

# **Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics**

Volume 7, 2015

Edited by Fabian Dorsch and Dan-Eugen Ratiu

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## **Proceedings of the European Society of Aesthetics**

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# *Aesthetics as Dividual Affections*

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ABSTRACT. Together with the philosophies of Gilbert Simondon, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gilles Deleuze I will reflect once again on the possibility of the foundation of aisthesis/aesthetics in primary sensuous processes. I start with the idea of first passive-active processes which I call affections since they are supposed to bring about themselves in/as first energetic tensions, zones of vibration and sensation. Thanks to the relations and resonances between them they constitute fields of sensuality as non-personal and pre-individual preconditions for the development of more complicated, among other human sensibilities and later on artistic articulations.

Such primary affections have been unfolded by the French philosophers Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze as first quasi-ontological foundations. They are called quasi-ontological since they do not establish an inalterable and essential being, but processes of timing and of becoming. Both thinkers conceive of this quasi-foundation as a twofold and paradoxical figure: as temporal infinity able to affect itself while repeating its infinite past and, by doing so, constituting itself as an ever forthcoming present. Therefore it is called (self)affection in Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of perception*. Its twofold figure of repetition and constitution, of self-affection and affection of others is then applied to other processes of timing such as sensuous and sensitive becomings, not least to artistic practices and works of art. While providing its own foundation it sets free dynamic processes of differentiation and intensification of sensuous articulations up to the point where they transcend and transform themselves into surfaces of organic – or artistic - sensibility. Since this paradoxical process has the capacity to establish as well the immanent process of temporal differentiation as timing as such it is called primary transcendental aesthetics by Deleuze.

Thanks to the dynamic of this self-affecting process, it is supposed to bring about more complex, anorganic and organic constitutions such as the anthropogenesis. The becoming human is conceived with Sigmund Freud, Deleuze and Simondon as a complexification of the multiple and initially not coordinated sensuous inscriptions building up a surface of incorporeal expression and bringing about other capacities in qualitative jumps such as perception, emotion, consciousness and thinking. It does not come as a surprise that this human being is understood as a metastable equilibrium

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of heterogeneous layers of individuation which has to incessantly struggle for integration and coherence.

At this point I want to claim a significant correction of the philosophical terminology: Since the human being is affected by so many bio- and socio-technological processes, I want to argue that we can no longer consider it an individual, undivided entity. Besides the fact that humans today are involuntarily captured and controlled by hidden technologies, they also participate frenetically in digital communications up to the point of being intrinsically entangled with countless human others. But also thanks to our refined technologies of observation and registration we are forced to acknowledge that human beings are co-constituted by billions of microorganisms which influence and maybe constitute their psychophysis. This is why we have to recognize that the human being is an ever divided entity of voluntary or involuntary participation which should no longer be related to "individuality", but should be conceived of as ever changing "dividuation".

The term dividual is used twice by Gilles Deleuze: in a positive sense in his film studies in order to characterize the expressive and ever changing articulations of filmic art works; in a rather negative sense in his small text *Society of Control* where he conceives of the epistemological and political shift from analogous to numeric times. In his eyes this technological shift transforms the human subject into an indefinite self-modelling process which varies according to other fluctuations of the social field, such as the currency or the demographic rates. Since the single person gets numerically and statistically related with abstract and impersonal processes, Deleuze speaks of new modes of subjectivation: „The individuals have become dividual“. Being dividual or a dividuation as I would prefer to call it expresses a twofold passive-active status of the single human being: the status of being affected as well as affecting countless many, not only human beings. In this sense human subjectivation can be compared with filmic processes and their ever changing dividual expressions. They act like aesthetic ensembles temporally framed by their particular expressions. They have a certain affective and cognitive coherence, but they permanently divide themselves according to their multidirectional participations. Their future will depend on their affective management and their subversive use of affections.

In a last step I want to present an example of filmic dividuation: The essay film "Passing Drama" of Angela Melitopoulos. It refers to the topic of human migration by demonstrating in close-ups that all things and their metamorphoses can be portrayed as processes of migration. The film provides series of so called images of affection which do not only prove that each image is in permanent transformation, but that it consists of an infinity of microimages and pixels which remind their constitution in temporal simu-



lacra. By doing so, the film exposes its own foundational processes in quasi-sensuous data by claiming for a political recognition of human migration.

Aesthetics in my understanding does not only consist in theories of art, but, as has been stated now for at least 250 years, should try to unfold a sensitive logic as primary capacity able to found and to bring about other capacities such as perception, feeling and reason. Nevertheless the relatedness of the two aesthetical aspects has not been unfolded, as far as I know, until today. In Kant's philosophy they remain separated as two aspects which we can call the objective and subjective part of aesthetics. Therefore I want to promote here an aesthetical-epistemological figure which is able as well to found a capacity of sensual recognition as to deliver an aesthetical norm for the discussion of art.

Together with the philosophies of Gilbert Simondon, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gilles Deleuze I want to present this figure as a necessary twofoldedness which means that it has to respond to two needs at the same time: it has to fulfil the paradoxical task of constituting itself as primary sensual process and of bringing about all further processes of becoming. These processes are supposed to develop a heterogenesis of sensuality and sentience which allows to determine as well historically changing human subjectivations as changing aesthetical articulations. These articulations can then be evaluated according to their reflection of their primordial heterogeneous foundation. This twofold figure I call it "affections". Affections, as I want to explain further with Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, can be developed as primary self-affections and as stimuli for processes of becoming of all sorts.

Affection, the Latin translation of Aristotle's *pathos*, do not only express a passive quality of human capacities, but can be considered minimally active in the way that they bring together at least two different terms, provoke reactions between them while holding them in distance. Affections can therefore be called a disjunctive synthesis, opening up a space between related terms. This space is considered by Henri Bergson as the precondition for the development of a sensitive capacity between perception and action. This third capacity is supposed to be the human capacity as such, since it interrupts the stimulus-response-automatism and allows

the development of sentience and emotions. I want to consider this capacity of opening up a sensitive space, of assembling different sensuous terms and provoking temporal and autopoietical processes between them as the foundation of aesthetics.

These heterogeneous terms can then be unfolded as the reason for the formal heterogenesis of art works and for their temporal dynamics which hinder the art work to be ever entirely realized. They also reveal anthropogenesis as an open process, especially today where our affective capacity is constantly stimulated by sensory technologies, defying us and forcing us to develop new capacities such as “hyperattention”. Thanks to their autopoietic dynamics they defy the artistic creation and bring about new artistic concepts and affects.

Therefore I want to claim further that thanks to the foundation of human subjectivations and of art works in heterogeneous affections and of their continuous reaffections we can no longer speak of undivided, individual entities, nor for the human beings nor for the art works. Deleuze uses the term *dividual* for a positive description of expressive articulations in musical and filmic art works: But he also employs it in a rather negative sense when he tries to conceptualize the epistemological and political shift from analogous to numeric times. In his eyes this technological shift transforms the human subject into an indefinite modulation which varies according to other fluctuations of the socio-economic field. Since the single person is numerically and statistically correlated to abstract processes, Deleuze speaks of new modes of subjectivation: „The individuals have become *dividual*“<sup>1</sup>. Being *dividual* or a *dividuation* as I will call it, expresses an ambivalent status of the human being as of the art work in our times: the status of being affected by multiple informations thanks to our many forms of participation and of affecting countless others. Expanding on these few remarks of Deleuze I want to conceive human subjectivations and art works as *dividuations*; thanks to their foundation in *dividual* affections we can reconnect the subjective and objective part of aesthetics.

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<sup>1</sup>Deleuze, Gilles, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” <https://files.nyu.edu/dnm232/public/deleuzepostscript.pdf> (retrieved February 25, 2014), p. 5.

### 1. Affection as Foundation of Aesthetics

The concept of „affection“ has a long history in philosophy which dates back to the theologian Augustine in the 4<sup>th</sup> century A.D. and his translation of Aristotle’s “pathos” into Latin. The concept develops a social impact in modernity when, at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Scottish-English philosophers start using it in a positive anthropological sense. As a result of the English Glorious Revolution and the „Declaration of Rights“ in 1689, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury conceives the idea that man has inborn moral sense and natural reason. Together with other philosophers such as Hutcheson, Hume and Smith he develops an anthropological thinking which, in clear opposition to the earlier negative conception of mankind in the philosophy of Hobbes, is based on the idea of a „natural sympathy“ between all human beings. Shaftesbury attributes man with a natural „feeling or affection for his likeness“ (II, 4, 82)<sup>2</sup> and a „natural compassion“ for his „fellow-creatures“. With the philosophy of Spinoza he shares the assumption that affections in general are part of the aesthetical-ethical disposition of man and therefore have to be treated in an affirmative way. Different from Spinoza, Shaftesbury conceives affections as oriented towards society and public life. Affections are considered „highest pleasures“ (I,2,1,65)<sup>3</sup>, since they provoke „social pleasure“ and „mental enjoyments“. In English and later in French philosophy we encounter the expression „social affections/affections sociales“; Hutcheson even coins the term „publick affections“ and observes „desires of the pleasure arising from publick happiness“<sup>4</sup>. Social progress is linked with the idea of self-affection of mankind and will, in the long run, lead to the American and French revolutions at the end of the century. David Hume, as the most famous philosopher of this tradition, claims that the affective similarity between men brings about natural compassion and allows for identification and imaginary substitution among human beings. The aesthetics of the enlightenment are based on this idea<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>2</sup>Third Earl of Shaftesbury, „An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit,“ in: idem, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, Vol. II, Farnborough, 1968, p. 5–176 (82).

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>4</sup>Francis Hutcheson, „An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue“ (1725), in: *Collected Works*, Vol. I, Hildesheim, 1971, p. 1–276 (7).

<sup>5</sup>David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Aalen, 1964.

In the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Alexander Baumgarten, the first German theorist of philosophical aesthetics, wanted to extend philosophical reflection beyond the rational domain. In the dawn of the German enlightenment he learned to understand that the traditionally privileged „logic of reason“ has to be completed by a „cognitio sensitiva/logic of sensual recognition“<sup>6</sup>. Immanuel Kant in his *Critique of pure reason* also claims that recognition arises from two sources, the receptivity of impressions and the spontaneity of reflection. But although Kant states that reason is founded in a passive capacity and that perception is based on affections, he does not provide a critical explanation of this first receptive capacity. Deleuze criticizes him for not building a bridge between receptive passivity and rational activity.

Why do I mention this philosophical tradition? Why does it seem relevant to me? I refer to this tradition since I conceive affections myself as a basic human capacity enabling us to build up connections with the outer world, with non-human and human beings, with nature and society. Affection is the ecological sense of all living beings, since it connects their natural drive with their psychic desire; it attaches them to others and makes them aware of their being embedded in social and natural assemblages. But the main reason for reflecting on affections today is the assumption that affective management changes over time and that the contemporary inhabitant of the western – and probably also of the non-western – world, models his affectivity in a way different from, let's say, thirty years ago. We can observe a profound change in the formation of our affective capacities because of the transformation of the media technologies, because of dominant cultural techniques as well as globalized spatiotemporal orders and certain interconnections of organic and technological devices. These changes force us to claim that we no longer deal with the same sort of subjectivation as in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The move away from slow techniques of reading, writing and interpreting towards fast communication of images and texts, towards almost instantaneous exchanges of short messages made possible by the digital and social media, the permanent affective irritation of the internet user by available information and by its reception in real time, produces new forms of perception and affective

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<sup>6</sup>Alexander Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, Hamburg, 2007, p. 20, translated M. Ott.

reaction to the world. Since individual orientation is nowadays negotiated within a globalized world, an intercultural framework and transnational communication, the affective relation gets constructed in totally different ways than some decades ago. We practice social affections in a far more radical way than the English philosophers could dream of. These are not necessarily based on a natural inclination towards mankind, but probably more on a fascination for technical devices and for new possibilities of communication.

We can also observe changes in affective practices in the domain of the arts. On the one hand the globalized film industries compete among each other in global affect management; they target the spectators worldwide with codified masses of images and sound and establish globalized orders of affectivity. Popular movies produce ever more violent expressions of affect and submit the viewer to an ecologically inadequate treatment of his sensual life. On the other hand artistic films try to elaborate new affective qualities. Since nowadays they often oscillate between documentation and fiction, they defy the affectivity of the viewer; they no longer search for the identification of the viewer with the represented protagonist and his destiny as in the aesthetics of the enlightenment. They rather try to subvert the codified modes of expression and to provide undetermined affects, which stimulate the reflection and loss of identification of the viewer with given standardized emotions. We encounter filmic articulations which question the globalization of social affections by exposing their political and uniforming character or by pointing at the fundamental contingency of any possible expression.

In order to better understand what we have in mind when we speak of affections, we want to question recent philosophical positions and their understanding of affections, before reflecting on contemporary modes of affection. Philosophically speaking we can observe that affections, while being a topic in philosophy since its very beginning with Plato and Aristotle, have always been treated as a less valuable capacity than reasoning. In Aristotle's anthropological reflection of *Peri psyches/De anima*<sup>7</sup>, affection is connected with external causes, such as sensual data, provoking a passive reaction in the human being. Since Aristotle thinks more highly

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<sup>7</sup>Aristoteles, *Peri Psyches*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1882.

of the internal causes, from the personal will, he devalues affections as „pathos“, as passive and receptive processes. Beginning with this interpretation, the philosophical history of affection is connected with deprecation. Furthermore, philosophy has not always differentiated between affective sensations and visual perceptions, but has often considered them identical. Only in the philosophy of Spinoza does affection get acknowledged as a natural process which has to be appreciated like everything which belongs to nature. Therefore we would like to claim, with Spinoza, the English philosophy and other more recent philosophers, that affection is the most basic self-constitutional act of a living being, building up a primary sensuality and hereby founding other capacities such as perception, imagination and reasoning. In this sense, certain French philosophers of the last century not only develop an anthropogenetic explanation of sensuality and the affective processes that go along with it; they even claim that affections are primordial ontological processes initiating first processes of timing and of material-spiritual syntheses long before the emergence of living beings. With these philosophers we want to elaborate on affections, in an extended understanding of aesthetics, as ontological foundations, as basic human and non-human capacities and as specific expressions of works of art. Since affections are liminal processes, they cannot be observed as such, but can be deduced from the effects they bring about in living beings and in symbolic acts. We want to question the affective articulations we can see and hear as symptoms of the human and symbolic development of our times.

As you know, the 20<sup>th</sup> century offers different phenomenological, psychoanalytical and poststructuralist explanations for the genesis of primary sensuality. Edmund Husserl develops the idea of primary passive constitutions of human sensuality. The observation of the „phenomenon of affection“ leads him to the assumption of a primordial „passive synthesis“ constituted in „pure passivity“. Husserl's conception of affection is also criticized by Deleuze for not being critical enough and for reporting the passive constitution to an already established conscious ego while being prior to it and being the condition of possibility of such an ego.

The psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud is the first one to conceive of unconscious inscriptions and of the principle of pleasure as already minimally active capacity preorganizing the psychic development. Interestingly

affection in Freud's understanding appears as a constitutional act which dates back to preindividual times and cannot be observed in its causation, but can be reconstructed according to the effects and symptoms it produces. The assumption of a hidden „big bang“ of affection is formulated in Freud's theory of primordial innervations of phylogenetic heritage, of ontogenetic experiences in childhood, of inscriptions of traumatic events which cannot be remembered but co-organize the psychic reality.

The two philosophers who explicitly deal with affections and develop them as prepersonal and non-individual constitutive processes are Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gilles Deleuze. Interestingly Merleau-Ponty determines affections as primary acts of self-constitution and equates them with the logically necessary self-constitution of time as infinity, as endless self-repetition and ever changing process of timing. For him time is the primary subject: „If time is the subject, then self-constitution is no contradiction. (..) Time is ‚affection of itself by itself‘; (..) here affection and being affected are the same“<sup>8</sup>. Time is considered a circular and paradoxical process insofar as time must already be given in order to bring about processes of timing; at the same time it can only constitute itself in these processes. Being endless by definition and therefore always advancing itself, it constitutes itself by repeating a forever lost past and by synthesizing it into present sensual moments. This twofold structure of affection as repetition and constitution, as passivity and activity, as immanent genesis and possibility of further constitutions - I want to consider this figure as primary aesthetics. Deleuze opposes it to Kant's conception of time and space as form a priori and pre-given entities, comparable to Newton's theory of absolute time and space. Primary aesthetics as self-constitution of time together with sensual data provide impersonal and non-individual sensualities; they are not focused on anthropomorphic perceptions or feelings. They develop temporal dynamics and affective resonances between heterogenetic signs; human sentience is one possible result of their unfolding and of the continuous captivation between organic dispositions and sensual data.

The process of forming human sentience can be understood in an analogous way: We constitute ourselves in unconscious syntheses and must

<sup>8</sup>Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, London/New York, 1962, p. 425f.

therefore be considered “totally passive and active at the same time”<sup>9</sup>. The organic „origin“ may be located in drives and may be provoked by inner and outer stimuli, as Freud suggests. But human affection is always already self-affection of unconscious inscriptions, psychophysical processes and cultural stimulations. In opposition to Husserl’s idea of primary passivity of the ego, Deleuze underlines that the formation of sensuality is accompanied by minimal „local egos“, which are minimally active. Thanks to their contractions and integrations the heterogeneous inscriptions can constitute habits and memory; the minimal egos enable an ever wider synthesis of time and finally a complex synthesis of reflection in an active ego: „the active ego is a global attempt of integration“<sup>10</sup>. The formation of the human capacities is conceived as a process of continuous complexification and of self-transcendation which enables the human being to re-affect and transform itself into an open metamorphosis. Deleuze resumes the process of affection as a bodily event which surpasses itself and creates a non-corporeal surface of expression, which can be coded by cultural signs. In the German word „Sinnlichkeit“ the two-fold character of affection, its „origin“ in sensual senses and its creation of an intelligible sense can be expressed. In the English language this process seems to split into two different meanings, sensations becoming the basis of sensuality, sense the basis of sensibility.

Deleuze’s conception of an immanent and transcendental aesthetics is more profound than the aesthetics of Kant: As we have heard Kant divides the ego into passive receptivity and active rationality corresponding to the two sides of his aesthetic theory: the objective element of sensation guaranteed by the absolute form of space and time, the subjective element incorporated in pleasure and pain”<sup>11</sup>. If instead the process is conceived as passive-active affection, it necessarily repeats and intensifies itself and brings about other capacities and expressions. Anthropogenesis must therefore be considered an open process, changing with the stimulation of the outer world; the same is true for art works which thanks to their heterogeneous dynamics can never be entirely realized.

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<sup>9</sup>Ibd., p. 428.

<sup>10</sup>Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, London/New York, 1994, p. 98.

<sup>11</sup>Ibd.



## 2. Dividual Affections in Art

Spinoza concedes that an individual has the more potentiality, the more its different „individuations“ get affected and the more affections it develops with other bodies. Since we constitute ourselves in processes of reaffection, we have to countereffectuate our affections and involuntary repetitions in order to discover our form of repetition very much like works of art. This specific repetition cannot be considered an individual law, since it repeats early unconscious inscriptions and varies their impersonal and non-individual character. Gilbert Simondon underlines the metastability of the single person thanks to the need of integrating preindividual sensualities in which the psyche is founded. The single person can be compared to the dweller of a city who realizes that his personal emotions are only a variation of the affective attitude of the city. Deleuze and Guattari even claim that the single person should immerse himself into the impersonality of the social field and become nameless and imperceptible. For Deleuze such attempts of becoming dividual, of becoming everybody or nobody are prerequisites of an ethical existence.

Together with Guattari he states in *Mille Plateaux*<sup>12</sup> that affects are dividual articulations long before becoming human emotions. They read literary texts as the result of affections between the writer and non-human beings, mainly animals; they try to prove that artistic creations start with affections between normally incompatible terms: „Affects are exactly these becomings non-human of man“<sup>13</sup>. They put forward an affection for water and fish in the literary texts of Virginia Woolf, an affection for beef in the German novels of Karl Philipp Moritz. A work of art, they state in *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*, is characterized by the non-psychological affect it provides and by the new percepts and concepts based on it. In contrast to Kant, who considers drawings as the highest quality of art because of their formal harmony with the human capacities, the authors appreciate a work of art according to its distance to human affectivity and to its dissolution of formal standards. On the basis of the dividual aesthetics they read even paintings – in contrast to Hegel – as an unfolding of time.

<sup>12</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis, 1987.

<sup>13</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, New York, 1994, p. 160.

In his film theory Deleuze develops the idea of an auto-affection of film. He isolates a certain film image called the „image of affection“<sup>14</sup>: This image, mainly realized in close-ups, is interpreted as a sort of self-exhibition of the visual qualities thanks to which the filmic narration is interrupted and the spatio-temporal context of the film eliminated. By undergoing its central perspective and exhibiting the tactile character of its surface, the image presents itself like an icon and intensifies its visual qualities in this self-presentation. By that the whole film receives an affective quality and produces an affective expression which cannot be attributed to the emotion of the filmmaker or the viewer. While exposing its iconicity, it nevertheless de-individualizes its sensual articulations thanks to the filmic techniques: by enlarging the human face in close-ups, by continuously varying the framing of the shots, by transforming the aesthetic qualities of the ensembles within the frames, by contrasting the visual with the auditive signs and so forth. The same is true for serious musical compositions where the multiplicity of voices is not homogenized, but presented in its heterogeneity. Today the dividuality of images and sounds is reinforced by their inevitable relatedness to the electronic field of images and sounds where it gets more and more dividualized.

In the hope of corresponding to certain ideas of vitality, these visual and auditive works of art unfold semiotic proliferations and escape the constraint of formal unification. They replace formal laws by way of becoming informal; they strive to become limitless very much like time. Demanding works of art even attempt to reflect their limits of articulation and to expose the contingency of their expression. An example of such a demanding work of art is the film „Passing Drama“ by Angela Melitopoulos, a German-Greek female filmmaker living in Berlin.

Her film thematizes migration by quoting different Greek persons, among others her father, who because of political changes in Europe at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century had to leave the place where they were born and had to migrate to several different countries. The film does not express the result of migration mainly through personal testimonies, but through affective and abstract images and sounds showing movements of all sorts. It connects close ups of different metamorphical processes, of

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<sup>14</sup>Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema I. The Movement-Image*, Minneapolis, 1986, p. 98.

changing surfaces, of movements of proliferation, thereby evoking the continuous transformation of everything and performing the inevitable, impersonal and non-individual character of migration.

The film *Passing Drama* thematises migration by quoting different Greek persons who because of political changes in Europe at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century had to leave their place of birth and had to start a new Odysse. The film expresses this dividual destiny of migration less through personal testimony than through impersonal and abstract images and sounds of affection and connects them in a loose manner in order to remember the weaving process of Penelope and the contingency of each narrative. It connects close ups of different metamorphical processes, of changing surfaces, of movements of proliferation, to a sort of tapestry, in order to evoke the endless and dividual character of migration as the destiny of all, not only human livings beings.

### **3. Some Afterthoughts on Human Dividuations**

As I have stated, the dividual status, today, should not only be attributed to works of art, but to all living beings. Thanks to our epistemological shifts, to our microscopic observations as well as to our ecological widening of the epistemological field, all living beings seem interconnected with other organisms and must be recognized as qualitative variations and differentiations of dividual biodiversities. When discovered as entities inhabited by millions of microorganisms which affect their psychophysical constitution, they do not necessarily lose their affective coherence, but must be determined as parts of environmental multiplicities from which they cannot be easily separated. When biotechnologies influence our neural processes we can no longer consider ourselves as individuals. On the macroscopic level the dividual status becomes even more obvious: We are interrelated with sociotechnologies in such intense ways that we can hardly separate ourselves from these devices. They not only stimulate our participation, but make a profit from our passivity and our affective needs; they control and take over our desires, our spatial orientation, our personal profile and become part of our body. Therefore we cannot but understand ourselves as dividuations very much like filmic works of arts, continuously reframing

our relation to the world. We should learn to appreciate our connectedness with everything thanks to our affections by impersonal and non-individual sensualities.

For that reason we should also fight for open access in electronic media and for the abolishment of the global electronic divide which hinders certain populations to get affected by aesthetical qualities. To connect the unconnected, to get affected by intolerable situations and to express them by aesthetical means is still a political act to do. Democratic tactics can consist in the construction of affective relations between places where people can express their affections and places where they cannot.

On the other hand we should realize that we are permanently over-affected by sensual data, by commercials, music and images even without wanting it. Therefore we not only discover our laws of repetition and affection, but also of their selection and reduction. We have to become aware of our limits of affection and of the necessity to protect us against affective overflow – we have to decide which degree of dividuality seems good for us. Our aesthetical action must consist in a conscious self-modelling and self-questioning of our capacities while not forgetting that our so-called individuality is nourished and kept mobile only by the dividual affective sensualities which make us feel connected with others and bring about new aesthetical expressions and new social forms of interactivity and interpassivity.

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