

# Aesthetic Judgements and Motivation

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ABSTRACT. There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from Non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical Non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism (MJI). It is claimed that if we accept MJI and a plausible theory of motivation then we ought to accept Non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those wishing to defend Aesthetic Non-cognitivism, would be to appeal to a similar argument. However, both Caj Strandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong have argued that MJI is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. In this paper I will argue that both of these objections can be raised against MJI about moral judgements as well. As a result, MJI is no less plausible a claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I will then show how a theory of MJI about normative judgements in general is capable of avoiding both of these objections.

## Introduction

Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief like states or non-cognitive, attitudinal states? In recent years a number of writers, inspired by the debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists about moral judgements, have attempted to provide answers to these questions.<sup>1</sup> These answers have often been informed in interesting ways by the equivalent debates in metaethics<sup>2</sup>, and can be seen as part of the more general project of investigating whether theories about moral judgements can be plausibly applied

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<sup>1</sup> For example, Hopkins (2001); Todd (2004); McGonigal (2006).

<sup>2</sup> Todd (2004), for example, defends a view similar to Blackburn's view (1998) about moral judgements.

to other normative judgements.<sup>3</sup> The fact that aestheticians have looked to metaethicists for inspiration should come as no surprise given that it is commonly suggested that aesthetic judgements and moral judgements share a similar structure.<sup>4</sup> The focus of this paper will not be on whether Cognitivism or Non-cognitivism provides the more plausible theory of aesthetic judgements. Instead I will be investigating the related question of whether there is an internal connection between aesthetic judgements and motivation. This question is importantly related to the previous one, as it is often claimed in metaethics that the existence of an internal connection between moral judgements and motivation provides support for metaethical Non-cognitivism.

The possibility of an internal connection between aesthetic judgements and motivation has been recently dismissed by both Caj Stranberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Both Stranberg and Sinnott-Armstrong claim that it is much less plausible to think that an internal connection exists between aesthetic judgements and motivation than to think that such a connection holds for moral judgements. If true this would provide us with good reason to think that there is an important difference between moral judgements and aesthetic judgements. In this paper I will respond to Stranberg and Sinnott-Armstrong by arguing that both objections can be raised against the existence of the internal connection for moral judgements as well. As a result neither claim gives us good reason to think that aesthetic judgements are different from moral judgements. I will then provide an account of the internal connection between normative judgements and motivation that avoids these objections.

### **1. Motivational Judgement Internalism in Metaethics**

Motivational Judgment Internalism in metaethics is the view that there is an internal connection between moral judgements and motivation. This claim plays an important role in metaethical debates. The reason for this is that it seems possible to argue from internalism and the dominant theory

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<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Blackburn (1998 p.318), Gibbard (2003 p.227), Chrisman (2007) and Ridge (2007b) for attempts to defend a non-cognitivist theory of epistemic judgements.

<sup>4</sup> For example, see Ayer (1936), McDowell (1983) and McNaughton (1988).

of motivation to the conclusion that moral judgements are non-cognitive states.<sup>5</sup> The Humean Theory of Motivation states that beliefs by themselves are incapable of motivating. If we accept MJI about moral judgements then we accept that motivation is internal to moral judgements and so according to the Humean view of motivation, they cannot be purely cognitive states.<sup>6</sup>

Many have found MJI to be an attractive theory of moral judgements because it provides an explanation for the strong connection that seems to exist between moral language and motivation.<sup>7</sup> As many have observed, there seems to be something odd about someone who claims that an act is obligatory but fails to be motivated to perform it.<sup>8</sup> We can see the plausibility of this claim by considering the following case:

*Case 1:* Jill and Jane are debating whether or not to donate money to famine relief. Jane says that they both ought to make a donation. A charity worker calls by, asking for donations and Jane refuses to donate.<sup>9</sup>

Jane's behaviour seems puzzling in this case. We expect Jane's moral judgement that she ought to donate money to motivate her to do so. Internalism provides a ready explanation for this intuition; the reason this case is puzzling is explained by the necessary connection that exists between moral judgements and motivation.

The other important argument in the debate supports externalism. This argument concerns the conceptual possibility of the amoralist, someone who makes sincere moral judgments but remains unmotivated by them. Externalists claim that such people are at least conceptually possible.<sup>10</sup> If we accept that such people are possible we seem forced to ac-

<sup>5</sup> This point is made by Michael Smith (1994, p.12).

<sup>6</sup> Although, for all this argument shows, moral judgements could include both cognitive and noncognitive states. Such hybrid views are increasingly popular, see, for example, Ridge (2007a) and Tresan (2006).

<sup>7</sup> This way of characterizing the appeal of Internalism comes from Strandberg (2012 p.89).

<sup>8</sup> See Stevenson (1944 pp.16-17), Dreier (1990 pp.13-14), Dancy (1993 p.4), Smith (1994 p.60), Blackburn (1998 pp.48, 52-53) and Lenman (1999 pp. 443-446).

<sup>9</sup> This case is borrowed from Smith (1994 p.6).

<sup>10</sup> See Svavarsdóttir (1999).

cept that there is no necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. Internalists respond to the possibility of amorality by weakening their claim. Either by claiming that the motivation need only be pro tanto or by restricting the claim to certain kinds of moral agents (rational, normal or virtuous). Of course, by doing so internalists run the risk of decreasing the significance of the theory for other metaethical debates. Certainly for some ways of restricting MJI it seems reasonable to worry that what started as an interesting claim about moral judgements, has become a less interesting (for metaethicists at least) claim about certain kinds of moral agent.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, my interest in this paper is not in the implications of internalism but whether it is a plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements. For the purposes of this paper I will be dealing with the following weak version of internalism:

*Moral Motivational Judgement Internalism (MMJI):* For rational agents, there is a necessary and internal connection between making a moral judgement and being motivated to act in line with that judgement.<sup>12</sup>

In the remainder of this paper I will investigate whether a similar claim can be made about aesthetic judgements. As with moral judgements, the truth or falsity of Motivational Judgement Internalism about aesthetic judgements would have important consequences for the debate about the nature of these judgements. If internalism about such judgements is plausible then this will provide support to non-cognitivists about aesthetic judgements.

## **2. Aesthetic Motivational Judgement Internalism**

In this section I will look at what MJI about aesthetic judgements would look like. The first step in giving an account of MJI about some type of judgement is to determine the actions that these judgements motivate us to perform. This is harder to do for aesthetic judgements than for moral

<sup>11</sup> Miller makes this point convincingly about versions of MJI that are restricted to virtuous agents. This, Miller points out, “Might be the case simply because of what it is to be a ‘virtuous agent’ in the first place,” (2008 p.252).

<sup>12</sup> This is similar to versions of internalism endorsed by Smith (1994) and Van Roojen (2010).

judgements. A central class of moral judgements concern the performance of certain kinds of action. When I judge that I morally ought to it is quite clear that this judgement will motivate me to . However, it is less clear what actions I might be motivated to perform when I judge a work of art to be beautiful. As this judgement is not about an action it is harder to see what action it might motivate me to perform.

Nevertheless, as Strandberg points out, there does seem to be some kind of connection between aesthetic judgements and motivation. We assume that someone who recognises the aesthetic value of a work of art will be motivated to seek out similar works of art, at least so long as she is aesthetically competent.<sup>13</sup>

We can do so by considering the following case:

*Case 2:* Alex says that The Ring Cycle possesses a very high degree of aesthetic value. However, Alex is never motivated to go to other operas by Wagner. Whenever one is on in his town Alex goes to see the latest Hollywood blockbuster at the multiplex instead.

There seems to be something puzzling about Alex's behaviour, we want to say that Alex is being either irrational or lacking in aesthetic competence. The fact that this seems puzzling is instructive. There seems to be a reliable connection between judging a work of art to be aesthetically good and being motivated to seek out similar works of art. This reliable connection provides prima facie support for the existence of an internal connection between aesthetic judgements and motivation. We can formalise the form of aesthetic internalism suggested by Strandberg in the following way:

*Aesthetic Motivational Judgement Internalism (AMJI):* For rational and aesthetically competent agents, there is a necessary and internal connection between judging a work of art to be aesthetically good and being motivated to seek out similar works of art.

In this section I have looked at the form of Motivational Judgement Internalism about aesthetic judgements considered by both Strandberg and Sinnott-Armstrong. In the next section I will examine some criticisms that have been raised against the possibility of a necessary connection between aesthetic judgements and motivation.

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<sup>13</sup> Strandberg (2011 p.53).

### 3. Challenges to AMJI

In this section I will consider three reasons that have been given to support the claim that AMJI is less plausible than MMJI.

Despite suggesting the form of aesthetic internalism we looked at in the last section, Strandberg thinks there is good reason to think that this form internalism is less plausible than MMJI. Strandberg argues that the reliable connection that exists between aesthetic judgements and motivation seems much weaker than the corresponding connection for moral judgements. He supports this claim in the following way:

It is not difficult to imagine a person who recognizes that a work of art is aesthetically good, but is not motivated to look out for similar works as he has become tired of the kind of sensation they give him or for some other reason. (2011 p.53)

In other words, cases where the connection between judgements of aesthetic value and motivation break down are surprising and call for an explanation. However, cases where the equivalent connection breaks down for moral judgements seem far more surprising and have fewer acceptable explanations. While feeling tired or not being in the mood will serve as suitable explanations for not being motivated by aesthetic judgements, the same does not seem true for moral judgements. Strandberg's point seems well supported by our intuitive reactions to Case 1 and Case 2. I take it most people would share the thought that while Alex's behaviour is odd it is far less odd than Jane's. Similarly, while tiredness can explain Alex's lack of motivation to see an opera, it will not explain Jane's refusal to donate money to charity. The reason that this weaker connection creates a problem for AMJI is that a considerable part of the appeal of MMJI is derived from the reliable connection that exists between moral judgements and motivation. If we accept that the reliable connection to motivation is weaker for aesthetic judgements than for moral judgements then we should accept that the case in favour of MJI for aesthetic judgements is also weaker.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong raises a similar challenge to AMJI. His objection is as follows:

(I)t is not clear why I cannot judge that a modern painting (or piece of music) has the positive aesthetic quality of being creative, even though I have no desire at all to see it (or hear it played).<sup>14</sup>

The point Sinnott-Armstrong is making is that we can make positive aesthetic judgements for which no explanation is needed for a lack of accompanying motivation. Although this point is similar to the previous one, there is an important difference. Strandberg's point was that the connection between aesthetic judgements and motivation is weak enough to be broken by tiredness or some other factor that would not be sufficient to break the connection with moral judgements. Sinnott-Armstrong, on the other hand, points to a positive aesthetic judgement for which there appears to be no need whatsoever to explain a lack of accompanying motivation. This point also seems well supported by our intuitions. We would find Alex's behaviour much more understandable if he judged opera to be the most creative art form rather than the best. This is problematic for AMJI as it shows that it is possible to make a positive aesthetic judgement about a work of art and feel no motivation whatsoever to seek out similar art works.

The final challenge that I will consider to AMJI is one that can be developed from observations made by Matthew Kieran to support a criticism of an entirely different claim made about aesthetic judgements. While attacking the view that aesthetic facts are determined by the tastes of ideal aesthetic appreciators Kieran claims that cultivating certain characteristics is essential for the enjoyment of certain aesthetic experiences (2008 p.278).<sup>15</sup> Someone who has spent a lot of time and effort developing the right capacities to appreciate classical music may find it hard to appreciate disco. If we spend our time developing the appropriate character traits and responses for enjoying horror films we might find it hard to appreciate realist cinema.

To link this back to our discussion of motivation we can imagine someone who used to have all of the appropriate character traits to appreciate

<sup>14</sup> Sinnott-Armstrong (2010 p.65).

<sup>15</sup> The claim that aesthetic facts are determined by the tastes of ideal critics is a view that is often thought to found in David Hume (1963), although Stephanie Ross argues that this is not how Hume's position should be understood (2008).

horror films gradually becoming more and more interested in realist cinema. Perhaps she has begun spending time with people who enjoy these films and this has allowed her to develop an appreciation for the slower pace of realist cinema. As she has developed these traits her capacity to appreciate horror films has deteriorated. She no longer gets the same enjoyment from horror films that she once did and as a result she is no longer motivated to watch these films. The reason this is important for our discussion is that we can imagine a person meeting this description who continues to judge horror films to possess great aesthetic value. If we accept that such a person is possible then we have a case of someone who judges that horror films are aesthetically valuable but feels no motivation whatsoever to watch any.

#### **4. In Defence of Aesthetic Motivational Judgement Internalism**

In this section I will respond to the three problems for AMJI looked at in the last section. I will argue that while the three objections present major problems for the form of AMJI we have looked at up to now, they would equally apply to a similarly formulated version of MMJI. The problems, then, do not show that AMJI is less plausible than MMJI. Rather they show the problems with the definition of AMJI given in §2. If this argument is successful then I will have shown that these criticisms fail to give us any reason to think that the case for AMJI is weaker than the case for MMJI.

The definition of AMJI given in §2 looked to aesthetic judgements that are not clearly connected with any specific action on the part of the appraiser. Recognising the aesthetic value of an artwork does not commit the appraiser to any specific act, though as we saw in §2 being left completely unmoved by such a judgement may seem odd. The claim I will make in this section is that a definition of MMJI formulated in the same way as AMJI is formulated would be equally implausible. The problems considered in the last section then, are problems with the version of AMJI under consideration not with the general claim that an internal connection exists between aesthetic judgements and motivation.

To start, let's reformulate MMJI, so that it is similar to the formulation of AMJI that we are considering:



*Moral Motivational Judgement Internalism Two (MMJI<sub>2</sub>):* For rational agents, there is a necessary and internal connection between judging some act to be morally good and being motivated to perform similar acts.

In the rest of this section I will show that the objections raised against AMJI can equally be raised against MMJI<sub>2</sub>.

The first reason to think that AMJI is less plausible than MMJI is that there are some aesthetic judgements for which a lack of motivation requires little explanation. The kind of judgements that Strandberg claims meet this description are judgements of aesthetic value. A lack of accompanying motivation for such judgements can easily be explained by the agent being tired or not in the right mood. However, I think the same point can be made against MMJI<sub>2</sub>. We can judge an act to be morally good and require very little explanation for a lack of accompanying motivation. In fact the very same explanation that Strandberg considered in the aesthetic case will apply here. We can imagine someone who has spent ten years helping out at a soup kitchen and has become so tired of acting in this way that she has no motivation to carry on. There does not seem to be any reason to describe such a person as irrational. The crucial part of this objection is that the act is judged to be morally *good* rather than morally *obligatory*. This is important as the claim that we might be unmotivated by a judgement that an act is morally good is much more plausible when we are clear that this is not the same as judging the act to be morally obligatory. Similarly, there can be acts that I judge to be morally good that due to tiredness or not being in the right mood, I feel no motivation to perform.<sup>16</sup>

Keeping in mind the separation of the good and the obligatory also allows us to respond to the second argument for the claim that AMJI is less plausible than MMJI. The claim that there are some positive aesthetic judgements for which there is no need to explain the lack of an accompanying motivation will apply to moral judgements as well. Judging an act to be supererogatory seems to be just such a judgement. We might judge an act to be beyond the call of duty, I take it that it's a familiar feature of

<sup>16</sup> Zangwill (2008) makes a similar point.

our everyday experience that we are not always motivated by these judgements, nor do we expect others to be. I might judge that it would be good for me to stop working on this paper and go to help out at a soup kitchen. However, I have no motivation to do so and this strikes me as both perfectly normal and perfectly rational. There seems little need for someone to explain why she is not motivated to perform an act she judges to be supererogatory. A reasonable response to someone puzzled as to why an agent is unmotivated by a supererogation judgement is to point out that it was judged to be supererogatory not obligatory. Sinnott-Armstrong's point that there are some aesthetic judgements for which there is no need to explain the lack of accompanying motivation applies equally to MMJI2.

Perhaps, though, there is another way of understanding Sinnott-Armstrong's point that presents a different problem. The example Sinnott-Armstrong gives, a judgement that a work of art is creative, is a thick aesthetic judgement. A thick judgement is one that contains both descriptive and evaluative elements.<sup>17</sup> Perhaps, then, we might understand Sinnott-Armstrong as pointing to a lack of connection between thick aesthetic judgements and motivation that does not apply to thick ethical judgements. However, this response does not withstand serious scrutiny, as thick ethical judgements do not clearly show a link to motivation either. For example, someone might judge that it would be courageous to volunteer to assist in the clearing of landmines but feel no motivation to do so. Such a person does not seem guilty of any form of irrationality. To make the point more forceful, we might judge an act to be courageous even though it is morally bad. We might think that suicide bombers display courage in giving up their lives for their cause while judging that their acts are overall morally bad. Someone who made this combination of judgements would clearly not be irrational if she was completely unmotivated to become a suicide bomber. We can see, then, that Sinnott-Armstrong's criticism of aesthetic internalism also applies to thick moral judgements.

Finally, the point that we might judge an aesthetic experience to be valuable but be unmotivated to perform it due to having developed traits that are unsuited to the appreciation of those experiences can also be

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<sup>17</sup> Williams introduces the idea of thick ethical terms to describe terms such as 'brave' and 'prudence' that contain both evaluative and descriptive elements (1985 p.129). For a discussion of thick aesthetic concepts see Bonzon (2009).

transferred to moral judgements. It seems reasonable to think that focussing on developing the traits needed to be a war hero will be quite different from those needed to work in a soup kitchen. Just as developing a love of realist cinema might make me unsuited to appreciating horror films, developing the virtue of courage might make me unsuited to performing acts of charity. It seems perfectly reasonable to imagine a war hero who judges helping out at a soup kitchen to be a charitable act but has no motivation to act in this way. Again, the important point here is that these acts are judged to be good rather than obligatory. While it may be puzzling for a war hero to judge that helping out at a soup kitchen would be obligatory and be unmotivated by this judgement, the puzzle disappears when the case is altered so that the judgement is one of moral goodness or some other positive moral judgement.

In this section, I have responded to three reasons to think that AMJI is a less plausible claim than MMJI. I have argued that when we formulate internalism about moral judgements in the same way the criticisms can be raised with equal force against this form of internalism. There is no reason to think that AMJI is less plausible than MMJI<sub>2</sub>. In order to test whether internalism is a plausible claim about aesthetic judgements we must investigate a definition that is closer to that typically given by those who defend internalism about moral judgements.

### **5. Saving Motivational Judgement Internalism?**

In this section I will suggest a way in which both AMJI and MMJI can be saved from the three objections I have considered so far. I will argue that restricting the claims to first person judgements about what there is most reason to do, all things considered, can save both views.

What the three objections considered in the last two sections amount to is that there are certain kinds of judgements we make in morality and aesthetics that are not clearly linked to motivation. Judgments about goodness and thick judgements are not necessarily accompanied by motivation, even among the rational. This should not surprise us. The reason that these judgements are not necessarily linked to motivation is not because they are aesthetic or moral judgements but because they are not sufficiently action guiding. Judging an act to be aesthetically or morally good

may be accompanied by a judgement that these acts are bad in some other way. An act that is morally good may be prudentially bad. An act that is aesthetically good may be morally wrong. Similarly thick judgements and judgements about the virtues are also insufficiently action guiding to be necessarily linked to motivation.

What this tells us is that in order to find a plausible version of Motivational Judgement Internalism we must ask ourselves what kind of judgements will be necessarily connected to motivation among rational agents. The answer, I think, is simple. A rational agent will necessarily be motivated by a judgement that an act is what she has most reason, all things considered, to do.<sup>18</sup> This form of internalism concerns only all things considered normative judgements. It can be defined as follows:

*Normative Motivational Judgement Internalism (NMJI):* For rational agents, there is a necessary connection between first personal judgements about what there is, all things considered, most normative reason to do and motivation.<sup>19</sup>

This form of internalism allows us to see why there seems to be an internal connection between some aesthetic judgements and motivation. If I judge that I ought to paint my room blue rather than black and this judgement coincides with what I have all things considered most reason to do then I will necessarily be motivated to paint the room blue if I am rational. It also explains why the objections to both AMJI and MMJI<sub>2</sub> were successful. The criticisms presented us with cases where an agent is unmotivated by an aesthetic or moral judgement that is not also an all things considered normative judgement. This is perfectly compatible with NMJI.

If we accept NMJI, then we should accept that motivational judgement internalism is true about aesthetic judgements in exactly the same way that it is true about moral judgements. Both kinds of judgement will be necessarily connected to motivation whenever these judgements coincide with judgements about what we have most reason to do, all things

<sup>18</sup> Wedgewood makes this point (2007 p.23-26). Sinnott-Armstrong also thinks that internalism should be restricted to all things considered practical judgements, though he denies that aesthetic judgements can ever be overall practical judgements (2010 p.65).

<sup>19</sup> This is similar to the form of internalism given by Wedgewood (2007 p.25).

considered. Of course, this is not quite the same as the form of Aesthetic Internalism considered in §2. There is no reason to think that Alex was making an all things considered judgement here. Nevertheless, it does point towards a way in which we might seek to explain the intuitive oddness of Alex's judgement either by explaining how aesthetic judgements weigh into our all things considered normative judgements or by explaining why aesthetic assertions such as Alex's convey an all things considered normative judgement pragmatically.

We might wonder whether this form of internalism is able to explain why there seems to be a tighter connection to motivation for moral judgements than aesthetic judgements. However, there is a view that is commonly accepted by moral philosophers that would allow us to explain this. Moral Rationalism is the view that we always have most reason to act in line with our moral requirements.<sup>20</sup> If we accept this view then this will explain why MMJI seems more plausible than AMJI. The reason it seems more plausible is that moral requirement judgements will coincide with our all things considered judgements about what to do more often than aesthetic judgements do.<sup>21</sup> Certainly when we consider a case where we have a clash between a moral requirement and an aesthetic requirement it seems reasonable to think that the moral reason should take priority.<sup>22</sup> For example, if someone is in a burning museum and is able to save either a Rembrandt painting or a museum guard it seems reasonable to think that the moral requirement to save the guard should override the aesthetic reasons in favour of saving the painting.<sup>23</sup> Of course, as Van Roojen notes, Moral Rationalism might be true without everyone being aware of its truth. If this were the case then it might not be irrational for such an

<sup>20</sup> Those who defend some version of this view include Portmore (2011), Smith (1994), and Van Roojen (2010). This view is sometimes confused with The Overridingness Thesis, which is the view that moral reasons always override other kinds of normative reason. For a discussion of the difference between the two see Archer (Forthcoming).

<sup>21</sup> This seems right even if we accept the claim that aesthetic obligations exist. This claim is defended by Eaton (2008). Importantly though Eaton accepts that these obligations may be reducible to moral obligations or exist only when comparing two cases which are identical in all moral respects (2008 p.5-8).

<sup>22</sup> This point is made by Hampshire who claims that aesthetic considerations are trivial compared to moral reasons (1954 p.162).

<sup>23</sup> This case is mentioned by Eaton (2008 p.4).

agent to be unmotivated by a moral judgement. However, as Van Roojen argues, the meaning of the term 'morally required' is determined by the normal cases, those where the judgement that an action is right motivates the agent. This allows us to conclude that rational agents acting normally will be motivated by a judgement that an act is morally required.<sup>24</sup>

Likewise, we might think that the proportion of first personal judgements is smaller in aesthetics than morality. In ethics a large proportion of the judgements that we make concern the assessment of behaviour, be it our own or that of others. We cannot escape the fact that many of the decisions that we make are open to ethical evaluation. In aesthetics, however, it seems plausible to think that the evaluation of behaviour plays a lesser role. Often we are concerned more with evaluating objects. Of course this may not be true for everyone. Things may be different if we approach this from the point of view of the producer rather than the audience of art and music.<sup>25</sup> When a painter makes a judgement as to the right colour for her to use or a jazz musician decides what is the right note to play it may seem more plausible to think that many of the aesthetic judgements being made will be first personal practical ones. Even some aesthetic judgements made from the position of the audience might be directly action guiding. For example, if I am the judge of a competition for novelists then my judgement that I have most aesthetic reason to award it to Novel X rather than Novel Y will be a first personal judgement.<sup>26</sup> However, we are all of us the producers of acts that are open to ethical evaluation and criticism and, as a result, much of our ethical language and discourse is concerned with the evaluation of our own behaviour. If we accept NMJI then this provides us with an additional explanation for the intuition that MMJI is more plausible than AMJI. The reason that this is the case is that moral judgements are more likely to be concerned with what we have first personal reason to do and it is these judgements that are necessarily connected to motivation. Even those unwilling to accept this claim might concede that aestheticians spend less of their time focusing on these judge-

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<sup>24</sup> Van Roojen (2010 pp.518-521).

<sup>25</sup> Thanks to Simon Frith for pointing out the importance of these different viewpoints. A similar point is made by Came (2012 p.166).

<sup>26</sup> Thanks to Cain Todd for pressing me on this point and Aaron Meskin for suggesting this example.

ments and this would be enough to explain the intuition.

However, we should not assume that this means that aesthetic judgements will never be first-personal all things considered normative judgements. If, for example, I find out that a museum is planning to dispose of a work of art that I judge to be of greater aesthetic value than any other I know of and I can save it at absolutely no cost to myself or others then this is surely what I have most reason to do all things considered.<sup>27</sup> In the same way, someone trying to paint a beautiful painting who judges that a certain brushstroke is the one that would be aesthetically best surely has most reason, all else being equal, to make that brushstroke.

To sum up this section, the criticisms made of both AJMI and MMJI allow us to see what is wrong with both forms of internalism. Motivational Judgement Internalism is only a plausible claim about judgements concerning what we have all things considered most reason to do. Accepting this form of internalism allows us to explain why MMJI appears more plausible than AMJI.

### **Concluding Remarks**

To sum up, in this paper I have responded to three reasons to think that Motivational Judgement Internalism is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I have argued that the reason that both criticisms were successful is that they attack an implausible version of aesthetic internalism. When we define moral internalism in a similar way the same criticisms apply. As a result, these criticisms give us no reason to think that Aesthetic Motivational Judgement Internalism is less plausible than Moral Motivational Judgement Internalism. I then gave an account of Normative Motivational Judgement Internalism that can avoid both of these objections. On this account, moral and aesthetic judgements are connected to internalism in exactly the same way. However, if we accept Moral Rationalism or then we should accept that moral requirement judgements are more likely to motivate than aesthetic judgements.

While Moral Motivational Judgement Internalism has been used to argue for a non-cognitivist view of moral judgements it is not clear that the

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<sup>27</sup> Thanks to Rob Hopkins for suggesting an example of this sort.

form of internalism defended in this paper provides any support for non-cognitivists about aesthetic or moral judgements. I started this paper by asking whether aesthetic judgements are cognitive or noncognitive states and set out to investigate whether an aesthetic noncognitivist could appeal to Aesthetic Motivational Judgement Internalism in order to support her view. I have argued that there is a sense in which internalism is true for aesthetic judgements, it is true for rational agents when such judgements are also first personal judgements about what there is most reason to do all things considered. However, it is far from clear that this version of internalism is one that provides much support for the noncognitivist, if any. After all, the cognitivist can argue that this restricted form of internalism, if true, tell us something interesting about what it is to be a rational agent rather than anything interesting about aesthetic or moral judgements.<sup>28</sup>

As I have already mentioned, the form of internalism that I laid out in the final section of this paper does not explain why it seems strange for Alex to be unmotivated by his aesthetic judgement in Case 2. However, if there is a connection between this judgement and the all things considered normative judgement then this might explain why this case seems strange. Such a connection might be a necessary one or perhaps one that can be explained by pragmatics. The investigation of whether there is any such connection and what kind of connection it might be is, to my mind at any rate, one that ought to be pursued.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Similar points are made by Enoch (2011 p.251), Miller (2008 p.252) and Svavarsdóttir (1999 p.183) against forms of MMJI restricted to rational agents. Given that NMJI is restricted to both rational agents and to first personal judgements about what there is most reason, all things considered, to do it seems reasonable to think that the point is even more pertinent here.

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