists in generating content through appropriate alignment of events and creation of time configurations. Plot as schema of imagination creates the meaningful order of events according to rules of configuration. Metaphor is a special product of linguistic imagination, it creates new semantic pertinence through unconventional combinations of words in a sentence – it transgresses the conventional order of language. Metaphor is closer to the aesthetic idea, which transgresses any conceptualizations in free play of images, than to synthesis and schematization of imagination.

Construction of literary fiction, telling stories, creating narration or plot consists in generating content through appropriate alignment of events, creation of time configurations and establishing relations between the elements. In his description of productive powers of language Paul Ricoeur uses Kant's concept of imagination which synthesizes and systematizes the object of experience. Imagination not only makes images appear, but it is a rule for generating content through time alignment of images. In this way the French philosopher avoids contradictions caused by taking negative reference to reality as a point of departure. It entangles concepts

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that analyse images from the point of view of differences and similarities to perception. They do not focus on the dynamics of images, but analyse the ontological status of a single image. Ricoeur, on the other hand, proposes linguistic interpretation of imagination and seeks a productive rule for generating fiction. In this respect, Ricoeur goes back to Kant's findings on *modus operandi* of imagination and introduces Kantian productive imagination into the field of language. He finds similarities in synthetic and systematizing function of plot in a story. Metaphor takes a special place in his considerations, as it creates semantic innovation going against previous linguistic usage. Comparison with the aesthetic idea described in Critique of Judgement contributes to in-depth analysis of metaphor.

The goal of this paper is to analyse connections between Kantian theory of productive imagination and Ricoeurian linguistic imagination concept and expanding it with the concept of aesthetic idea. Synthetic and schematic aspect of productive imagination will be described first, and then a reference will be made to the role of plot in a story. Metaphor will be presented as a special product of linguistic imagination that is closer to the aesthetic idea than to synthesis of imagination.

1. Synthesizing Experience

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, imagination is necessary to create a meaningful experience. Imagination is in fact a rule of forming and synthesizing the variety of temporal and spatial connections which makes them meaningful. At the same time it prefigures form of object of possible experience. Forming and giving discursiveness intermingle in a single process of generating the content of experience. Rudolf Makkreel, a great interpreter of Kant's legacy, shows that imagination process of synthesizing experience takes the form of hermeneutic circle: a part is apprehended by the whole. There are three steps of synthesizing the object of experience: intuitive apprehension, imaginative reproduction and conceptual recognition. At first, variety is apprehended as a single representation of time and space in the process of running through and establishing relations between elements. This running through and organizing also means comparing and selection from a manifoldness as a prerequisite for correct uniting. In this

way a single image is borne.[1]

However, this synthesis is preceded by reproduction of previously recorded images that become a context for currently formulated representation. Reconstruction ensures continuity of images, so it is only with it that any imagination becomes possible. If it is not so, in a series of subsequent momentary representations, the subject of experience would disintegrate. Continuity of the time itself also contributes to keeping past images as it emerges together with unity of the image: "But if I were always to lose the preceding representations from my thoughts and not reproduce when I proceed to following ones, then no whole representation and none of previously mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most fundamental representations of space and time, could ever arise".[2] It is only in relation of succession and precedence that the subject of cognition emerges together with unity of the time itself. Keeping images allows for mutual references to representations, disambiguating them and setting relations.

Reconstruction, subordinated to cognitive goals, needs to keep appropriate relations between representations i.e. according to rules of association. These relations function as constant connections of associations thanks to which cinnabar will always be represented as red.[3] It means that it will be neither blue nor white. Only appropriate definition of differences and capturing repetitive sequences of representations allow for creation of meaning compound and intelligible content. These are not random connections, but appropriate, selected and constant reference connections:

> Since, however, if representations reproduced one another without
> distinction, just as they fell together, there would in turn be no de-
> terminate connection but merely unruly heaps of them, no cognition
> at all would arise, their reproduction must have a rule in accordance
> which a representation enters into combination in the imagination
> with one representation rather than with any others.[4]

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[1] I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1998, p.229

[2] Ibidem, p. 230.

[3] See, ibidem, p. 230 "If cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy (...) then my empirical imagination would never even get the opportunity to think of heavy cinnabar on occasion of representation of the color red".

[4] Ibidem, p. 239.

It is important to stress that apart from linking compatible elements there is also an element of distinction and selection in the way imagination works. Each act of setting a form is connected with limiting and differentiating. Synthesis of reconstruction and association, together with the whole wealth of relations between representations points to imagination as an array of their possible comparisons and differentiations, as well as connections and selections. Only imagination understood in this way allows for specific combinations of images and generating appropriate sets of images, thus also intelligible content.

Description of the third synthesis, the moment of recognition, points to two significant aspects of the process of cognition. First, the whole cognitive experience, gathering images, viewing and running through, must have formal unity of cognitive consciousness at its base. Second, and more important, this formal unity of experience is guaranteed by using categories in apprehending manifoldness.[5] They are responsible for constant and confirming way of relating to the synthesized manifoldness.[6] In other words, thanks to recognition, phenomenons are understood as appropriate and always as the same object, in line with a given concept. This three syntheses together form a circle: apprehension which creates basic elements of experience needs reproduction to ensure continuity and possibility to apprehend subsequent elements. Representations are connected with each other in stable relations thanks to recognition, or even more, the recognition of phenomenon as an object (right and always the same) needs to commence the whole process.[7]

To sum up, synthesis of an experience generates content through building temporal continuity of an object and this showing constant relations of appropriate elements succeeding and accompanying each other. Such an object is apprehended through reference to an appropriate category that sets its limits for apparition.

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[5] See, ibidem, p. 241.

[6] See, ibidem, p. 232.

[7] R.I. Makkreel, *Imagination and interpretation in Kant*, The Univesity of Chicago Press, US 1990, p. 28.

2. Imagination Schemata

Imagination schemata, and to be more precise schemata of pure intellectual concepts, intermediate between particularity of sensual cognition and generality of category. Applying the schemata introduces unity and comprehensibility of experience. Categories are formal determinants of possibility of discursive meaning. Phenomena are put into categories through their temporal depiction in schemata.

> Schemata are therefore nothing but a priori time-determinations in accordance with rules, concern, according to the of the categories, time-series, the content of time, the order of time, and finally the sum total of time in regard to all possible objects.[8]

Schemata organize experiences and thus generate their temporal meaning. This meaning ensures unity in temporal sequence of a given phenomenon or a series of phenomena that become apprehensible through this alignment. In other words, temporal meaning is the coherence and discursivity of phenomena obtained as an effect of connecting them in an appropriate manner. For example, causality scheme introduces a rule of apprehending time sequence as necessary, which makes succession of representations be perceived as influence of one event on another and gives it a status of appropriateness. Other schemata define, among others, the possibility of temporal co-occurrence of phenomena, methods of fillings time and their relations to time as such. Temporal sequence in a form of discursive depiction of the possible subject.

Makkreel compares the way schemata operate to grammar rules that organize words within sentences, define relations between them and thus give them coherence and condition their intelligibility. This procedure highlights meaning generation role of ordering phenomena in line with appropriate category. In brief: schemata organize representation into content according to appropriate rules and thus allow for apprehending it. They generate content. This allows us to take a look at configurational role of schemata regardless of epistemological functions of imagination e.g. in the art of telling stories. This very function is needed anywhere where a given configuration of phenomena is represented. Schemata turn

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[8] I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., p. 276.

out to be a rule for generating sequence of events in a story or a movie. Generative Kantian imagination is the major basis, apart from *Poetics* of Aristotle, of Ricoer's theory of story narration and plot. According to the French philosopher what is most important is that imagination is treated as a scheme for generating temporal sequence and it is the factor generating its meaning.[9]

3. Plot and Imagination Scheme

In his definition of plot the French philosopher stresses the dynamic aspect of creating organized set of events.[10] This is the major axis of a story on which temporarily complex representation is based. It is exactly plot building that is the process that allows for representation of a story as it requires productive imagination.[11] This synthetic, configurational act: "consists of 'grasping together' the detailed actions or what I have called the story's incidents. It draws from this manifold of events the unity of one temporal whole".[12] The sense of a story materializes itself in teleologically directed whole and, as an effect, it generates immanent time of a story. The French philosopher calls this effect of arranging events within-time-ness.[13] It is realized in the requirement of wholeness of the story in line with guidelines included in Aristotle's Poetics: with the beginning, the middle and the end. The beginning is defined by lack of necessity of succeeding something, the middle already requires such succession relations on both ends. The end appears according to rule of necessity as an effect of earlier events. Story composition is not, however, characterized by necessity in its strong sense, but allows for being followed, it is probable, and from the point of view of end, even necessary.

> "To follow a story is to move forward in the midst of contingencies
> and peripeteia under the guidance of an expectation that finds its

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[9] P. Ricoeur, *The Rule of metaphor*, translated by R. Czerny, K. McLaughlin, J. Costello, Routledge, London, 1977, p. 199.

[10] P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 1, translated by K. McLaughlin, D. Pellauer, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1983, p. 55.

[11] Ibidem, p. 56.

[12] Ibidem, p. 66.

[13] Ibidem, p. 61.

> fulfillment in the "conclusion" of the story. This conclusion is not
> logically implied by some previous premises. It gives the story an
> "end point," which, in turn, furnishes the point of view from which
> the story can be perceived as forming a whole".[14]

The story allows for being followed and the end becomes a conclusion of successive episodes which are brought together as a story. It is in connection of events e.g. by cause-and-effect relationships that Ricoeur sees the necessary and universal character of a story.

In Kantian terminology plot corresponds to imagination scheme: in a specific case it uses appropriate rules for temporal apparition, interdependency, co-existence and succession of events and realizes them thanks to sequential links. These rules regulating the course of events (to which appropriate regulations connected with speeding up, suspending, repeating etc. can be added) correspond to Kantian categories. The plot also perform complex synthesis: such heterogeneous elements "as agents, motives and circumstances are rendered compatible and work together in actual temporal wholes".[15] Plot connects separate events with the general dimension of the story systematizing sequence of events aligned into a given story. Thanks to it the story is no longer an enumeration of events, but it forms an apprehensible whole: "emplotment is the operation that draws a configuration out of a simple succession".[16]

Configuration consists of building various temporal experiences (non-chronological) that connect in a synthetic plot with chronological time, manifesting itself in subsequent episodes. Thanks to fictional cuts and detachment from cognitive requirement within-time-ness of the story is free from linear representation of events with linearity of the course of time. In this sense time in a story is configurable: moments different in time build up a greater whole.

Ricoeur defines a term of concordant discordance that underlines the synthetic but not uniform character of the plot even more.[17] Concordance relates to the comprehensive form of the story in which temporarily

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[14] Ibidem, p. 66.
[15] Ibidem, p. 57.
[16] Ibidem, p. 65.
[17] See: ibidem, p. 66.

discordant elements appear. The plot must cope with various temporal dimensions connected with multi-plot character, different points of view, relations between narrator and characters and also between the characters themselves. The narrator can accompany his or her characters but he or she can also look ahead, look back or contemplate the presence from the point of view of its anticipation.[18] Synthesized discordances also relate to various times of characters that form a temporal unity. Multiplicity of temporal experiences of various characters interlace in one another. It it exactly this network that, examined as a whole, constitutes time experience in Mrs Dalloway.[19]

The plot creates both the whole of a story and a very specific experience of time. Literature serves here as a laboratory for imagination. In Kantian understanding of imagination – as synthesis in reproduction (forming continuity of time) and method of giving meaning – also the intelligibility and necessity appears through temporal organization and schematization. Schemata mentioned by Ricoeur do not have a priori value. They are created as an effect of accumulation of writing practices during which relevant narration forms are created. They regulate the way plot is constructed and the possibilities of departures in such a way as to keep unity of the work. Then philosopher subsequently undertakes historical and literary studies and tracks changes in schemes: from the development of new forms and conventions that aimed at even more faithful representation of a real experience (e.g. epistolary prose), through introduction of deepened character psychology and stream of consciousness after the attempt at eliminating end in the 20th century. Rules for generating content, form of what it probable or scope and limits of semantic fields are thus well-established in tradition. Metaphor is thus placed at the other end of dynamics of linguistic creation, it transgresses this order and leads to semantic stress.

4. Metaphor

In classical Aristotelian definition, metaphor consists of noticing similarit-

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[18] See: P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative,* vol. 2, translated by K. McLaughlin, D. Pellauer, The Univeristy of Chicago, Chicago and London 1985, p. 94.

[19] See: Ibidem, p. 112.

ies. Ricoeur stresses that constructing metaphor does not consist in associating what is like and substituting the name of one thing with the name of another thing, but in juxtaposing and seeing similarities in what is different. Ricoeur poses a rhetorical question: "But what is it to be perceptive of resemblance if not to inaugurate the similarity by bringing together terms that at first seem 'distant', then suddenly 'close'"?[20] In brief, metaphor is about proximity, comparison and establishing similarity. The work of imagination consists in changing distance, juxtaposing given elements in such a way that they could be compared and causing a tension between elements. Imagination is a comparative array thanks to which distant elements can be juxtaposed and can exhibit mutual relations; similarity becomes visible as an effect.[21] Metaphor is thus unconventional combinations of words in a sentence (is broader metaphoric expression), not a type of verbal image. Combination is a metaphor: when we see resistance in words in their casual meaning and discordance in literal interpretation of a sentence. In other words, when we cannot find adequate representation in literal language for it, in a specific notion.

This new relation is shocking and causes a shift in meaning and produces new semantic pertinence. In this place we can talk about the moment of cognition, similarity or establishment of new semantic applicability. However, this will not be apprehension that is realized in synthesis through subsumption under a notion determining power of judgement, but it manifests itself as reflecting power of judgement. The question is, whether such recognition does not require actions of a genius who could grasp the free play of imagination and give it palpable form. His work does not mimic his predecessors and stays beyond representation rules accepted to date. Thus, it establishes a new rule. However, the power of vivid, poetic metaphor (i.e. a metaphor that is not part of phraseology of a given language) causes the multitude of senses that it suggest not be able to define themselves literary, be translated into non-figurative sentences. The French philosopher describes the differences between vivid, poetic metaphor and a trivial metaphor with possibility of paraphrasing: "The difference between trivial metaphor and poetic metaphor is not that one

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[20] P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 1, op. cit., p. X.
[21] See, P. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, op. cit., p. 226.

can be paraphrased and the other not, but that the paraphrase of the later is without end. It is endless".[22] In other words, poetic metaphor, thanks to its surprising and rule-breaking juxtapositions, recognizes a certain similarity and at the same time it opens richness of senses that will never exhausted, and meaning-creation by connections is endless. It is thus a miracle of free imagination that works beyond the limits imposed by the rules of language, transgresses them and uses in free creation. Metaphor (metaphoric expression) corresponds to modus operandi of free imagination described in Critique of Judgement.

5. Aesthetic Idea

Modus operandi of imagination in an aesthetic experience does not consists in providing a series of representations, as it is the case in cognitive process. Imagination It is free from empirical rules of association and linear representation of time. It is not limited with goal of any kind, effect to be achieved or end; its time-related mode of operation changes. This shift changes relation of cognitive powers and leads to redefining imagination and broadening its scope. Imaginations plays freely with formats beyond any requirements, uses its powers of connecting and schematizing, allows for feeling beauty and once captured by a genius, it generates aesthetic idea that transgress notions.

Aesthetic idea is a rule rendering work more lively. It gives a work of art *Geist*. In other words it makes it transgress symmetry, accuracy and canon. It appears as a result of a series of transformations and is striking (but not determined by concept) presentation. Idea assembles all the different images accompanying it, but it stays beyond any of the concepts. Because of that "occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought or a concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible".[23] In a series of imagination operations, the idea is an accurate, but indeterminate representation, encompassing references to manifoldness of other representations that not only cannot be encapsulated in a single notion, but they

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[22] Ibidem, p. 223.
[23] I. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, translated by P. Guyer, E. Matthews, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000, p. 192.

expand it aesthetically. It animates the mind "by opening for it the prospect of an immeasurable field of related representations".[24] A work that constitutes an aesthetic idea, suggests something more than the mere notion that was supposed to be included in it.

In this very different formation of representations imagination can freely use intellect schemata and while staying independent of its empirical application and right of association, it can also go beyond the intellect and reach for rules included in reason. Imagination appears here as an experimental space for all what is sensual; a genius, a poet aim at giving palpable form to what is not sensual i.e. to what goes beyond cognitive experience with the use of what is sensual. In this sense aesthetic ideas are close to the ideas of reason: they transgress experience. At the same time, by generating non-standard and unperceived representations, they give the intellect a new field for possible definition.

Kant does not explain exactly what this processing of palpable data consists of, nor in which manner imaginations implements anew the rules of intellect and reason. Description of normal idea constitutes a possible interpretation path. It is a type of intermediate image that appears during the process of appearing the ideal of perfection.[25]

Ideal of perfection is a unitary representation that would constitute the pattern of taste. Its generation requires the idea of reasons (it is not the ideal of free beauty but dependent beauty) and aesthetic idea of norm that constitutes palpable image but with greater degree of generality. Imagination, by creating the idea of norm, shows its ability to reproduce even the most distant images, to compare them and let them glide one to another: "superimpose one image on another and by means of the congruence of several images of the same kind to arrive the model image".[26] Repeated act of imagining a given phenomenon not only makes it generate intermediary image, but it shows complexity of relations between images where imagination can lead it. It mines it from linear structures of experience, compares and selects them as defining what is typical requires omission of deviating and keeping similar elements. The structure of imagination as array of comparison, selection and combination is confirmed. Imagin-

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[24] Ibidem, p. 193.
[25] See: ibidem, p. 116 – 120.
[26] Ibidem, p. 118.

ation exhibits its flexibility, that means that imagination practically traverses the linear organisation of images from inner sense and compares representations beyond this order. This flexibility of imagination allows for comparing images in real time and allows for liberty in cutting, in any possible direction, linear representation of experience. In this way imagination can process images with a larger degree of generality that constitute a measure in assessing perfection. Aesthetic ideas of norm do not, however, go beyond notion of a given kind and do not guarantee achievement of the ideal of beauty, but only a certain canon. What transgresses the notions and stimulates thinking, through palpable image, is the aesthetic idea. Imagination in aesthetic idea is even more free and unpredictable. It reproduces images and shapes of objects out of an immense number of different representations and gives them new life.

Imagination must go beyond just superimposing images and selecting what is typical for a given species. It operates on an uncountable number of representations of various species and it connects them by selecting between them regardless of differences in rules of associating them in an experience. It connects freely all types of images, but in such a way that they take new meaning, or rather that they suggest a multitude of possible meanings. As Kant defines it: "the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination associated with a given concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial representations in the free use of imagination that no designation of a determinate concept can be found for it, which therefore allows the addition to a concept of much that is unnamable".[27] This idea is thus a work that expands a given notion by a series of representations not visible in these very things that are revealed only by free operation of imagination.

Striking similarity and relations of a given thing with various images that break its limits become visible in an idea. Metaphors, as described by Ricoeur, stress selected aspects of things by linking them with other, distant meanings in such a way that they focus on multitude of associations and images. They evoke subsequent metaphors that escape literal, unambiguous depiction even further. Root metaphor puts subordinate images together and these very images taken together scatter and disperse the

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[27] Ibidem, p. 194.

concept. It focuses on the whole group of images, creates structure and hierarchy and transgresses any conceptualizations.[28] In this way, they, this whole group of images, become open to the richness of sense that in Ricoeur takes the form of opening to symbolic experience of the world. This happens at the contact of the semantic and the non-semantic (connected with desire or experience of *sacrum*). Metaphor is implemented in language on the basis of which it works on meanings and it, in this way, distils relations mixed in what is symbolic, such as affinity, correspondence or difference.[29]

It manipulates freely connections of various semantic fields and causes shifts in relation to well-established linguistic relations, it allows for noticing unexpected relations and thus opens itself to these that do not allow themselves to be finally encapsulated in senses of symbolic experience that Kant instils in the aesthetic. As an example, Kant gives Jupiter's eagle, who hold in its claws a lightning being attribute of the appropriate God. However, all this is not logically linked or univocal; it suggests a multitude of elements linked with majesty, loftiness, powers of nature etc. and it gives imagination momentum: it's an aesthetic link. The aesthetic idea resounds in the poem that Kant evoke and that is practically an extended metaphoric expression:

> "Let us depart from life without grumbling and without regretting anything, leaving the world behind us replete with good deeds. Thus does the sun, after it has completed its daily course, still spread a gentle light across the heavens; and the last rays that it sends forth into the sky are its last sighs for the well-being of the world".[30]

The poem of Frederick William II of Prussia relates to the notion of end of life that is, however, extended and scattered in juxtaposition with sigh and rays of sun, death and sunset, it evokes the atmosphere of a summer night, expresses consent to death, but it is also filled with nostalgia and indicated the natural, circular organization of things. He thus links this notion with multiple intimate and distant images that confirm the metaphor and

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[28] See: P. Ricoeur, *Metaphor and symbol,* in: *Interpretation Theory*, Texas Christian University Press, Texas, 1976, p. 64.
[29] See: ibidem, p. 69.
[30] Ibidem, p. 193.

escape a single, adequate expression. Aesthetic ideas are formed in rhetoric, poetry and also in painting, sculpture or music that through appropriate sensual compilation transgress and expand the notion in question. This very comparison with the way metaphor works can facilitate understanding the way aesthetic idea works and broaden the scope of metaphor beyond purely linguistic dimension.

6. Summary

By establishing a link between Kantian thought and Ricoeurian concept we can understand aesthetic idea as metaphor and see the aesthetic idea in metaphor in more detail, as well as get closer to the idea by reading it through metaphor. Schemata of imagination as a plot combine events in temporal configurations and make them understandable and necessary. The configurations and relations of representation in aesthetic idea are free from linear course of experience and create unexpected combinations in metaphor: semantic innovations.

Metaphor and aesthetic idea are connected by the possibility of linking representations in a way independent of all association rules: incongruent semantic fields. Thanks to this aesthetic idea transgresses the framework of a given notion, just as metaphor transgresses language usage. Aesthetic idea only suggests a meaning, gives food for though just as poetic metaphor allows for paraphrasing without loss of its semantic richness. This elusiveness of idea and metaphor provides an opening to new meaning, but on the other hand it does not allow for concrete, synthetic depiction. The play itself is endless. Additionally, the idea is not realized in a linear sequence but its multiple meanings appear through confrontation of many representations. As such, it relates to the idea of reason and not to the category of intellect. Comparison of idea and metaphor allows for familiarization with the way imagination works. It brings closer images that are distant and unrelated in cognitive experience, as metaphor juxtaposes distant semantic fields by comparing and shocking, establishing similarities. This surprising accuracy of aesthetic idea can consist in establishing relations between these images and showing similarity. In a way it extends the concept by opening the prospect of the immeasurable filed of related

images and creates sensuality according to other, changeable and freely selected rules.

Juxtaposition of metaphor with idea pushes it, however, far from plot and temporal configurations understood in their synthetic function. Metaphor as semantic innovation differs significantly from construing plot understood as schematic construction of temporal experience. Novel construction that necessitates linking images together on the basis of appropriate associations based on linguistic and stylistic rules is something utterly different. What brings plot and imagination's scheme creation close is their synthetic function. Plot creates fictive experience of time through assigning images to appropriate categories. This assignment is not so restrictive as in cognitive process; in story telling experience and time can be freely configured by they cannot break some applicability rules. Creation of metaphor goes beyond schematic operation of imagination that configures content in line with traditional novel schemata and even as effect of violating rules, it opens the richness of sense in the situation of endless paraphrasing. There is, however, no way of completely separating influence of the innovative function of metaphor from the development of narrative schemata in the historical process of transformations of language and the art of story-telling. Schemata stabilize understanding and temporal experience and at the same time they prepare background for subsequent metaphors, and the creative power of language makes the process dynamic. The power of imagination to organize and stabilize content is also the power to transgress this order and opening new meanings.

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