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BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Abstracts

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Keynotes

What Can Mere Musical Form Show Us about Reality?
Hanne Appelqvist (Helsinki)

Abstract

My talk addresses the conflict that arises from the seemingly incompatible goals of granting music autonomy and making sense of music's ability to contribute to knowledge. I will examine the incompatibility claim by discussing two formalist accounts, put forth respectively by Eduard Hanslick and Ludwig Wittgenstein. While formalism strictly denies music's ability to represent conceptually determinable contents, both Hanslick and Wittgenstein suggest that music manifests features of reality more fundamental than specific emotions or thoughts. In doing so, I will argue, they rely on Kant's transcendental idealism and specifically on Kant's notion of beauty as the form of purposiveness.
Emancipation, normalization, or coercion? Aesthetic education from Kant to Spivak

Ruth Sonderegger (Vienna)

Aesthetic education, especially in its Kantian and Schillerian variants, seems to have a vogue. One could think e.g. of Jacques Rancière’s multiple references to Schiller’s Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education of Man. Another case in point is Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s most recent book *An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization*. Despite the fact that Spivak is much more critical of Kant and Schiller – she speaks of the necessity to sabotage them, and contends that “Enlightenment is sick at home“ - she insists on the timeliness of Kant and Schiller’s aesthetic theories. If anything can help us to navigate through the recent crises of globalization, or so she seems to argue, it is aesthetic education.

Why would a philosopher as suspicious of education as Rancière believe so strongly in Schiller’s project? And why would a postcolonial theorist such as Spivak expect so much from European philosophers who, obviously, contributed to colonial ways of thinking? Or, to put it more generally, why is aesthetic experience so often associated with an educational process towards emancipation and freedom despite the fact that we know of numerous and monstrous examples that testify to the fact that aesthetic experiences can accompany the most barbaric acts?
Painting in Waiting: Prelude to a Critical Philosophy of History and Art

Lydia Goehr (Columbia University)

"L’avenir, par définition, n’a point d’image. L’histoire lui donne les moyens d’être pensé." (Paul Valéry)

It’s wise to follow a perfect epigram with a telling example. So here’s one, drawn from Cervantes’ last work of 1617, The Trials of Persiles and Sigismunda. A pilgrim poet tells of a wealthy monsignor in Rome who has the most curious museum in the world. It’s a museum of the future comprising empty tablets awaiting persons illustrious enough to be painted. Two inscriptions indicate the persons to come: poets who through their works will declare the coming of a great political leader, in this case Constantine (also to be named a Second Moses). One poet is Torquato Tasso; the other Zárate. But when we learn that Tasso is named for his madness and the other for his lack of talent, something suddenly about this museum seems awry. Won’t painters die of starvation waiting for the poets? Will any political leader live up to the poet’s promise? And were a painting in waiting ever to be completed, wouldn’t it necessarily enter a museum of the present, there anxiously to compete with the unsurpassable masterpieces of the past?

My talk investigates the idea of a painting in waiting by importing the idea of waiting into a critical philosophy of history and art. Of course, there’s no one thing meant by waiting. It can mean to pause, hesitate, linger, or to anticipate with trepidation or hope. But it can also mean to serve as once ladies-in-waiting served in royal courts or as waiters in restaurants once stood in readiness, perhaps to the point of Sartrean nausea, fully prepared to accommodate the needs of others. I have three questions. One is how waiting has come to mean a serving of the self and thus a freedom from the serving of others. The second is why a Beckett-like endgame of waiting is so often a waiting for a new game to begin, but where in truth there’s only one game to play. And the third is what we learn about the critical labor of negation in thinking about waiting by reference to blank paintings, or to books whose empty pages are not yet written.
Trust in the Author
Kalle Puokkala (University of Helsinki)

While there seems to be a growing consensus among literary cognitivists, who believe literary works can be sources of significant non-trivial knowledge, that the evident need to recourse to experience external to the work in justifying the epistemological content of literary works does not, by itself, undermine their cognitive significance, as some anti-cognitivists have argued, cognitivists have not really attempted to formulate strong positive reasons for taking literary works seriously from an epistemological point of view. Drawing on the work on trust in social epistemology, I offer some important additions to existing defenses of literary cognitivism by formulating such reasons. I argue that especially the position known as the assurance view, which sees trust as a specific kind of non-evidential reason for a belief, provides some important insights into the epistemological relationship holding between the author and reader, especially concerning the responsibilities that pertain to the author when she presents her work to the public and how those can entitle, at least in a prima facie way, the reader to adopt beliefs, perspectives and other epistemologically significant elements from literary works. Trust might not give an indubitable reason for forming beliefs on the basis of literary engagements, but it can nevertheless be considered a genuine reason having rational weight. I will argue that especially in the case of the works of such authors, whose whole oeuvres are underpinned by the examination of a more or less single theme, readers can have a good initial justification to take such literary outputs as one of their epistemological guides into the terrains the oeuvres consider.

Is Poetry Fiction?
Anna Christina Ribiero (Texas Tech University)

The ancient Greek word poiesis, from which ‘poetry’ derives, means ‘making it up’; this might suggest that in Antiquity poetry was considered fiction. The more recent notion of a ‘poetic persona’ suggests a similar approach. Yet the number of poems where the presumed persona and the author seem to collapse into one is too large to make this generalization credible. Drawing on examples of war poetry, love poetry, and praise poetry, I challenge that model of interpretation that would make poems fictional tout court, arguing that most lyric poems are best regarded as nonfiction.
Kant and Hume on the Normativity of Taste

Gianluigi Dallarda (Northwestern Italian Philosophy Consortium (FINO))

Hume is certainly one of the authors from whom Kant has developed his own conception of beauty. The relationship between the two authors, however, is not one of dependence, but consists of a spontaneous and constructive comparison (Giordanetti, 1997; 7). I would like to renew this comparison by directing it to the topic of aesthetic normativity. It is not my intention to provide an historico-philological account of the relationship between the two thinkers, nor do I intend to engage in a merely exegetical reading. I would rather like to show, through a contrastive look, the aporias hidden in the attempt to provide a transcendental foundation of taste. The final goal of my paper is to highlight the need for a deepening of the concept of aesthetic exemplarity in order to grant an as far as possible autonomous normativity to aesthetics.
Hegel's End of Art and Art's Modernity
Sarah Kiernan (Birkbeck, University of London)

It is a fact of great misfortune that Hegel’s aesthetic theory is commonly seen in Anglophone philosophical circles as bearing no applicability to modern art as a result of one of its most perplexing and poorly understood aspects - the so-called ‘end of art’ thesis. The Hegelian ‘end of art’ thesis arises from the notorious assertion in Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Art that art ‘considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past.’ Outside of Hegelian scholarship, and sometimes within it, this infamous statement is largely taken to mean that Hegel is announcing that a literal ‘death’ of art has already occurred and that no significant works of art will henceforth be created. This assumption seems not only outrageous or radical to most contemporary students but also clearly incorrect; the sheer volume of art created since the nineteenth century is held up as overwhelming evidence against such a claim. It thus appears that Hegel’s philosophy of art is not only poorly positioned for any constructive engagement with the art of modernity, but actually meets an immediate refutation in the existence of a richly diverse and influential modern art tradition.

However, there are a number of recent commentators who see the Hegelian ‘end of art’ not as incompatible with the artistic developments of the last two centuries, but as prophetic of these seemingly radical changes in the world of art. Theories such as these view art’s end as affinitive with art’s modernity and see the ‘end of art’ thesis as shedding light on the state of the twentieth-century artworld. The most enthusiastic assertion of this idea comes from Arthur Danto, who sees the end of art as primarily the end of its developmental history rather than the cessation of its production. Although I agree that the supposed ‘end of art’ does not herald a literal death of art and also that Hegel’s aesthetic philosophy presents an almost visionary compatibility with the artistic avant-garde, I will present a unique thesis regarding the Hegelian ‘end of art’ that will distinguish my view from that of Danto and other commentators. I concur with ample secondary literature that holds the ostensible ‘end of art’ to be nothing other than the demotion of art from the place it once held as the apex of human culture, but I will dismiss the status-quo assumption that this ‘end of art’ occurs with the dissolution of the third and final form of art, romantic art, in Hegel’s triadic scheme. Instead, I propose an innovative, but I believe accurate, interpretation of this ‘end’ of art as occurring with the closure of the second, classical form of art. As will be demonstrated, this proposal allows for the full integration of modern and contemporary art into the Hegelian system.

(Non)Identity – Adorno and the Constitution of Art
Lucas Amoriello (FU Berlin)

It is a well-known and fairly appropriate view that Adorno’s aesthetic theory is extensively concerned about difference. It asserts nonidentity as centerpiece of both art’s structure and its genuine achievement. Art is regarded to give rise to something individual that conceptual rationality is constantly suppressing due to its instrumental form which is embedded and totalized in capitalistic history and society. Thus, the nonidentical, or nonidentity, is essential for art’s critical stance towards social conditions. But once an interpretation of Adorno’s aesthetics presupposes nonidentity, it easily invokes
a rather abstract term of negativity loosing touch to the issue which is at stake for Adorno. This abstract term embraces a notion of the very other of conceptuality, rationality, and historical sociality which threatens to postpone art’s constitution and truth to a utopia beyond history.

However, things appear to be more complex once Adorno’s writings are thoroughly studied. In his Aesthetic Theory it is variously stated that “[b]y pursuing its own identity with itself, art assimilates itself with the nonidentical” (Adorno 2002, 134). Adorno stresses a dialectic of art’s nonidentity and its self-identity that still needs to be clarified. Accordingly, it is the main thesis of the paper that art is constituted of and manifests an ongoing struggle of what it means or could mean for any individual to have an identity - to be what one is. This struggle does not result in stipulating identity but in facing the inherent limits of conceiving identity. It is setting in motion what identity could mean. So, as I will reveal, this question for Adorno is properly addressed aesthetically by a certain engagement with conceptuality and identity (cf. Kreis 2004, 78). If it is a highly crucial point in Adorno’s theory that art’s negativity, even in its most radicalized forms and artworks, can never be reduced to a sheer withdrawal, this leaves open how identity and nonidentity of art have to be understood altogether. In line with this, I will first focus on how Adorno interrelates identity and nonidentity as far as art is concerned. Consequently, I will develop a more concrete picture of how this interrelation comes into live in art. This second step demands an examination of the relation of artworks and its spectators, which is crucial but quite underdeveloped by Adorno and often misread by his readers.

Regarding the relation of identity and nonidentity the paper will point out that, in fact, a threefold relation comes into view once an artwork’s (non)identity is concerned: (i) its nonidentical resistance to what is called ‘identity thinking’, (ii) its emphatic self-identity as being a self-determining individual entity, and, finally (iii) the way it adopts and identifies itself with forms of power and mastery. The paper will present a more profound understanding of how these three aspects of art interact according to Adorno and what this implies for art’s constitution and (non)identity.

When Bernstein develops his interpretation of what Adorno means by striving to transcend concepts by way of concepts, he criticizes second generation critical theory’s readings of Adorno for taking art as being beyond conceptuality (cf. Bernstein 2001, 266-68). Following this critique, the paper highlights the mutual infiltration and interaction of identity and nonidentity in art. This provides an argument for both the damaged character of art (its solely impure nonidentity) and its emancipatory potentials in opening the relation of identity and nonidentity. Art achieves a critical and reflexive identity by a forced and transgressive integration of the coercion of identity. By enlarging and condensing identity within itself the work of art is capable of breaking identity.

This result leads on to the second main argument of the paper. The rupture of identity is not exhausted by a breach of a totally new entity or quality. In contrast, I will underline that the inherent evocation of identity must be understood as a reflexive shift of the artwork’s formal character. My argument illuminates that for Adorno this shift of form and - a fortiori - the critical stance of art’s negativity is tied to its appearance, its appeal to the recipients’ active engagement with a work of art.

Adorno gives in-depth attention to the question of what it means to subjectively approach an artwork as a self-determining fabric. As Gunnar Hindrichs convincingly shows, art’s autonomous character implies a particular rupturing interleave of objectivity within subjectivity (cf. Hindrichs 2000). The second part of my paper will extend this thought in favor
of a more concrete picture of the spectators’ engagement with art.

What Adorno describes as the fracture of an artwork must be understood as a reflexive opening of its form. This reflexive form of art indicates entanglement between the form of the aesthetic object and the form of its subjective experience. A work of art transcends its form by appealing to its own synthetic processes and to their limits and overstrain, consigning these stirrings to an actualization accomplished by the spectator.

As Adorno explains, this actualization implies two supplementary dimensions: reenactment and articulation. Elaborating these receptive dimensions as constitutive moments of any artwork’s very own constitution, my paper will finally provide a more concrete notion of the dialectics between nonidentity and identity of art. Conclusive thoughts will concentrate on the critical powers inscribed in the mutual compression and opening of identity and nonidentity, self and other, artwork and spectator. Thus, the critical force of art’s constitution can be newly justified within a more complex reading of Adorno’s theory of art.
Many everyday imaginings involve unethical attitudes. Is there anything intrinsically wrong with engaging in such imaginings? Many defend the affirmative. Brandon Cooke, however, argues that only imaginative acts that also endorse unethical attitudes, by prescribing participants to ‘export’ them out of the imagined world into the actual one, exhibit intrinsic ethical flaws. Merely prescribing their imaginative adoption is not enough. This paper carves out a middle ground between these two positions, using speech act theory to characterize some ethical flaws as arising in the act constituted by the imagining itself. What is being done with an imagining depends on the context in which it is performed. Specifically, we argue, imaginings are oppressive because they instantiate what Patricia Hill Collins calls ‘Controlling Images’, and are thereby intrinsically ethically flawed, when they prescribe the imaginative adoption of unethical attitudes towards oppressed groups, even without a prescription to also export them.

Empathy, an aesthetic virtue

Lisa Schmalzried (Wittenberg Center for Global Ethics)

“Empathy” goes back to the German term “Einfühlung,” defined by Lipps as the imaginative imitation of another person’s experience. Along these lines, empathy is the ability to understand and to share the emotional state of another person because she is in this state. In order to successfully empathize, one has to imagine experiencing a situation from the inside as another person would experience it. Being empathetic in this sense is widely regarded as desirable. Empathy seems to be a virtue. This leads to the question what kind of virtue empathy is. The default answer is that it is a moral virtue. The first aim of this paper is to reject this standard view. There is morality without empathy, and empathy without morality. Its second aim is to argue that empathy is an aesthetic virtue. It is one of those traits and abilities contributing to inner beauty.

According to a strong interpretation of the standard view, empathy is necessary for moral judgements and behaviour. Admittedly, how an action affects the emotional state of a person can be relevant for moral evaluations. It would be problematic, however, if we could only gain this knowledge through empathy because psychological and epistemic limitations make it very difficult to successfully empathize. Goldie even argues that successful empathetic perspective-shifting is impossible due to the consciousness of the imaginative process. Additionally, our ability to empathize with different persons has limits: we can only empathize with few persons at a time, we rather empathize which those close or similar to us, and so on. Furthermore, it often suffices to understand the emotional state of another person, one does not have to share it. So empathy is no epistemic precondition for moral judgements. It also is no motivational precondition for moral behaviour. Empathic emotions might not motivate at all, and other emotions like anger or outrage also, perhaps even better motivate. According to a weak interpretation of the standard view, empathy reliably leads to moral judgements and behaviour. Bloom, Breithaupt, and Prinz, however, refute this claim. Due to its limitations and limits, empathy fosters biased moral judgements. Secondly, (hyper-)empathy harms the empathic person by wearing her out or letting her forget her own well-being. Thirdly, empathic cruelty, sadism and sadomasochism can occur. Taken together, these arguments strongly suggest that empathy is no moral virtue.
We do not, however, only appraise persons in moral terms based on their character traits and cognitive or emotional abilities, but sometimes also in aesthetic terms. We call them inwardly beautiful. The long philosophical tradition of speaking about inner beauty reflects this. I want to define aesthetic virtues as those traits and abilities which positively contribute to the overall assessment of a person as inwardly beautiful.

Empathy creates a congruence between the emotional states of two persons and thereby brings harmony into the world. According to the classical beauty theory, beauty emerges from harmony, symmetry and shapeliness. So, empathy might be an aesthetic virtue because it produces a typical beauty feature. This argument fails, however, because empathy does not become harmonious in itself nor does it make the character of the empathic person harmonious in itself by creating harmony between two emotional states.

The second argument starts with a more detailed analysis of inner beauty. Inspired by Burke and Reed, it suggests that inner beauty can be best explained in terms of amiability. It depends on sociable character traits and abilities for which we are looking in friends and partners, if we think about intimate relationships in general. Amiable traits and abilities evoke a presumably generalizable experience of attraction. This experience comprises pleasure, a wish to form or maintain a relationship and the belief that others should react in a similar way if they abstract from mere personal preferences and situational circumstances. Although it is no disinterested experience, it strongly resembles the standard experience of physical or physical-expressive human beauty. This similarity explains why amiable traits and abilities make up inner beauty and thus are aesthetic virtues.

Empathy falls within this characterisation of aesthetic virtues. If someone empathizes with me, this gives me pleasure. The weight of my negative emotions is lifted, and my joy intensified. Furthermore, we literally come to share the emotions of others by empathizing with them. This helps to take their ends and dreams as our own as friends and partners do. That is why we wish and even expect from our friends and partners that they are empathic. So, empathy contributes to evoke a presumably generalizable experience of attraction.

One might object that inner beauty and moral beauty are often equated. Empathy thus cannot be an aesthetic virtue unless it is a moral one. But as our pretheoretical notion of inner beauty shows, inner beauty does not only depend on morally, but on more generally desirable traits and abilities. Some forms of moral virtuousness are not even considered to be beautiful. And although empathy is no moral virtue, it is no moral vice. Empathy only leads to morally wrong judgements or immoral behaviour if combined with certain cognitive, emotional or character deficits. Therefore, empathy can be an aesthetic virtue although it is no moral virtue.
Borbala Jasz (Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences) and Zsolt Batori (Budapest Metropolitan University)

Architects, art historians and aestheticians alike often assume that the ontology of architectural works is unproblematic; that we know precisely what architectural objects are. It is also widely held that talking about how buildings convey communicative content is based on a well-developed technical language about architecture. This language (its terminology and use) is thought to be canonised to the point that we can easily discuss questions concerning architectural styles, conventions, functions, expressions, etc. In this framework, architectural intentions are considered to be readable on different levels and layers, depending on the contextual and art historical knowledge of the viewer. In other words, architectural communicative content (the “meaning” of buildings and even larger architectural units) is thought to be accessible with the theoretical and methodological tools of art history in general, and architecture history in particular. For instance, architecture historians would explain that the main building of Lomonosov University in Moscow is constructed centrally and symmetrically, presenting monumental columns on the fore-front and the cour d’honneur structure of the floor map. These are well-known traditional elements for conveying power, and they are often noted in the art historical analyses of buildings.

In this paper we suggest that architectural meaning is considerably more complex, and that its underlying conceptual framework is in need of further development and refinement. The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, architectural meaning has not been considered in the light of what kind of entities communicative architectural objects are. We argue that their ontological status has consequences for how we may explicate what and how they may communicate. On the other hand, and in connection with the first point, we suggest that much of the terminology used for describing architectural meaning is ad hoc or insufficient. The aforementioned example about conveying power, for instance, is insufficient, because we do not understand the mechanism for constructing and interpreting such meaning. Is it symbolic, language-like meaning? Is it pictorial type of meaning? Or is it something else?

For our arguments we partially rely on some of the concepts suggested by Nelson Goodman in his paper How Buildings Mean (1988). By analysing architectural language and terminology he distinguishes denotation (depiction, representation) from exemplification (of properties and structures), expression and mediated reference. These are examples of different communicative means and levels of producing architectural meaning. Despite its title, however, Goodman’s system is a promising account only of what can be communicated with buildings, but the how aspect is not explicit in his theory. The typology is not embedded in a developed conceptual framework of (architectural) communication.

We propose a new conceptual framework for architectural meaning on the basis of the speech act theory (Austin, 1962, Searle, 1969) and its application to pictorial meaning, the picture act theory (Kjørup, 1974, 1978, Novitz, 1975, 1977). We extend the theory of speech acts and picture acts to include objects in general and buildings in particular. Our theory of object acts accounts for the construction and interpretation of architectural meaning on the basis of how we interpret architectural locutionary acts (buildings) in the context of their production and use.
In our ontological account architectural objects, such as buildings or larger coherent units (blocks, districts or even cities) are understood not merely as physical objects, but also as architectural locutionary acts. An architectural locutionary act is the architectural object that is produced and presented not only for its utility, but also for the interpretation of its communicative content. Accordingly, the architectural illocutionary act is the architectural locutionary act interpreted in the specific context of its production and use. Similarly to speech acts, the interpreter understands not only the intended meaning (in the given contexts), but also that the producer of the architectural locutionary act intended her meaning-producing intention to be recognised. The basic components of architectural illocutionary acts are: object recognition, visual processing of spatial relations and arrangements, utterer’s (producer’s) intention, and context.

For instance, the central building of Lomonosov University is understood not only as a physical structure that serves a function, but also as an architectural illocutionary act. The locutionary act (the physical building) has certain characteristics that are to be interpreted according to the recognised intention of the producer of the locutionary act. Although the building does not depict or represent, it exemplifies (to use Goodman’s terminology), for instance, physical structures that are recognised to be strong, and in turn, are traditionally associated with power. A possible perlocutionary effect is that the viewer is impressed by the (conveyed strength of the) building.

According to our account, the various types of contents (what is conveyed by buildings) may be analysed in the conceptual framework of architectural illocutionary acts in order to provide a systematic theory of the rich variety architectural communication. These considerations are embedded in an ontological framework that accommodates understanding physical architectural objects as architectural locutionary acts.

While explicating architectural meaning may well stop at the point of describing the mechanism of architectural illocutionary acts, we will also take one further step to include the role of architectural photography in contemporary architectural meaning construction. Modern architects (from the first part of the twentieth century) quickly discovered the utility of architectural photography. They started to think about not only how buildings may be perceived, but also about how they may be represented in photographs. This entailed that architects started to design their buildings not only for the naked eye, but also for the photographer’s camera. This became a new level of architectural meaning construction; while communicative content had always been an important aspect of buildings, the point of view of the laypeople walking by or into the building is markedly different from that of the professional architectural photographer, who interprets the work and presents her own understanding to the viewers of the photos. For instance, the creative collaboration of Le Corbusier and Lucien Hervé provided for a novel interpretation and better understanding of Corbusier’s works.

It is also important to note that people (laypersons and architects alike) know most of the buildings beyond their home neighbourhood by looking at photographs, not from personal experience. Architectural photography, hence, has a chance of adding an extra layer on meaning up to the point of even blurring the difference between architectural objects and sculptures, since in the photograph the form and the communicative content may get priority over the actual function of the building. In the last section of our talk architectural photography is explicated as an inherent aspect of at least a significant portion of contemporary architecture.

**Philosophy of Design: towards a new definition**

Michalle Gal (Shenkar)
The paper offers an infrastructure of a formalist definition of design, as an aesthetic medium whose essence is its aesthetic compositions. The philosophy of design is a relatively young, nonetheless significant, sup-discipline of aesthetics. It is high time aesthetics broadened its scope to analyze design more formally and widely, given that design objects furnish so much of our surroundings. Therefore, the formalist definition is presented in the paper in juxtaposition to what I classify as rationalist and functionalist definitions, formulated respectively by Glenn Parsons in his 2016 The Philosophy of Design, and Jane Forsey in her 2013 The Aesthetics of Design.

Because design is so ubiquitous in our daily spheres, the formalism versus functionalism or rationalism distinction with regard to design, goes all the way back (or up) to a characterization of the human-being—in our case as an aesthetician or a visual being or rather a user. The corresponding normative question is whether design ought to aestheticize functional things, to be looked at, or to enhance usefulness, convenience and functionality. Many will say both equally. But I think that in many crucial moments a choice IS made, and that design is first and foremost an aesthetically oriented field, nonetheless its essential functionality.

Trying to prove this proposition, the paper examines the class of re-used designed objects as paradigmatic cases supporting a formalist definition of design. I argue the following logically related claims:

1. A privileged added value is attributed to the aesthetic qualities and status of re-used forms of designed objects and buildings. Function-depleted designed forms—those forms of objects for which new functions may be substituted for old ones—gain aesthetic qualities (even beauty) due to a ‘metaphorical-dialectical’ structure. Exemplary instances include Marcel Duchamp’s Trap (a coat hanger converted to a ‘trap’, where the function is only metaphorically projected); Fallen Furniture’s 737 Cowling Chair (an engine cowling of Boeing 737 converted to a chair, where only part of an undefined form is re-used); Junktion Studio’s Telephone Desk Lamp and IKEA Hackers products; the Tate Modern Museum and Musée d’Orsay (a power station and a railway station converted to museums) and other modernist factories. In each of these instances a form-follows-function structure is inverted to a function-follows-form structure, where the designed object is born anew from its form. However, it is not pure but rather deep form. Formal properties rise and thicken as a result of a lingering, vacuous presence of a former function, and a subjugation (in Gombrich’s sense) of the new projected function to the existing form.

2. This phenomenon might be definitive of the nature of the designed object, rendering form as its core property, if not its essence. In this way, form whose original function was removed may call for new functions, beyond what modernist architecture literature refers to as premeditated “functionalist flexibility” or what is termed by Parsons “functionalist indeterminacy”.

3. Pointing to the aesthetic added values, and to the exposition of form as axis of the re-used design objects, supports a normative formalist definition of design. Namely, it supports the proposition that the main role of design consists in attaining a rightness of composition of a functional-object. Parsons and Forsey define functionality as a necessary condition of design. They distinguish between proper function and use, proper function being intentional, not accidental, not imposed on the object, or even as Parsons dubs it “belongs to the thing itself”, or as Forsey puts it: “Within the vast range of human artifacts, we need to further distinguish design as those that can be defined by their function, in a sense that takes us as far back as Aristotle. What makes something a hammer is that it is meant to serve the function of—have the purpose of—hammering.” If a rock also drives in a nail, it is not therefore a hammer: it is used as a hammer, “which gives it, if you will, honourary hammer-status” for the duration of its use. But with designed objects, their intentional functions are part of
what define them as the kinds of things they are. What makes a car a car, she argues, is
the original or intended function of the thing as designed to be the thing it is.

However, the examples the paper supply are of objects and buildings whose original and
intended function was intentionally and seriously and laboriously converted by designers,
and that are exhibited and re-purposed as design objects. A few of the objects were ex-
tremely functional originally, made in a most functionalist era. How is it possible to de-
plete such functional objects from their intended function? It is a fact that their forms
have some sort of precious self-standing aesthetic prominence, that invites new purposes.
This applies both to the buildings that a public campaign was held to save them from de-
molition, and to objects whose prototypical form, such as the car or phone is liked by
their users-beholders. This is the reason that the depleted form can call for a new use.

This form, which serves as the foundation of the inverted structure of function-follows-
form, that renders the designed object to be newly born from form, is not a pure form,
but rather a deep one. We see in the Musée d’Orsay the no longer active function of the
railway station, of hosting moving vehicles and passengers, as well as its atmosphere. Si-
milarly, the weighty function of the former power station is well felt in Tate Modern. The
re-purposed form in these cases at least is monumental as well. Less grandiose, nonethe-
less effective, is the absent-present function of the engine cowling chair and other simple
or less simple design objects.

What is more important is that what maintained the identity of the design objects are
their forms. The depletion of the function renders the structure of the objects seen and
apparent, and their prototypical forms moves to the fore. Thus, the phenomenon might be
definitive to the nature of the design object, rendering the form as its foundation.
In §54 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant writes that laughter is “an affect resulting from the sudden transformation of a heightened expectation into nothing. This very transformation, which is certainly nothing enjoyable for the understanding, is nevertheless indirectly enjoyable and, for a moment, very lively” (5:332, 209).

Contemporary interpretations tend to explain Kant’s notion of laughter as a species of the beautiful or the sublime. In short, they argue that laughter is similar to the beautiful in that it originates in a disinterested play between the faculties of imagination and understanding, yet dissimilar to the beautiful in that the play is disharmonious, rather than harmonious, resulting in the feeling of displeasure instead. On the other hand, laughter also shares similarity with the sublime in that the discordance between the imagination and understanding evokes a purposive relationship between imagination and reason, therefore resulting in the feeling of pleasure.

However, such an interpretation faces many difficulties. First, the explanation of the pleasure of laughter as consisting in how disharmony between our cognitive faculties stimulates the free play of the faculty of reason fails to accord with Kant’s characterization of pleasure in laughter as a kind of relief (5:332, 209). Pleasure characterized as a relief signifies a reduction of that something which produces tension and frustration in the first place, hence a reduction of the disharmony between cognitive faculties. This suggests that the source of pleasure in laughter lies in the elimination of the displeasing disharmony between the imagination and understanding, rather than in an additionally acquired harmony between imagination and reason.

Second, the idea of pleasure in laughter as originating in the invocation of the supersensible faculty of reason and its ideas (as in the case of the sublime), does not appear to be consistent with the material content distinctive for objects that occasion laughter. Namely, faculty of reason is associated with the ideas of freedom, god and immortality and as such is particularly suggestive for the expression of ideas that celebrate the rational and moral side of our being, such as the life-affirming ideas of compassions, peace, virtue, gentleness, courage, altruism, etc. Yet, what is distinctive for objects that occasion laughter is that they tend to express ideas that are opposite to rational ideas, such as ideas of irrationality, mortality, moral and physical weakness, clumsiness, absent-mindedness, stupidity, foolishness, ignorance, etc., all of them emphasizing the finite, the sensuous and the smallness of a human character. For example, we laugh at Mr. Bean’s clumsiness and helplessness in practical matters, at the dishonest, insecure, stingy and selfish nature of George Constanza in the comedy show Seinfeld or at the confrontational, irritable and socially awkward manners of Larry David in Curb your enthusiasm. Comical objects tend to communicate ideas that stands in opposition to the supersensible ideas of reason, and thus it does not seem to be a tenable position to explain pleasure in laughter as result of the purposive relationship between imagination and reason.

Third, such an interpretation fails to give an account of the distinction between the notions of laughter and ugliness, presumably both depending on the state of mind of disharmony between imagination and understanding. As Giamario explains laughter: “The subject laughs when the understanding cannot make sense of the world with the empirical concepts and rules it normally employs. As the world of appearances diverges from its expectations, the understanding experiences a certain frustration before suddenly relaxing and providing the subject with the paradoxical pleasure of laughter.” But Kant also expla-
ins ugliness as the result of the object’s resistance to be subsumed under the established concepts and rules of the understanding. Ugliness depends on the feeling of displeasure due to the “discord of freedom, in the play of the power of imagination and the lawfulness of the understanding” (Anthr 7:241, 137). We find an object ugly when the sensible manifold apprehended by the imagination conflicts with the faculty of understanding and its need to establish order and unity over the heterogeneity of the manifold. The difference is that in the case of ugliness such discord between imagination and understanding does not result in a paradoxical feeling of pleasure. Accordingly, this interpretation raises the question as to why it is the case that even though both laughter and ugliness depend on the state of mind of disharmony between imagination and understanding, that is, they both involve a certain kind of incongruity that is ill-adapted to our cognitive abilities, producing thereby the feeling of displeasure, yet that we should after all feel pleasure in the former, while not in the latter.

Appealing to the similarity between Kant’s notion of laughter and the sublime cannot solve this problem. This is because the disharmony involved in the sublime takes place between the faculties of imagination and reason and not between imagination and the understanding as it is the case in laughter. The experience of the sublime, as Kant writes, is the result of the failure of imagination to satisfy the task given to it by the faculty of reason, namely, to sensibly present the rational idea of infinity (infinite size and power). It is the disharmony between imagination and reason that produces the displeasure felt in the sublime. Yet, the fact that imagination fails to satisfy the task given to it by reason (i.e. to sensibly present the rational idea of the infinite size and power), on the other hand, indicates the existence of the supersensible faculty of the mind (i.e. the faculty of reason) which produces in us the feeling of intense pleasure. Accordingly, the faculty of reason is present in the feeling of displeasure (in fact, it is precisely because of its presence that imagination reveals itself as inadequate); it is merely that this displeasure reveals its existence. The very act of disagreement between imagination and reason is an act of their agreement. On the other hand, laughter depends on the mental state of disagreement between the imagination and the faculty of understanding. In this relation, there is no failure of the imagination to satisfy the task given to it by the faculty of reason; rather it is the case that sensible manifold apprehended by the imagination simply conflicts with the understanding’s concepts and rules. Laughter consists in the frustration of the faculty of the understanding rather than of the faculty of reason and thus it is difficult to see how such frustration could reflect or inspire the power of the faculty of reason and the accompanying feeling of pleasure.

In this paper I offer an alternative interpretation of Kant’s theory of laughter that can meet the challenges left behind by the interpretations given so far. In short, I argue that laughter originates in a (nonsensical) representation that involves a disconnection rather than a disharmony between the faculties of imagination and understanding. While disharmony between imagination and understanding results in the feeling of displeasure (and accordingly in a judgment of ugliness when the relation is in free play), a disconnection between cognitive powers (neither agreement nor disagreement) results in neither pleasure nor displeasure. Rather, the experience is one of puzzlement, uneasiness and tension. Furthermore, taking into account Kant’s remark that “we laugh and it gives us gratification, because for a while we toss back and forth like a ball our own misconception about an object that is otherwise indifferent to us, or rather our own idea that we’ve been chasing, while we were merely trying to grasp and hold it firm,” (5:333, 210) I explain pleasure of laughter as a reaction to the dissolution of nonsense, whereby the dissolution of nonsense takes the form of realizing our own misconceptions about the object. Pleasure lies in detecting our mistaken assumptions about the object and thereby relieving us from the nonsense provoking tension. Thus, no appeal to the faculty of reason is required. To put it differently, laughter is a reaction to the relaxation of tension. We feel pleasurable relief in
recognizing that it is not the representation itself that fails to agree with our cognitive abilities, but rather the opposite is the case; it is our own cognitive abilities that misguide us and lead us into a wrong direction (into forming false expectations). This implies that what is laughable is not the object itself, but rather the subject in recognizing the rigidity of its own mind.

I conclude that even though laughter shares a similarity with the sublime in that they are both attributed not to the object, but to our mind, it also stands in a direct opposition to the sublime. While sublime celebrates the victory of our rational faculties, laughter belittles them and mourns their fall. In contrast to the sublime, laughter reveals something about our cognitive and rational system, namely that it is insufficient to explain all our experiences and perceptions of the world and that we often need to revise our expectations in order to make sense of the world. What is inherent in laughter is the recognition of inadequacy of our cognitive system, of our ordinary enforced rules of order that govern our perception of the world and thus it is a feeling of disrespect and self-mockery for our own cognitive abilities (but which we show to an object through subreption, i.e. attribute laughable deficiencies to the object instead to us).

“In General” – On the epistemological mission of Kant’s doctrine of taste

Zoltán Papp (Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), Budapest)

Despite the abundance of innovative interpretations, Kant scholarship still cannot get rid of what has come to be called the ‘everything is beautiful’ problem. It stems mainly from the fact that the central argument for the universal validity of the judgments of taste, presented in both Introductions, §§ 9 and 35-38 of the third Critique, identifies the mental constellation in the judging of the beautiful, the harmony of the imagination and the understanding, with the condition of determinate condition. This means that any object of cognition must have been found beautiful on a subjective, pre-conceptual level. I would like to propose a reading of Kant’s theory of taste that, instead of trying to provide yet another solution to the ‘everything is beautiful’ problem, shows why it is an unavoidable - though unacceptable - consequence of an epistemological mission to be fulfilled by this theory.
The Images between Iconoclasm and Iconophilia – War against War by Ernst Friedrich

Marta Maliszewska (University of Warsaw)

There are two main accounts considering the images which can be called in general “iconoclasm” and “iconophilia”. While first of it can be characterised as a distrust of the image, second is connected with a belief in positive power of the image. As J. W. Mitchell writes, leftists critique mainly represent lack of trust to the images and the iconoclasm. Based on the example of the project War against War by Ernst Friedrich I would like to show that there is also another way possible, which combines both the iconoclasm and the iconophilia.

War against War was published in 1924 and contained over 250 censored archives and press photos from the World War First. Friedrich collapses two different representations of war - propaganda published in newspapers and that showing the other face of war’s reality, made of dead bodies, mug and destruction. Every photo is ironically titled by Friedrich, often with the quote form the newspaper. The album is preceded by a manifesto in which Friedrich criticises the discourse of “the Field of Honour” which glorifies the war. He believed that if people understood that “in all wars the object is to protect or to seize money and property and power”[1], they would strike against it opening the possibility of the society of “Man and Love”.

In his project Friedrich uses photos which he have stolen form the official archives. As Michael Foucault and Howard Zinn notice, the archive are not neutral, they are tools used by the power to construct the dominant discourse. In modern times the discourse is constructed not only by the text but mainly by the image. The power decides which images can and which cannot be seen. At the same time it documents all aspects of the world to control it. In the photo archive, as Allan Sekula writes, all photos are predominant by the archives owner who can freely interpret them. In contrast to that, Friedrich liberates and shows the photos which were supposed never to be seen. By showing what is repressed he redistributes the sensible. This means, as Jacques Rancière puts it, “revealing one world behind another […]. It involves organizing a clash, presenting the strangeness of the familiar, in order to reveal a different order of measurement that is only uncovered by the violence of a conflict”[2].

In the next step Friedrich combines together the archive photos and the element form the press, both textual and visual. In this way, he shows an incompatibility between the two images of war - the photos of “Field of Honour” and heroes stand next to those of dead bodies and mutilated veterans. The difference between them is also aesthetic and it may be interpreted through Klaus Theweleit’s Male’s Fantasies – while proud soldiers are thick and consistent, their dead comrades split and mix with a mug and dead horses. This is the image of war which cannot be accepted by eulogists of “Field of Honour”. He titles the images in ironic style. This is, on textual level, his strategy to catch out pathos of “Field of Honour”. As he writes “[...] they invented such beautiful phrases as »Fatherland« and »Field of Honour, and spoke of »defence« and uttered other lies. [...] they ordered to murder and to rob for the interests of the money-bags”[3].

In this point the iconoclast critique of the dominant discourse ends. By using critical methods Friedrich have shown how it represses some narration and empower other. But he not only accuses the image, he also believes in their positive power. War against War is meant to be the starting point for a new society based on “Man and Love”. The images, are undoubtful, “[...] not a single man of any country whatsoever can arise and bear witness against these photographs”[…][4]. These beliefs can be seen as naïve by the iconoclasts. But Friedrich understands the threat and the dominant power in the images. But at the same time they can play an ambiguous role. The photos from the archive which the
power tries to hide, can be a powerful tool of giving voice and constructing alternative narrations. By liberating the images Friedrich deprives the power of having the photos only for itself and by of interpreting them. At the same time the images can be the testimony as Georges Didi-Huberman shows it in “Images in Spite of All”. Photos from the World War First are not the documents. Because of the poor technical conditions they are often blurred. The viewer cannot say correctly what is presented on them. Still that is why they are telling us about the experience of soldiers in trenches, where everything mixes and become an organic mass. This testimony puts some moral responsibility on the viewer and that is why he/she can not simply ignore an appeal of the image.

What follows is that there is a third way different from both the iconoclasm and the iconophilia. It uses the methods of the iconoclasm to show how the dominant discourse is constructed by the images. But it also, in its iconophilian character, underlines the power of the same images to destabilize these discourse and to give the testimony. Contemporarily, when the flood of ideological images appears to be unstoppable, the need of such a breaking the opposition between the iconoclasm and the iconophilia becomes a specially urgent.


The Moral Significance of First-Personal Trauma Narratives

Zoe Cunliffe (City University of New York)

The first-personal narratives of trauma victims are important as testimonial accounts of lived experience, and also have the potential to fulfil various morally significant functions. The productive work that narratives can do depends upon empathic listening: upon the existence of an appropriately empathetic audience. In this paper, I draw on Susan Brison and Diana Meyers to explore how trauma narratives can achieve morally pertinent benefits for both victims and those that attend to the narratives (Brison 2002; Meyers 2016).

In §1 I clarify how first-personal narratives function in cases of traumatic experience; I identify three morally significant features of victims’ stories. §2 looks at a potential objection to the narrative coherence of victims’ stories. I suggest that the traditional conception of narrative itself should be interrogated and expanded, and argue that the fragmented nature of trauma stories ought not to interrupt empathic listening.

1 - First-personal narrative accounts of trauma

In this section I detail three moral features of first-personal trauma narratives, and sketch what I mean by empathic listening. First, for trauma victims - those subject to war, abuse, violence - the development of firstpersonal narratives recounting their experiences often plays a crucial part of the recovery process.

Narratives offer a victim a way of ‘mastering trauma’ through the telling and retelling of past events, such that more control can be gained over traumatic memories. This control in part comes from the fact that narratives are, by nature, the results of choice and interpretation - how much information to disclose, which words to use, and who to impart the narrative to.

However, this recuperative potential of narratives is dependent upon those narratives receiving appropriate uptake - empathic listening is required, from “an audience able and willing to hear [them] and understand [their] words as [they] intend them” (Brison 2002,
5). A first-personal narrative cannot be used to regain a sense of control if it is resisted or rejected by others.

A second function that first-personal narrative accounts of trauma can play is in expanding the scope and depth of our moral understanding. This is the thought that first-personal narratives can actively contribute to and shape our moral landscape. Diana Meyers argues in the context of grave rights violations that many victims’ stories convey some kind of moral void: a set of circumstances that allowed the traumatic events to take place (2016, 99). Victims’ stories have the potential to draw attention to “implicit moral imperative[s] that [have] been systematically ignored”, and thereby expand the scope of what we consider morally pertinent. Note that for victims’ narratives to have this effect, empathic listening is again important.

If an audience is not attuned to the victim’s story in an open-minded way, they might not pick up on the moral demand that the story poses, or might not feel its potency. This leads me to the third morally significant feature of first-personal trauma narratives: they can facilitate empathic listening. In virtue of its first-person perspective and its depiction of a concrete, lived experience, a victim’s story urges its listener to be actively involved with it in some way. Empathy’s definitive features are highly contested, but I follow others in taking empathy to fundamentally involve a kind of first-personal perspective taking: imagining ‘what it is like’ to be in somebody else’s shoes (Coplan 2011; Matravers 2017). Empathy’s value has been questioned in recent years, with academics such as Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz questioning its moral efficacy (Bloom 2016; Prinz 2011). However, I maintain that there are nonetheless good reasons to focus on empathy.

First, as Lorraine Code emphasizes, much of empathy’s value lies in its profoundly relational nature: empathy between two individuals centrally involves “a bond, a sense of mutuality” (Code 1995, 123). The importance of empathy’s capacity to foster connection is particularly clear concerning the therapeutic function of narratives for trauma victims - understanding how a victim feels and engaging with those feelings is part of what enables recovery.

Second, in cases of trauma it is arguable that adopting sympathy leads us morally astray and empathy keeps us on track, rather than it being the other way around. Trauma often involves experiences of humiliation and degradation - these notions have deep cultural roots, and might even vary between individuals.

2 - Challenging the traditional conception of narrative

One problem for the establishment of empathic listening is that traumatic memories do not lend themselves to robust narrative form, as traditionally construed. First-personal narratives are stories, and it is commonly thought that stories must be designed in particular ways. For example, Noël Carroll stipulates that a narrative requires “a unified subject and a perspicuous temporal order” (Carroll 2001, 120). The core idea is that narratives can be more or less successful in virtue of the way they are organized - and that purported narratives that fail to structure their contents appropriately might fail to qualify as such.

There is a worry that this kind of organization might not be evident in the first-personal narrative given by a trauma victim. As Brison notes, traumatic memories are by nature incomplete and fragmented, especially with those for whom traumatic experience extended over a longer period of time (2002, 53). They might therefore fall short of counting as stories at all, on a standard understanding; at the very least, insofar as they are fragmented, they will be considered poorly told narratives.

Instead of arguing that victims’ stories can be construed in such a way that they qualify as full narratives, I contend that we should broaden our conception of what a narrative should look like. The structural differences within victims’ narratives are correlated to their
traumatic memories - fragmentation of some sort is characteristic of the recounting of trauma. This means that it would be disloyal to the embodied experiences of victims for them to attempt to represent those experiences in a temporally structured way.

A further issue with a traditional understanding of narrative is that the requirement for stories to be well-structured and contain some sense of closure is liable to interrupt empathic listening and its morally significant features, or at the very least to lead it astray. If somebody narrativizing their traumatic experience is under the impression that their audience expects their story to be organized and non-fragmented, this might lead them to impose structure on their experiences too hastily. This is particularly pernicious given the prevalence of dominant, oppressive ‘master narratives’ that might influence victims’ stories - these are defined by Hilde Lindemann Nelson as distorting stock plots from our culture’s socially shared understandings.

Finally, I want to suggest that in some cases, the absence of unified structure, completeness or resolution in first-personal narratives about trauma can actually enhance an empathic listener’s ability to engage in a morally meaningful way. Gaps and discontinuities in victims’ stories should not be seen as flaws but instead as a meaning-laden method of conveying experience. Part of the point of some stories is that they do not convey a particular message, and that they do not contain any emotional resolution within them.
Arguably, Jacques Rancière's biggest contribution to aesthetics is his idea that aesthetic practices (in his terminology: aesthetic regimes) are organised around a notion of equality, rather than freedom. This paper proposes to systematically examine the notion of aesthetic equality in the work of Rancière and in what senses it might be possible to understand it as more fundamental than aesthetic freedom. I discuss three ways in which to understand aesthetic equality and critically discuss them. In each case, this paper will conclude, Rancière faces serious issues.

Aesthetic equality is the result of what Rancière calls an aesthetic regime that is asserted against (and overturns) an earlier representative regime. In this regime the arts are differentiated according to the subjects which they should represent. The relation between the different arts (and between different genres) thus comes to be a hierarchy analogous to the hierarchy that exists in the world. E.g., since history painting is defined by its portrayal of the actions of great men, it is the highest genre of painting, whereas genre scenes of servants and maids (or worse yet, inanimate still-life painting) are a lower genre because they depict humbler subjects. In Rancière's words: "A regime of visibility [here: the representative regime] is at once what renders the arts autonomous and also what links this autonomy to a general order of occupations and ways of doing and making" (Rancière 2004, 22).

The aesthetic regime throws this hierarchy into relief: instead of propriety of form to subject matter, the only rule that the aesthetic regime posits is a subjective norm of corresponding to "a sensible mode of being specific to artistic products" (22) (i.e. a way of being perceived, i.e. aesthetically). In his critical introduction to Rancière, Joseph J. Tanke identifies three forms of equality that result from the aesthetic regime (Tanke 2011, 85-90). First, a norm of indifference that describes the relation between the subject matter of artworks and their form: any subject can be portrayed aesthetically in any way whatsoever, and all works count equally as art (Rancière 2010, 146-147). Second, equality is a prescriptive norm for the aesthetic mind evaluating an artwork: a free play of the faculties substitutes the evaluation of propriety of form to matter and so posits an equality between the imagination and the understanding where, before, there was only an activity of the understanding subordinating the other faculties (184). Third, equality is a norm for artists/artistic producers, prescribing their status vis-à-vis their audience (and other participants in the artwork): since artists in the aesthetic regime cannot any longer rely on the authority of the understanding (by which to fix the rules for creating a good artwork), they must assume the equal status of their audience as co-creators of the work in question (Rancière 2011).

In these ways, Rancière has sought to emphasize the fundamental importance of equality, but is his analysis sound? As regards the first kind of equality, indifference to subject matter, it seems to be merely a descriptive norm of aesthetic practice as a whole, rather than a description of any particular participant of the practice. So it is difficult to see how this equality is foundational for aesthetic freedom, instead of being merely a different level of analysis.

As regards the second norm of equality, the free play of the faculties, it is tempting to see it as an equality between the freedoms of the imagination and the understanding. This, in any case, seems to be the way in which Kant understands the free play. But, of course, this precisely undermines Rancière's thesis that equality, rather than freedom, is fundamental to the aesthetic regime. If, on the other hand, Rancière thinks that there is a different kind of equality instituted in the aesthetic regime (one without necessary reference
to freedom), there must be a way in which the two faculties are ordinarily unequal beyond the imagination being unfree because it is constrained by the understanding. There should have to be a different inequality (say, in strength/airtime/dignity/etc.) between the faculties when they are functioning ordinarily. I see no reason to suppose this is the case.

As regards the final norm of equality, between audience and artist, Rancière's thesis hinges on the idea that the audience is like the artist because both must do aesthetic work (be it manual production or intellectual interpretation) (Rancière 2011, 13). Prima facie, this argument is likely to reduce, again, to an assertion of equal freedoms, in this case of artist and audience alike to assign meaning to an artwork. Even if this interpretation holds without relying on some notion of aesthetic freedom, however, it crucially relies on either the claim that the intention of the artist does not matter, or on the claim that it is of equal importance as the intentions of the audience. Both claims are false. First, authorial intention is ineliminably present in all art for the simple reason that something should recognizably be intended as art before it is reasonable for an audience to engage with it aesthetically: both Rembrandt's The Night Watch as well as Rembrandt's afternoon snack are creations by the Dutch master, but only one of them is intended as art and consequently only one of them can possibly qualify as an artwork.

Second, the artist's intention can influence the work in ways that the audience's intention can never aspire to: e.g., by representing certain buildings and natural features and, for good measure, titling a landscape View of Delft, Johannes Vermeer can decide that the painting is a representation of Delft. Conversely, however, perciptents of the artwork cannot so decide (they may pretend, of course, that it is a representation of, say, Utrecht, but pretence changes nothing about the work). Only by biting the bullet that, in these cases, subject matter does not matter for aesthetic meaning at all (i.e. by insisting on a very extreme variety of aesthetic formalism), can Rancière argue that an artist's intention is of equal worth.

I conclude by summarizing that Rancière's thesis of aesthetic equality faces serious issues and, if time constraints allow, I will further elucidate why I think these issues do not arise for the orthodox notion that places a premium on aesthetic freedom.

When Juliet was the Sun: Metaphor as Play

Palle Leth (Stockholm University)

In this paper I will put forward an approach to metaphor according to which it does not serve to suggest unstated similarities between things from different domains. Rather, metaphor serves to initiate a kind of discursive and imaginative play brought about in the discourse which follows upon the metaphorical sentence. These metaphors do not invite the hearer to take the single sentence as a starting point for association, but to make sense of what the speaker herself goes on to say in the wake of her metaphor.

The view of metaphor which I will be reacting against holds that in a metaphorical ‘S is P’ sentence the predicate ascribes or intimates – depending on whether this is taken to be semantic or pragmatic – properties resulting from some kind of interaction between the subject and the predicate. It is frequently suggested that the function of the predicate is to offer a perspective, a frame or a prism for thinking about the subject. Thanks to the juxtaposition of the subject and the predicate, the hearer sees the subject as something which it is not and is invited to explore the similarities between the subject and the predicate. Some of the properties associated with the predicate are perhaps not directly applicable to the subject, but may be suitably modified to apply. This is supposed to lead the hearer to revelations and insights concerning the nature of the subject. It is thus thought to be the hearer's task to follow up on the suggestion made by the speaker and to work
out the properties which somehow are shared by the predicate and the subject and see
which implications are made, according, of course, to what fits into the context at hand.
This process is thought to be endless or at least open ended; metaphors are particularly
appreciated for being infinitely suggestive. In sum, the mere juxtaposition of the subject
and the predicate results in a firework of properties, similarities, suggestions, which, tho-
ough effectuated wholly by the hearer, is somehow thought to be the speaker’s achieve-

Interpretations of Romeo’s metaphorical sentence ‘Juliet is the sun’ will serve as my star-
ting point. Theorists propose that Romeo by this utterance says or suggests that Juliet,
e.g., is warm, sustaining, comforting, bright, dazzling, unequalled among women (Cavell
2013). There is perhaps no direct evidence against neither the form nor the content of this
kind of interpretation. As long as we confine ourselves to the single sentence it may seem
natural to imagine that some sharing of properties occurs. Nevertheless one may want to
have some explicit support for such an interpretation. On what grounds is it assumed that
the sentence ‘Juliet is the sun’ by itself says or suggests so very many things and precisely
the things proposed? Is there e.g. any textual evidence for any of the sun-like features
proposed or for Romeo’s wanting us to explore such features at all?

According to the reading of Romeo’s discourse which I will propose, the function of the
phrase ‘Juliet is the sun’ is not to suggest similarities between Juliet and the sun, but ra-
ther to, as it were, cast Juliet as the sun. The phrase ‘Juliet is the sun’ in itself does not
say or suggest more than this casting. But Romeo does not stop there. By ‘Juliet is the sun’
Romeo starts playing at Juliet’s being the sun. Once Juliet is cast as the sun, it is possible
to speak of her beings and doings and of her features and actions in terms of beings and
doings and features and actions of the sun. If Juliet is the sun, what is Rosaline? Rosaline
is the moon. If Juliet is the sun, what is it for her to step out on the balcony? It must be to
arise. If Juliet is the sun, what is it for her to replace Rosaline in Romeo’s mind? It is sim-
ply to kill the moon. Casting Juliet as the sun thus permits Romeo to make further utte-
rances about her in terms of the sun. In some cases, our establishment of counterparts is,
though not definite, quite straightforward. Romeo thus seems to make some rather de-
terminate points which we get at with sufficient confidence. In other cases, there is much
less precision. Romeo is playing at Juliet’s being the sun and at Rosaline’s being the moon,
but also at the sun’s being Juliet and at the moon’s being Rosaline in such a way that there
is a wilful mix of vocabularies and that there is no definite content to be gathered from
some of his further utterances. The imprecision seems to be part of the pleasure.

It does not seem then that Romeo draws our attention to some unstated similarities be-
tween Juliet and the sun. Instead, he draws our attention to what he goes on to say. Ro-
meo does not invite the hearers to do the job, he does the job himself; he is the one who
exploits his having said ‘Juliet’s the sun’. This phrase offers him a locus for going on tal-
kling about Juliet. We should not ask, ‘In which respects is Juliet similar to the sun?’, but
rather, e.g., ‘Who is the moon?’, ‘What is it for Juliet to arise and kill?’ Our task is rather
to establish counterparts than to explore similarities. This process does not seem to corre-
spond to an associative and perspectival seeing-as along the lines usually suggested by
theorists.

Further examples from Shakespeare, Sandburg, Blake and Proust will be analysed in sup-
port of the view that metaphors may serve to initiate the speaker’s discursive play consi-
isting in applying P predicates to the subject. It will appear that such an application may
be used to represent features and actions of the subject or to make the subject appear in
a certain way. According to the play account, what matters to such metaphors is not the
hearer’s associations, but the speaker’s further utterances; not what the hearer imagines,
but what the speaker says; not unstated and endless similarities, but certain more or less
determinate features. Focus is shifted from the metaphorical sentence itself to what it permits the speaker to go on saying (cf. Walton 1993, Hills 2017). The play account of metaphor emerges as a distinct account of metaphor, in addition to the ad hoc (Sperber & Wilson 2008) and similarity accounts already in existence.
Photography, Digital Technology, and Hybrid Art Forms

Claire Anscomb (University of Kent)

In this paper, I tackle the pressing issue of how to correctly identify and profitably appreciate digital arts that involve photography. This area needs attention, given the philosophical disagreement that it attracts, and to demonstrate why this is so, I direct the reader’s attention to the example of Light Field Camera (LFC) images. The LFC was developed in 2012 by Lytro and the camera worked by capturing the direction of light as it hit the image sensor and from this, the light field was then reconstructed by software. This technology enabled viewers to refocus and to change the viewing angle of LFC-images after they had been taken. Although the images were made using photographic technology, not all philosophers agree however, that the images are photographs and should be appreciated as such.

Jiri Benovsky for instance, has proposed that due to their dynamic nature, LFC-images are not photographs but digital sculptures. For Benovsky, a photograph is the result of necessary decisions that the image producer makes regarding framing, aperture, shutter speed, and focal length. These necessary decisions imbue photographs with narrative powers as the compositional techniques enable image producers to manipulate and manage the attention of viewers to convey messages (Benovsky 2014, 730). As these necessary decisions are made by the viewer of LFC-images, rather than the producer, Benovsky has suggested that the images are not photographs but sculptures, given the viewers dynamic, self-determined interaction with the work. In contrast to this, due to his permissive “New Theory” of photography, Dominic Lopes can count LFC-images as photographs. For Lopes, a photograph is a product of mark-making processes, used to produce an image, that took input from a “photographic event”, or the registration of light on a photosensitive surface (2016, 81). Given that LFC-images originated in a photographic event, which was output in digital mark-making processes to make an image, for Lopes, they are photographs.

Both theorists have different premises for basing their conclusions on, however it appears that both approaches have value, given that viewers do engage with LFC-images dynamically and that digital photographic technology is used to generate the images. Hence, it is not clear that either approach alone sets the precedent for the appropriate categorization and appreciation of the works. Specifically, if viewers identify and appreciate LFC-images as either a form of digital sculpture or a form of photography, then they will fail to appreciate how the norms of both sculptural and photographic practices have been flouted and combined in a new practice to afford the viewer a new kind of visual experience of the subject through these images. This philosophical disagreement is problematic then, because only by correctly identifying the nature of digital works that involve photography, such as LFC-images, will viewers be able to profitably appreciate these artworks.

The case of LFC-images is however, by no means an isolated one as there are a number of different ways that arts, which involve photography, have developed in the digital age and may subsequently be identified and appreciated. There are some arts, that involve photography, which pre-exist the digital age, but have evolved to incorporate digital technology, such as digitalized overpainted photographs, that are produced by artists including Loretta Lux. While other digital arts involve, or are influenced by, photography and/or other arts, such as virtual photographs, that are produced by artists including Richard Kolker and computational works, that are produced by artists including Stan Douglas. How then, are viewers to correctly identify and profitably appreciate such works? To account for the different ways that photography may manifest itself in digital arts, in this paper I develop a classificatory framework, which is based upon Jerrold Levinson’s account of “hybrid art
forms” (1990, 26-36), in order to distinguish between different types of arts that have evolved or involve, or are influenced by, other arts.

In his account, Levinson has outlined the different reasons as to why agents adopt hybridization as an artistic strategy by identifying three different types of hybridity: juxtaposition, fusion, and transformation. Although, for reasons that I discuss in the paper, I stipulate the conditions for these types of hybridity differently to Levinson, I suggest it must still be the case, as Levinson proposed, that for an art to be classed as a “hybrid” one, ‘some essential or defining feature’ of the hybridized arts must be ‘challenged, modified, or withdrawn’ (1990, 33). In accordance with this, the classificatory framework that I propose, for distinguishing between different types of arts that have evolved, or involve, or are influenced, by other arts, is as follows:

- Evolving arts are those in which some aspect of a pre-existent practice is developed or expanded on, while the majority of the essential or defining features of the art are retained, by incorporating newly developed materials and/or techniques.
- Hybrid arts are those in which the essential or defining features of an art (or multiple arts) have been juxtaposed, challenged, modified, or withdrawn, with or by other arts.
- Arts that are influenced by other arts, are those in which the practices of an art are adapted so that the resultant works reflect the properties of other arts.

Using this framework, in the paper, I look at a range of examples from contemporary art, including the works of Lux, Kolker, and Douglas, to demonstrate how to appropriately identify and profitably appreciate the following: arts and hybrid arts, involving photography, that pre-exist the digital age, but that have evolved to incorporate digital technology; new digital hybrid arts that involve photography; and digital arts that are influenced by photography.

To return the example of LFC-images, in light of the framework that I develop in this paper, as both sculptural and photographic arts are central to the creation and appreciation of these works, I alternatively suggest that it is most appropriate, and profitable for appreciative practice, to recognize LFC-images, as belonging to a hybrid art, which may be deemed “light-field photography”. Sadly, Lytro no longer support the LFC-image viewing platforms and although the practice was short-lived, Apple have recently announced developments for their iPhone cameras and software, which enables users to alter the depth of field of images after they have been taken. The issue of appropriate identification and appreciation of digital arts that involve photography is then key to address at this point in time. Although it may be tempting to assert that, given the increase in new technological materials and techniques, there are an increasing number of new hybrid arts, such as light-field photography, in the digital age (Maynard 2000, 17), it seems that many digital hybrid arts are however, as I demonstrate in this paper, continuations and evolutions of existing hybrid arts, and should be appreciated as such. Some hybrid arts, I conclude, such as virtual photography or light-field photography, are new in virtue of the digital technology that is used to create the works and as with other new and developing arts, at present these hybrid arts tend to be transformations, however this is likely to change as digital arts develop in the future. In sum, the classificatory framework that I develop in this paper will provide a way to appropriately identify and profitably appreciate these future developments in the digital arts.

Phenomenology and Documentary Photography. Some Reflexions on Husserl´s Theory of the Image
The aim of this paper is to reflect on documentary photography in relation to Edmund Husserl’s theory of image. Thinkers like Michael Griffin (1999), Susan Sontang (2004) and Errol Morris (2011) claim that documentary photography meaning resides in its symbolic dimension in detriment to the historical specificity. One case is the manipulation of war photographs, which can be politicized and depoliticized at the same time (Sontang, 2004) and be employed arbitrarily in hegemonic speeches of propaganda. When dealing with the potential of the documentary photography as visual testimony -characterized by its documentary value, that prevails over its technical resolution (low quality), and its effective circulation in different contexts- the following questions emerge: what role does imagination play in determining the veracity or falsity of a documentary photograph? Does it operate as an interpretative matrix, that is, as a condition of possibility of the symbolic effectiveness of photographs?

To approach these questions, I am going to reflect on image consciousness and its symbolic dimension from the perspective of Husserl’s image theory. From this view, image experience re-presents [vergegenwärtigt] its object through a mental image connected to a physical stimulus, which is referred to as physical imagination or re-presentation. This case is of particular interest as it requires us to leave the content and physical support of the photograph in order to focus on its genesis and relationship with its surroundings. To being with, I am going to introduce the idea that image [Bildobjekt], despite being in connection with its physical support and referents, is autonomous because it is constituted in and by aesthetic contemplation. However, at the same time, the image is truly a nothing because there is not an “image thing” [Bildding] existing in the mind. That is, what is presented does not exist as Husserl says: “it does not have existence outside of my consciousness, it does not have existence within my consciousness, it does not have existence at all” (Husserl 2006, p. 23). This distinction reminds of a claim that is also made in the Appendix of the Fifth Investigation, “Critique of the ‘image-theory’ and of the doctrine of the ‘immanent’ objects of acts”, which explains that for the naive interpretation of the image presentation, the image is a fiction that is stuck in the mind as a thing is there in reality (Husserl 2001). On the contrary, in the imaginative contemplation, although the object exists as an objective fact, consciousness only has the image, and reference to its physical support does not explain the essence of the act of imagination (Husserl 2001). Secondly, the nullity of the image would explain its fictional and non-actual [unwirklich] character. According to the content-apprehension schema explained in “Logical Investigations” and “Phantasy and Image Consciousness”, in physical re-presentation there are two apprehensions, a primordial that determines the actual present, whose contents are used up by a modified perceptive second apprehension, which gives way to the image. So, the second apprehension imprints a new character by which the image re-presents and simulates. In this sense, the image works as bearer of the re-presented, producing a coincidence of intuitive moments between the image [Bildobjekt] and the subject of the image [Bildsujet], but also a disparity insofar as in any re-presentation there is a margin of inaccuracy or absence. Waldenfels (2011) calls this margin “iconic or pictorial as-if”, which determinates image appearance as image insofar as there is a difference between the plastically visible and the medium in which it becomes visible. Thirdly, this difference reveals the “transeunt” [transeuenta] or symbolic image function of the intuitive re-presentation. This image function on the basis of an initial appearance points out as signs certain moments of the subject, considering them independently of the object image, that is, considering the image only as a medium without an aesthetic function (Husserl 2006). Thus, we can say that from its exclusive symbolic consideration the images turn out to be an empty signifier, filled at every opportunity according to the interests of those who observe them or circulate them (Zylberman 2013). In fact, in the case of the image experience of a documentary photograph, there is no immediate knowledge, we do not
automatically move from the perceptive to the iconological, because the displacement also depends on a certain skill, an active work of adjustment, with which this reading is made. One example is the series of photographs of Abu Ghraib (2003) - the different tortures to the Iraqi prisoners made and photographed by the American soldiers- which were subjected to a palpable process of design-resignification. These photographs show a change in the use of war photography, its exclusive symbolic consideration, stripped of all reference to reality, due to its circulation in graphic and television media and via internet. In that constant diffusion, the more symbolic a photograph becomes, the less indicial force it possesses (Zylberman 2013).

In light of the above considerations, my conclusions are: (1) according to Husserl's image theory, our relationship with a documentary photograph is conditioned by the transient or symbolic image function. Although our attention is directed mainly towards the image, we always maintain an awareness of the photographic context -caption, headline, etc- as a determining factor of its meaning. (2) Likewise, we can say, in opposition to the idea that documentary photograph meaning is fixed because it is the capturing of a particular place at a specific time, documentary photography is in fact neutral and the inferences we make from them can be true or false (Morris 2011) inasmuch as the re-presentation is not constituted only from the seeing, but also from the previous experiences that are deposited in the image, determining our symbolic references.

References


From Natural Beauty to Moral Theology: Aesthetic Experience, Moral Ideal, and God in Immanuel Kant’s Third Critique

Moran Godess-Riccitelli (University of Potsdam)

This paper addresses Kant’s problematic moral duty to realize the highest good in the natural world as the ideal object of morality. The main difficulty is that the realizability of the highest good does not derive directly from Kant’s rationale that duty indicates possibility. Hence Kant argues that we need the postulates of practical reason (I refer mainly to the postulate of God) as transcendental conditions of the highest good. I argue that for this solution to actually work it needs to address the question of our moral motivation to strive to realize the highest good in nature. For this, we need the power of imagination that provides us with two (kinds of) presentations (Darstellungen): purposiveness in nature and compatibility between nature and our faculties. I demonstrate these two presentations through the idea of culture and our aesthetic experience in natural beauty respectively, as they are presented in Kant’s ‘Third Critique’. I wish to argue that only by presenting a structure of possibility in imagination, the necessary connection Kant makes between the realizability of the highest good and the postulate of God gains practical meaning within nature.

Kantian Disinterest in Jacques Rancière’s Aesthetic Regime of Art

Scott Robinson (Monash University)

In this paper, I develop an explicit account of French philosopher Jacques Rancière’s notion of disinterest. Inspired by Immanuel Kant’s foundational text on aesthetics, The Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), specifically the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’, Rancière theorises a radical suspension of concept and interest in making judgments in the experience of certain objects. Disinterest plays a key role in the genealogy of the ‘aesthetic regime of art’, including in key texts from ‘The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes’ (2002), more obliquely in his major aesthetic text, Aisthesis (2013), to ‘Art, Life, Finality’ (2007). In each, disinterest is treated, somewhat cursorily, as one element in a broader historical revolution in thought, with radical consequences for both aesthetics and politics. I aim, by threading together disparate moments in which disinterest functions in Rancière’s oeuvre, to show and understand the conceptual role it plays in the aesthetic regime of art and evaluate it by the standard of Kant’s own use of the notion.

Aesthetic judgment prioritises neither the order of knowledge nor the order of desire. It is a new quality of experience characterised by a disjunction both historical (modernity) and conceptual (beauty without concept) as Rancière describes in the first scene of Aisthesis. Beauty, for Kant, is characterised primarily as being without a concept (§15), and the experience of beauty is primarily characterised as lacking interest (§2) in whether the object is pleasing to the senses, or good for an end or purpose. In this, Rancière perceives a radical possibility for emancipated experience. In his rumination on the palace (§2), Kant excludes certain aspects of experience such as the fact that it was build for ‘the vanity of the great who waste the sweat of the people’ (5:204). From Kant’s double negation of interest in the form of knowledge (the palace’s condition of production) and desire (the thought of the pleasure of owning the palace, or living in it) Rancière excavates that aesthetic judgment is available to anyone at all who might otherwise be excluded from aesthetic pleasure (see Shusterman, 1993). Moreover, it encompasses any material at all by being ‘indifferent... with regard to the existence of the object’ (5:205). This claim is controversial among scholars of Kant, including Guyer (1978) and Crawford (1974), who claim that we must hold some desire for the persistence of the beautiful object. However,
Rancière’s reading does not submit to the cultic fascination with the ‘beautiful object’ but attends more closely to the experience, whole-heartedly accepting the erosion of the boundary between art and non-art that is the difficulty of opening the aesthetic field to anything at all. Most importantly, disinterest characterises a quality of experience in which desire, say to own or consume, and the compulsion to understand are suspended (without thereby incurring asocial cognitive disarray or incommunicability). By treating an object with disinterest, according to Rancière, we are able to ‘withdraw it from the hierarchical distribution linked with matters of needs and desires.’ (2010) Rancière’s interest in this phenomenon of aesthetic experience is congruent with his insistence on the possibility of anyone at all, at any historical time, becoming emancipated and taking hold of disinterested pleasure. It is a democratic possibility of which Rancière has written since his seminal work on workers in nineteenth-century France (1989).

But the Kantian idea of disinterest does not go unchanged in Rancière. He gives it an explicitly political angle, noting how aesthetic judgment can be taken up by anyone at all, and how it can apply to any object at all. As Alison Ross has noted (2012, see also the second scene of Aisthesis, especially p.31), Rancière introduces a historical, Hegelian identity between art and non-art antithetical to Kant’s otherwise limp, ascetic theory of specific works of art. Tina Chanter (2017) has recently shown that Rancière’s inflection on Kant’s aesthetics makes it more amenable in part to feminist aesthetics. Read in this way, Rancière may provide a corrective to critiques of Kant’s aesthetics as restraining the role of taste and tempering the freedom of the imagination (Kneller, 1993). I show how in various texts, Rancière works selectively through Kant’s aesthetics to his own egalitarian notion of disinterest. Unlike orthodox or more faithful interpreters of Kant (see for instance Paul Guyer, 1978), Rancière wilfully diverges from Kant’s own account. Avoiding textual debates about the success or failure of Kant’s notion of disinterest, for instance the difficulty of its attainment as a pure state of experience, or how it applies to objects as opposed to the experience of them, Rancière intervenes to release political possibilities from Kant’s aesthetic theory.

I evaluate Rancière’s new conception of disinterest and his transformation of the Kantian material. I argue that Rancière’s emphasis is compelling in its openness, egalitarianism and emancipatory politics, it may nevertheless come at the cost of certain elements such as the transcendental communicability of judgments of taste ($6, see Pippin, 1996) so crucial to the Kantian system and its ideal of a sensus communis ($20). In other respects, however, flaws in the systematic coherence of Kant’s text, such as the vaguely defined but important relationship between art and nature, become less important under Rancière’s account. Similarly, Rancière either compensates for such costs by, for instance, re-defining the ‘community of sense’ according to insistently egalitarian presuppositions (see Rancière, 2009), or has reasons to resist the emphasis on common sense in Kant. His resistance to the ethical turn in aesthetics (Rancière, 2015), derived from Kant’s sublime (Rancière, 2004), as consisting in a hierarchical relation induced by an infinite subjection to the Other (Lyotard, 1991, see Rancière, 2005) has also let to interventions in art criticism.

Rancière’s ‘aesthetic regime of art’ is then far from strictly Kantian (indeed, Osborne, 2018, contends that it is substantially more Schillerian). Nevertheless, Kant’s influence, in the form of the notion of disinterest remains an alluring if elusive possibility for an emancipatory form of experience.
To be Performed: Recognizing Presentations of Visual Art as Goodmanean “Instances”

Sue Spaid (Independent)

This paper proposes that presentations of visual art are effectively performances of artworks. Even if the performers are typically curators, who perform artworks on artists’ behalf, this view runs counter to Rossen Ventzislavov’s thesis that “curating should be understood as a fine art” (Ventzislavov, 2014, 83). Several questions arise: 1) Why apply Nelson Goodman’s terms “performances” or “instances” to visual art? 2) What is to be gained from describing curatorial work as performing artworks? 3) How are curators artistic directors, no different than conductors, directors, or publishers? 4) Which arguments from philosophy of music overcome visual art’s lack of notation? 5) Does it follow that artworks are the kinds of things that prompt interpretations and engender performances? The answer to this fifth question has wide-ranging implications. In fact, it explains how originally nonart events and objects such as inscrutable sounds, rituals, ameliorative practices, material culture, and even natural elements like driftwood, shells, pebbles or rocks are suddenly experienced as artworks.

This paper addresses all five questions, but begins with my arguing against the view that curating should be understood as a fine art. To my lights, Ventzislavov’s thesis ignores four basic features of curatorial work: 1) Curatorial work concerns artwork presentation, not artwork production, though curators sometimes physically produce and/or install artworks on behalf of artists, 2) Curators contribute cognitive value (novel reasons to appreciate the works), though not artistic value, 3) Curatorial work introduces temporary classification systems that rarely have lasting value and 4) The curator’s exhibition checklist requires someone to stage it, but it does not prompt interpretations the way conceptual art does.

How to Perform Silence

Catherine Robb (Tilburg University)

By its very nature, silence makes ambiguous the oppositional structure between presence and absence: silence is the absence of sound, but it is also the presence of that absence, the appearance and perception of auditory nothingness. Throughout his work, Cage is adamant that silence does not exist, and what we think of as silence is merely a lack of intentional sound and the presence of unintentional sound. This means that some aspect of sound is always part of and present in what we consider to be silence. If Cage is right, and unintentional and hidden sounds will always be present as part of the listening experience, we might assume that it is in fact impossible to perform silence; there is always going to be something that is performed, expressed, and some sound that is perceived and perceivable.

In this paper, I explore how the performance of silence might be possible despite the continuing and inescapable presence of sound. I propose that the performance of silence, if it is possible at all, should be understood not as a performance of the negation of sound (either intentional or unintentional), but instead, as a performative response to the impossibility of silence. In order to achieve this, I suggest that it is helpful to theorise the tension that arises when performing silence as an instance of a performative contradiction. Such a contradiction occurs when the propositional content of a statement contradicts the necessary presuppositions of asserting that statement, the conditions that make asserting the statement possible. In this way, there is a discrepancy between the act of the performance itself and the content of the performance. To perform silence is to state
that ‘I am performing silence’ and so the conditions that are necessary to make the propositional content of this statement true are negated by the performative act itself. To create the conditions for absolute silence, therefore, is already to intentionally gesture at sound, to create movement, peripheral noise, and to undermine the possibility of silence, due to the very nature of what the possibility of performing of silence must entail.

How then might it be possible to escape this performative contradiction? How might it be possible to perform silence? Cage was convinced that the performance of silence should embody or represent the bringing to presence of sounds that usually constitute what we think of as ‘silence’ - the amplification of peripheral and unintentional sounds. However, Cage’s performances of silence put an undue emphasis on silence as a presence of sound, forgetting that at the same time, silence is also to be understood as the absence of sound, as a lack of something significant and intended. If we are to perform silence in some way, then it cannot be by ignoring one side of this dialectic. I suggest that in order to respond to the performative contradiction that arises when attempting to perform silence, we ought to not merely focus on the silence as presence, as Cage does, but also to find a performative moment that accommodates silence as absence and presence.

When Habermas claimed that the poststructuralists were guilty of a performative contradiction when critiquing reason, he insisted that the tension and aporia rising from the contradiction is one that ought to be avoided and resolved. In a similar vein, even though Cage admits that the performance of silence is impossible, he claims that this impossibility can be overcome because we are misunderstanding what silence is; we are listening to silence in the wrong way. The performance of silence is made possible by Cage because silence is reconfigured as a presence, and the performance of present expressive gestures is possible. In this way, the contradiction is resolved; it is resolved because the definitional terms have been manipulated to change the propositional content of the statement. The claim is no longer, ‘I am performing the absence of sound’, but instead, ‘I am performing the presence of unintentional sounds’, and the assertion of this statement does not negate the necessarily conditions for the propositional content of the statement to be true. Cage escapes the contradiction by changing the content of the statement; this move, however, is conceptually mistaken given the phenomenology of silence that encompasses presence and absence in a subtle and complex dialectic.

It is not enough to change the content of the performance and avoid the performative contradiction. Instead, we ought to accept the contradiction and the conceptual tension that comes with it; when performing silence, we ought to perform the contradiction, and explore the impossibility of performance itself by re-discovering the dialectic that arises by considering silence as both absence and presence. In other words, the performative contradiction does not need to be resolved, and it would be a conceptual oversight to do so. The tension should be traversed, explored and brought to the fore. When it comes to silence, it is the dialectical tension between presence and absence itself which gives rise to the performative contradiction in the first place, that should be performed and brought to perception as a performative gesture. Therefore, the performance of silence, if it is possible at all, should be understood not as a performance of the negation or affirmation of sound, but as a performance of the dialectical tension that arises between the presence and absence of sound.

To perform silence is a performance that embodies the transitional moment of the dialectic between silence as absence and silence as presence. And whilst it may be unnecessary, undesirable, or even impossible to resolve or escape the performative contradiction that arises when performing this silence, an acceptance of the performative contradiction, in all its aporetic glory, is to refuse to settle on one side of the dialectic, to refuse to per-
form and theorise silence as an affirmation of sound. The performative contradiction invites us to perform silence as the potentiality of sound, affirmation and presence, but also at the same time, and within the same movement, as the potentiality of absence, loss and decay. In doing so, we realise that performance itself requires us to capture the very movement of the performative contradiction itself.
Wednesday 16:45-18:15 – Room 116
Jean-Luc Nancy: The Body Aesthetic

Rona Cohen (Tel Aviv University)

This lecture addresses the ontological affinity between aesthetics and the body in Jean-Luc Nancy’s thinking. The question of the body, from Plato’s paradigmatic object of beauty in the Symposium, to its consideration as an ideal of beauty in Kant’s Critique of Judgment on to Merleau-Ponty’s “aesthetics of flesh” and Jean-Luc Marion’s notion of saturated phenomenon, has occupied philosophy from antiquity. Whereas this affinity is hardly new, the connection between body and aesthetics in Nancy’s thinking is unprecedented. For Nancy the body is not merely an object of an ideal aesthetic appreciation, nor is it addressed from the standpoint of the subject of aesthetic judgment, but rather art and the body are ontologically complicit inasmuch as the ontology of the body is aesthetic and the ontology of art is bodily, indeed Nancy argues that the aesthetic body is a simple tautology (Corpus, 35). But in order to understand this aesthetic circle, whose tautology is far from being obvious, it is essential first to disclose the nature of such affinity, why is the body addressed in aesthetic terms and why is art addressed in bodily terms.

For Nancy, both art and the body are in excess of signification, “perhaps body is the word without employment par excellence. Perhaps, in any language, it’s the word in excess” Nancy writes in Corpus (1992), only to repeat this argument with respect to art two years later, “art would thus be in default or in excess of its own concept” (The Muses, 1994). Both body and art exceed signification, we need only go to Kant’s Critique of Judgment to find the problem of the aesthetic object as a problem of an excess of intuition over the concept, an excess of sensibility which cannot be conceptually determined and therefore necessitates the introduction of the reflective function of the power of judgment and the extension of the capacities of the imagination beyond the schematism of the first Critique, namely the introduction of the notion of presentation (Darstellung). However in Kant’s thinking, aesthetic presentation is confined to objects we either call beautiful or sublime, namely to aesthetic objects, for Nancy on the other hand Darstellung becomes the question of philosophy as such (The Discourse of the Syncope: Logodaedalus, 18), and this question is a question of touching.

In Nancy’s thinking the notion of touching (le toucher) is introduced on a par with Kant’s aesthetic presentation; touch he argues is what “in another lexicon we call a sensuous presentation” (1994). In addressing touch as a sensuous presentation, Nancy argues that touch is not merely a mode of relating to an object sensibly but rather a mode of relating to an object aesthetically, that what is at issue is a question of aesthesis as excess rather than aisthesis in the Greek sense of sensible perception. Interestingly, Nancy applies this aesthetic mode of relating to objects in excess of signification beyond the domain of beauty and sublimity, to objects of excess in general, paradigmatically the body.

Nancy presents the philosophical problem of the body as a problem of representation or in other words as a problem of an object in excess of signification. In Descartes’ metaphysics a conception of an object is clear and distinct insofar as its representation is manifest to the mind, hence certainty is achieved if an object meets the criteria of representability. The criteria of representability initially disqualifies everything that cannot be reduced to a representation such as formations resulting from the integrated functions of mind and body like the passions of the soul, ideas which Descartes claims, are “obscure and confused” due to their origination in the body. The body cannot be represented by the mind in a clear and distinct manner and therefore remains, in Kantian terms, conceptually indeterminate. The question of the union, namely “being a single person who has a body and thought together” (Descartes, [1643], 2007), a union which Descartes argues is undeniable, thus remains philosophically obscure. In The Extension of the Mind (2006) Nancy rereads
Descartes’ famous letter to Princess Elisabeth wherein he admits that whereas the union is “what everyone constantly experiences in themselves” this experience is “without philosophizing” (Ibid), in other words the union can be felt, it is a phenomenological certainty, but it cannot be thought, it remains metaphysically inconceivable, rejected outside the domain of philosophy. It is with the intention of introducing the body back into philosophy that Nancy turns to Descartes as it is in Descartes’ thought that he finds the formulation of the problem of the body as a problem of representation. Yet it is exactly this metaphysical impasse, namely the impossibility of philosophically conceiving the body, that he seeks to transcend using an aesthetic mode of presentation, namely touching. It makes no sense to talk about body and thought apart from each other, he argues, “as if each could somehow subsist on its own: they are only their touching each other, the touch of their breaking down, and into, each other” (1992).

Indeed when Heidegger was asked why he wrote so little about the body, he answered that the corporeal is the most difficult question, the problem being that we represent (vorstellen) the body to our mind as an entity, and representional thought is exactly what, has prevented Western philosophy from asking the more fundamental question of being (Vallega-Neu, 2012). It is this insight that Nancy endorses when developing an ontology of the body on aesthetic grounds. Thinking the body aesthetically and thinking aesthetics bodily suggests an intimate connection between body and aesthetics which goes beyond the thinking of art and body as names for the Nancean Event, but rather it is through an aesthetic modality that the ontological body is presenced and it is through this very same modality of touching, that the ontology of art is constructed. For Nancy existence is conceptualized as a fundamental suspension of sense (1992) and exposing this suspension is nothing other than an aesthetic gesture, namely, touching. This lecture will further explore this affinity between body and art.

Everyday Aesthetics and its Dissents: The Experiencing Self, Intersubjectivity, and Life World

Dan Eugen Ratiu (Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania)

This paper investigates the aesthetic experience in everyday life and the relationship between its subjective-private and intersubjective-public dimensions. It addresses two related core issues that still allow room for dissent in Everyday Aesthetics (EA): the nature and structure of the everyday life and the experiencing self. Since these concepts actually shape EA’s accounts of everyday aesthetic experience or life, they require further discussion. At stake here are some critical philosophical questions, such as how to both preserve and integrate different layers of experience – aesthetic and ethical, art-related and ordinary - within the continuity of one’s experience as well as the personal and intersubjective-dimensions within the unity of one’s life. The claim is that consistent conceptions of the whole experiencing self, the structure of one’s everyday life and life-world as well as their constitutive intersubjective-dimension, are required as a compelling framework for understanding the aesthetic dimension of everyday life. Yet most of current EA’s accounts fail to provide such conceptions. In Everyday Aesthetics the phenomenal presence of the experiencer is usually ignored: “the self” is invisible, I might say, since one can hardly find an explicit account on this topic.

Instead, I will make new theoretical claims about the nature and structure of the experiencing self and, accordingly, the everyday (aesthetic) life. Unlike other authors, I do think that one can find some valuable insights on this matter in philosophical tradition. These are notably the intersubjective aspect of everyday life and the dialectic of fragmentation-and-continuity, highlighted by the phenomenological research on life world (Husserl, Schutz) and life (Simmel), and the dialectic of continuity-and-discreteness of
experience in the unity or totality of one’s life emphasized by Gadamer’s practical philosophy.

To sum up, on this basis I will defend: 1) the intersubjective nature of a subject’s self-constitution and experience. 2) the structure of the experiencing self as an identity in difference. 3) the essential structure of the everyday life-world as constituted by the dialectic of continuity-and-discreteness and unity-and-differentiation. From this viewpoint, the discontinuity of experiencing the everyday and art as distinct life-worlds, backed by the “strong” EA, is not an absolute, final ontological feature or structure of experience or life as such. Rather it is a matter of analytic perspective that is complemented, from a broader perspective of life as a whole, by the continuity of experiencing in one’s life. Yet it does not mean that this whole self is uniform, indistinct and unchanging; rather it means that the discreteness of experiences and aspects of life is preserved and integrated in the continuity of human life.
Although aesthetic concepts, beauty, sublime, and so forth, have been discussed since the ancients, the well-known history of aesthetics is that Baumgarten establishes the concept of the aesthetic in the eighteenth-century. While cautious of anachronism, in this paper I argue that historians of aesthetics, nevertheless, conform to a problematic methodological convention in their analysis of accounts of aesthetic concepts made prior to the concept of the aesthetic. On the current convention the methodological question of enquiry is: how does this (or these) account(s) of an aesthetic concept anticipate, relate to or advance (the development of) the field of aesthetics? With respect to pre-aesthetic accounts of, for instance, the sublime, the question becomes how does this concept of the sublime anticipate the concept of the aesthetic?

This approach is first clearly seen in Samuel Holt Monk, who argues that there is demonstrable line of intellectual development from the eighteenth-century English accounts of the sublime towards Kant’s formalisation of aesthetic concepts to establish a philosophically systematised concept of the aesthetic. I suggest it continues to be repeated by subsequent histories of aesthetics across aesthetic concepts, which is evident when Paul Guyer lists the variety of modern ideas that historians of aesthetics connect with establishing the autonomy of the concept of the aesthetic.

Where the explicit aim is to understand how pre-aesthetics accounts of aesthetic concepts anticipate the concept of the aesthetic, the convention offers a valuable framework in approaching the history of aesthetics. However, as a general, default method, it has the overall problem of presupposing that the entire history of aesthetic concepts is only anticipatory of the history of the concept of the aesthetic. It attempts to isolate the aesthetic from other philosophical commitments or categories. This has two detrimental consequences for understanding accounts of beauty, sublime, etc that appear prior to the establishment of the concept of the aesthetic.

One consequence is that it assumes that the intellectual development of aesthetics advances along, what might be called, an arrow of knowledge. It accepts that there is a unified, accumulative line of development that moves from disparate, undeveloped, even confused aesthetic concepts to a refined distinct concept of the aesthetic. This has two adverse effects on the understanding of pre-aesthetic and early accounts. Firstly, primitivism that takes earlier accounts to be inherently primitive to later ones, denying their potential philosophical sophistication and value. Secondly, prescriptivism that prescribes which accounts are philosophically relevant without regard for their philosophical substance, and automatically deems pre-aesthetic accounts of aesthetic concepts that do not anticipate the concept of the aesthetic to be non-philosophical. The other consequence is that it imposes an ahistorical question of enquiry, systematically ignoring the philosophical aims that these accounts of aesthetic concepts might actually be addressing at the time.

I reveal these problems in relation to the existing picture of the philosophical development of the sublime. Specifically, that as a direct result of the convention the earliest discussion of the sublime in poetry is mistakenly excluded. The existing picture draws a strong distinction between the philosophically relevant natural sublime that is claimed to originate with Third Earl of Shaftesbury and the sublime style, which is associated with the first professional literary critic John Dennis and the so-called Longinian tradition’s discussion of poetry. Problematically, historians of aesthetics hold this to be an exhaustive distinction where philosophical relevance is determined by the appeal to physical nature.
As it stands, the illicit move goes from accepting certain accounts from the period — specifically the accounts of Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant — as being definitively aesthetic to taking for granted that these accounts alone determine the philosophically relevant features of the early eighteenth-century sublime. To be clear: let the substantive sublime be any account of the sublime of philosophical substance, aesthetic or otherwise. Philosophical substance includes, yet is not limited to, descriptions of the sublime source, cause and effect, object, and features of experience, also any aesthetic, metaphysical, moral, epistemic, teleological, theological commitments or conditions. By accepting an arrow of knowledge and employing prescriptivism, the existing picture assumes that appeals to physical nature determines the relevance of early accounts because it best anticipates Burke and Kant’s accounts of the natural sublime. Currently, this forms the primary grounds for excluding the accounts concerned with poetry. However, the mere anticipation of Burke and Kant does not appear sufficient reason to reduce the substantive sublime to accounts of physical nature.

Instead the relevant distinction lies between the substantive sublime and the sublime style, where the natural sublime is a non-exhaustive sub-set of the substantive sublime. This distinction is actually first established by the Longinian tradition’s discussion of poetry, where it relegates the sublime style to mere rhetorical persuasion, in order to focus on the substantive sublime, that is, the genuine effect of great poetry to irresistibly transport or elevate its audience. As such, and against the current convention, these accounts ought not be automatically excluded from the philosophical development of the sublime.

I propose that the accepted methodological convention would benefit from being turned on its head. Specifically, that the concept of the aesthetic be understood as the one instantiated by a (or any) theory of an aesthetic concept throughout its history. Particularly, regarding pre-aesthetic but potentially all accounts of these concepts. The historian of aesthetics’ guiding question of enquiry becomes simply: what is the theory of that particular aesthetic concept? In contrast to isolating as it conforms to or anticipates the concept of the aesthetic, on this approach concepts such as the sublime are actually located in their original context and analysed on its own intellectual terms. This has the advantage of identifying and developing a philosophically sophisticated conception of aesthetics throughout its history. By exploring the full extent of its concepts the history of aesthetics can discover its philosophical riches.

Plato’s conception of the image: alleviating the tension between theory and method

Katerina Bantinaki (University of Crete), Anna Antaloudaki (University of Crete), Alexandra Athanasiaadiou (University of Crete) and Fotini Vassiliou (University of Crete)

The departing point of this presentation is a paradox that has often been noted in the philosophical literature on Plato with regards to his stance towards images. The paradox concerns the evident clash between Plato’s critique of the image in Book X of the Republic and the recurrent use of descriptive images in platonic dialogues -no less in the Republic- at points of utmost importance with regards to his philosophical aims. Noting that Plato’s theorizing of the image and his methodological point to opposing directions with regards especially to the cognitive value of the image (and thus to an incoherent conception of the very nature of the image) some theorists have chosen to regard the use of descriptive images as merely decorative (thus assigning them no cognitive function), while others have chosen to dismiss Book X of the Republic on variable grounds. The purpose of this presentation is to alleviate the supposed paradox: it will be argued that Plato’s theorizing of the image and his methodic use of descriptive images are (a) fully consistent and (b) point to an overall conception of the nature of the image and its cognitive value that is
both more lenient and more elaborate than the one commonly attributed to him -in the philosophy of art and beyond- on the grounds of solely Book X.

The argument will employ insights from contemporary philosophy of depiction to foreground those aspects of the image that seem to be constitutive of Plato's overall conception of its nature and which allow a Janus-faced function with regards to the aim of knowledge: i.e. its inherent selectivity, its capacity for analog vs. digital representation as well as for structural mapping, and its reliance on active engagement for the representational relation to be accurately traced. Focusing on the Republic, it will be shown that it is these aspects that ground the cognitive function of the descriptive images (thus justifying their use on cognitive grounds) but also that it is those very aspects that Plato draws attention to in Book X, in order to develop a contextual critique of the image - rather than a diagnosis of its nature and value tout court, as commonly assumed.

In particular: Operative in the analysis will be a minimal conception of depiction; a conception, that is, that involves aspects of depiction that virtually all pictorial theorists acknowledge as constitutive of its nature, regardless of the ways in which they choose to define it. According to this minimal conception: a) As they embody a point of view, all images are inherently selective or aspectual: i.e. depending on their representational aims, they present their objects under certain aspects while excluding others; b) all images possess compositionality, i.e. the design does not merely map individual elements of an object or scene - it further maps the relations between those elements in an overall (object or scene) structure and it is in the context of this structural mapping that any part of the design assumes a definite representational function; c) pictures are rich representations owing to their analogicity: one cannot simply depict an object, without thereby assigning particular properties to that object; d) pictures allow and require twofold experience - thus active rather than contemplative engagement: to experience a picture as a picture, one needs to hold to her awareness both vehicle and object of representation, thus being able to register the correspondences between them but also their limits.

This minimal conception of pictorial representation can allow us to trace the cognitive function of the descriptive images employed by Plato in the Republic, which -to account for their diversity- we can conceptualize as variable visual metaphors. Focusing on the image of the cave (as a representation of the ascent to the world of Ideas), the image of the Sun (as a representation of the Good), and the Line (as a representation of the levels of knowledge), the aim is to show that all three: a) exploit the inherent selectivity of imagistic representation, to focus attention on aspects of their objects that are of particular salience; b) on aspects, furthermore, that are ineffable, being relevant to complex structural relations (which, in the context of philosophical thought, are nothing less than structural relations in a conceptual space); c) owing to their richness -as analog visual representations,- they function as Kantian aesthetic ideas, foregrounding attributes of abstract objects that are hard to conceive (all the more due to their relational nature). It will thus become evident that the use of these images is not merely illustrative but such as to enable understanding of that which, according to Plato, is ineffable, i.e. cannot be given in words and thus escapes any attempt to definition: the descriptive image works precisely to bring to the gaze -the noetic gaze- that which is ineffable. But to perform this cognitive function the images d) require active engagement (as all cognitive endeavors) rather than a contemplative stance, i.e. they require the recipient to track specific correspondences between the constructed image and its object - thus an active and explorative stance.

Armed with the understanding of the features of descriptive images that allow their cognitive function, if we then turn to Plato's critique of the image in Book X, we will note that it is those very features that he draws attention to, explicitly or implicitly: images, he admits, present just one part of their object (selectivity); they are essentially visual representations (richness) and thus can only present how things appear, exploiting their
structural relations from a given vantage point (compositionality/structural mapping); and they are approached contemplatively and uncritically by the masses (as against the need for active engagement). It is for all these reasons, in conjunction, that images cannot afford true knowledge of sensibilia.

The Cult of Beauty: What was Paterian Aestheticism?

Andrew Huddleston (Birkbeck, University of London)

For much of its history, art has been intimately connected with religion. A tour through any art gallery covering more than the last few centuries, or through a typical archaeological museum, reminds one just how much artistic attention has been lavished on religious matters. Art, as it is often said, was long the handmaiden of religion. One typical narrative of art’s development maintains that art gradually emancipates itself from religion and, over the last several centuries, comes into its own as an autonomous practice. On some level, this secularization is undeniable. No longer is a religious subject matter, in any recognizable doctrinal form, the primary focus of most high art. Likewise, art is usually now regarded as something paradigmatically valuable “for its own sake”—not needing to win its significance through service to anything else.

Yet another strand in the aesthetic theorizing of the 19th century—especially pronounced in Romanticism, and going through the 20th century to certain key segments of artistic, literary, and musical modernism—is one that, while acknowledging this secularization, highlights the ongoing continuity and affinity between art and religion. Some of the tasks that previously fell to religion now might be taken up by art. With doctrinal religion on the wane, it is thought, by various artists and philosophers, that art will act as our highest ‘calling’ in life, provide our moral compass, reinforce the bonds of community, serve as a source of existential meaning or consolation, perhaps even grant mystical metaphysical insight. As the poet Wallace Stevens will put it: “After one has abandoned a belief in God, poetry is the essence which takes its place as life’s redemption.” This sort of sentiment is not unique to him. In the reflections of countless figures in this period, art and the aesthetic get presented, whether explicitly or implicitly, as either a kind of alternative religion, or an alternative to religion, answering too many of the same spiritual needs, but in a distinctively artistic way.

To note this link between art and the aesthetic, on the one hand, and religion, on the other, is simply to repeat a truism about this period. But what, I want to ask, does it really amount to? What different shapes does it take? My next main project, of which the present paper is only a small part, is to explore this theme and several of its interesting variations in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

That much is meant as background. In the present paper, I pursue one smaller aspect of this broader project. I look at the strand of aesthetic theorizing known as “aestheticism,” of the sort prominent in the 19th century with such figures as Gautier, Pater, Swinburne, Rossetti, Wilde, with echoes in the 20th century with Fry’s and Bell’s brand of formalism.

Aestheticism represents a curious and ironic confluence of the two strands I set out just now. From one perspective, it is emblematic of art coming into its own, of a liberation enabling “art for art’s sake.” Yet at the same time, it is often credited, or charged, with making a “religion of art.” That latter phase, in particular, is often bandied about in association with aestheticism. But what, I want to ask, might that actually amount to, philosophically speaking? It is beyond the scope of this short essay to consider the full range of figures in the aesthetic movement, but I focus my attention on the writings of one of its most prominent representatives Walter Pater and seek to reconstruct the form of aestheticism he presents.
Pater does not advocate the literal worship of artworks, nor does he suggest that doctrinaire Christian belief is to be perpetuated through aesthetic experience. But nonetheless, there is good sense to be made of idea that he invests art and aesthetic experience with what might aptly be termed a “religious” flavor. That is what I seek to explain.

Pater will maintain that a certain kind of attentive aesthetic attitude allows us to enter a special state of “ecstasy.” “To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life.” We are ephemeral beings “under the sentence of death but with a sort of indefinite reprieve”:

Some spend this interval in listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest, at least among ‘the children of this world,’ in art and song. For our one chance lies in expanding that interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time...For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments’ sake (Pater, The Renaissance)

This mode of attentive aesthetic experience, Pater stresses, is something valuable for its own sake. It doesn’t need to lead to anything else, nor does it need to have something standing metaphysical surety behind it. In this appreciation of (this-worldly) beauty, we reach our highest condition as human beings. This is the core credo of Pater’s aestheticism.

The good life is one spent in the contemplation of art and beauty. The Paterian view stands in dialogue with, but in contrast to the Platonic-Christian tradition, which would celebrate the experience of beauty too, but think this earthly experience is ultimately second rate, compared with contemplation of the Forms or of God.

To the extent that it has significance, it inherits that significance from something else. For Plato (in e.g., the Phaedrus), we see in human beauty a glimmer of divine beauty, and the beauty of the particular person draws our souls upward to higher, more abstract forms of beauty and eventually to the Form of the Good. Christianity offers various twists on this basic theme. The beauty we see in the world is the beauty of God’s creation, and thus a reflection and reminder of Him and his majesty. But Pater has no truck with this metaphysics and sees aesthetic experience as a self-sufficient bearer of value and the route to the highest mode of life. Whereas the monk devotes his life to God, the Paterian aesthete will devote his life to art and beauty. In this commitment, Pater draws on a background of ideas associated with “art’s for art’s sake.” This phrase (growing out of the reception of Kant’s philosophy in the early 19th century), promulgated by Benjamin Constant, and later Charles Baudelaire and Théophile Gautier becomes a kind of rallying cry in the 19th century. It is reaction against the idea that art needs to have a moral, political, or epistemic purpose. Simply being beautiful is of sufficient significance and can be the focus of attention. So in one sense, art has become autonomous. But at the same time, its tremendous elevation into the place of life’s highest calling makes it appropriate to describe Pater’s position as a “religion of art.” I conclude my discussion by reflecting on some of T.S. Eliot’s searching criticisms of Paterian aestheticism and of the attempt to find a substitute for religious belief in aesthetic experience. “Nothing in this world or the next,” Eliot writes, “is a substitute for anything else; and if you find that you must do without something, such as religious faith or philosophic belief, then you must just do without it.”
Rethinking Susanne Langer’s Virtual Space through a Performance Theory of Art

Ken Wilder (University of the Arts London)

1.
From the broad remit of a performance theory of art, this paper will revisit Susanne Langer’s distinction between the modes of ‘virtual’ space of sculpture and painting. What happens when the aesthetically significant distinctions between encounters afforded sculpture and painting are manifest by how the performance of the artwork articulates a content (i.e. when the artwork is considered an event-like rather than object-like entity)? I claim that the resulting distinction is twofold. It is manifest in differences between the practice of sculpture and painting, but also how such spatial content is recovered by the beholder’s own performance – each, in turn, dependent upon the relation the artwork structures with the surrounding space of the studio/gallery. These claims will be tested against two medium-specific artworks that Langer’s theory would otherwise struggle to accommodate: Anthony Caro’s Prairie (1967) and Agnes Martin’s Falling Blue (1963).

2.
In Feeling and Form (1953), Susanne Langer distinguishes various modes of ‘virtual’ space, which she considers ‘the primary illusion of all plastic art’. I will focus on the virtuality of painting and sculpture: the former characterised by a perceptual space conceived as virtual scene, an entirely visual affair rather than an experiential space; the latter characterised by ‘the image of kinetic volume in sensory space’, such that ‘sculpture makes virtual “kinetic volume” out of actual three-dimensional material’. Both notions of virtuality are abstractions from actual three-dimensional space; but whereas the virtual space of painting has no sense of continuity with the space in which we live, the ‘real’ three-dimensional space of sculpture – where volume rather than scene is the issue – constructs a semblance of kinetic space, such that we can experience it, spatially, from multiple positions (rather than the point of view(s) that painting presents). Nonetheless, for Langer it is still a semblance of kinetic volume, in that ‘[a] piece of sculpture is a center of three-dimensional space’ in such a way that the immediate ‘environment derives all proportions and relations from it’, rather than from the embodied beholder (i.e. our experiential space).

3.
The most systematic evaluation of Langer’s account has been by Robert Hopkins. Hopkins sees in Langer’s account the potential for completing an ‘account of sculpture’s and painting’s differing relations to surrounding space’, which for Hopkins is crucial to distinctions in the aesthetic encounters afforded. For Hopkins, the value of Langer’s account is precisely that is seeks aesthetic satisfactions that are distinctive to sculpture (and hence, by turn, painting). However, Hopkins argues that Langer’s ideas need adapting; he states that the claim that ‘the space we experience as organized by the sculpture is gallery space’ (unclear in her account) is open to her. Hopkins suggests that the respective kinetic organization Langer proposes involves the imagination:

First, in painting the environment seen as so organized is not actually surrounding the picture, but that depicted within it. Second, the centre around which it is organized will lie at the point of view from which the scene is depicted, a point the actual viewer imaginatively occupies. In the sculptural case, in contrast, the viewer does not see gallery space as organized around the sculpted object by imagining herself in that object’s shoes: her own actual point of view remains the relevant one. From that point of view, she experiences the space around the sculpture as shaped by the sculpted object’s potential to move and act in various ways.
This builds upon, and fills out, David Martin’s claim that ‘the space around a sculpture, although not a part of its material body, is still an essential part of the perceptible structure of that sculpture’, such that ‘the perceptual forces in that surrounding space impact on our bodies directly, giving to that space a translucency, a thickness, that is largely missing from the space in front of a painting’.

4.
Hopkins’s appeal to the imagination seems right. Nevertheless, I want to test such a theory against two difficult examples. The respective sculpture/painting by Caro and Martin are abstract works that refuse any sense of representing any object, or properties, other than themselves. Unlike Caro’s later work from the 1970s onward, increasingly evocative of bodily gesture, his mid-1960s floor-based pieces refuse overt gestural moves; it is thus difficult to assimilate Prairie to Langer’s notion of a virtual kinetic volume ‘with the semblance of living form’. Martin is insistent that her grid works should not be thought of as representing landscapes, or anything else in the natural world. It is likewise tricky to accommodate Falling Blue to Langer’s notion of a ‘scene’, while (as Rosalind Krauss famously argues) Martin’s grids demand the viewer adopt different viewing distances. With regard sculpture, the issue of non-representational abstract work is one Hopkins glosses over by stating that not all examples of the ‘class’ of sculpture need to be encompassed. But this would seem to be a not inconsiderable loss.

5.
The paper will reframe the discussion of Langer by two related moves. (1) I will claim that what is aesthetically significant, and distinctive of sculpture and painting, is the tension constructed between the virtuality of the artwork and that of the beholder’s space, which in much contemporary work (including Caro/Martin) is deliberately problematised. I want to argue that it is precisely that tension that provides the ‘thickness’ that David Martin refers to (and which I will claim applies, in a distinctive phenomenal way, to Agnes Martin’s grid paintings). (2) By reconsidering the two artworks considered as ‘event-like’ entities (i.e. performances), I want to argue that what is aesthetically important (and distinctive between the two media) is how the performance of the original sculpture/painting is recovered by the beholder’s own performance, which crucially (as Hopkins suggests, involves the imagination). There are, I suggest, two performances involved here, and each engages aesthetically distinct orientations towards the work in the respective cases of sculpture and painting: firstly, on the part of the artist, and secondly by the beholder. As Langer notes, in painting virtuality emerges from the very first mark, and it is the recovery of the rhythm and repetition of mark making by moving on an axis determined by the painting that is important in the recovery of content in the case of Agnes Martin’s grids; in Caro, who famously evolves a ‘syntax’ by composing within space, we realise not so much the sculpted object’s potential for movement and action, but the performance this syntax enacts (which in the case of Prairie, threatens the very ground on which we walk).

The Reception of Langer’s Idea of Primary Illusion and her Conception of Gestalt

Randall Auxier (Southern Illinois University Carbondale)

Susanne Langer’s ideas about the relationships among symbols, form, logic, and perception were not well received as they appeared, between 1937 and 1963. In spite of the fact that her ideas were novel, insightful, well-argued, and important, her colleagues in philosophy were critical and often even baffled, having difficulty in grasping what she was talking about. There is no question that a part of the explanation is Langer’s being a woman in a time and place where women were almost wholly excluded from participating in academic debate. But there were philosophical and what might be called “interdisciplinary” reasons
for the incomprehension of some of those who would otherwise have been receptive to
her thinking. In this paper I argue that her idea of a "primary illusion" (or "semblance" --
she gives the idea several different names, which did not help) fell between the cracks of
the academic disciplines then growing. Langer not only read and spoke German as her first
language, but was dealing with an academic climate in which the developments in Europe
were not well understood after the First World War. In particular, Langer’s time studying
with Karl Buehler in Vienna gave her an understanding of the concept of Gestalt that was
out of keeping with the more psychological and anthropological views that had come to
the US in the work of Koehler and Koffka. Innis and Chaplin have both shown that Langer’s
idea of "Gestalt" was a more philosophical idea that affected her conclusion that our feel-
ing of the world, taken as a whole, is a symbol of the world. This way of understanding
"form" as Gestalt affected everything else Langer argued and defended. It is especially at
the heart of her insight that each art creates a primary illusion that exists "only for per-
ception." This widely misunderstood claim of Langer’s was, I argue, the main aspect of her
aesthetics that her contemporaries did not understand. There were some, such as Ernst
Cassirer and later Arthur Danto (her student), who immediately grasped her central point,
but most of her academic readers did not.

I also contrast Langer’s understanding of perception with a few contemporary theories
which continue to misinform those who want to understand Langer’s view. The only path to
a full understanding of Langer’s view is to consider very closely the sources of her thinking
and how her view was formed, including not only Buehler, but her early reading of Cassirer
(when no one else in the US was reading him), her unusual interpretation of Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus, and her work with Whitehead. All of these sources led to a view of symbols that
is very difficult to grasp now, and the idea of a Gestalt as a primary symbol of the world
that can be taken from context to context as something held and conserved in the physical
body. The relation, therefore, between the presentational symbol, as a feeling of the
world, and the creation of a primary illusion in an artistic production, has to do with by-
passing the tendency of such Gestalten to become rarefied and discursive, and instead
handing them to the world as expressive forms that call forth interpretation of the sem-
blance of that presentational symbol they offer. When Langer’s view is understood in light
of these sources and her arguments, it becomes clear that most (not all) of the standard
criticisms of her aesthetic theory rest on misinterpretations. I conclude by pointing out
one criticism that does not rest on a misinterpretation: the view that the collapse of the
symbol is a condition for certain kinds of excellence in performance (e.g., method acting).
Langer’s view indeed cannot accommodate such a view, but should it? There is room for
doubt.

Along with a number of other philosophies of art (as distinct from aesthetics), Langer
maintains that the creative tension between the production of the art and its actual per-
formance is crucial to leaving sufficient space for interpretation. While the collapsing
symbol view, that production and performance must be identical, will deny to artists any
ability to interpret themselves, Langer’s view obliges artists to hold their creative effort at
a distance from their performative effort. Her view of Gestalt grounds this insistence on
her part. She grants that artists are usually poor interpreters of their own efforts, in the
sense that they do not describe their own art well, let alone authoritatively, but she does
not ascribe this shortcoming to a lack of “distance” from the productive power of the pre-
sentational symbol. I will explain using the examples of acting and musical performance
how her idea of Gestalt as an already formed response to the feeling of the world is richer
than the standard psychological and anthropological ideas about the relationship between
sensation and perception, and that critics who prefer collapsing the symbol have a view of
perception and sensation that is inadequate to account for the reality of the Gestalt
Langer describes.
Form as Logic, Art and Felling: Langer and the early Wittgenstein

Adrienne Dengerink Chaplin (Kings College, London)

The influence of the early Wittgenstein on Susanne Langer has long been seen as a liability and reason for rejecting her philosophy of art. In the view of those critics the ‘Tractarian’ Langer is merely constructing another outdated correspondence theory, this time not between language and the world, but between art and feeling.

This paper challenges that view. It does not deny the fact that Langer has been strongly influenced by Wittgenstein’s early work. In her book The Practice of Philosophy (1930) Langer refers to the Tractatus (1921, 1922) as ‘the extraordinary prophetic gospel of Ludwig Wittgenstein,’ and in Philosophy in a New Key (1942) we are told that ‘the logical theory on which this whole study of symbols is based is essentially that which was set forth by Wittgenstein, some twenty years ago, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.’ But it rejects the view that Langer held a correspondence view of knowledge or that, indeed, Wittgenstein held such. For Langer the ‘new key’ in philosophy was the discovery that our sense-data are primarily symbols and that the ‘facts’ that constitute the world are fundamentally symbolic. According to Langer this had been recognised not only by Wittgenstein, but also by the logician Henry Sheffer, the process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead and, most of all, by the neo-Kantian philosopher of culture Ernst Cassirer. Read through the lens of these thinkers, Langer was the first American philosopher to read the early Wittgenstein not as a neo-positivist in the British empiricist tradition but as an exponent of a broader linguistic and ‘symbolic turn.’ Adopting Sheffer’s Roycean conception of logic as the study of forms, she recognised the importance of Wittgenstein’s notions of logical form and structure. Influenced by Whitehead and Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms, she understood Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the role of expression in language. This reading enabled her to expand the new symbolic logic she had been instrumental in developing, so as to address questions of symbolic meaning outside mathematics and the natural sciences, most notably the arts.

In order to illustrate Langer’s unique reading of the Tractatus and the deep affinity between her and Wittgenstein’s way of thinking, I will focus on three concepts: ‘fact’ (‘Tatsache’); ‘image’ (‘Bild’); and ‘expression’ (‘Ausdruckung’). Langer’s and Wittgenstein’s shared understanding and use of these concepts profoundly challenged the neo-positivism of their time.

First, for Langer, as for Wittgenstein, a fact is always a product and an act of interpretation. It is an ‘intellectually formulated event’ whether the formulation be performed by a process of sheer vision, verbal interpretation, or practical response. Facts can adopt different forms: for a logician the ‘form of a fact’ is the form of proposition and for the behaviourist the ‘form of fact’ becomes the form of a response. There are thus not two ontologically different realms - the world of symbols and the world of ‘brute facts’ - but one world perceived under different aspects and with a view to different needs. According to Wittgenstein ‘the world is the totality of facts, not of things’ (1.1.) and ‘we make ourselves pictures of facts’ (2.1). For Langer this means that our perception of the world is always being mediated by a particular symbolic form.

Second, in thesis 2.1 Wittgenstein states that we ‘make to ourselves pictures (Bilder) of facts,’ followed by the sub-thesis ‘[t]he picture (Bild) is a ‘model’ (Modell) of reality’ (2.12). We know from Wittgenstein’s 1914 notebooks that the idea of a ‘picture theory’ had come to him when reading about a Parish court case in which small cars and dolls were being used in order to reconstruct a car-accident. Much earlier, however, as an engineering student, he was also much influenced by the German physicist Heinrich Hertz. In his Principles of Mechanics Hertz used the word Bild to refer to models as a way of understanding physical processes. In contrast to Mach’s positivistic, sense-based approach to
scientific knowledge, Hertz’s conception of science was predominantly neo-Kantian. In *The Phenomenology of Knowledge* Cassirer refers to Hertz as ‘the first modern scientist to have effected a decisive turn from the copy theory of physical knowledge to a purely symbolic theory.’ Hertz’s notion of Bild prompted Wittgenstein to think of language and equivalent forms of representation as ‘models’ that can function like charts, maps, graphs and so on. A spatial, visual picture is only one form of modelling reality. For Wittgenstein ‘every picture is also a logical picture [but] not every picture is spatial’ (2.182). For a piece of music these ‘pictures’ can be as different as a gramophone record, a musical thought, a score or the waves of sound. All these are different ways in which the ‘logical form’ or structure of the music can be represented or translated: ‘The picture can represent every reality whose form it has’ (2.171)

Third, in order to understand language we have to investigate how certain facts can be used to represent other facts. When we say that one fact (for instance the arrangement of little black marks) expresses the other (the eruption of the volcano), the particular relation between them is called expression. A symbol is not ‘a reproduction of its object, but an expression — an exhibition of certain relevant moments, whose relevance is determined by the purpose in hand.’ Expressions are different ‘perspectives’ on the same reality as articulated in different kinds of languages or symbolic forms. They can unlock different aspects, or modes of being, of the world. There is therefore no such thing as the form of a real thing or event. Instead, there can be ‘several adequate descriptions of reality.’

It is the above insights that enabled Langer to move effortlessly from the realm of symbolic logic in the 1920’s and 1930’s to the realm of art and aesthetics in the 1940’ and 1950’s. For her there was ‘an unexplored possibility of genuine semantic beyond the limits of discursive language.’ This enabled the articulation of experiences from realms other than the physical world, including religion, ethics, and aesthetics. Such semantic or symbolism is not an irrational, instinctive outpouring of emotions but has its own distinctive forms of representation, its own ‘logic.’ Art has the logical form of feeling.

The paper shows that Langer had a better understanding of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* than most of her contemporaries and recognised its importance and implications for a philosophy of art as articulation of felt experience. In this, as in many other aspects, Langer was well ahead of her time.
Non-Standard Emotions and Aesthetic Understanding

Irene Martinez Marin (Uppsala University)

A deeply rooted notion about emotions is that they possess significant epistemic worth. In this paper, I want to explore—adopting a virtue-aesthetics framework—how this common thought performs in the aesthetic domain. We tend to characterize aesthetic judgement as being a perceptual activity where the agent is merely responsive to certain object’s features or configuration. Yet a virtue aesthetics theory aims to stress the overlooked agential dimension of our aesthetic judgements. We can define a virtue approach to aesthetics as one that puts the focus on the nature and value of our aesthetic activities, being ‘art appreciation’ a key act in our aesthetic lives. According to this theory, to appreciate involves more than a perception of x, but requires to have an ‘experience of value’ that demonstrates aesthetic understanding. As we will see, to have an experience of value is about consciously perceiving the good-making features of an aesthetic object. And, we can say that aesthetic understanding, unlike aesthetic knowledge, requires (1) a grasp of the reasons that make the claim in question true, (2) providing an explanation that demonstrates understanding, even though it can be of a rather minimal kind.

Now, the main claim I will be exploring is the following: a sincere emotional engagement with an artwork, under the right conditions, can help us to grasp the relevant aesthetic features that make the artwork aesthetically valuable. Thus, what is key in the appreciative process is not only to judge a particular artwork as having aesthetic value (as when we say that Grace Paley’s short stories are frank and insightful) but also to understand why this is the case. For example, in order to judge Paley’s work as being aesthetically valuable we need to go through the reading process in a way in which one is able to recognize that what makes her stories good and acute is in part that the voices of her New York characters sound as if they were completely real (and we do this by pointing out textual features like the kind of vocabulary used by the characters). But, what is of special relevance for my appreciation account is that an important part of this ‘attending with understanding’ to the relevant features of an artwork is, also, an emotional task. Therefore, the question to keep in mind is in which ways emotions can be helpful to achieve these two requirements (1) and (2) stated above, for aesthetic understanding.

Against the prevalent view on the relation between emotions and the recognition of value, my take is that emotions are not ‘perceptions of value’. Following Michael Brady’s account (2013) on the nature of emotions, I argue that emotions can help us to grasp the aesthetic reasons that explain why something is valuable, by focusing the agent’s attention and inviting her to search for reasons. One of the important things that attentional persistence can do is to enrich our representation of potentially significant objects and events, precisely by enabling us to discover reasons which bear on the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of our initial emotional appraisals. In the same way, in the art case, the persistence of attention in emotional experiences can facilitate, by motivating the search for and discovery of reasons, a judgement as to whether emotional appearance in this instance really does match evaluative reality about the value of the work. So, to understand emotionally a work is not merely to go along with the emotions evoked by a work and to later secure our response, but to reflectively attend to those evaluative properties that emotions provide us with, and then to put that feeling in connection with the overall theme of the work.

Attending now to the structure of the paper, I will start by addressing the question of what emotions must be like in order to play a significant epistemic role in our evaluative judgements about art. From there, my strategy will be to analyze what is known as the simple model of emotions in art appreciation—which equates emotional feelings with bodily
feelings—, to point out some of its limitations when applied to aesthetic understanding. After that, I will explore the relevance of non-standard emotions for appreciation. My argument will reveal that these higher cognitive emotions such as curiosity, courage, awe, and admiration, might be better suited than the basic ones since they: (a) help us focus our attention in a deliberate way, and (b) place the appreciator in a state of second-order awareness of one’s mental states. And, since these two epistemic tools (a, b) are precisely the ones that can help the appreciator to meet the double requirement for aptly performing the activity of art appreciation, we can say that, if we are to talk about aesthetic emotions, non-standard emotions are the best candidates to fulfil this position. Finally, I will raise two potential objections against a ‘non-standard emotional model of appreciation’, and sketch two possible solutions to them. The first objection has to do with the costly process of reappraising non-standard emotions, as opposed to the more easy process of cognitive-monitoring the basic emotions. The second problem is connected to the cognitive demandingness that seems to involve aesthetic understanding. As we will see, both problems have serious implications for any notion of appreciation that relies too much on intellectual attention and on second-order beliefs, such as my view on appreciation as aesthetic understanding.

In conclusion, this paper aims to show that appreciation is not only a matter of perceptually identifying beautiful objects, but it is an activity in which the agent needs to explain why those objects merit our love, being this an activity where emotions can sometimes play a positive epistemic function.

Aesthetic Testimony, Authenticity and Emotion
Shannon Brick (City University of New York)

If Sonja tells Naomi that the novel she's just finished reading is thrilling and perceptive, and Sonja's evaluation is correct, can Naomi come to know this about the novel by trusting Sonja? Amongst philosophers, responses to this question are varied. Some think it is obviously false that Naomi could gain knowledge of the novel’s aesthetic properties by trusting Sonja: Naomi, they argue, must read the novel herself (Whiting 2017). Other philosophers, however, think it is obviously true that Naomi can get knowledge: provided Sonja is trustworthy in the relevant aesthetic domain, there will be no obstacle to Naomi’s gaining knowledge by trusting her (Sibley, 1965). To still other philosophers, while Naomi can gain aesthetic knowledge by trusting Sonja, it would be nonetheless illegitimate for her to rely on knowledge gained this way: although Naomi’s trusting Sonja might give her knowledge about the novel’s aesthetic properties, it will not give her the right to, for example, go and tell someone else that the novel is thrilling and perceptive, at least not without prefacing her comments with, “I’ve heard that-”. For Robert Hopkins (2011), the first defender of this latter position, there is thus something peculiar about aesthetic testimony. This is because, in non-aesthetic domains, it seems perfectly fine to rely on another’s testimony. If Sonja is both a competent watcher-reader and is almost-always honest, and she tells me that it’s 2pm, I can proceed to tell Naomi that it’s 2pm without doing anything wrong.

Aesthetic testimony, on Hopkins view, is therefore subject to a non-epistemic “norm of use.” A norm of use is a norm that governs our processes of belief-formation, and is contrasted with an epistemic norm. Something is an epistemic norm if its normative force follows from its being truth-conducive. A norm of use, on the other hand, does not derive its normative force from its being conducive to the truth, but being conducive to some other value.

In this paper, I support Hopkins position and offer an account of the value that underwrites
the norm of use he identifies. I argue that it is illegitimate to rely on aesthetic testimony because, in matters aesthetic, what we value is not just the acquisition of aesthetic knowledge, but knowledge gained in a specific way. In particular, I argue that in the aesthetic domain we value arriving at aesthetic knowledge of works of art by relying on our own emotional responses to them. Insofar as this cannot be achieved by relying on testimony, we have reason not to rely on aesthetic testimony.

In the first section of the paper, I argue that we do not think it is legitimate to rely on aesthetic testimony because what we value in aesthetics is the experience of arriving at evaluative beliefs by relying on one's own evaluative responses to their objects. I frame this value in terms of authenticity. One is authentic, in the way I use the term, if their beliefs about what is valuable accurately reflect their own evaluative dispositions, and when those beliefs are arrived at by relying on one's own evaluative responses to their objects. In virtue of the value of authenticity, the experience of coming to know about aesthetic value by relying on one's own evaluations has an additional, positive value for the knower—a value that is not exhausted by the value of the knowledge acquired. This is because one does not just gain a piece of knowledge that enables them to more successfully navigate themselves in a community by, say, passing it on to others. In addition, one gains a first-person appreciation of the features in virtue of which certain kinds of objects are valuable in different ways, as well as the higher-order, self-reflective knowledge that one's evaluative beliefs are based on such an appreciation.

In the second section of this paper, I explain the important role of cognitive emotion with respect to authenticity. Building on an insight from Wittgenstein, later reformulated by Sydney Shoemaker and Gareth Evans, I argue that emotional responses enable us to know that we are evaluating their objects, and thus that we are being authentic. This is because emotions are a way of knowing that is immune to a certain kind of error: while we may be wrong with respect to the evaluation we arrive at, we cannot be wrong that we are the ones doing the evaluation, when we rely on our own emotional responses in forming evaluative beliefs.

In the third and final section of the paper, I explain how this account of emotions not only makes sense of intuitions I share with those who, like Hopkins, think it is illegitimate to rely on aesthetic testimony, but why it is that people often seek out artworks that arouse the so-called “negative” emotions. Although my argument in this final section will be somewhat more speculative than the others, my principal purpose is to suggest new avenues of thinking about this other problem in aesthetics. My argument is that it is the experience of coming to know that we value when we seek out artworks that arouse negative emotions. Very often in artworks, the value of this experience outweighs the negative value of what we come to know. So, for example, while the facts that life is short and that humans can be cruel might have a negative valence, this negativity can be outweighed by the positive value of the experience of coming to know them that I enjoy when I watch a tragedy or thriller.

Provided that certain details of this final argument can be filled out, there would be several strengths to it. For one thing, it would not involve hiving off the emotional experiences we have when we engage with artworks from the ones we have outside of art, either by saying that we experience only “pretend” or “pseudo” emotions when we respond to art, or by saying that emotional responses to artworks are necessarily irrational. On my account, the emotions that art can arouse are not different in kind from those that we encounter beyond our experiences of artworks, it is just that the facts we grasp when we encounter art are not so close to home that we cannot enjoy the experiencing of grasping them. Nor would my account suggest that what we are after when we seek out artworks that
arouse the negative emotions is somehow separate from the negative emotion itself. In other words, it acknowledges that what we value about these artworks is very much bound up with the experience of the negative emotion and is thereby faithful to the phenomenology. What we value and so enjoy when we seek out tragedy or tear-jerkers, I suggest, is precisely the experience of coming to know certain evaluative truths - that humans can be cruel, that life is short, or that we have very little control over how our lives go, for example.

**Rhythm and aesthetic experience: an enactive approach**

Carlos Vara Sánchez (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice)

The aim of this paper is to present rhythm as the foundation of an enactive concept of aesthetic experience. Following John Dewey’s thinking, I will defend rhythm as an essential feature of every cognitive process, particularly important in aesthetic experience, for these experiences afford a qualitatively different engagement between environment, brain, and body. The aesthetic will be considered from a non-dualistic point of view; that is, as an integral part of our experience, and as something that affects our interactions with the environment. I will begin by introducing a brief view on classic embodied approaches to aesthetics, some of the criticisms they aroused, the reason why it is favored and enactive approach, and, afterwards, the origin and features of the proposed idea of rhythm, both as a philosophical concept and as biological phenomenon.
Transformation und Transzendenz des Tragischen: Das Realtheater Milo Raus

Asmus Trautsch (Independent)

Transformation und Transzendenz des Tragischen: Das Realtheater Milo Raus

Der Vortrag wird für die These argumentieren, dass die Theaterarbeiten von Milo Rau und seinem Produktionsteam, dem International Institute for Political Murder (IIPM), eine Aneignung und ästhetisch-politische Weiterentwicklung der griechischen Tragödie und ihrer philosophischen Rezeption darstellen.


Den Vortrag schließen werde ich mit einem Argument, dass Hegels an der Antigone entwickelte Tragödientheorie aus der Phänomenologie des Geistes eine Begründung dafür liefert,
The Curator as Author: Evaluating the Morality of Curated Exhibitions

Eleen M Deprez (University of Kent)

This paper provides a philosophical discussion of the role of the curator in making a curated exhibition. Doing so encourages us to engage with curated exhibitions as works of critical interest in their own right and not just a display of works of art. Curated exhibitions are about something, they have meaning, and can be an object of our appreciative practice. Some curated exhibitions appear to be ethically flawed. The exhibition organised in support of Nazi propaganda, Degenerate Art (1937), is a prime example here. This exhibition supported anti-Semitic racist ideology, but a firm understanding of the curatorial mistakes is not exhausted by its immoral context or effects. I will argue that considering the curator as an author will allow us to develop a firmer grounding for our ethical and moral criticism of curated exhibitions as works.

In the first section of this paper I outline the crucial features of curated exhibitions. A curated exhibitions necessarily involves what I call a curatorial utterance and a selection and display of works of art. Next I present an understanding of authorship by drawing on the work of Sherri Irvin and Christy Mag Uidhir. Authoring a work essentially involves bearing responsibility for it. To understand a curator as author will entail holding them ultimately responsible for the features of the work as curated exhibition: selection, display, and utterance. In the final section I discuss three examples: Primitivism in 20th Century Art: Affinities of the Tribal and the Modern (MOMA, 1984), Degenerate Art (1937), Eric Gill: The Body (Ditchling Museum of Art+Craft, 2017). The first two examples serve a fairly straightforward claim: it is not because an exhibition contains immoral or not immoral art that it itself becomes immoral or not immoral. The third example will provide some more nuance to that claim.

Posing Skill: The Art Model as Creative Agent

Aurélie Debaene (University of Kent)

In this paper, I explore the act of posing as a skill. Employed by the expert model, it functions as a tool for artistic invention that renders the model a creative agent. It is through an aesthetic investigation of posing that the model’s status in certain contexts of art making can be revised to that of an artistic collaborator. Instead of following conditions set by the artist, she engages in a mutually influenced creative process to achieve new artwork, an autopoietic feedback loop. To formulate an account of creative agency through the act of posing, I look into three key questions: 1) Can we differentiate types of poses? 2) Are certain poses creatively more valuable than others, and why? 3) What are the conditions for a model to generate these creatively stronger poses?

I first define what I understand under ‘pose’, before looking into types. Posing is an intentional action of body structuring in a space, to communicate something to a spectator, with the aim of being registered in artistic context. The pose therefore highlights and emphasises aspects of an integrated body-subject, the model, regarding her form, movement, presence, etc. within a restricted temporal sequence of art making. I argue that
the pose is presentness turned into a profession through the conscious performance and invention of particular features of and by the model’s phenomenal body to a spectator. This consists of an immediate spectator (the artist), as well as a delayed spectator (the later audience of the created artwork).

1) I distinguish between three different types of poses based on who determines the invention of the pose. These are the ‘guided pose’, in which the artist imposes a particular configuration on the model. This pose is active in its execution, the model actively maintains it, but remains passive in its conception: the model did not invent this pose and instead can only mimic the arrangement determined by the artist. The result is directly related to the artist’s own creative vision and ability to direct the model. Second is the ‘self-improvised pose’, which rather than guided by the artist, is instead wholly generated by the model. This can be the case with supermodels who achieved a celebrity status, for example. They represent themselves as a brand, and are in charge of their own creative process during shoots. The self-improvised pose is a consequence of posing expertise in an environment that does not impose on it. Lastly, I introduce the ‘collaborative pose’, which is the most common type of pose among posing expert models. The model injects her own creativity into the session, in addition to the artist’s creative goals. She conceives of what she projects into the space, and how. What is achieved is a mutual contribution to an artwork. The model is relied on for her own creative contribution and invention, through which she becomes a collaborator of the artist. When models are hired for particular jobs, they are often invited for the creative input they themselves bring to the session, and not just to blindly execute a sequence set by the artist.

2) The creatively more interesting types are the self-improvised and collaborative poses. I argue that they are more valuable because they reserve greater creative contributions from the model to art making. The model has insight in the creative process, as well as what is required for her to achieve the aims of the posing session. I rely on Stanley and Williamson’s account of skill as “a kind of disposition to know”, which connects skill to knowledge, and leads to the idea of situation-specific “manifestation of a skill as a knowledge state, as well as an action”. The model sustains a disposition to the act of posing, which exhibits her knowledge of the things that may be required to pose, and improves it by experience engaging in actual posing.

3) The conditions for a model to invent creatively relevant poses are rooted in a coming together of the discussed creativity and skill, with the addition of imagination. Imagination as a term is not without problems, and in some ways is too passive to account for the action following the imaginations that result in a pose. To this end, I introduce the Dutch term uitbeelding to designate my notion of the posing mechanism. An uitbeelding offers the framework for the model’s imaginative process; it is the active construction of an idea by the sensory-motor, communicating body as an integrated whole (rather than continuing an implicit divide between a mental or physical conception), which is intended to invent and result in an actual outcome - the pose.

I connect the effects of a successful uitbeelding in posing to the notion of effortlessness: sprezzatura, as it was coined by Castiglione Baldassari. Reanimating the idea of (perceived) aesthetic effortlessness, it is still key especially to photographic models to pose with an amazing guise of ease. Castiglione’s courtier embodies grace and beauty, yet does not reveal the processes leading to this, nor the effort required. The supermodel embodies a lifestyle, character, or particular physical disposition that takes precedence over the reality of what actually led to creating the image. What spectators then admire in these pictures, is an apparent kind of effortlessness, which goes hand in hand with the posing expertise required to create such effortless appearances.
I propose that the model as a creative agent anticipates the creative process through her integrated posing expertise: an all-round awareness and insight, not only in the artistic concepts and directions the project might take, but also a physical understanding simultaneously. I treat the model as a body-subject who has the capacity to imagine and express creatively beyond sheer mental imaging or anticipating. The model experiments by moving through the space and feeling within her body the attempts that could lead to a successful artwork or session altogether. Rather than a purely visual imagination, such as imagining herself as a kind of living image from the artist’s perspective, she employs a bodily imagination that feels itself into the suitable pose. She anticipates the way the artist beholds her, but also potential representations that will be created of her. She steers the artmaking process through her own skilled posing expertise, as a creative agent of her own right.
Our engagement with visual narrative fictions, such as theatre or cinema, is complex. Like all fictions, they aim at conducing what Richard Gerrig calls “transportation”, i.e., focused attention on what is happening in the world of the fiction to the detriment of what is happening in the real world (Gerrig 1993). In addition, our engagement with such fictions is also sometimes characterized by what I shall call the actor-acted two-foldedness: namely, the fact that sometimes when engaging with performances, we experience both actors and the fictional characters they portray. For instance, one can be transported into the world of fiction and relish in the actions of a fictional character while, at the same time and without transportation being hindered, remarked to oneself how much the well-known actor portraying the fictional character seems to have aged.

The focus of my paper is the nature of such complex experiences and, in particular, the nature of their different intentional components. On the one hand, there is little doubt that experience of an actor portraying a fictional character constitutes an instance of a common perceptual experience: we see the actor on the stage as much as we see the barista behind the counter of our local coffee shop. But what about of our experience of the fictional character being portrayed? Is it also an instance of a common perceptual experience or something else altogether?

It seems very implausible that such experiences of fictional characters could be instances of common perceptual experiences. Indeed, consider the following argument. Macbeth has been portrayed both by Sean Connery, who is 1.88m, and by Daniel Day-Lewis, who is 1.87m. If one were to have perceptual experiences of Macbeth himself by means of enjoying each of their performances, then Macbeth would possess contradictory properties. But no objects can instantiate such properties and, therefore, such experiences of fictional characters cannot be instances of common perceptual ones.

How else should we then characterize such experiences of fictional characters? A popular answer starts from the now well-spread thesis that to engage with a work of fiction is a matter of participating in a game of make-believe (e.g., Walton 1990; Currie 1990). Accordingly, to engage with what is going on stage is a matter of make-believing that the events being portrayed obtain. We thereby see the actors who serve as props in a game of make-believe and only make-believe that we see the fictional characters they portray.

My paper will aim to argue that this popular answer turns out to be inadequate and that we shall instead reconsider the alternative thesis that we can have common perceptual experiences of fictional characters. In other words, I will argue that when attending to a performance of Macbeth, we undergo a complex perceptual experience presenting us both with Macbeth and the actor portraying him. But why? I will give three arguments in favor of that claim.

According to the first argument, a theory of acting should be sufficiently general so that it can cover all forms of acting, including impressions. But successful impressions are often characterized by a particular, sometimes disquieting, phenomenology: the one of directly seeing or hearing someone through someone else. Take for instance the now iconic famous monkey scene in Ruben Östlund’s 2017 movie “The Square”. The particularly disquieting experience of watching this scene, I shall argue, is best explained by the fact that we undergo perceptual experiences of both the actor and the monkey he portrays.
The second argument relies on what I shall transportation hindering: namely, the fact that in some cases audiences face difficulties in being transported in the fiction because they remained hooked at the level of their perception of the actor. Such challenges are sometimes reported by audiences seeing relatives or familiar faces on stage or on screen. In such cases, the actor-acted two-foldedness is challenged: one experiences the actor while encountering difficulties to also experience the fictional character. But how are cases of transportation hindering to be explained?

A natural answer would be that, in such cases, audiences experience imaginary resistance in moving from seeing the actor to make-believing seeing the fictional character. But this alone does not suffice: a substantial story needs to be told as to why such imaginative resistance can occur and, I will argue, it is difficult to come up with one. I will then propose the following alternative: in normal cases, we perceptually experience both the actor and the fictional character being portrayed and can perform Gestalt switches from the one to the other. In cases of transportation hindering, audiences experience difficulties in making sufficiently salient the properties of the two Gestalts and, therefore, experience difficulties in moving from a perception of an actor to a perception of a fictional character.

The third argument is based on the existence of so-called invisible theatre, where actors are hiding from their audience the fact that they are portraying fictional characters. How should we best characterize the experience of a spectator confronted with such performances? Friends of the make-believe account must say that an audience cannot experience the fictional characters depicted by the actors performing invisible theatre prior to their being aware of the conditions that would allow the audience to engage in make-believe. But, I shall argue, we shall instead favor the following explanation: in the context of invisible theatre, one thinks one is seeing only real persons, but one is, in fact, seeing both real persons and fictional characters.

But what is this right account of our perception of fictional characters and how can it avoid the contradictory properties argument mentioned above? I shall argue that what is required is a correct account of the metaphysical structure of acting. This requires, first, distinguishing between three things: the actor, the acting, and the acted. And, second, properly understanding the relation between them. Namely, if acting can be considered a first-order property of the actor, the acted is best viewed as a secondary property of the acting: namely, as a way the acting is adverbially modified.

In other words, according to such a model, fictional characters are nothing but sets of adverbial modifications and for an actor to portray a certain fictional character is for her to act in such a way that her acting is suitably adverbially modified. Thereby, when we see an actor on stage portraying Macbeth, we see three things: the actor, the acting, and what is thereby acted, namely Macbeth. Once such an account in his place, we can pocket the advantages of being able to claim that we can have perceptual experiences of fictional characters while completely side-siding the contradictory properties argument.

After having presented this claim in some detail, I will then close by gesturing at how this account can be worked out as a general account of fictional characters.

**Idées esthétiques et théâtre engage: Les quatre petites filles de Pablo Picasso**

Jessica Jaques (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Le Picasso écrivain est encore peu connu, même de la plupart des spécialistes de l’œuvre plastique de l’artiste. Plus de trois cents poèmes et trois pièces forment un corpus dont
l'étude peut modifier de manière profonde le regard porté sur les contributions de Picasso à l'art des deux premiers tiers du 20ème siècle. Cet article vise à fournir une des premières approches critiques de la pièce de théâtre Les Quatre petites filles (LQPF, écrite en 1947-8, publiée en 1968 et créée en 1971). Cette œuvre est le fruit d'une tension poétique féconde entre ce que Kant a désigné comme des idées esthétiques (KU §49) et ce que Sartre définit comme la littérature engagée ; dans le cas de LQPF, cet engagement est à mettre en lien avec la “révolution Beauvoir” et sa libération programmatique du deuxième sexe.

LQPF est la deuxième pièce de théâtre écrite par Picasso (en français) et elle doit être lue à la suite de la première, Le désir attrapé par la queue (1941, également rédigée en français) et comme prélude à la troisième et dernière œuvre, El entierro del conde de Orgaz (L'enterrement du comte d'Orgaz, 1957, en espagnol). Elle se découpe en six actes d'une seule scène et les personnages sont quatre filles (numérotées de I à IV). Picasso était âgé de soixante-six ans au moment de sa rédaction, sa fille adolescente et un bébé faisaient partie de son entourage immédiat, il était affilié au Parti communiste français depuis trois ans. Face à l'horreur de l'Holocauste qui, dès cette époque et suite au procès de Nuremberg, était connue dans (presque) toute l'étendue de son horreur, il a été tenté par un certain iconoclasme proche du silence artistique de l'époque. Cette même impulsion iconoclaste l’a poussée à délaisser la peinture et la sculpture au profit de la céramique et de la gravure et l’a conduit vers le sud de la France, avec l’envie de fuir le bruit de Paris. Et vers l’écriture : le défi de la page blanche, le défi de l’origine.

Je développerai le propos de cet article en quatre sections, chacune accompagnée d’un lien poétique avec une ou deux des œuvres plastiques.

1. Une idée esthétique dominante qui lie l’art et la vie

Les (quelques) éditions existantes de LQPF omettent souvent de reproduire la page initiale, une erreur, car c’est précisément cette page qui livre la clé de lecture du texte. C’est sur celle-ci que l’on trouve le dessin ocre de quatre feuilles de ce qui ressemble à du laurier, accompagné d’un court texte en espagnol, disposé et écrit de la manière suivante :

“Al rededor del círculo quadrado del tiempo”

Pour reprendre les propos de Kant au sujet de l’idée esthétique, l’ensemble donne à penser beaucoup à partir d’un dispositif physique sans qu’aucun concept déterminé ne vienne clore la pensée. En effet, la quadrature du cercle est, depuis que l’être humain est doté d’une conscience de sa propre créativité, le défi le plus difficile à relever ; l’accompagner de quatre feuilles de laurier illustre de façon énigmatique ce défi. Picasso se situe Al rededor (“autour”) : il tourne autour, comme un tourneur de céramique, son activité principale à ce moment-là.

En 1948, le défi suprême de la créativité est de fonder une nouvelle origine du monde après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Picasso y fait face avec une impulsion iconoclaste, en écrivant un texte scénique dans lequel le cercle et le carré s’engagent dans une dialectique autour de la fondation d’une nouvelle temporalité et d’un nouvel espace. Les protagonistes : quatre filles, nées de quatre feuilles de laurier, et qui finiront totalement enveloppées par celles-ci, comme des chrysalides dans l’attente d’un événement qui pourrait être bienveillant ou malfaisant, et les conduire au paradis ou dans l’enfer. Pour commencer à lui donner forme, Picasso se déplace autour du cercle carré du temps dans une métamorphose constante à logique biomorphique entre nature (vie) et culture (art), un retour arcadien au jardin méditerranéen au début jusqu’à un cube blanc à la fin, avec des clins d’œil en guise de da capo.
L’autoportrait tient une grande place dans LQFP et je donnerai les raisons picassienes de cette puissance créatrice autoréférentielle. Les lectures nocturnes de Picasso comprenaient à la fois Kant, Nietzsche, Freud, Bataille et probablement le corpus hermeticum. Elles nous donneront quelques-unes des clés de construction d’un nouveau monde, soit de paix soit de guerre, comme dans l’installation de Guerre et Paix réalisée postérieurement dans la chapelle de Vallauris (1952–9), référence plastique de cette section.

2. Picasso, Sartre, Beauvoir : l’engagement d’une refondation féminine du monde de l’après-guerre

L’année même où Picasso achève LQPF, Sartre publie Qu’est-ce que la littérature, où il défend la thèse de l’impératif d’un engagement pour la littérature postérieure à la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. La même année, Beauvoir achève l’œuvre qui sera publiée en 1949 et qui occupera une place prééminente dans la culture de l’après-guerre: Le deuxième sexe.

Sartre et Beauvoir avaient participé à la lecture dramatisée du Désir attrapé par la queue en 1944 et l’on peut facilement imaginer que leur relation avec Picasso s’est maintenue pendant les années suivantes, en nourrissant sa deuxième œuvre de théâtre. Je propose donc de lire cette œuvre en présentant l’engagement politique picassien dans la fondation d’un nouveau monde d’après-guerre et l’effondrement que suppose pour la narration traditionnelle le fait que LQPF soit la deuxième œuvre dans l’histoire du théâtre où les protagonistes sont exclusivement des femmes (des filles). À ce titre, rappelons que la première œuvre de théâtre avec des rôles exclusivement féminins est La Maison de Bernarda Alba de Lorca, écrite en 1935 et publiée en 1945.

L’œuvre plastique que je propose d’associer poïétiquement à cette pièce est la céramique Le Pichet aux quatre femmes (1948).

3. Métamorphose dans la cuisine

L’idée esthétique fondatrice du texte génère des dizaines d’idées esthétiques qui transforment l’idée initiale en performative en lui conférant de l’espace, du temps et de l’action. J’insisterai sur le fait que la plupart de ces idées esthétiques se rapportent au carré de la cuisine et de la table et au cercle de plats qui accueillent à la fois des mets exquis ou pourris. À partir de cette proposition, je rappellerai la récurrence de la gastropoïétique comme lieu privilégié dans la compréhension de l’idée que Picasso se fait de la créativité comme métamorphose. Les œuvres de référence seront les deux versions picturales de La Cuisine (1948).

4. LQPF comme texte dramaturgique méta-artistique

LQPF se situe, à partir de l’idée esthétique originale de la page d’accueil, dans un espace d’art sur l’art : il ne se situe pas à l’intérieur du cercle carré du temps, mais autour de celui-ci. Le métadiscours artistique est un élément récurrent dans le processus créatif de Picasso. Cette fois-ci, l’alter ego de la Petite Fille III joue le rôle de l’artiste avec une attitude fantasmagorique, silencieuse, oraculaire et prométhéenne, et qui endosse la responsabilité démiurgique et alchimique de surmonter l’oxymore de la quadrature du cercle suite à l’horreur.

Les dernières œuvres plastiques de référence seront: la sculpture en argile blanche Main (1948) et le décor pour l’Œdipe Roi de Sophocle (1947–8).
Andre Bazin’s proposal that in photography we see not a reproduction but the model itself has been given naturalistic readings by authors like Roger Scruton and Ken Walton. They claim that there is no ontological difference between the image and the thing or model. While this reading is no doubt philosophically interesting, it does not do justice to Bazin’s aesthetic vision of the power of photography and film. Bazin’s famous essay “The Ontology of the Photographic Image” is rather, I contend, a celebration of the potential of film to preserve human memory from nature. Indeed, it is accounts like Scruton’s and Walton’s which Bazin explicitly set himself to repudiate.

If, as I argue, Bazin in part of the aesthetic tradition going back to Kant for whom the beautiful was a sort of revealing of the underlying noumenal structure to reality, then Bazin’s celebration of the technical achievements of film—in particular the depth of field shot—receive a new importance. The depth of field shot is no longer a particular way of seeing the world as a new style of story-telling might be in an innovation for the novel. Rather, the depth of field shot constitutes the fundamental way of understanding reality per se.

To make evaluate this claim I’d like to situation Bazin’s thinking in the context of Walter Benjamin’s work on photography and in particular “The Work of Art in the Age of its Mechanical Reproducibility”. The reason for the comparison is that both account view photography as ushering in a fundamentally new way of perceiving and hence understanding reality, a qualitative shift in the way we consider our relationship to nature. Of the many similarities that exists in the story Benjamin and Bazin tell about the transformative power of photography, the most striking is perhaps that they both see in the family portrait the vestiges of what Bazin calls the mummy complex and Benjamin calls the aura. For both, the aura or the mummy complex which is an expression of the human need to wrest away a fragile human essence from the power of the natural world.

Yet the idea of the aesthetic as the arrest of the forces of nature is taken is taken in two different directions by Benjamin and Bazin.

Bazin argues that because film can present to us the object as it really is, that is, that film “shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model”, as Bazin puts it. This claim places the camera in the position the agency that was previously only reserved for the artist. The camera becomes the creator of the nature just like the artist. But, Bazin argues, the camera is a creator in a different way than the artist for the modern artist creates a work which is essentially tied to her subjectivity. The camera, on the other hand, creates an object which is essentially objective. In this sense, the camera reveals the world rather than expressing it. This is why Bazin champions the depth of field shot: it is only in this sort of shot that the subject can find an aesthetic reality which is presented to it in a value-free way, hence in a way which is safe from the business of the world or subjectivity itself, of the “spiritual dust and grime with which my eyes have covered it”, as he puts it. Bazin’s theory is thus fundamentally one of recovering a hidden reality.

In a sense Benjamin, for whom the camera is also a fundamental transformation of our capacity for understanding the world, agrees with Bazin. For Benjamin the camera also reveals a world but in a different way. For, the revelation which occurs for Benjamin in the photograph is rather the emancipation from a world in which nature is conceived as hidden. Benjamin associates the development of art with the cultic, the mystical, which thriv-
For Benjamin, the camera recovers nature, demystifies it by bringing it closer to us and hence allows us to manipulate nature. This is why Benjamin, along with other Marxists like Eisenstein and Kuleshov, champions montage theory. In montage, Benjamin argues, nature is allowed to present itself in its disorganized rawness. (By nature Benjamin means all forms of the physical from untouched nature to the brutal cityscapes produced by human activity and encountered as if they were nature.) The camera’s stripping away of the auraltic (speak beautiful or sublime) allows the director to present nature to the viewer anew, as something to be contemplated and acted upon rather than blindly accepted as if it were already part of our necessary condition. The stripping away of the aura by the camera thus has for Benjamin a truly revolutionary potential. And, in a strange way, this is where the Bazin’s and Benjamin’s accounts meet again since both see the camera as an essentially creative force, constituting a new objectivity which it is our responsibility, as viewers, to respond to.

Appreciation and Evaluative Criticism: Making the Case for Television Aesthetics

Michael Young (University of Reading)

Given the general conference theme, I propose we look at the intersection of value, quality and standards in aesthetics through the lens of television. Taking as my reflective starting point the notion that television does more than statically mirror prevailing contemporary cultural traditions (Hills, 2011), this paper will explore the structural composition of televisual aesthetics as a means to appreciate and evaluate shifting aesthetic sensibilities. In a sense, my examination of stylistic configurations in television from the perspective of aesthetic engagement and focusing on three political thrillers entails considering the interdisciplinary convergence of metaphysics and television studies, specifically drawing on Kantian analytic aesthetics to focus on the sensate (Cardwell, 2006) and televisual style (Jacobs and Peacock, 2013).

As a growing branch of television studies, television aesthetics tends to refer to close stylistic analysis (Butler, 2010) but also, more rarely, to an interest in philosophical aesthetics as applied to television (Cardwell, 2013). I will tap into both strands: close textual analysis as a methodology and also an interest in what aesthetics can bring to the evaluation of television programmes (Jacobs, 2001). Crucially, I explore how our sensorial relationship with televisual spaces depends on their transformative power as aesthetic objects (Brunsdon, 1997). I therefore argue for an approach to appreciating quality television (Nannicelli, 2017) derived from Kant’s moments of ‘aesthetic judgment’ (2000: §1-22). My ultimate aim is to contribute to the refinement of the ‘weak understanding of what close textual analysis means’ (Cardwell, 2006: 72) for television.

I will start by briefly reflecting on the various aspects, comprehensions and interpretations of value in television; though the scope of this paper will be limited to Anglophone television, this does not necessarily imply it is not more broadly applicable to other languages. The paper will be divided into four separate but interrelated sections. The first section will discuss how the field of television aesthetics has grown apart from conventional television studies approaches which tend to refrain from aesthetic questions and judgment, methodologically omitting them in favour of representational, theoretical, socio-political or ideological concerns. This represents a gap in knowledge that has only just started to be seriously addressed (despite the successful return to stylistic criticism in film studies). An aesthetic perspective therefore complements and extends existing television scholar-
ship as this paper firmly ‘acknowledges the roles of evaluation and aesthetic judgment to frame our research and drive our field’ (Mittell, 2009: 122).

The next section will focus on the concept of quality as it is comprehended within the field as a framework for qualifying the differences between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ television. The third section follows from the definitions previously laid out to develop the idea of what constitutes ‘extraordinary’ television. I will use the close textual analysis of three extant programmes’ stylistic signatures to show how our subjective sensitivities can be used as both a justification and legitimate foundation for making objective observations about television and determining its value. The programmes (Scandal, Homeland, House of Cards) analysed in this paper form a loose but distinct grouping, chosen with the following criteria in mind: they are American produced, only in production since the 21st century, with a female lead, and of the political thriller genre as these parameters give rise to a limited exemplary list. The choice of programmes also recognises the dearth of female protagonists in TV generally and provides a space for them within my work. Moreover, it addresses the gap in the literature on thriller aesthetics within television studies. Finally, I will carefully attend to the formal execution or techniques that enable its visual, sonic or otherwise striking stylistic and artistic particularities, and which contribute to its specific exemplary aesthetic qualities (e.g. feeling and tone, or beauty).

My particular approach to close stylistic analysis follows from existing practice in television aesthetics. It also corresponds to a phenomenological perspective, being concerned with sensible plausibility and deploying intuitive immersion, close observation and attentiveness, detailed analysis, and explicit description in its methodological toolkit. This approach aligns Cardwell’s ‘aesthetic attitude’ (derived from Kant’s mode of ‘disinterested reflection’) with phenomenology’s natural attitude ‘bracketing’ (derived from Merleau-Ponty’s ‘radical reflection’) and Heideggerian Befindlichkeit (‘the way one finds oneself’ in pathic relation to the world), respectively. Thus, while this paper serves to contribute to the discussion of how best one might engage with these programmes it will also help to further develop the connection between television aesthetics and analytic aesthetics.
Thursday 12:00-13:30 – Room 115
Seeing Things in Pictures, and Pictures in Things

Caitlin Dolan (University of California, Berkeley)

In this paper, I investigate the nature of a certain variety of experience, namely the kind of visual experience that a thing must provide the opportunity for, given that it is a picture. A quick answer to the question is that the experience that pictures necessarily afford is that of seeing something depicted, or seeing what something depicts. This answer provides some clarification of the experience, in that it makes clear that the experience is one of genuine perception, rather than illusion. It implies that pictures offer an experience of something that is really there to see, rather than that of merely seeming to see something. But a fuller treatment of the phenomenon would unpack this use of the phrase “what is depicted.” My attempt to do that concludes that the experience of seeing what something depicts can be identified as a form of seeing how something looks. The route to this conclusion illuminates the phenomenon of visual perception by clarifying some distinctions between the forms that it can take. And the conclusion itself suggests how depiction is essentially linked to an essentially aesthetic dimension of perceptual experience.

My argument begins with a consideration of the idea that a key feature of the experience is that it involves some kind of duality: it is an experience of a picture, and at the same time it is an experience of what the picture depicts. This is the feature that Richard Wollheim draws attention to in speaking of the “twofoldness” of our experience of pictures. Despite widespread agreement that there is some such feature and that it does define the nature of the phenomenon in question, the issue of what it amounts to has been a topic of controversy.

Wollheim identifies twofoldness with a certain structure of visual focus or attention: the picture, or the way that it is configured out of marks on a flat surface, and the object that we recognize as depicted by it, count as two objects of awareness, which divide our attention within a single view. But though they are distinct, they are not the sorts of things of which we can be aware separately: awareness of the one is necessarily complemented by awareness of the other. This “twofoldness,” according to Wollheim, characterizes not just pictorial experience but a broader “genus” of visual perceptual experience, which he calls “seeing-in.” Wollheim links this genus of experience to what he calls a “special perceptual project,” in contrast to “straightforward perception,” which enables us to “see things which are not present to the senses.” In seeing an ink drawing as depicting an elephant, we are seeing what is there in our midst - a pattern of ink on paper - as well as something that is not - an elephant, or a butterfly.

Many readers interpret Wollheim as having failed to give an adequate account of the twofoldness that these kinds of experiences exhibit. They read him as saying that it is in some way important way like seeing a configuration of marks, and in some important way like seeing something other than a configuration of marks, while refusing to say anything about how it is like either of these experiences, thus leaving us without any substantive grip on what the experience in question is like. But this criticism is misplaced, and obscures a deeper problem with Wollheim’s view. The problem with Wollheim’s account is not that it omits something, but that it characterizes seeing-in as involving seeing something that is not present to the senses. In saying this, Wollheim does not intend to classify it as visual illusion; the claim is that pictures and the like enable us to see things that are there to see, but aren’t there in our midst. But to see something just is for it to be present to the senses - specifically, to the visual sense. To maintain that there is such a thing as seeing what is not present to the senses is confused, or magical thinking - it makes pictures out
to be like crystal balls, visual portals to another realm.

If that’s right, then we must find a way to identify the objects of attention across which attention is distributed without referring to anything beyond what is there in the viewer’s midst in this context, and so potentially present to her senses. Malcolm Budd has claimed that there is no hope for this project: that in this context we cannot hope to see something other than a configuration of marks, and so we should not be looking for something else that the viewer sees. Instead, we should be aiming to pick out a particular way in which she sees the configuration before her. Budd suggests that the relevant way is one that implicates a familiarity with the look of a particular kind of thing, the kind of thing we refer to when we specify what the picture depicts.

But Budd overlooks something that, I maintain, the viewer must see, if she sees the configuration as depicting whatever it does. She must see how the configuration looks. This is distinct from merely (“straightforwardly”) seeing the set of configured marks itself - one might manage to see them, without seeing how they look. The look of the marks is not an item, and it does not occupy space in the way that the marked support (the painted canvas, or inked paper, or what have you) does. Yet the look of the marks is something there on the surface before the viewer, and is a potential object of awareness there in her midst. Considering the look of the marks, then, provides us a better way of understanding the twofold nature of the experience of seeing in: one which makes it out to be a special way of seeing, different from merely seeing a set of marks, but one that still counts as a case of a viewer’s seeing what is before her. Moreover, it ties depiction to our capacity for aesthetic experience, insofar as seeing how something looks, as opposed to merely seeing it, manifests a concern for appearances and the capacity to appreciate them.

Is there life after Lopes’ argument against pictorial resemblance?

Marco Arienti (University of Antwerp)

In his book Understanding Pictures (1996), Dominic Lopes has launched a powerful challenge to those accounts of depiction based on the notion of resemblance. He holds there that the relevant relation of resemblance occurring between the picture and its subject should face two restrictions: it must not be dependent from a previous knowledge of which scene is represented (the independency constraint), and it must allow for the variety of ways and styles in which that scene can be depicted (the diversity constraint). He then shows that no available theories of resemblance can avoid both constraints at the same time. Here, I will try to explore the scope and the implications of his argument, to see which limitations it imposes to theories of depiction and how they might be overcome.

To begin with, I will argue that Lopes’ caveats have actually a broader target than simply the one addressed by the author, that is resemblance theories of depiction. The two conditions in fact revolve around the same core problem: the possibility of a mismatch between the subject which the picture refers to and the visual appearance displayed by the image. Therefore, the criticism applies not just to theories of objective resemblance (Hyman, 2006), but also to the experiential ones, which try to ground depiction in the phenomenal nature of the experience elicited by pictures (Gombrich, 1960; Wollheim, 1987; Hopkins, 1998). On the one hand, a relation of objective resemblance anchors our understanding of pictorial representations to some features they instantiate, but it can determine the depicted content only in a limited range of cases, namely where the resemblance between the image and its subject is pursued to a very accurate extent. This violates the diversity constraint by not encompassing many possible deviations from a realistic way
of rendering a scene: visual resemblance is in fact meant to determine the pictorial sub-
ject prior to an assessment of that subject according to the particular expressive choices.
On the other hand, experiential accounts have proposed to explain depiction by character-
izing the experience entertained by the spectator. Relying on a subjective attitude ena-
bles these views to deal with more variations in depictive styles, but at the cost of giving
up the independence constraint once the question of pictorial recognition arises. On this
matter, these theories can hardly reconcile the viewer’s visual experience, which can le-
ave open a wide number of possible interpretive options of what is seen, with the condi-
tions of representational correctness held by the image, which authorizes only one inter-
pretation corresponding to the intended pictorial subject. Any attempt to identify the
content of the picture on the basis of our visual experience implies taking the former for
granted, because the subjective character of such experience is in principle unfit by itself
to set the representational function of public images.

The failures of these two kind of proposals can however provide better insights on the cru-
cial point motivating the criticism. It consists in the invitation to take seriously the pro-
blem of pictorial recognition, which is also at the heart of Lopes’ positive proposal. All the
theories examined are in fact unable to spell out the visual look of pictorial images as a
sufficient guide to understand what they represent. The issue has to be understood as an
epistemological one: how is the represented subject identified through the distinctive fi-
gurative mode of presentation characterizing pictures? Such question, in turn, pulls to-
wards a consideration of pictures as serving a communicative function, that is as convey-
ing a message, expressed in a visual way, which can be adequately or inadequately gra-
sped by an audience.

At this point, I will try to envisage a broad explanatory strategy which can overcome Lo-
pes’ objection. First, to avoid the diversity constraint, the mechanism at the heart of de-
piction should be flexible enough to adapt to a plenty of pictorial varieties (as experiential
theories acknowledge); at the same time, it still has to be rooted in an objective feature
of pictorial items which can constrain the determination of the depicted content, in order
to satisfy the independence constrain (as theories of objective resemblance do). These
suggestions seem to point out the idea of a skill or a practice which can be exercised throu-
gh many different contexts, while at the same time remaining reliable about the infor-
mation conveyed; a similar approach is also shared by Lopes’ theory of depiction itself,
which focuses on the ability of visual recognition. Second, such proposal should embrace
the important implication behind Lopes’ argument: the distinctive visual mode of presen-
tation of pictures determines our understanding of the depicted subject, therefore the
former should not be characterized in a way which presupposes the latter. This means that
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the visual value of pictures should be designed
to constitute also necessary and sufficient conditions for their representational value.

I will conclude by briefly analyzing a position put forward by Catharine Abell (2009) as an
illustration of a resemblance theory which acknowledges the importance of these guide-
lines. Abell individuates necessary and sufficient conditions of depiction in the notion of
intention-based resemblances, that is objective resemblances which become relevant to
us thanks to our ability to grasp communicative intentions. This account can thus escape
the diversity and independence constraints because it appeals to a general but context-
sensitive competence with pictorial representations, which also relies on some objective
features of their visual aspect. By taking such perspective, this kind of approach seems on
the right track to correct the flaws which made the other theories vulnerable to the ob-
jection advanced by Lopes.
References
Wollheim, R. (1987), Painting as an Art, London, Thames and Hudson
Thursday 12:00-13:30 – Room 116

**Embodiment and Wakeful Dreams - Danto’s Revisited Definition of Art in the Light of Costello’s Criticism**

Sarka Lojdova (Charles University)

One of the topics to which philosopher Arthur C. Danto paid a systematic attention is the one of definition of art. His contribution to the discussion developed mainly in his book *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* works on the principle of indiscernibles aims to distinguish an artwork from mere real things but without forming the real definition. Later on Danto isolated two of necessary conditions and characterized art as “embodied meaning.” However, this was not his last say on this topic. In 2013, Danto published his last book *What Art Is* and added the third necessary condition of “wakeful dreams”. In my proposal, I aim to consider this Danto’s step with regard to Diarmuid Costello’s criticism of Danto’s cognitivism as presented in the article “Whatever happened to “embodiment”? The eclipse of materiality in Danto’s ontology of art.” I shall seek to answer a question whether Danto’s revision of the definition is able to resist Costello’s arguments.

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**The use of Imaginary Artworks within Thought Experiments in the Philosophy of Art**

Matthew Rowe (City and Guilds of London Art School)

The paper makes a contrast between two views of the relationship between art and the philosophy of art - the ‘conceptual view’ that seeks analyse the concept of ‘art’ and draw conclusions for artistic practice from that, and the ‘practice view’ which regards the actual practice of art as manifested in his history and current extension as the object of analysis. Differences in how these two views often emerge in respect of questions in which the status of an artefact as an artwork is in doubt, and the reasons provided in support of any conclusion depend upon whether one holds a conceptual or a practice view.

The paper proposes some problems that follow from taking the ‘practice view’ in respect of the use of thought experiments to address such questions, in particular those that include imaginary artworks. It further suggests that these problems suggest a more general methodological constraint for the application of such thought experiments within some definitional projects or ontological account accounts of artworks within the philosophy of art. It’s argued that this constraint is most pressing on definitional projects that use the actual art of the past to in some way enfranchise artefacts of the present as art and for those accounts of artworks for which their identity and existence conditions necessarily involves the precise context of its creation (however construed).

A short analysis of the structure and role of thought experiments within these discussions is offered. It’s suggested that these are commonly constructed to test a theory or idea through applying it to a new situation or circumstance, one that is not actual but is possible as an extension of that theory, to discover the applicability of a theory beyond actuality and into possible situations. In doing so the thought experiment will often use imaginary artworks - those that have not actually been made, but which, given an artwork that has actually been made, would, on the basis of a theory, seem to be unproblematically a further artwork. This then provides a test of the proposed theory - to test how it reaches into the non-actualised world of possible artworks.

However, the paper claims that if we adhere to a view based in a practice-based view of the philosophy of art, then thought experiments that use hypothetical, counterfactual, or otherwise non-actual situations and artworks can only be justified in very limited circumstances. Two pillars of support are given for this:
The first is that art, when considered as a practice, unlike the natural or even the social sciences, makes no claim internally within its own methods for the need that any particular putative art-making activity or particular artwork's existence should also thereby, license or need to account for, non-actualised cases. Art provides no reason to think why there should be any wider validity to any result beyond the actual result that has actually obtained within that practice - i.e. the artworks that have been actually made in their precise historical circumstances. Indeed, it's argued that the actual history of art suggests there is a positive reason not to assume that practice sets a settled theoretical precedent for non-actualised cases. That is, it's suggested that the method of using thought experiments to test the actual through the non-actual but seemingly theoretical possible is unnecessary for art.

Secondly, it's argued that for philosophical accounts of art that suggest that a particular set of complex circumstances of an artwork's manufacture (however cashed out) are necessary to its identity as an artwork, conclusions drawn through any extension into fictional situations from those particular actualised circumstances needs very careful consideration and justification. In extremis, given a view that a precise contextual articulation produced a precise artwork, it might not even be possible to generalise over any wider situations other than the on actually articulated.

The paper therefore argues that thought experiments in the philosophy of art are potentially neither needed (by the practice) nor warranted (by some philosophical commitments). It's noted that this offers those who commit to a practice-based view both a potential freedom from the results of thought experiments, and a constraint on their legitimate construction. The methodological constraint may be that for such theories we cannot use imaginary artworks in our thought experiments about those theories. If so, then all we are left with for our comparison set to test these theories of art is the manifestation of the practice in the actual world - the artworks that actually exist. The freedom is that given the sort of practice art is, adequate theories only require one-world extensional equivalence, so that they do not need to have proofs and generalisations that divert from actual practice. This potentially leaves thought experiments from non-actual situations as irrelevant to practice-based positions. However, it's argued that the potential freedom from counter-example one-world validity gives in defence of these positions becomes a prison when trying to argue positively for such positions, since it may lead them to collapse into little more than descriptions of that one actualised world.

The paper then considers whether another form of activity could potentially replicate some of the intended clarificatory effects of thought experiments using imaginary artworks. A form of experimental aesthetics that might be called “philosophical anthropology” is suggested: That is, constructing experiments within the practice of art by making the artworks conceived within philosophical thought experiments - making the philosophically theoretical, artistically actual.

Three challenges to this suggestion are set out - each of which, it's argued, illustrate aspects of philosophy's relationship with art: (1) whether the work of the philosophical anthropologist would get accepted as art by the practice of art; (2) the precise nature and order of its experiments spring from philosophy's own history and so even if accepted, the philosophical anthropologist's works are imposed from outside that practice and done for philosophy's need; and (3) the effect of attempting the experimental work within the practice will change that practice so that it is different from that which was to be initially tested by the experiment.

In conclusion it's argued that if thought experiments are used then philosophy takes the role of adjudicating, on the basis of philosophically tested possibilities, what can count as actual instances of the practice. What this means is that we have moved beyond making
thought experiments about art as a practice, to making thought experiments about ‘art’ as a concept. So, the use of thought experiments to cover non-actual situations and artworks is conceptual analysis, not practice analysis - they are about the concept of ‘art’ and are of philosophical value, but their use indicates moving beyond a purely practice-based approach to analysis. It's argued finally that this is the route cause of the tensions so far highlighted - that thought experiments in philosophy do conceptual analysis, but that their use within any practice analysis based on a practice view of art is more obscure. The paper concludes on an open note as to whether this suggests a need for any practice view to have some element of normative criticality, or whether ‘art’ is the sort of concept for which philosophy's role can only be to provide a descriptive practice-based account.
This paper explores the ontological nature of musical versions. The thesis that I defend is that the hypothesis of nested types (HNT) solves two problems faced by traditional type/token theories when applied to musical versions: the repeatability of a work in its versions' performances and the distinction between a work’s versions and inspired works.

It is not unusual to find musical works with different versions. A work’s versions typically present slightly different sound structures and, sometimes, different instrumentations (cf. Davies, 2007; Rohrbaugh, 2003). For instance, Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 2 is said to have two versions from 1872 and 1879, respectively. The third movement’s flute solo is remodelled in the 1879 version with respect to the 1872 version, and A theme’s melody proceeds now by arpeggios on the violins, rather than by syncopes. A work’s versions ought to be distinguished from the phenomenon of works inspired by other works. These are works including literally melodies from other pieces, but regarded as different musical works from the source work. Berlioz’s Fantastic Symphony -whose fifth movement takes the melody of the Gregorian sequence Dies Irae- exemplifies this last phenomenon. The relevant differences between the phenomena of a work’s versions and inspired works are reflected by the way we speak about these musical products.

We currently say that musical versions are of a musical work. We speak, for example, about ‘the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 2’. The way in which we refer to versions suggests a kind of relation between a version and a musical work. Accordingly, a widely shared intuition in our musical practices is that, in a performance of a version, we are hearing the musical work this version is said to be of. In a performance of the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 2, and in a performance of the 1879 version of Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 2, listeners assume to be hearing, not different, but the same work: Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 2. A one-many relationship is assumed to hold between Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 2 and the performances of its versions indicated in 1872 and 1879. Consequently, three things are assumed to be heard in a performance of the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 2:

1. That particular performance.
2. The version that this performance is of (the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 2).
3. The work that this version is of (Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 2).

Let us call it the standard view on versions, according to which the performances of the different versions of a same musical work are regarded as occurrences of that work. Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 2 is repeated to this extent in the performances of its 1872 and 1879 versions. In addition, in hearing a performance of the 1872 version, we can also aesthetically appreciate the 1872 version as well as the work versioned. By contrast, Berlioz’s Fantastic Symphony is not said to be something of the Dies Irae. In a performance of Berlioz’s Fantastic Symphony we can recognize the Gregorian melody. However, this performance does not count as an occurrence of the Dies Irae: we are neither hearing or aesthetically appreciating the Dies Irae, but the Dies Irae as used or developed in the Fantastic Symphony.

Type/token theories, which identify musical works with the ontological category of types, have been typically considered as the best explanation of musical works’ repeatability (cf. Wollheim, 1980; Wolterstorff, 1980; Davies, 2003; Dodd, 2007; Levinson, 2011). However, attending more closely to the phenomenon of musical versions reveals as insufficient the
account of musical works’ repeatability provided by them. Types are ontologically thin entities (Dodd 2007, 53–56), individuated by the set of conditions that something must meet in order to be one of its properly formed tokens (Dodd 2007, 53–56). In the case of musical works, these conditions are specified by the succession of sounds in a specific structure. A change in such sounds or in their disposition would establish a new set of conditions to be satisfied by the tokens of a type, which results in a different type. The ontologically thin nature of types entails the thesis of structural monism for the individuation of musical works: the idea that a musical work is individuated by one, and only one, sound structure. Consequently, since a work’s versions always exhibit different sound structures, versions would count as different musical works and, consequently, the work versioned would not occur in the performances of its versions. To this extent, traditional type/token theories are unable to explain the repeatability of a work in its versions’ performances and the differences between versions and inspired works, reducing the former to the latter.

The type/token theorist can avoid both problems if she embraces the HNT. The HNT will show that the thesis of structural monism and the association of different sound structures with a same musical work are compatible. According to the HNT, musical works are higher-order types that are instantiated in lower-order types—a work’s versions—, which in turn admit of instantiation in musical performances. It will be shown that types appealed by the HNT are types in a full sense. Firstly, they are not an ad hoc category, having applicability in other domains different from the ontology of musical works. Secondly, they exhibit a feature that distinguishes types from properties or other universals (cf. Dodd, 2007: 17; cf. Trivedi, 2002: 74): the transmission of predicates between higher-order types and their instances (lower-order types), and between higher-order types and the tokens of lower-order types (performances). Thirdly, the explanation of the access to a type by means of its instances provided by the notion of deferred ostension is also available for the HNT (cf. Quine, 1969: 40; Dodd, 2007: 11): since a token ‘stands proxy for the type’ that lies behind it, we hear a lower-order type (a version) passing through its tokens (performances), but since a lower-order type is also an instance of a higher-order type (the work versioned), we hear the higher-order type passing through the lower-order type. Perceptibility is transmitted from tokens of a lower-order type to the higher-order type of which that lower-order type is an instance.

In addition, the HNT can explain how the versions’ different sound structures can be associated to a same musical work without rejecting structural monism. Two compatibles explanations can be provided:

1) The differences between the sound structures of a work’s versions may be explained in terms of imperfect instantiation: some versions are not properly formed instances of the higher-order type. This explains those cases in which a composer is not satisfied with a previous version and wants to improve it.

2) The differences between the sound structures of a work’s versions may be regarded as a consequence of the variability of the properly formed instances of a higher-order type. Accordingly, the sound structure that individuates the work qua higher-order type is more generic than the ones that individuate any of its versions. It has variables to be filled in different ways by the sound structures of its lower-order types. This explains those cases in which a new version is understood as a new right mode of presentation of a same work.

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If we think of music as part of culture, there are many examples of natural sounds that are considered musical or welcomed into musical experiences as in traditional wind chimes or the sounds of car engines in City Life by Steve Reich or street shouts in Luciano Berio’s Cries of London. Yet, in Western artistic music tradition the definition as well as understanding of music from traditional to modern theories consider music to be first and foremost an effect of artistic creation; a product of compositional working, an effect of intellectual careful fashioning, composer’s work (Ingarden 1986). The dominating element in definition of music seems to be its rational source and a good design. From the Ancient understanding of music, which sees in it a careful combination of sounds and rhythms (Augustine, Boethius), to twentieth century definition of musical work as sound structure indicated by X at t (Levinson 1980: 20), music is conceived, pre-arranged, and executed to the point. The idea that music may just happen is contrary to intuitions as much as it is to most of its descriptions. How then are everyday sounds present in the experience of music? How is music made of everyday sounds? In what way, in what percentage, if any, is it made in communion and in response to the environment? Can wind blowing, or sea roaring be truly considered music? And if so, how does the theory of music and music philosophy deal with that? In other words, there seem to be a huge disparity between expectations that music is rational and created by man containing complex design and the fact that anything sounding may be heard as music, and that essentially music is perception.

This last realization, however, should be put in context of (1) precise but wide understanding of perception and (2) theoretical and practical demonstrations of what is meant by everyday sounds being part of music and musical works. The talk discusses the difference between understanding music as primary rational and artefactual and considering it to be a matter for perception. Author analyzes the difference between music understood as rational creation, artistic or otherwise, and music seen as perception, rather than cognition, where it is not any particular kind of sounds or ways in which these sounds are grouped together that makes music, but the listeners’ willingness to hear such phenomena as significant, beautiful or most of all culturally potent that does the trick. Discussing contemporary accounts of music such as Jerrold Levinson’s (Levinson 1986) and Roger Scruton’s (Scruton 1991) among others, author points to assumptions about music being created in artistic process and rational at core contrasting them with contemporary musical experiences. Author further refers to aesthetic theory by John Dewey (Dewey 1980) and Eric Clarke’s ecological account of music (Clarke 2005) to suggest that music was always born out of perception rather than fashioned from physical processes. That the willingness to
hear music is as important and the ability to listen for it, and that the most important dif-
ference is not between the rational and irrational ways of recognizing music but between
the exclusive and inclusive ways of thinking about music. The avant-garde music of the
twenty century has been full of attempts to make music out of almost anything. From
John Cage’s Livingroom music to Steve Reich’s clapping music or his microphone music and
Pierre Schaeffer’s Suite pour l’homme, to Alvin Lucier’s I am sitting in a room and Tan
Dun’s Water Concerto sounds have been found and converted to form musical composi-
tions.

Groups such as Stomp have shown in a way more persuasive that any theory ever could
that music is born out perceptive attitude rather than out of carefully modulated physical
processes. Even though the phenomenon of music has been developed in culture throu-
ghout hundreds of years, it may just as well occur out of nothing, unexpectedly, while on
the MR scan examination or when out on a walk in a forest. The practical and social deve-
lopment is as important as the intellectual one - the listening as perceptual adjustment
for music. Considering various examples of musical works, author concludes that the di-
sparity between music as cultural phenomenon and the music as understood in philosophy,
is not as wide as it has been believed. The primacy of perception doesn’t have to be in
conflict with the studies showing human cognitive abilities to be musical (Honing 2011). As
we are reminded the work done in terms of material, form and means of production may
just as well be explained in terms of forces of nature resolving their natural tensions and
the deliberate artistic work in its carefully designed shape may not be as different as it
appears to be from the naturally occurring waves of tensions that drive the music situation
in the rain (Dewey 1980). The natural tendencies and biological grounds of human cultural
functioning cannot hide the fact that the will to hear music going hand in hand with the
perceptive readiness to listen for the music is crucial to any music experience.
Artificial Creativity and Adversarial Networks

Jens Dam Ziska (Kunstakademie Düsseldorf)

Computer programmes already compose music, write poetry, paint paintings, and assist in scientific discoveries. Does this mean that such programmes are creative, or that they have the potential to be creative? This question is sometimes used to raise fears of a future in which artists and scientists have been replaced by creative machines, but philosophically it also raises further questions about the nature of human creativity. Even if machines will never make human creativity obsolete, seemingly creative programmes may still offer us a glimpse into the workings of human creativity.

According to Margaret Boden (2005), creative machines can also dispel some of the romantic myths that stand in the way of a scientific understanding of creativity. In particular, artificial intelligence can help dispel the claim that human creativity must remain outside the scope of scientific explanation because creative acts are the unpredictable acts of geniuses who bring something new into existence - a new theory, a new work of art, etc. which could not have been foreseen. If we can use AI to programme machines that simulate such creativity closely enough, perhaps we may also eventually uncover the rules and heuristics that govern human creative thought.

Yet, attempts at reproducing creativity using classical AI all suffer from a fundamental flaw. They all rely on pre-given rules and heuristics which a computer then applies in a plodding manner which would not be described as creative had it been performed by a human. Even if such computer simulations can deliver seemingly creative results, this does not mean that the procedure itself was creative. As Hubert Dreyfus notes, when we aim for psychological explanation, it is not enough that a computer simulation manages to imitate the input/output functions performed by a human being when these functions may be satisfied in many ways. The program must also simulate the cognitive processes that people actually go through when they generate the output from the input (Dreyfus 1972, p. 80).

This is an issue that current research on computational creativity seems increasingly to recognise. Much of this research does not attempt to identify the supposed rules and heuristics which define a given style of thought. Instead, this research aims to generate creative outcomes by training neural networks on databases of manmade artworks until these networks are able produce similar works themselves. So-called Generative Adversarial Networks are made up of two sub-networks: a discriminator which has access to a training set of manmade images and a generator which produces new images. When these sub-nets are set up so that the generator tries to produce images which the discriminator will mistake for a real manmade image, the two sub-nets will eventually reach an equilibrium at which they begin to produce outputs which look like already existing art.

These networks have two advantages. The first is that they do not follow heuristics like the programs of classical AI, but do instead seek to emulate how the brain processes information. The second advantage is that they have access to and respond to a database including canonical works much in the way that artists respond to exemplary work of art. Yet, these networks do not generate anything creative in their current form. After all, they are set up to produce works which look like already existing art. They can therefore at most be likened to an artist who has learnt to imitate a certain style.

Perhaps it is possible to augment these network, however, so that they generate genuinely creative outputs. Elgammal et al. (2017) describe a recent program which represents an attempt to do just this. This program which Elgammal et al. call a Creative Adversarial Network is set up so that instead of trying to generate images in an already existing style,
it attempts to generate novel images which are ambiguous between different pictorial styles. This type of network has produced some remarkable results. When asked to compare a series of abstract pictures generated by the network with a series of abstract pictures from the Art Basel 2016 art fair, a group of respondents rated the images by the network as more aesthetically pleasing than the works from the art fair (the program is less successful when it is asked to produce figurative work).

It is, however, still too early to say whether this type of network holds any promise to produce genuine creative works of art. As the authors themselves admit, an evaluation of aesthetic pleasantness does not entail that the work is also creative. One might indeed expect the opposite, with radically creative work being rated as less aesthetically pleasing when it is first shown. More still, Elgammal’s Creative Adversarial Network is yet to generate its own distinct style as opposed to producing work which is merely ambiguous between different already existing pictorial styles.

This suggests that we are still some way from seeing genuine artificial creativity. Although past and current attempts at artificial creativity yield many noteworthy results, they ultimately fall short of genuine creativity. Most importantly, we are yet to see machines and programs which not only traverse a creative domain to produce novel products, but which do so in manner which itself is creative and where this creativity is not better ascribed to the creator of the program. What is more, we are also yet see programs which are able to develop their own distinct style where this style amount to more than mere ambiguity between already existing styles. Until we know whether it is possible in principle for a machine to achieve these feats, it remains unclear whether genuine artificial creativity is at all possible.

Laughing at ugly people. On humour as the antithesis of human beauty
Matilde Carrasco Barranco (University of Murcia)

Since Kant, human beauty is considered a mode of dependent beauty, which presupposes a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it; in this case, the concept of human being. Thereby, insofar as we call someone beautiful, we judge them as a perfect example of the category, whereas ugliness is the imperfect realization of it. Human beauty, integrating body and character, becomes a norm which deviation from can lead to humour that, in this respect, is in the family of antitheses to beauty. Ugly people are considered appropriate objects for comedy and mockery, usually because their defective appearance is often taken to be a sign of a faulty moral character. Despite these views having been an important part of Western philosophical reflections on humour, the contrast with beauty in order to explain the phenomenon is no longer their focus yet it is still very present in our culture. My aim is to relocate the question in the current scenario dealing mostly with the “incongruity theory”, which can explain how humour exploits transgression of human beauty, understood as a norm in the way suggested above. However, I will address also the superiority theory, which is based on ridicule and it seems concerned precisely with the antithesis between humour and human beauty, making it though too restrictive to succeed as a general theory. But recent research contests the rivalry between these two theories as they address different aspects of humour, and their complementarity seems to me the more plausible explanation of why we laugh at ugly people. Nevertheless, I will explore possible counterexamples in order to show that bringing back our attention to this old question not only benefits the understanding of a significant case of comic amusement but also it may contribute to refining the current debate between theories that try to explain the nature and value of such a complex thing as humour.
Social Reality of Universal Style

Jakub Stejskal (Freie Universität Berlin)

The aim of this paper is to salvage what is left of the once grand idea that stylistic analysis alone can reveal the social reality behind general style. The paper comes in four parts. First, I introduce a key distinction for my argument, that between general and universal style. Second, I rehearse the devastating criticisms the idea that universal style tracks social reality has faced. Third, I discuss an example of a universal pictorial style, split representation, and show its vulnerability to the criticisms. Fourth, using the example of split representation, I defend a deflated version of the idea that universal pictorial style tracks social reality: from a certain pattern of configuring pictorial content it is possible to devise socially sanctioned desires the universal style is particularly apt to serve.

Perceptible Authenticity. The Role of Style in Aesthetic Appreciation

Lisa Giombini (Roma Tre University)

Imagine the picturesque old town of an ancient European city, a piece of human history that has managed to resist for centuries to the tear and wear caused by time. Now imagine that all of a sudden, a terrible war ruinously destroys the whole place. Fortunately, though, once peace is restored, the city is rebuilt to exactly how it looked before. Some people would think that something has nevertheless been lost in the process: the city is simply not the same as it was before. But what exactly is missing?

If we can answer that, we are on the right track to discover what it is that we find valuable about original artworks. In many circumstances, originals are valued more than reproductions, even if there is no obvious difference between them and even if reproductions could offer a more rewarding experience. Why is it so? Is it just snobbery? This ties into the broader question of why details of an object’s history should make any difference to how the object is aesthetically appreciated - a question at the core of one of the most long-standing philosophical discussions ever, that revolving around art and authenticity. While some theoreticians have argued that the relevance we attribute to authenticity in the context of aesthetic appreciation is justified (Sagoff 1978; Levinson 1989; Farrelly-Jackson 1997; Dutton 2003; Korsmeyer 2008), other have retorted that it is just fetishism (Lessing 1965; Zemach 1989; Jaworski 2013).

In this paper, I argue that though aesthetic appreciation does not necessarily require attribution of authenticity, authenticity can, however, be conceived of as what I call a ‘derivative’ source for aesthetic appreciation. Unlike standard aesthetic properties like form or colour, authenticity cannot be immediately grasped from objects’ surface appearance; it can, however, be appreciated derivatively through identification of one artistic property that is both aesthetically perceptible and indissolubly tied to the object’s authentic history: style.
Collaborating to Learn from Fiction

Stacie Friend (Birkbeck, University of London)

Both philosophers and psychologists are interested in whether and how we learn from fiction. Yet there has been little productive interaction between the theoretical and empirical approaches. In this paper I argue that a collaborative approach is essential for at least certain kinds of learning. This position contrasts not only with those that deny the relevance of empirical research to philosophical argument (or vice versa); but also with the assumption that philosophers can simply draw on empirical research, which proceeds along a separate track.

The argument has two parts: First, I argue for the relevance of empirical research to claims about learning from literature. Second, I highlight flaws in extant psychological studies that demonstrate the lack of an appropriate theoretical framework. I conclude by acknowledging the difficulties in bridging disciplinary divides but suggest that this is the only plausible way forward.

Literature as Thought Experiment

Gregory Currie (University of York)

In philosophy and in the sciences we make use of thought experiments (TEs) such as trolley scenarios and Maxwell’s demon. I will assume that the TEs we have in philosophy and the sciences are in good standing, and ask whether their success gives support to the idea that works of literature sometimes function as TEs, as some have claimed. I argue that it does not.

I offer an account of how TEs work that appeals to the way that making an imaginative assumption tends to provoke the process of belief-updating. This account coheres with the Gendler-Mach model that invokes tacit knowledge to explain how we learn from TEs. I present four arguments (two described in the long abstract): If literature provides TEs then social and personal psychology should do so, but they do not; literary scenarios do not tend to produce robust agreement about outcomes, something required for the reliability of TEs; complex tropes of narration typical of literature generate unreliability; literary scenarios depend on testimonial knowledge in ways that scientific/philosophical TEs do not.
What can empirical aesthetics contribute to philosophical aesthetics and what it cannot - a tentative meta-analysis

Monika Bokiniec (University of Gdańsk)

The main purpose of this presentation is to review empirical approaches to questions of philosophical aesthetics in order to evaluate its potential contribution to answering questions formulated within philosophical aesthetics. Throughout history, there has been little interest in empirical studies of the arts within philosophical aesthetics and empirical data have rarely been used as support for arguments. It is surprising, since aesthetics, by its very name, seems to be predisposed for empirical investigation - its focus on experience, attitude, evaluation etc. seems to beg for empirical verification, while its history is dominated by speculation rather than by experiments.

The history of empirical aesthetics can nevertheless be traced back to at least the 19th century and the work of Gustav Fechner, who combined philosophical and psychological approach and methods in his work on aesthetics. Currently we can observe a growing interest in empirical studies of the arts, especially since the 1980s, not only in fields such as psychology or neurosciences, but also in philosophical aesthetics, as evidenced by, for example, the growing number of publications on the subject in leading journals and collections of essays. I shall focus my analysis on selected empirical studies and experimental approaches to aesthetics from the more recent period (2000s).

I make a distinction between empirical aesthetics (a broader category) and experimental philosophy of aesthetics (a narrower category). Experimental aesthetics is a branch of experimental philosophy, in which philosophers themselves design experiments to confront philosophical intuitions with empirical dimension. Within experimental aesthetics, philosophers attempt to verify empirically their hypotheses related to aesthetic values and factors influencing our aesthetic beliefs and preferences or the way we apply aesthetic notions. They explore issues related to aesthetic experience, imagination or emotions. Experimental aesthetics has been criticised because of its incompetence, e.g. by Vladimir J. Konečni (in The Journal of Aesthetic Education, 2012) who claimed that philosophers resort to methods they are not trained to apply, thereby distorting the results. However, some experiments are rather simple in their design, but still can provide some interesting data.

To organise various empirical approaches to aesthetics, I ordered them on three scales: (1) According to the level of data examined (physiological, behavioural, phenomenological, secondary); (2) According to methods used (appropriation, quantitative, qualitative, use of simple and complex devices); (3) According to the level of incorporating empirical data (from “thin” to “thick” use of data). I provide examples of studies or experimenters for each scale (although it should be noted that these scales often intertwine and there are studies which combine different levels and methods used to study art empirically, for example, the study on museum goers called eMotion: Mapping the Museum Exerience uses both wristbands recording the route and time of museum visit and questionnaire) and discuss their relevance for philosophical aesthetics. I also provide and discuss examples of studies and experiments, which are misconceived and based on misunderstanding of philosophical questions, as well as mixed cases.

The meta-analysis of relevant studies and experiments related to aesthetics provides the basis for evaluating the potential contribution of empirical data to philosophical aesthetics. I would list several advantages of using the empirical approach for aesthetics, including:
- raising awareness: turning to empirical data while discussing philosophical problems can make us aware of what Matthew Kieran called the “fragility of aesthetic knowledge”. Kieran’s answer to this problem is not to doubt in the possibility accurate aesthetic judgement, but rather to use this empirical knowledge to cultivate awareness, humility, self-honesty, courage and other virtues in order to become a skilled appreciator (“The Fragility of Aesthetic Knowledge: Aesthetic Psychology and Aesthetic Virtues”, in: The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and Psychology, 2011);

- getting rid of details: some questions and paradoxes that philosophers have pondered upon can actually be decided or resolved by turning to empirical data; setting them can leave more room to reflect upon a bigger picture or issues are impossible to settle upon;

- it can verify some pseudo-problems and overly speculative or idealistic premises or theories, for example by revealing the underlying processes;

- it can provide new, interesting stimuli for philosophical reflection, inspire new directions of thinking;

- it can open up a meaningful interdisciplinary dialog in order to reveal a comprehensive image of art, its underlying mechanisms, processes, role and significance.

However, the meta-analysis of existing studies and experiments also reveals the limits of what empirical data can contribute to philosophical aesthetics or what they mean on their own, without in-depth philosophical reflection. These include:

- the question of values and norms, the prescriptive dimension - empirical studies (parallel to ethics) can only assist in descriptive stage of analysis. Often the results of empirical studies are left without elaborating their normative consequences;

- (also similarly to ethics), empirical studies explain why most people would behave or experience in a certain way, but they are often unable to account why some didn’t, therefore provoking the question about their potential for generalisations, especially their philosophical relevance;

- individual studies without more general context are meaningless - our interactions with art are so complex and context-dependent, that it seems that no empirical study can provide a comprehensive explanation;

- without philosophy empirical studies on art are perhaps left without the beginning - a set of relevant questions and notions (without preceding theoretical speculations and analysis empirical research would be, and sometimes is, dominated by a certain naiveté);

- they would also be left without an end - a creative synthesis. Even if we combined all these methods, techniques and approaches and gather all the empirical results, would their summary give us final answers to our philosophical questions or a comprehensive and exhausting description of aesthetic experience, appreciation, evaluation?

- some philosophical problems simply cannot be settled by empirical study and if such attempts are undertaken, they result in distortion of the original problem (the study of Kantian sensus communis reported in Cova et al.)

- in some cases, a question arises about what the results of empirical studies really tell us; for example, what do images resulting from studies on the brain tell us about the quality of experience? The imaging itself is a kind of medium. Often these experiments are taken out of context, historical, social, personal, etc. in which our interactions with artworks usually take place, and as a result they offer us some bits and pieces of information that are not necessarily informative.
I finish my presentation with some more speculative reflection on the future of empirical aesthetics. It is relatively young, some of its branches, such as neuroaesthetics - are even younger. It is still searching for its identity and it remains unclear, whether it will be able to deliver what it promises. It is open to criticism, some of which is directed at its “unphilosophical” character, and some - at its methodological unreliability. In other words, sometimes it is not philosophical enough for philosophers and not scientific enough for scientists. If we understand aesthetics narrowly, as a subdiscipline of philosophy, bound by the rigours of its problems and methods, the perhaps one might legitimately claim that most empirical studies remain at the “zero level” of reflection - they take what is directly given at face value, and as such are irrelevant for philosophy. On the other hand, we may conceive of aesthetics as a set of questions, answers for which may be found through various cognitive channels, methodologies, approaches. In such case, philosophy would be treated as a source of hypotheses for experimental aesthetics.

Mannerism: Two Contemporary Philosophical Evaluations
Sjoerd van Tuinen (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

In my paper I discuss Giorgio Agamben’s aesthetics from a Deleuzian perspective, with an emphasis on what I think is their main shared problem and interest: modal individuation and a mannerist sensibility. Mannerism raises an interesting problem for philosophy, because it reveals a logical paradox in the concept of style to the extent that Art historians use it both for referring to the individual manner of artists or artworks and for generalizing a formal aesthetic epoch. On the one hand, the sixteenth century marks a crucial moment in the individualization and emancipation of the artist. On the other hand, the mannerist focus on particularities puts at risk the very idea of a unified art and the principles of its historical development, as well as the criteria for distinguishing historical and geographical manners. Almost from its inception, art history and philosophical aesthetics have therefore tended to reduce many of the personalized manners to artificial tricks or stereotyped ‘mannerisms,’ which ultimately, in classicism, would led to the rejection of mannerism tout court. But is a manner by definition also mannered? And does it follow that the artistic significance of a whole stylistic epoch ultimately lies in its dissolution in subjective idiosyncrasies, as if the ‘stylish style’ - to pick up on John Shearman’s famous formula - was ultimately lacking all style?

If the concept of mannerism is to resist the generic judgment implying artistic degeneration, then the classical division between an essential style and its particular varieties or mannerisms is impossible to uphold. As Shearman’s tautological definition reflects, in mannerism the particular itself aspires to the status of a universal, forcing into contradiction the generic set of which it used to be a part and becoming itself like a class that includes itself as its member. Speaking with Bertrand Russell, mannerism appears to constitute an ‘illegitimate totality.’ But then how could we still use the concept of mannerism in any meaningful way?

Like all paradox, the paradox of style submits logic to something that exceeds thought: practice. As the word suggests, ‘mannered’ is a subjective quality of an objective standard. It describes an accessory deviation from a more original identity. Mannerisms are therefore always external variations on a model or form that is already deemed ‘ideal’ or ‘perfect’ in itself. A manner, by contrast, is capable of immanent deviations that drag every established model along. Rather than a stable identity, mannerism reveals style to be an internal manner of change. It marks both the breakdown of the classical distribution of the general style and particular mannerism, and the breakthrough of manner. Instead of owing its existence to a more original style, a manner multiplies the original and constitutes an original multiplicity itself.
An a-mereological understanding of originality can be found in Deleuze’s concepts of singularity and haecceitas, borrowed from Duns Scotus, but even more in what Agamben calls ‘whatever singularities’. In The Coming Community, Agamben discusses a third figure besides genus and species, which scholastics refer to as exemplars or maneries: one singularity among others that simultaneously stands for each of them. As a replacement for the generic (historical) and the personal, maneries are adequate for an age that seems to lack both existence and essence, and that much more than the relative homogeneity of the Renaissance and the baroque already heralds the plethora of manners of the new that was to characterize the modern. Being a pure processual term, the notion of manner enables us to define art as practice rather than as historical object and lineage.

For Agamben and for Deleuze, moreover, mannerism is a problem of subjectivity: ‘Mannerism, in the history of art and in psychiatry, designates excessive adherence to a usage or a model (stereotype, repetition) and, at the same time, the impossibility of truly identifying oneself with it (extravagance and artifice)’. The key term in Agamben’s definition of mannerism and his work at large is ‘usage,’ which means both use in the sense of putting something to work and in the sense of common use or habitual praxis. This distinction is needed for ‘entirely rethinking and correcting, starting from habit and use, the Aristotelian doctrine of dynamis and Energeia.’ In mannerism, the excessive adherence to a usage and the impossibility of truly identifying oneself with it are symptoms of one and the same problem or pathology. It marks the moment of fatigue in repetition, when subjectivity (contemplation/imagination) and action (contraction) come apart. While the contraction of habit is by definition indiscernibly active and passive, a classical writer nonetheless feels in full possession of language. What he misses is precisely an inner wavering, a trembling of his means, which enables him to resist and undo the possibilities of creation that are already given. The self-referentiality of mannerist poetic language, e.g. Tesauro’s concetti, by contrast triggers a self-problematizing contemplation of the capacity to speak and write. Standing in relation to his own capacity not to be (passive potentiality or adynamia), the mannerist enters a process of learning what language is capable of. Mannerism is thus a ‘destitution’ or disappropriation of style and the invention of the inoperative work of art. To have the potential of art is for the artist also to have the potential not to act and thus remain an artist who seeks new possibilities of expression. In the very similar words of Deleuze, creation takes place in ‘choked passages’: ‘A creator’s someone who creates their own impossibilities, and thereby creates possibilities.’ A literary style, similarly, ‘is managing to stammer in your own language’ and to enforce a new contraction or manner that ‘stretches’ the pre-existing language to its, i.e. this manner’s ‘limit.’

Having arrived at this point of maximum overlap between Agamben and Deleuze, we may wonder whether the return of the classical dichotomy of style and manner, albeit under new conditions, doesn’t risk a relapse into classical stylistics. While the categories of proper and improper express the shift from being to having, do they not come at the cost of the return of good old essentialism?

1) Because every new manner remains in a way parasitic on an older and more ‘proper’ style, art historians generally regard mannerism as something which necessarily comes late. For Agamben, too, mannerism can appear only when the dominant style begins to lose its authority and its doubling by manner becomes an inspiration in itself. If style or habit exhausts the potential in the actual of language, then manners are more untimely contractions of this potential. Agamben thus holds on to the classical image of growth and decay of style. Yet while this emphasis on lateness is historically correct, for Deleuze it is ontologically misguided. It is true that a new manner can only exist as a redundancy in relation to a preceding manner and for this reason can never completely cut itself loose it. But what is special about mannerism, is that it renders style and manneredness practically indistinct. In this respect, the problem of mannerism is not the problem of lateness with respect to an already perfected technique, but that of the conditions of the new. Rather
historical lateness, far from exhausting the question of the new in ever more unnatural and apparently superfluous repetitions, makes it all the more urgent.

2) It is also significant that Agamben does not distinguish between the history of art and the history of psychiatry. For Agamben, mannerism is both a pathological condition of the subject and a form of mastery of its correlative object. In psychiatric terms, it is the mode of presence of a soul who is out of tune with his body. In artistic terms, it is the mode of presence of the master whose skill is rooted in his power of withholding from action and whose virtuosity results from the ongoing self-problematization within the experience of this power. By taking together the two senses of mannerism Agamben repeats the great cliché of the infamous figure of the artist as ‘born under Saturn.’ Yet here again Deleuze teaches us to be wary of the classical reflex to see art as a sublimation of the tensions that accompany normal productive life, i.e. the work of art as some consoling and palliative fantasy for infantile souls incapable of coping with reality. Does Agamben, by failing to separate the work and its author, not subordinate the mannerist contractions to the contemplation of a general (human) interiority that transcends the work? Does the striking visibility and recognizability of mannerisms not reduce the mannered subject to a psychological problem to be dealt with precisely by the normalizing apparatus of discipline and control that it seeks to resist?
Friday 9:15-11:30 – Room 115
Aesthetics and Autobiography in Cavell
Jochen Schuff (Goethe University Frankfurt am Main)

Though there are some well-known examples of autobiographical storytelling in aesthetic theories, Stanley Cavell is one of very few authors to systematically reflect on the connection between biographical events and experiences and their respective theories. His own method of blending autobiography and philosophy amounts to questioning the alleged neutrality of theory as well as the difference between philosophy and literature. In my view, Cavell's position is particularly interesting when it comes to aesthetics. In my presentation I will show how, in merging philosophy and criticism, Cavell points to a fuller picture of how art matters. By reviewing Cavell's ideas, I will elaborate on the relation between personal involvement, theory and the importance of art.

The Aesthetic Judgment “This is Art” in Cavell, de Duve, and Kant
Pioter Shmugliakov (Freie Universität Berlin)

Before the rise of the avant-garde movements of the 20th century, the principal question vis-à-vis an artwork was the evaluative one: "Is it a good work of art?" or, in a manner in which it was most commonly posed, "Is this piece of art beautiful?" The fact that this is art that is being judged, on the other hand, was trivially given – neither argued for, nor disputed. In Kantian terms, the judgment that recognizes an object as a work of art was a determinate judgment, while the one judging the piece as beautiful was an aesthetic one. The former was subsuming an entity under an empirical concept; the latter was claiming universal agreement on the non-conceptual basis of a subjective feeling. In the 20th century, however, the situation within the artworld became increasingly defined by the fact that the very belonging of certain objects to the category of art turned to be a matter of controversy. Confusion regarding the real status of objects that claim to be art, but which by traditional standards look as no more than a hoax or provocation became a disturbing routine of the museum-goer. In this paper I explore a particular philosophical strategy of tackling the problem, which consists in reinterpretation of the judgment “This is art” as an aesthetic, rather than a determinate judgment. The paper is dedicated to a comparative analysis of the positions of Stanley Cavell (1969; 1979) and Thierry de Duve (1996) which share the following double similarity: both (1) view the judgment "This is art" as an essential feature of the experience of art (rather than a preamble to it), and (2) model this judgment on Kant's account of the judgment "This is beautiful." On the basis of an interpretation of several passages in the third Critique, I will argue that Cavell's manner of pursuing this strategy is faithful to the major thrust of the Kantian aesthetic doctrine, whereas de Duve's marks a serious departure from it.
Emergence of the biomimetic interactive architectural entity. For millennia, the buildings created by human architects largely displayed traits of solidity, immobility, passivity, limited interactivity, and reliance on fairly simple geometrical shapes to constitute their core structure. As a result, the field of architectural aesthetics could take for granted the fact that a “building” was such a motionless, non-interactive shell; the philosophical frameworks developed to analyze buildings thus had very little in common with those used to analyze, say, living organisms or moral agents.

This paper begins by showing how such historical assumptions are now being undermined through the development of technologies that enable the creation of types of buildings that would previously have been impossible. For example:

- Augmented reality technologies increasingly allow buildings to create perceived and experienced structures that differ wildly from the buildings’ actual physical components.
- Developments in ambient intelligence and social robotics allow a building to create intimately interactive spaces that interpret their occupants’ moods and unspoken thoughts and respond through physical changes, speech, and other social behaviors.
- AI-guided parametric design (championed by figures like Zaha Hadid and Patrik Schumacher) is enabling the creation of highly complex, asymmetrical, curvilinear, resilient, biomimetic architectural forms that no human mind could design.

The building of the dawning future is more than just a “building”: it is a biomimetic, interactive architectural entity that is richly “biomimetic” not simply because of its curvilinear surface but because of its dynamism, agency, and role as an intelligent, autonomous social actor. Depending on its AI, such a building may even constitute a “person” capable of meaningful social relationships. In the language of Herbrechter’s critical posthumanism, such buildings are posthuman agents that create new types of posthumanized architectural spaces.

The need for new conceptual frameworks. The emergence of such architectural entities requires the development of new conceptual frameworks for investigating them from the perspective of philosophical aesthetics. One popular paradigm employed to analyze parametrically designed architecture is that of Deleuze’s fold, which Deleuze illustrated in Le Pli: Leibnitz et le Baroque (1988) through his allegory of the “Baroque house.” The Deleuzian fold is active, curvilinear, and mediating; it thus possesses some properties common to biomimetic, parametrically designed buildings. However, we argue that Deleuze’s Baroque house allegory fails to capture the agency, dynamism, mutability, and interactivity of the emerging architectural entities described here; the need thus remains for new frameworks to describe them. We propose one such approach that draws on elements of Ingarden’s later thought that have been largely overlooked within the field of aesthetics.

The unknown Ingarden. The Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) is known in the field of architectural aesthetics primarily for the “classical” phenomenological frameworks that he developed in the 1920s and 1930s, which analyze the stratification of the architectural object (i.e., the “building”) as a work of art, the ontological status of the building as a purely intentional object, and the role of concretization in aesthetic experience. Today - after a century of developments in aesthetics - the ontological suppositions
of those frameworks are seen as increasingly antiquated, and it is often presumed that Ingarden has little to offer for the analysis of posthumanized architectural entities.

In this paper, however, it is argued that the opposite is true, as the conventional view of Ingarden overlooks innovative strains of thought (a sort of “Ingarden 2.0”) that arose in his later years, as he explored ongoing scientific and technological advances. For example, we show how Ingarden foresaw future VR technologies, analyzed what today would be called “computational aesthetics,” and made one of his last (unfinished) projects the reworking of his earlier writings to account for new discoveries in neuroscience. Moreover, his work in systems theory proved so influential that he is considered a pioneering figure of Polish cybernetics.

Ingarden died before applying his mature systems theory (and especially, his model of the “relatively isolated system”) to aesthetics; as a result, it has been largely ignored by later aestheticians. However, we argue that it is not only possible to formulate a “systems-theoretical aesthetics” grounded in Ingarden’s systems theory, but that it offers a valuable tool for analyzing emerging biomimetic, interactive architectural entities.

**Developing an Ingardenian systems-theoretical architectural aesthetics.** As the foundation for its proposed systems-theoretical aesthetics, this paper analyzes Ingarden’s concept of the “relatively isolated system” by tracing its development over decades and providing translations of some passages previously available only in Polish. Sources analyzed include:

1. Ingarden’s account of the membranes that partially isolate bodily organs from one another, which is presented in *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego* (1937).

2. Ingarden’s model of a living organism as an enduring core surrounded by outer layers that arise and are destroyed throughout one’s life, as presented in *Spór o istnienie świata*, vol. 1 (1941).

3. Ingarden’s model of the “partially isolated system” and the role played by semipermeable boundaries that regulate an object’s engagement with its environment, as described in a plan (1945-46) for *Spór o istnienie świata*, vol. 3. This concept was influenced by Ingarden’s reading of Bertalanffy’s *Theoretische Biologie*.

4. Ingarden’s concept of the “relatively closed system,” found in preliminary notes (1950-54) for *Spór o istnienie świata*, vol. 3.


Drawing on the multifaceted concept of space found in Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Heideggerian architectural phenomenology, we demonstrate how a systems-theoretical aesthetics grounded in Ingarden’s concept of the relatively isolated system identifies the emerging biomimetic, interactive architectural entity as a system that *creates*, *encompasses*, *animates*, and *regulates* a nexus of overlapping three-dimensional, experiential, informational, technological, social, and ecological spaces. Such an approach categorizes, compares, and evaluates architectural entities according to the nature of their semipermeable membranes and their openings.

In a manner consonant with contemporary environmental aesthetics, this approach locates a building’s aesthetic properties in the “porousness” of its external and internal physical, informational, and social boundaries - which include not only structures like walls, windows, and stairwells but also the topologies of Wi-Fi networks; information security mechanisms; air circulation patterns; elements that regulate colonization of the space by plant or animal species; social networks; enforced social conventions; and the relation-
ships between a building’s human occupants and the artificial agents that enliven it. The definition and exploration of this approach represents this paper’s central achievement.

Assessment of this approach. The paper concludes by discussing strengths and weaknesses of this proposed approach. It is argued that it can prove useful for analyzing the design and aesthetic experience of buildings transformed through the incorporation of artificial agency and biomimetic dynamics.

Significance of this article. It is hoped that this paper can contribute to aesthetic discourse in several ways. First, it shows how diverse technologies are combining to create biomimetic, interactive, posthumanized architectural entities that differ qualitatively from buildings of earlier ages. Second, it formulates an Ingardenian systems-theoretical aesthetics whose foundations in emergentist theoretical biology render it at least as suitable for describing such entities as paradigms like the Deleuzian fold. Finally, the text presents a historical-textual analysis of aspects of Ingarden’s thought that are little known within philosophical aesthetics, thereby shedding new light on a leading 20th-century aesthetician.

Reading Pamuk’s The Museum of Innocence: A Challenge to Ingarden’s Ontology of Fiction.

Christina Travanini (Fondazioni Pini)

In my talk, I intend to discuss how Orhan Pamuk’s book, The Museum of Innocence, which is also a real museum in Istanbul, sets a challenge to Roman Ingarden’s ontology of fiction. According to Ingarden, fictional characters are necessarily “incomplete” objects; since they are not part of the real world, but exist only in a “quasi-real” dimension, they cannot be determined in every possible way. Fictional characters have blanks or “places of indeterminacy”, that need to be explicitly completed, or “filled out” by the reader. - For instance, if it is never said that the character is black or white, the reader is required to make a (default) assumption - sometimes with significant consequences.

In my presentation I shall claim that Pamuk’s project aims at filling out this incompleteness without the reader’s intervention, thus challenging Ingarden’s theory. In other words, are Pamuk’s characters “fictional” and “complete” at the same time?
Contemporary analytic aesthetics has turned its attention to almost all artforms but seems to have left aside poetry. From being the paragon of the arts in 18th and 19th century German philosophy, as in Baumgarten, Kant, or Hegel for instance, poetry in the contemporary world seems to have lost most, if not all, of its philosophical force. Even Plato, who is famous for being rather unkind to poetry, nevertheless admits that poetry has a particular force, one he is afraid of, and his unkindness reveals his fear of poetry rather than indifference towards it. Contemporary aesthetics has somehow avoided poetry, neither afraid of nor interested in it, but only indifferent to its effects and powers. How can one explain such a change in attitude towards poetry? One of the main reasons for such a shift can be found in one of the founding aspects of analytic philosophy: the ‘linguistic turn’. If, following this turn, philosophy is a matter of language and solving problems of language, poetry seems to be of no help at all, quite to the contrary, and this both to ‘ideal language philosophy’ and ‘ordinary language philosophy’. If poetry is a problem for the former, as it presents a form of language which cannot be translated into formal logic, and therefore not be given any truth-value, the latter also shows no interest in it, as Austin suggests that performative utterances in a poem, are ‘in a peculiar way hollow or void’. Failure for philosophy of language to give a substantial account of the language of poetry might have contaminated the realm of aesthetics and incited philosophers to look at other artforms than poetry, more easily approachable with these new philosophical tools. The great interest in literature and the problem of truth in fiction can be seen as a consequence of the ‘linguistic turn’: philosophers have started looking into aesthetic problems for which philosophy of language could be of use, rather than artforms which are problematic to philosophy of language. Inasmuch as Austin deprives poetry from any performative force, contemporary aesthetics strips poetry from its philosophical force.

If this schematic picture is valid for analytic aesthetics, one might think poetry fares better on the other side of the so-called ‘analytic-continental’ divide. At first glance, continental philosophers seem to pursue the 19th century praise of poetry. Heidegger is a prime example of that as he considers poetry almost on par with philosophy, and the most philosophical of all artforms. If one looks further, however, there also seems to be some kind of a shift in attitude towards poetry in continental philosophy. Although it is not a mark of indifference towards poetry, Sartre’s theory of literature seems to operate a similar shift from poetry to literature (and one can understand here, as with analytic philosophy, ‘the novel’). Indeed, Sartre defines literature in terms of political commitment and denies any commitment to poetry. Very schematically: the greatness of literature is proportional to its political force and poetry is denied any such force. This does not mean that Sartre denies any greatness to poetry, but one which might be of another kind, and certainly not of help to any concern in the actual world. Following Sartre, Rancière is primarily concerned with literature or fiction rather than poetry. If poetry still has a linguistic force in continental aesthetics, it seems deprived from any political force, and by that of any force of influence in the everyday world.

One of the possible reasons for such a shift is an inversion of value between literature and poetry. Whereas poetry was literature (or the highest literary form) for 18th and 19th century philosophers (and in this sense Heidegger inherits from this background and pursues a romantic tradition), the 20th century marks the rise of the novel. When one thinks of literature nowadays, the first thing to come to mind is probably more often a novel than a poem. In that sense, philosophy of poetry can be considered a subcategory of philosophy of literature rather than the opposite. However, even if there were such a shift, it would not explain the disdain towards poetry and why philosophers have stripped it from its for-
ce. In my paper, I therefore aim at reinstating the force of poetry by showing that it has a linguistic, philosophical, and even political force (and this as much as the novel). Against the idea that literature (as novel) can teach us facts about the world, I argue that literature (as poetry) teaches us a different way of seeing the world and that its force resides precisely in its capacity to bring us (or force us, perhaps) to see things differently. As Wittgenstein puts it: ‘The work of art compels us to see it in the right perspective’. More than seeing the work of art itself in the right perspective, it compels us to see the world in the right perspective, that is a perspective which makes sense.

To explore the force(s) of poetry, my paper is divided in three parts. First, I contest views which consider poetry forceless, be it linguistically or politically, by discussing Austin’s and Sartre’s views. Second, I explore the concept of force in the realm of art—focusing on Nietzsche’s philosophy and Menke’s Kraft der Kunst—and the relations between linguistic, artistic, and political forces. Third, I explore how the transformative force of poetry can be considered political by turning to Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language and Meschonnic’s conception of poetry according to which the poem does something to language and to the subject. Poetry is not only doing something with language, by also doing something to language. To rephrase Austin’s famous book, and thus reverse his evaluation of poetry, poetry might not reveal us How to Do Things with Words, but how to do things to words. The force of poetry is not primarily political, but it becomes political insofar as its force modifies language and, through this modification of language, our ways of being in the world.

Understanding: the Cognitive Value of Literature

Jeremy Page (Uppsala University)

When giving an account of the cognitive value of literature and reader learning three worries arise:

Given the lack of evidence and argument present in literature, can we:

(1) Assign a significant role to the literary work and its aesthetic features in the process of reader learning?
(2) Explain how engagement with the work leads to a genuine deepening of the reader’s understanding (as opposed to a mere conditioning of thought)?
And further,

(3) What justification do we have for allowing our understanding of a subject matter to be changed by an author through a literary work?

Noel Carroll (1998) has argued that the plausibility of arguments against literature having cognitive value on the basis of the above worries weakens once we realise that the primary cognitive value of our engagement with literature lies - not in its adding to a body of knowledge - but in the opportunity it provides for us to deepen our understanding of knowledge we already possess. This response mitigates the lack of evidence and argument in literature and eases worries relating to (3).

However, accounts such as Carroll’s are in danger of placing too much emphasis on the reader’s pre-existing knowledge and the reader’s own reflection; that is, they are in danger of marginalising the role of the work and its aesthetic features (1).

John Gibson (2009) responds to (1) by treating the work, and its aesthetic features, as the location of cognitive value: the work represents a demonstration of understanding regarding its subject matter. However, accounts of this nature need to provide an explanation of how it is that the reader genuinely learns from - rather than (2) merely passively witnessing or being conditioned by - the work.
The account of the cognitive value which I give draws on recent work on the nature of understanding by Alison Hills (2010, 2016, 2017), as well as Duncan Pritchard (2009) and Catherine Elgin (2009). (I do not comment on the relation between literary and cognitive value.) I follow Gibson in arguing that the work is an embodiment of the author’s understanding of the work’s subject matter. I use Hills’ characterisation of understanding why, and understanding of a domain, in order to articulate what in particular I mean by this.

One may have knowledge why $p$, and knowledge that $p$, without possessing understanding why $p$. For example, one can know $p$, and know why $p$, through trustworthy testimony and yet lack the ‘cognitive control’ – a kind of intellectual know-how - which Hills argues is the mark of understanding why (Hills 2017, 161-162). Thus knowledge is compatible with being unable to:

(i) follow explanations of why $p$
(ii) give explanations of why $p$
(iii) draw the conclusion that $p$ from the information that $q$ (where $q$ is the reason why $p$)
(iv) draw the conclusion that $p'$ from the information that $q'$ (where $p'$ and $q'$ are similar to but not identical with $p$ and $q$) (ibid.).

(i) to (iv) are some of the marks of understanding why. When one manifests them, one is exercising one’s understanding. When one forms an explanation of why $p$, one demonstrates their understanding of $p$ and the relations between $p$ and other states of affairs.

There would be something strained about thinking of the literary text as an explanation in this way. However, Hills notes that understanding why necessarily relates to another more general type of understanding. In order to have understanding why $p$ - where $p$ is a proposition in some domain - one must also have ‘at least to some extent a systematic grasp of the subject-matter’ more generally (Hills 2010, 196).

This enables us to see how a literary work can be seen as a demonstration of understanding: when an author sets out to write a literary work that involves some subject matter (love, self-deception, jealousy, etc.), they are involved in giving expression to their understanding of this subject matter. What ‘giving expression to their understanding of a subject matter’ involves here is composing a literary work in a way that represents the subject matter and the relations between various phenomena which constitute it. In a work of literary fiction understanding is demonstrated - not through an explanation - but instead through the presentation of the subject matter through narrative, plot, narrative style and the use of various aesthetic devices. In the paper, I will further articulate this view through discussion of Jane Austen’s Emma.

Through my discussion of Emma I will also respond to worries (1), (2) and (3) above. My responses can be summarized as follows.

In Emma, Austen demonstrates her understanding of the nature of the epistemically impoverishing effect which the tendency to perceive and comprehend social occurrences in line with one’s wishes can have. This is done through Austen’s masterful use of free indirect speech; which places the reader “behind the eyes” of Emma, and enables them to see how Emma’s fancies affect her comprehension of events. As David Davies (2018) argues, Austen allows the reader access both to the ‘fictional facts’ and Emma’s misreading of them, so that an appreciation of how Emma misreads events is enabled. In order to follow the plot, the reader must understand not only what Emma’s mistakes are and why they occur, but also how free indirect speech is used to embody and simulate these mistakes.
The attentive reader thus needs to be able to follow the demonstration of Austen’s understanding in the novel, where this involves being able to follow plot but also the use of various aesthetic devices. This process strengthens the readers understanding as they are doing something akin to “following an explanation” (which is, for Hill’s a mark of understanding). Further, this process directly involves active engagement with the work’s aesthetic features (1), e.g. the use of free indirect speech. This picture might, however, appear compatible with the reader merely having their understanding conditioned by the author’s presentation of the subject matter (2) and, what’s more, it does not answer the worry that we lack justification for allowing our understanding to be changed by the author (3).

I offer the following considerations to ease these worries:

i. The kind of cognitive value in question is not related to the reader taking on new knowledge, so the lack of the kind of arguments and evidence prevalent in paradigmatic modes of inquiry fails to be pressing.

ii. Reader engagement entails not merely passive following, and the conditioning of thought, but also critical appraisal of the narrative, the plot and the deployment of aesthetic devices as a means of presenting the subject matter. The critical reader will not simply accept the aptness of Austen’s use of free indirect speech as a means for presenting the subject matter, but will reflect on and be able to provide reasons why it is apt and how it accurately presents matters. This appraisal will be based on their prior knowledge and experience regarding the subject matter.

iii. Thus, understanding is not merely conditioned. Rather, the reader draws on their prior knowledge of the domain along with their nascent understanding, in order to appraise the aptness of the presentation and thus (implicitly) whether they are justified in changing their understanding in line with the author’s.

**Imagination, Possibilities and Aspects in Literary Fiction**

Salvador Rubio Marco (University of Murcia)

In his *La connaissance de l’écrivain* Jacques Bouveresse shares some relevant ideas with Martha Nussbaum and Cora Diamond about the role of creative imagination in the heart of both moral life and literary fiction.

Moral thinking cannot be reduced to a choice between pre-fixed and easily apprehended possibilities. “The important point is that, in this kind of situations, the possibilities are not something given at all” , and moral thinking does not necessarily consist of applying some principles or rules to the facts of a situation. Bouveresse quotes Cora Diamond: “The possibilities are not lying about on the surface of things. Seeing the possibilities in things is a matter of a kind of transforming perception of them. The possibilities yield themselves only as it were under pressure.” Bouveresse concludes: “And it is a feature that may also be applied, of course, to the possibilities which the literary works invite us to consider”.

Bouveresse thinks that it can help us to explain the relationship between stories told in the literary works (with the imaginative descriptions of the facts implied in the situations they build) and actual moral life (and the life tout court). Martha Nussbaum thinks that novels and their style are an indispensable part of moral philosophy. But the reason why this is so is that novels are far from the style alleged (more or less) to be obligatory in philosophy. “The very qualities that make the novels so unlike dogmatic abstract treatises are, for us, the source of their philosophical interest.”
Cora Diamond starts from the example of Socrates’s famous discourse in Plato’s Crito where Socrates utilizes the personification of laws in order to help his friend Crito understand why he avoids escaping from prison to save his life. The imaginative description by Socrates is, after Bouveresse and Diamond, a way of exercising his moral creativity and “It is as much a significant moral doing as is his choosing to stay rather than to escape, or, rather, it in fact goes to any full characterization of what Socrates is doing in staying: the story of his death includes the imaginative understanding of the death by his friends, the understanding to which they are led by his remarkable redescription of the situation.”

The aim of my text it to explain what “imagination” and “possibilities” mean in that context. On the one hand, we intend to explain how “possibilities” work in novels concerning both the task of the writer and the task of the reader. While on the other hand, we aim to explain how “possibilities” work in moral life and, consequently, how novels may have some influence on our actual moral life.

Sharing Cora Diamond’s idea that “seeing the possibilities in things is a matter of a kind of transforming perception of them”, I will approach from a theory of aspects in order to underline the perceptive character of that seeing. My hypothesis, from that theoretical angle, is that what we accede to through the imaginative openness to “possibilities” is a particular aspect of things. If my hypothesis is true, vice versa it may teach us something relevant about the working of aspects, in benefit of a philosophical theory of aspects, at least in the domain of aesthetic understanding. Of course, we can find here a first source of philosophical interest.

I will propose some examples sharing Martha Nussbaum’s idea that the literary style of novels is not a dispensable or secondary element in order to provide the perceptive result of understanding a moral situation. These examples (mainly from Henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady) are intended to demonstrate how literary features intervene relevantly in building the literary device which affords the aesthetic-moral experience. And, if Martha Nussbaum’s thesis is right, far from a literary technical matter, we have here a second source of nonetheless genuine philosophical interest.

Nevertheless, there are, in my opinion, some dangers to avoid in carrying out this research. One of them (that I often call “hypothesism”) lies in conceiving both the moral and the aesthetic experiences in everyday life as having a constant and permanent launching of “possibilities” (in terms of hypotheses to be confirmed or not). The awareness of the central role played by hypotheses in both domains has to be compatible with the assumption that such a constant launching of hypotheses would actually make both moral and aesthetic experiences, impossible to carry out.

Henry James’s novels offer an inexhaustible range of examples that have seduced and helped theorists such as Bouveresse, Diamond or Nussbaum. Even I am convinced that they still maintain all their charm and richness today.
Some Kantian Resonances to the Reconciliation of Aesthetic Autonomy and Moral Relevance in the Context of Classical Chinese Art

Xiaoyan Hu (University of Liverpool)

For classical Chinese artists or appreciators, the reconciliation of artistic autonomy and moral cultivation through art is achieved through artistic practice or appreciation which requires the mind to be in accord with the Dao. In this paper, I attempt to examine the efficacy of projecting Kant’s and Schiller’s somewhat modified Kantian philosophy of aesthetic autonomy and the moral relevance of art into a classical Chinese context. I suggest that although classical texts on painting do not supply a systematic analysis of these issues, it is worth noting the parallels and differences between the Chinese aesthetic tradition and Kantian ideas regarding them. Reflection on the parallels and differences helps to demystify classical Chinese aesthetics, increase appreciation of problems of earlier Chinese scholars’ adoption of Kantian ideas in their writings on the Chinese aesthetic tradition, and also to illuminate some limitations in Kantian aesthetics.

Firstly, regarding the free play of the faculties of the mind, whilst the classical Chinese do not have as sophisticated and systematic an analysis as Kant, classical Chinese texts on painting imply a correspondence with Kant in terms of stressing the free and harmonious working of the mind in artistic practice and appreciation, although there are essential differences between their philosophical occupations. Although the untrammelled shen (spirit) of the classical Chinese artist corresponds to Kant’s notion of spirit as the animating principle of genius (the union of imagination and understanding), in the classical Chinese context the spirit of the artist is required to respond to the spirit of the object depicted. Considering the notion of yun (consonance or harmony) in classical Chinese painting, one might also draw an analogy between the harmonious and free play of cognitive faculties behind yun and Kant’s notion of the free play of imagination and understanding. However, yun is not only more inter-subjective than Kant’s more intra-subjective notion, but also refers to the harmonious sympathetic resonance between subject and object, and this point is absent in Kant’s philosophy. Due to the pursuit of qiyunshengdong (spirit consonance engendering a sense of life), the marked distinctiveness of classical Chinese aesthetics lies in the double-focus on subject and object, while Kant’s aesthetic focus is the subject, which is consistent with his overall transcendental philosophical system.

Secondly, Kant clearly distinguishes aesthetic freedom and moral freedom, while the Kantian dualism cannot be found in the classical Chinese context where artists and audiences engage in a detached mental state in accord with the Dao penetrating everything. On the one hand, the purification of the mind prepared by Daoist or Chan Buddhist meditation and exercised in aesthetic spontaneity explains aesthetic autonomy, and this detached mental freedom experienced by classical Chinese artists in artistic practice is compatible with Kant’s aesthetic freedom. On the other hand, although according to Confucian ethics moral sentiments and characters are conditioned by the sincere will as analogous to Kantian good will, the Confucian sincerity involved in bringing the artist’s mind to be in accord with the Dao guarantees the moral dimension of spiritual affinity between the artist, object, audience and work. There is a convergence of aesthetic freedom and moral freedom united by the pursuit of the mind being in accord with the Dao in the classical Chinese context, since the moment of enjoying aesthetic freedom in an aesthetic experience seems to be that of simultaneously realising or cultivating moral freedom. Schiller’s view of internalised inclination as conforming to moral duty and cultivated and habitualised through art appears to show a parallel with the classical Chinese view of moral sentiments or virtues that are conditioned by sincere will and may be fulfilled involuntarily but actually willed voluntarily through art. However, unlike Schiller’s seeking unity within dualism, the moral sentiment or inclination is exercised through aesthetic contemplation in the
An Aesthetics of the Earth. Reframing Relational Aesthetics considering Critical Ecologies

Ines Kleesattel (Zurich University of the Arts) and Christoph Brunner (Leuphana University of Lüneburg)

This paper undertakes a reframing of Nicolas Bourriaud’s much discussed concept of Relational Aesthetics from a new materialist perspective, particularly regarding the ecological and (post-)colonial entanglements of worldly relations, experiences, and bodies. Focusing on artistic research practices that might be labeled «relational» in the complex and decolonial sense of Édouard Glissant’s Poetics of Relation, Isabelle Stengers’ Cosmopolitics and Donna Haraway’s SF* the authors argue for a Worldly Relational Aesthetics that is speculatively productive as well as critically situated - and that is thereby of special importance for our present age. Critically rerouting Bourriaud’s exclusively Western narrative (artistically as much as philosophically) through a post-colonial perspective of critical ecologies, the
paper’s aim is to reposition relational aesthetics as a relevant concept – and mode of thought – for a geopolitical aesthetics.

Given the social and ecological crises on a global scale, from resurgent nationalisms to species extinction and global warming, it is of vital importance to attach more value to an awareness of comprehensive, but always specific entanglements, that is, their geopolitical and cultural moorings as well as their translocal enmeshments. Our thesis is that certain artistic research practices activate an «aesthetics of the earth» (Glissant) that opens up an experiential layer of translocal relationality through the sensuous. Such a relationality is less defined by connections of preexisting entities but rather operates through «ecologies of practices» (Stengers) – as an always instable mode of articulation where relations have to be considered as real as the things related. Accordingly, the paper proposes a relation-specific approach rather than a mere site- or medium-specific take on particular artworks. Also it stresses the crucial role of aesthetic dissens (Rancière) within relational artistic research – as Glissant domination critically claims the aesthetics of the earth being an «aesthetic of rupture and connection».

The paper departs from a re-reading of Bourriaud’s most popular and most criticized case example - Tiravanijas Free (1992), showing how not only communality but also an intercultural dissensuality shapes the situational assemblage of intersubjective and more-than-human relations. Regarding more recent projects of critical artistic research the paper takes a closer look at particular decolonial critiques that combine discourse, performative and material levels, foregrounding an immanent dissensuality moving through more-than-human and translocal relations: Artist like knowbotiq, Maria Thereza Alves or Amar Kanwar present us with concrete possibilities to grasp interrelations of a global scale, which are elusive, if not inconceivable by other means, as they are widely distributed in space, time and matter. On the basis of methodologically wide-ranging research with heterogeneous sources and collaborators their projects microhistorically but multiperspectively delve into the partial - while seeking articulation instead of representation - and allow thereby further reaching semio-material perceptions of more-than-human entanglements in critically materialistic, but anti-positivist ways. However, for this articulation to happen the presented artworks must encounter recipients being apt to get productively involved in becoming assemblages of more-than-propositional, (dis )sensual knowledges.

By closely examining artistic case examples we will argue against the backdrop of Glissant’s, Haraway’s, and Stengers’ theories of relation, how it is fruitful to turn toward relational artistic research in search for «a more adequate, richer, better account of a world, in order to live in it well and in critical, reflexive relation to our own as well as others’ practices of domination» (Haraway). Considering artistic research’s potential to make models for a relational epistemology not only questions Kantian disciplinary separations of knowledge, aesthetics, and ethics, but helps distinguish critical fabulations from destructive post-truth phantasms - which are neither materialistic nor relational.

The post-colonial situatedness of the specific relations brought forward by such artistic research practices is not without impact on theorizing geopolitical aesthetics. Being relation-specific and cautious of colonialization in discussing such artistic examples requires us (as recipients and theorists) to think not so much about them but rather in resonance with them. Therefore the paper suggests to understand a Worldly Relational Aesthetics not only as a theoretical concept but pre-emenently as a «doing aesthetic theory»; a mode of problematizing that troubles and disrupts Western philosophical habits.

(* Haraway’s SF signifies «Science Fiction, Speculative Fabulation, String Figures, Speculative Feminism, Science Fact, so far».)
The Irrational and Anti-Social Character of Aesthetic Subversion

Sabrina Muchová (Charles University)

My concern in this paper is the question of the subversive potential of the aesthetic experience of art, as discussed in recent German critical theory, namely in the works of Albrecht Wellmer and Christoph Menke. Both begin their investigations of the topic in the context of the aesthetic theory of Theodor W. Adorno, more precisely with the idea of art’s opposition to the social order. Wellmer and Menke turn to the analysis of the aesthetic experience of art and emphasize the role of the recipient or rather the effect art has on its recipient. I argue that a common feature of their respective aesthetics is the stress on the anti-social and irrational character of the aesthetic experience of art, to which I refer as aesthetic subversion. This term implies the critical, undermining ability of the aesthetic experience of art, achieved by its irrational and anti-social aspects. First, I will summarize Wellmer’s approach to the aesthetic subversion and then I will turn to Menke’s conception. In both cases it is necessary to explain in what sense the authors understand the irrationality and anti-social character of the aesthetic. In the final part of the paper I will discuss what I consider to be the main advantages of Wellmer’s and Menke’s approaches, as well as the possible blind spot of their conceptions.

In both Wellmer’s and Menke’s works an assumption can be found according to which there is a qualitative difference between the aesthetic realm and the rational-social world. The rational and the social are closely related according to both authors, and they together form their idea of the social order of our modern societies, including the shortcomings of such an order. The qualitative difference of the aesthetic determines the subversive potential of the aesthetic experience of art, as well as its irrational and anti-social character. For both authors is the unique quality of the aesthetic tied with its opposition towards the prevailing social structure. At the same time they both subscribe to the idea that the subversive character of the aesthetic experience of art is crucial for understanding ourselves, others and society. In this sense art gains its social significance. A question then arises: what does it mean to ascribe social significance to a phenomenon defined by its anti-social, irrational character?

Albrecht Wellmer was one of the prominent figures of the post-Adornian German critical theory. Even thought he never developed a systematic account of aesthetics, he dedicated several studies to the topic and generally assigned a great significance to the aesthetic experience of art. In Wellmer’s view, art has an ability to express those features of reality, which would otherwise, that is in the rational-social order, remain suppressed and hidden, and the aesthetic experience enables us to perceive them. According to Wellmer, art operates through a non-violent, aesthetic synthesis, and open forms, which allows it to express elements which are diverse, ephemeral, marginalized and oppressed. Wellmer suggests there is a corresponding capability of subjects, who are able to perceive those elements during the aesthetic experience of art. Such an experience of art is then irrational and anti-social because it articulates those elements of reality, which are excluded by rationality and social order. As such, it also opposes and undermines the rational-social structure of our understanding of reality, as well as ourselves and others. Wellmer believes such experience to be crucial in the ongoing process of democratization, i.e. movement towards society based on non-violent communication, freedom and equal rights for all.

Christoph Menke is a contemporary German philosopher and aesthetician, elaborating on the tradition of German critical theory. The question of subversive potential and antagonism of the aesthetic experience of art towards rationality and social order is a recurrent theme of Menke’s books and essays on aesthetics. Menke understands the aesthetic experience of art as an irresolvable force of disruption, disclosing the irrational, anti-social nature of human beings. This basically means that the aesthetic experience of art exceeds...
the space of rational cognition, social practices and norms, and in contrast to them does not follow any rules or goals, but a principle of play. This may sound as a traditional account of the aesthetic experience of art, yet Menke’s approach is far more radical. According to Menke is the aesthetic force uncontrollable and ungraspable by rational powers or social practices; it is therefore irrational and anti-social. The aesthetic force is the principle of the aesthetic experience as well as of art. In the aesthetic experience of art is revealed a gap, or an abyss, between the anti-social, irrational forces and the rational, social subject, and by extension, a gap present also in our actions, judgments and community. There is no way of reconciling this gap; the aim of the aesthetic experience of art is on the contrary to disclose it and make us aware of it. Such an experience necessarily subverts our rational powers and social structures.

The aim of the paper is to spell out the implications of Wellmer’s and Menke’s notions of the aesthetic subversion for a modern society. Both authors argue for the (social) relevance of the irrational and anti-social aesthetic experience of art, but their opinions on the outcome of such an experience differ. Wellmer’s account faces the danger of becoming a theory of an aesthetic education towards the democratic humanity. Such conception would, however, have to explain how does the aesthetic experience of art always achieve the positive effect of strengthening tolerance, openness etc. What is more, it would threaten the aesthetic experience of art to eventually collapse into the strengthening of status quo. Wellmer himself does not consider the aesthetic experience of art to be the only agent in the process of democratization and its position among the others has to be further explained. Menke, on the other hand, avoids those problems by regarding the aesthetic experience of art as a radical subversive force, standing out of any social processes. Yet, this also forms the weak point of Menke’s account. For he only reluctantly admits that the subversive aesthetic experience has a transformative effect on our understanding of the rational-social order, but never explains in what exactly this transformation consists. Menke reject the idea of the aesthetic experience of art as a kind of social critique, nevertheless his take on the aesthetic subversion has a social effect, at least in letting the outlines of the social and the rational emerge.
To Be a Bat: Can Art Objectify the Subjective?

Ronald Shusterman (Université de Saint-Etienne)

There have been many attempts to connect art to cognition, and many arguments emphasising the way visual images seem to capture the real. One of the most radical formulations of this position can be found in the work of Barbara Maria Stafford. In Echo Objects: The Cognitive Work of Images (2007), she states quite clearly that the visual image transmits knowledge and understanding that go way beyond our daily perception. In one striking passage, she claims that we can perceive in certain geometrical shapes the total history not only of our species but of cosmology as well:

Upward or downward-inclined lines, upright or inverted isosceles triangles, circles, and squares schematize the sublimated violent tale of the formation of the solar system and suppressed recollection of the battle-to-the-death for the survival of the fittest.

This kind of affirmation of the objectivity of images goes hand in hand with a fair dose of determinism. Stafford’s approach belongs to a family of theories that situate art as the product of some mental process pre-programmed by our neurological structures and/or by natural selection. Other theorists that come to mind here include Denis Dutton and Ellen Dissayanake. But if this kind of determinism is explicitly acknowledged and accepted by these theorists, many contemporary artists also vaguely invoke similar ideas without being aware of their implications. My goal here will be to examine the way art may claim to capture, represent, and indeed transmit subjectivity. If it can be shown to do so, then the claims about the cognitive dimension of art will appear to be fully justified.

Ideally, one would have to spend a good deal of time defining the notions of cognition and objectivity - notions that have been attacked or redefined by poststructuralism, pragmatism, and other philosophies. The continued validity of the notion has recently been defended in a pleasant little study published by Stephen Gaukroger. So perhaps I can leave these general points more or less unargued here. But I would like to add that my approach is deeply indebted to Bertrand Russell’s classic distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance.

It is knowledge by acquaintance that is at the heart of subjectivity, and to answer the question raised by the title of this paper, I will examine the potentialities and the limits of works of art that attempt to show us “what it is like” to experience something - works that strive to objectify the subjective. Can art really capture all of the depth of our affects and our qualia? Is it capable not only of shaping our subjectivity but of transmitting to us the subjectivity of the artist? This was the question raised by T.S. Eliot in 1921 when he formulated his theory of the objective correlative:

The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an “objective correlative”; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.

We can note that this theory of the objective correlative is not far from James Joyce’s notion of “epiphany” - that moment of perception or intuition where a total vision or understanding becomes visible in some situation, object or event. And to go from the sublime to the ridiculous (or to what may seem so to some), one could easily argue that Tracey Emin’s My Bed (1998) is quite clearly the objective correlative of her inner life. Yet it still remains to be seen whether or not Eliot’s objective correlatives or Joyce’s epiphanies can be
our own. If an artist can indeed externalise her inner life and thus objectify her subjectivity, can she really manage to transmit it to us?

The allusion to the philosophy of Thomas Nagel in the title of this paper suggests that my answer to this question will be largely negative. In “What is it like to be a Bat”, Nagel imagined an attempt to transfer subjectivity from one species to another only to conclude that such a transfer remains impossible: we cannot know what it is like to be a bat. Nagel’s article will provide the framework of this paper, but since I am interested here in aesthetics and contemporary art, I would like first to examine briefly how certain artists imagine such radical alterity, how they attempt to represent or embody a transfer of subjectivity between species.

At the same time, it might be useful to consider a possible typology of three ways in which a visual work of art might provide something called “objective knowledge” or might “objectify” to some extent the experience of the spectator:

1. Objectivity via causality. Here the visual object is in some way a trace, an “imprint” of reality; it is produced by some causal process and is thus “objective” in that sense.
2. Objectivity of percepts. Here the visual object necessarily produces and determines certain percepts. In such a case, the spectator cannot avoid experiencing the sensations produced by the work.
3. Objectivity via propositional content. In this case, the figurative or narrative work of art yields an objectivity that is guaranteed by other cognitive channels. Works of art that involve recognition and/or verisimilitude are based on this phenomenon.

Since I am especially interested in qualia, in my paper I intend to deal principally with the second category (objectivity via the determination of percepts).

Understanding what is at stake here may help us explain the motives behind some of these artistic projects; it may also help us avoid some philosophical confusions. It seems relatively clear that the whole objectivity/subjectivity issue is a consequence of that vast debate known as the mind/body problem. Our inability to transmit, even in the most accomplished works of art, the full wealth of our qualia is a consequence of the dualism of mind and body. One way out of the dualism is to simply deny that an inner life exists; to claim that there is no subjectivity or that there is no point talking about it. This is, in part, the strategy of Rosalind Krauss in an essay on the work of Robert Morris. Morris seems to evoke the question in a number of ironical and provocative pieces dating back to the 1960's. In her article, Krauss uses Morris to denounce the unwarranted dualism that she sees at the heart of Nagel’s approach.

In my conclusion I argue that Krauss is unfair to Nagel and that she probably misreads A.J. Ayer as well. But we still need to explain why artists attempt to transmit their subjectivity via these immersive works. There is, of course, an ethical or metaethical dimension to this as well, since artists like Olafur Eliasson are explicitly claiming that such spatial and perceptual experimentation can make us better citizens of the planet. One can be sceptical about such utopian claims, but the fact that there is neither a view from nowhere nor a view from everywhere won’t stop artists from dreaming.

**Relational Aesthetics and Phenomenologies of Otherness**

Fabrice Métails (Aix Marseille University)
In this contribution, I will address the topic of the relationship between art and embodiment by focusing on the peculiar experience of the encounter with the other. In particular, I will attempt to show that some artistic works mobilize, as their main aesthetical drive, a specific sensitivity/sensibility related to the kind of affects felt by a subject when they encounter the other as other. I believe that we could use both cognitive sciences (the enactive approach) and phenomenology of the relationship to the other to provide an explanation (or at least an accurate description) of the experiential and embodied substrate of relational aesthetics, a substrate which until now has not been brought to light.

In 1998, Nicolas Bourriaud thematized the issue of an "art taking as its theoretical horizon the realm of human interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an independent and private symbolic space" (Bourriaud 1998). From this perspective, the aesthetic experience is no longer a solitary experience but an experience of the relationship with others. Any work of art could be considered from this relational prism: as a catalyst and medium for social connection. But, in addition, at the end of the 20th century, at the time when Bourriaud wrote his essay, he identified a group of artists who were using the social relationship itself as the material of their creation. The essay states that this shift in the way we approach art works should be the occasion for a new articulation between art and society.

This essay in aesthetics therefore mainly situates its stakes at the sociological (sociology of the arts), or even political level: it is essentially a question of considering how art could contribute to the construction of social cohesion. However, the essay does not clearly explain the phenomenal foundations of such a new aesthetic. I want to promote the idea that the relational approach to aesthetics could be enriched by engaging in a dialogue with the sciences and philosophies of sensitive experience. In particular, in that the latter could shed some light on the embodied dimension of the social experience.

To do this, I will distinguish three intertwined dimensions of this kind of experience: first, the relationship as intersubjective, or as the encounter of the alter ego in the process of empathy (einfühlung), as thematized in Husserl's pioneering research, and many other works afterwards; second, the emergence of an essentially collective dimension of meaning in what the advocates of the enactive approach to social cognition call Participatory Sense-Making; and third, the challenge of a radical otherness revealed through the face of the other as described in Emmanuel Levinas' phenomenology/ethics.

The most classical conception of the social relationship in the sciences and philosophies of lived experience is intersubjectivity. Before moving towards alternative conceptions of the social relationship that leave more room for the singularity and otherness of the other person, I will first argue that this classical conception of the social relation relies on an ideal of interchangeability, sameness and universality. Although Husserl's thoughts regarding how the subject accesses the experience of the other have been subject to many meanders -from the scheme of empathy developed in his Cartesian Meditations to the emphasis on the notion of flesh in Ideas II- it appears that the central pattern in his approach of social experience is commonality. Husserl thinks intersubjectivity as relations among a plurality of subjects. Each subject identifies in the other the similarities of a common structure. In empathy, it is only by recognizing in the shapes of the body of the other some similarities with mine that I can access -indirectly- their experience. Likewise, it is again an ideal of commonality that Merleau-Ponty pursues (reformulating and radicalizing Husserl's views) with his notion of interpersonal flesh. Indeed, the main idea behind this concept is a universal sharedness of the perceptive experience. Thus, I argue that as long as the aesthetics of the relationship is considered only on the basis of an Husserlian or Merleau-Pontian approach of intersubjectivity, it would remain subject to a universalist conception of sociality, that would tend to reduce and obliterate the singularity and otherness of the other person.
It seems that other descriptive schemes may reflect more appropriately the aesthetics at work in some contemporary practices. Based on the analysis of Thomas Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument, I will show how the concept of Participatory Sense-Making—an enactive approach to social cognition—provides a new explanatory framework for understanding the aesthetics of the relationship. In this approach, the sensory-motor dynamics of cognitive agents entangle to one another in some kind of dance, a dance that is not directed by any individual agent but is the product of the interaction. The dynamics of participatory sense-making emerges from the mutual attachment of individual enactive dynamics: this social dynamic, on the one hand, acquires autonomy with regard to the individual dynamics that support it; and, on the other hand, in return, conditions them back. In the Gramsci Monument, Thomas Hirschhorn makes an art work out of this dynamic of emergence. I think Relational aesthetics is here illuminated in a new light thanks to this explanatory framework that reflects the transcendental character of sociality without reducing the singularity of the people who carries it.

Returning then, in a final stage of the contribution, to the strictly experiential and embodied dimension of the encounter, I want to initiate a dialogue between the relational aesthetics and the philosophy of the face of Emmanuel Levinas. Indeed, Levinas' phenomenology/ethics not only offer a groundbreaking description of the singularity of social experience: radically contrasting with any experience of constitution, the challenge of the face is described as the questioning by the other of the spontaneity of the very powers of constitution. But, in addition, the philosopher details the incarnate, sensitive and material dimension of this contest: for Levinas, ethics is revealed as a command or a call weighing on the selfish enjoyment of being. I will take, for example, the case of Marina Abramović's performance Rhythm 0 to illustrate this particular sensitivity: the aesthetics of an ethical resistance within the realm of embodied possibilities.

In the end, I will have shown how the phenomenological study of the experiential and embodied substrate of the experience of the relationship to the other could contribute to highlight the sociological stakes of relational aesthetics. In particular, it will appear that this insight into the phenomenology of contemporary relational aesthetics is only possible if the classical scheme of intersubjectivity is overcome through approaches that do not reduce the uniqueness and otherness of the other person.

Documentaries, Docudramas, and Perceptual Beliefs

Enrico Terrone (Universitat de Barcelona)

Currie (1999) characterizes a documentary as a film about a subject that predominantly exploits photographic traces of that subject. In this characterization, “about” designates an intentional relationship (the filmmaker intended to make a film about that subject) whereas “of” designates a causal relationship (the photographic apparatus directly recorded that subject).

The main problem of Currie's account are those films that we usually treat as documentaries about their subjects and yet they do not predominantly exploits photographic traces of those subjects. This is what usually happens when a documentary is about an “out-of-reach” subject, that is, a subject that cannot be filmed, as for instance the extinction of dinosaurs. Furthermore, Currie’s account can hardly deal with those documentaries that heavily exploit reenactment, that is, the practice of resorting to filmed recreations of past events. In fact, a reenacted scene is about a certain action but is not a trace of that action; rather, it is a trace of the reenactment itself.

By characterizing documentaries in terms of assertions instead of traces, Carroll (1997) can effectively deal with out-of-reach subjects and reenactment. Specifically, he conce-
ives of a documentary as a film to whom the audience is meant to respond by taking the relevant propositional content as asserted. Thus, an alleged documentary about a out-of-reach subject, actually counts as a documentary because it mandates the audience to take propositions about that subject as asserted even though it does not exhibit traces of that subject. Likewise, Carroll’s account can effectively deal with reenactment because a reenacted scene mandates the audience to take propositions about a certain action as asserted even though it does not exhibit traces of that action, but only traces of its reenactment.

Still, according to Plantinga (2005), Carroll’s account finds it hard to deal with the “observational documentary mode”. While documentaries in the “expository mode” explicitly make assertions, often by means of a voice-over narrator, documentaries in the “observational mode” limit themselves to show us events going on. In order to solve this problem, Plantinga (2005, 111) proposes to conceive of documentaries as films that can make not only canonical assertions about their subjects but also meta-representational assertions about their communicating “some phenomenological aspect of the subject”. However, Plantinga’s account cannot properly differentiate documentaries from those fiction films, namely docudramas, that re-creates, by dramatic means, certain actually occurring events. Plantinga (2005, 114) himself acknowledges this when he writes that, in a documentary, “we might accept actors playing historical figures if we were convinced that quality research had figured into the historical accuracy of what the actors wore, said, and did” (2005, 114).

At the end of the day, Currie’s trace-based account seems to be the one that can effectively distinguish between docudramas and documentaries. Yet, this explanatory benefit arguably involves an unsustainable cost, namely, the impossibility to treat documentaries involving out-of-reach subjects or reenactments as genuine documentaries. Thus, one might wonder whether there is a way to exclude docudramas from the domain of documentaries without excluding also documentaries involving out-of-reach subjects or reenactments.

I propose to affirmatively answer to this question by relying on the notion of a perceptual belief, that is, a belief that one can form just by endorsing one’s perception. If, for instance, one perceives a dog jumping, one can form the perceptual belief that this dog (having all the sensory features our perception provides us with) is jumping in this way (including all the sensory features our perception provides us with). In short, one has a perceptual belief when one believes what one is perceiving. That being the case, I characterize a documentary as a film that mandates its audience to form perceptual beliefs concerning what one can perceive in it. While watching a documentary that depicts a dog jumping, one can form not only the perceptual belief that this film is screened in this way, but also the perceptual belief that this dog is jumping in this way. I call the latter a pictorial belief, that is, a perceptual belief that one can form by endorsing what one perceive in a picture. Thus, a documentary is a film that mandates its audience to form pictorial beliefs.

This conception of the documentary allows us to preserve the explanatory advantages of Currie’s trace-based account for what concerns docudramas while avoiding its problems for what concerns out-of-reach subjects and reenactments. Although docudramas mandate us to form beliefs about their subjects, they do no mandate us to form pictorial beliefs about those subjects. Thus, a docudrama differs from a fiction film since it mandates us to form beliefs instead of imaginings, but it also differs from a documentary since it does not mandate us to form pictorial beliefs about its subject.

Currie situates the difference between documentaries and docudramas in the fact that the latter do not predominantly exploit traces of their subjects. Yet, in so doing, he find it
hard to deal with documentaries involving out-of-reach subjects or reenactments. In order
to overcome these difficulties, we should acknowledge that traces, in a documentary, are just means to the end of forming pictorial beliefs. Furthermore, the latter beliefs are not forced to concern the subject of the documentary. A film that mandates its audience to form pictorial beliefs is a documentary even though those beliefs do not concern the subject of the documentary. This allows us to deal with out-of-reach subjects and reenactments.

Consider An Inconvenient Truth (2006), a documentary about global warming that depicts a series of talks given by Al Gore. We can treat this as a case of out-of-reach subject if we assume that global warming cannot be filmed. From Currie’s perspective this film cannot count as a fully-fledged documentary since its traces are not of its subject. By contrast, in the account I propose, An Inconvenient Truth remains a documentary since it still mandates us to form perceptual beliefs, even though these beliefs are about Al Gore instead of about global warming.

The same sort of reasoning can be applied to reenactments. A documentary that resorts to the reenactment of an event instead of recording this very event should choose whether (a) presenting the reenactment as such or (b) trying to deceive the audience by presenting the reenactment as if it was the original event. Yet, in both cases, the documentary would mandate its audience to form pictorial beliefs, in spite of the fact that it is not using traces of the event it is about. Specifically, choosing option (a) would mandate the audience to form veridical pictorial beliefs concerning the reenactment itself whereas choosing option (b) would mandate the audience to form deceptive pictorial beliefs about the original event.

Bibliography


Friday 11:15-13:30 – Room 116
Understanding Site-Specific Art
Elisa Caldarola (University of Padova)

The category ‘site-specific art’ was originally introduced (probably by artist Robert Irwin in a 1985 essay) to refer to contemporary artworks that enjoy a special relationship with a site (see also e.g. Meyer 2000; Kwon 2002), but it is now being applied also to e.g. medieval works of polyphonic music and Renaissance frescoes (e.g. Bagby 2013; Gillgreen 2017). There are, however, two problems:

(1) we lack a satisfactory characterization of site-specific art (SSA): literature on contemporary SSA has mostly concentrated on works that criticize socio-political institutions and/or that prompt reflection on certain geographical sites (e.g. Coles 2000; Meyer 2000; Kwon 2002), setting aside, without proper discussion, the issue of what kind of relationship to sites works need to have in order to be considered site-specific (SS);

(2) since the concept of site-specificity has been originally introduced and most carefully analysed in relation to contemporary art only, it’s not clear whether it really is appropriate to describe artworks from other epochs.

To address both problems, this paper

(1) identifies the three key features that a work must jointly present in order to count as SSA;

(2) argues that both contemporary artworks and artworks from other epochs qualify as SS, acknowledging, however, some differences between contemporary and previous SS works.

How can food be art? Eating as an aesthetic practice. A research proposal
Yaiza Ágata Bocos Mirabella (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Over recent years, we have witnessed the blooming of cooking as art and food as an artistic medium. Enumerating the artists who have worked with food and their motivations for doing so, or justifying the introduction of cooking in the art world has become unnecessary. In the end, aren’t we facing a paradox, when we agree that “art is over” and, at the same time, we extend its concept to the edible? Art has freed itself from the quest of its own concept. The same occurs with any practice, which could be lived as art (let’s say as an aesthetic form) without suffering a challenging discussion with the tradition of Art and, at the same time, without having to deny or exceed any previous practices with its own discourse.

Nevertheless, assuming everything could be art and, going further still, that everyone can be an artist, as theorists we still have to find the reasons that justify the inclusion of taste within the aesthetic dimension. Even though we are not looking for criteria at all, we still have to work on the question of how the edible can be art. Even if we don’t connect art to an end (neither its end in history), we usually agree that it has a sort of function (linguistic, sociological, emphatic). We cannot define it, yet we usually assume it. In other words, we do know there is something within a work of art that radiates outward: there is a push, a re-consideration or even a nascent point of view, which can open up unexpected territories. The question I want to propose is how the edible or the gustative can be such a catalyst.

On the one hand, there is no doubt that this is broad issue. While bringing to the discussion the reasons why a mouthful (in its specific context) can be considered as an artistic
experience, we are taking part of a definition of art, in a way that may involve the acceptance and the denial of the philosophy of art’s corpus and its most representative theoretical problems. I will try to show how, by using traditional art theory with respect to the gustative question, we are assuming that an aesthetic experience is taking place through taste.

On the other hand, practices involved with food have been a fundamental part of any culture. From an anthropological point of view, an aesthetical dimension of eating is a primary reason that explains the particular development of cooking in time and space. What and how we eat are material phenomena, but it is a conceptual register that goes beyond hunger and accessibility which accounts for the many efforts humanity has taken to define the edible, to present it in certain ways, to relate it to a precise occasion, to envelop it with rituals, myths...and so on. Its current definition as art could be understood as the recognition of the practice itself as a conceptual practice, which medium had been used for embodying discourses from religious, political and other normative spheres and now released to its own purpose.

I will refer to Hiroshi Ishida’s strawberry presentation (at Mibu, Japan) as an example of this proposal and will try to point out what I consider to be a more satisfactory way of addressing how the edible could be art. By satisfactory, I mean both a fertile way for an aesthetic thought and accurate procedure for reflection on food practices. To do this, we will need to shift our attention from the question of art’s definition and purpose to a more humble understanding of the sensorial. Due to the historical meaning of the first, and its vindicated non plus ultra capacity within conceptual discussions, a more mundane and broader ground seems to be needed in order to address our concern. I will detail an eating theory that would help to understand food as art.

Performing Interventions into Life Processes: The Presence of Living Entities in Biotechnological Art

Polona Tratnik (Alma Mater Europaea)

Art has had interest in the questions of life in different periods of history and from various perspectives. For Michelangelo Buonarroti, it was crucial to assure the experience of the marble statue of Pietà as the presence of Mary with slithering Jesus in her arms. Since the 1990s biotechnology is the promising science that contributes new chapters on revitalization of organs and therefore the quality of life and longevity. In this framework, art that addresses the issues of life, can hardly avoid biotechnology. Why not growing living entities within art. Already in the 1988 Vilém Flusser posed this question of artistic manipulation of the living matter radically (“Why is that dogs aren’t yet blue with red spots, and that horses don’t yet radiate phosphorescent colors over the nocturnal meadows of the land? Why hasn’t the breeding of animals, still principally an economic concern, moved into the field of esthetics?”) The options to grow living entities or culture living cells has opened in the sphere of art, whereat this is often to be achieved only with the support of biotechnology. Art has started to use methods that enable manipulation with the living material and also tends to present these interventions into living processes to the public directly, through performative installations.

Working with living entities requires to assure special conditions needed for the preservation of life. In the presentation, the author will claim that the presence of living entities and this establishment of particular conditions that build die Umwelt (as this notion has been introduced by Jakob von Uexküll for the animals) for them is significant for addressing the possibility to actually work with living matter and to intervene into life processes. Using any kind of media that would introduce mediality in the communication process with
the spectator, such as painting, photography or video, would transpose the living matter to the level of pictorial representation. In such a manner this art would fail to achieve to surpass the status of secondary reality as it was established with the traditional representational media and to finally confront the spectator directly with the presence of the living substances, with the real. Art that is speaking about the living processes and manipulation of living entities is necessary performative. It does not produce the representations of reality, as this was the main reproach of Bertolt Brecht for the play, but presents reality itself, and also offers interventions into it. For discussing the structure and the ontological status of biotechnological art, in particular the project that involve tissue engineering, the author will revise the concepts of mediality, representation, presence, performativity, and différance (introduced by Jacques Derrida). She will claim that this art tends to minimalize the différance between the context of origin and the situation of installation and aims to (symbolically) affect the everyday reality with intervening into living substances, which paradoxically renders it back to the level of secondary reality with no real effects on the real. The author will question the sense and function of that kind of doing.
Friday 15:00-16:30 – Room 111
Atmospheres in Architecture and Scenography

James Hamilton (Kansas State University)

I suggest certain directions we should take in answering these questions: (a) What should we say that “atmosphere” is with respect to architecture and scenography? (b) How is atmosphere actually accessed in works of architecture and in theatre? and (c) How can atmosphere be described in order to make it available for spectators’ or observers’ interpretations and evaluations of works of architecture and theatrical performances? Roughly, I suggest we be quite literal in adopting “the atmosphere” as the referent of the term with architecture and scenography. With respect to the second question, I make use of some empirical work on peripheral vision and its role in generating affective responses. As to the third question, I make use of a now common distinction between vehicular and artistic media to explain how we ought to describe what we call the atmosphere created in a work of architecture or a scenic design, and finally, I show how a roughly counterfactual relationship can help us discern spurious affective experiences from those that actually enable us to interpret and evaluate works of architecture and scenography.

“Melkine”: dance::melody::music – New Principles of Dance Composition

Gregory Scott (New York University)

I. Dance (as “ordered body movement” for pleasure, following Plato, Aristotle and common experience) is far behind other arts in terms of us understanding its formal aspects. I emphasize “formal aspects” because today I am only concerned with pure movement, not with the mimetic capabilities that dance has and that are important in other circumstances. Original notations treated the body (whether human or horse) as a unit, and showed the patterns that an individual or group made on the ground. However, even with Labanotation & computer programs like DanceForms (originally Lifeforms), there is great difficulty in making sense of 3-D movement of a complex entity like a human being.

II. First problem: Crow epistemology & Miller's law—human beings (and animals in general) can only be aware of about 6 percepts maximum at any time, and this apparently is if the percepts move very slowly or are static.

III. Second problem: What counts as a percept, that is, a part or unit? Is the body 6 parts or (like with Indian dance or robotics) at least 26, including fingers as individual units? (I don’t know anyone treating each toe separately.)

IV. Third problem: Lack of recognition of what I call “melkines” (from the Greek mel, honey, and kinesis, body movement). Other artforms have significant “units” of composition, like a melody in music and a sentence in poetry or literature, designed to be pleasing in the relevant way. The melkine is more than a movement phrase, just as a sentence is more than a linguistic phrase (usually) and just as a melody is more than just a tonal phrase, which itself is just a snippet of a few notes.

V. Why enchainement in ballet don’t count: Many different dynamics patterns by multiple body parts happening simultaneously, usually because they are part of the balletic vocabulary, not necessarily because the choreographer is creating a graspable harmony of concomitant dynamic shapes designed to be visually pleasing (I leave aside today kinesthetic pleasure or a combination of kinesthetic & visual pleasures because of time and because this is more advanced). For instance, mechanical considerations often determine the movements and positions of the arms (explain with assemblé combination and pirouettes).
VI. Bipedality is so natural as to be assumed in dance (cf. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone): steps to music. One ballet teacher denied that Parsons’ Sleep Study is dance. It may not be ballet, but surely it is dance. Show 2 snippets. First: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RlzjSp0OV0 About 0:45 to about 1:30. NOTE 1:10 where he says “movement phrase,” but note he is NOT using one body part, like an instrument in an orchestra, for the phrase. Rather he is assuming that the whole body and its particular configuration(s), what I would call a whole “corporal orchestra,” will be creating “THE” movement phrase. 2nd snippet, 1 min: https://vimeo.com/133720927 for the final product. There is nothing wrong with steps to music—folk dance is ubiquitous—but to limit dance to steps is unwarranted, as Parsons and even the ancient Greeks showed: They anticipated break dancing and there are records of people dancing on their head. The problem is trying to understand dance when it is not restricted to a vocabulary like ballet, Graham, or Horton, and vocabularies, although very useful, can inhibit.

VII. We need in my opinion a systematic approach to creating and understanding movement, one that takes our cognitive limitations into account. My own view stems in part from teaching DanceForms, when I directed … in dance education [title and location omitted to preserve anonymity for evaluation]. Ironically, much as I detest Cartesian dualism, along with Descartes’ absurd notion that the pineal gland is where the absolutely incorporeal soul connects to the physical body, for once in my life I felt as if I were following Descartes, wiping the epistemological slate clean and starting from scratch. The computer forced me to look at creating movement in a different way.

VIII. My way is not the way of William Forsythe. Why invisible lines don’t work for the issues I’m speaking of, even if they are a completely legitimate way of creating dance for him and his followers, can be seen from a couple of his videos (show two-three 23 Studies). Rather, I assume we must work with what is visible and objective to an audience. Choose your body parts and determine the dynamic patterns. This is not like a circle, which is static and 2-dimensional in geometry, but a 3-D pattern that cuts across time. It is a moving circle or a vortex or a spiral or a movement following the pattern of a triangle or the like; ultimately it could be a melkine. I stick for the moment with patterns that reflect geometrical shapes because those are most easily graspable, as long as one realizes that the shapes are only an abstracted aspect of the full dynamic pattern. One tenet of the new approach, and of developing more powerful choreography, is that the dynamic patterns much be graspable and repeatable or reversible or the like, similar to melodies in music composition. Often people who like a melody hum it. Have you ever seen someone leaving a dance concert repeating movement phrases that were captivating or saying that they want to repeat it when in a studio? If dance is to realize its full potential, in my view, choreographers have to learn to create melkines that cause audience members to want to kinetically “hum” them, as it were, at least in the imagination. Of course, the choreographer could structure the rest of the work around melkines (or around the further constructs stemming possibly from melkines), just as musical works are often structured around melodies.

IX. To demonstrate all of this, I start with one body: fingers, hands, lower arm, upper arm, head, and torso are the “units” or “instruments.” Legs & feet are treated similarly to arms except for the toes, which anatomically don’t have the range of fingers.

X. Video 1: My dancer doing six circles simultaneously with different body parts, showing she is an orchestra, not an instrument (like a flute, although a piano can function too like an orchestra). Video 2: Examples of some obvious component parts of melkines, analogous to notes in melodies: Dynamic lines (straight, with angles, curved); more complex constructions, like 3-sides of a rectangle, figure 8, etc. Video 3: A few examples of basic melkines, analogous to basic melodies.
XI. Possible applications for groups & floor patterns.

XII. Rewards: Better understanding of the formal qualities from 3 perspectives: creator, audience, and critic. The possibility of audience members executing the melkine or at least clearly imagining it.
Strategies of Irreproducibility

Emanuele Arielli (University of Venice)

In this paper I focus on the topic of reproducibility (and irreproducibility) of aesthetic experience and effects, distinguishing it from the traditional subject of artifact reproducibility. The main aim is to outline a typology of the various kind of irreproducibility of aesthetic experience and to draw some implications for the aesthetic discussion concerning contemporary art.

Depending on the type of artwork, we can define the difference (or the “ratio”) between aesthetic experience in the presence of the artwork and aesthetic experience in its absence, that is, in the presence of its reproductions or documentations. For instance, in an easily reproducible painting the difference between experiencing the real artwork or its reproduction could be considered relatively small, while the difference between real experience and reproduction would be high in a complex room-filling installation. This ratio can depend on ontological, material, or practical reasons and depend also on the technological means of reproduction and documentation.

In conclusion, following Groys (2017), I will suggest that the application of different "strategies of irreproducibility" testifies the urge to escape the replicability of aesthetic experience and the desire to generate forms of uniqueness and exclusivity in the fruition of art, and could therefore be seen as one of the reasons why art today is strongly based on documentations, installations or performative events.

Beauty, Admiration, and Exemplarist Moral Theory

Panos Paris (University of York)

Linda Zagzebski recently put forward a new moral theory, that is meant to provide an alternative to theories like consequentialism and deontology, and which works by defining key moral terms by direct reference to exemplars. More specifically, Zagzebski defines, for instance, a virtuous person as a person like that, where that points to such individuals as Leopold Socha, Confucius, Jesus Christ, and the like. A key mechanism for this theory, which both helps us identify exemplarity and to provide motivation for morality is the emotion of admiration.

I wish to argue that unless Zagzebski’s theory recognises and incorporates an aesthetic dimension to morality, as did, e.g., eighteenth-century sentimentalists by recognising the categories of moral beauty and ugliness, her theory suffers important theoretical difficulties, whilst, in fact, lacking some of the theoretical merits that it purports to. To this end, I will cast doubt on the prominent role accorded to the emotion of admiration for morality, arguing that it either has to be qualified as a specific kind of admiration—namely that which can be said to be a response to the beautiful—or has to be replaced altogether with the affective response to the beautiful, a mark of which is pleasurable contemplation. In short, an aesthetics of character is necessary if we are to truly discover the affective and motivational components of morality, which, I suggest, is exactly what virtue ethicists like Aristotle and Hume sought to do, and what most clearly distinguishes them from modern ethical theories like utilitarianism or Kantian deontology.
The debate about the rational character of aesthetic judgment and about the possibility of characterizing its correctness conditions has attracted much attention in the last decades. This line of research and the different developments of particular aspects related to the alleged rationality of aesthetic judgment have implicitly promoted an epistemic approach to the nature of the aesthetic judgment. Thus, the rationality of the aesthetic judgment is basically understood as a matter of getting things right with respect to the object aesthetically considered; where part of the conditions considered as necessary for getting things right aesthetically involve being able to point to certain aspects or non-aesthetic features of the objects appreciated in support of one’s aesthetic judgment.

One clear aspect that reflects this epistemic approach to aesthetic judgment is the current debate over the possibility of aesthetic testimony (in what follows AT) on the face of the accepted validity of the so-called Acquaintance Principle (in what follows AP). AT is the view according to which it is legitimate to endorse and aesthetic judgment on the basis of testimony. Defenders of this view are, for example, Livingston (2003), Budd (2003) and, more recently, Robson (2012, 2013). The AP is a principle that regulates the correct formation of aesthetic judgments. According to this principle, in order to properly assent to an aesthetic judgement or description, one has to experience the object oneself. It follows from the canonical characterizations of AT and AP that we cannot hold the two of them simultaneously. And yet, it seems that we often form aesthetic beliefs based on the experts’ testimony and that we often see the need for experiencing the object directly in order to fully determine its aesthetic character. Thus, for example, the AP has been defended in connection to the impossibility of aesthetic principles and, therefore, to the impossibility of ascertain an object’s aesthetic value through solely inferential means. The lack of aesthetic principles and the impossibility of aesthetic inferentialism have therefore provided further support to the AP.

A way to describe this debate in a simple way is to put it in terms of a dilemma. Either we embrace the AP and reject the validity of AT, or we accept AT and we give up on the strong reading of the AP. It is important I think to notice that both contenders share an epistemic approach to the aesthetic judgment in the sense that the key aspect is to characterize the epistemic validity of the process through which one produces an aesthetic judgment. While those who stick to the AP think the only valid way to produce aesthetic judgments is by directly experiencing (or perceiving) the aesthetic character of the work, the defenders of AT believe we can perfectly endorse aesthetic judgments obtained through testimony given that the testimony meets certain validity requirements.

Now it seems that both principles have strong arguments in their favour. AT defenders point to cases where we typically accept aesthetic reports as valid sources for our own aesthetic judgements. Thus, for example, we tend to trust experts’ judgments about works that may be almost inaccessible or lost; we read critical reviews in newspapers, blogs and magazines to make up our minds about which movie to see or which novel to read. Or, finally, we look at catalogues or web pages in order to see visual reproductions of theatre performances, dance or installations (and in general to look at so-called aesthetic surrogates) and to judge whether the work is worth visiting on the basis of these aesthetic surrogates.

On the other hand, the importance and role played by the AP within the classical characterization of the aesthetic judgment have made some to defend its validity as a characteristic feature of aesthetic judgment in contrast to other perceptual judgments. According to the AP defenders, we cannot give up on this principle because one has to see the object for oneself in order to properly capture its aesthetic value. No description or characteriza-
tion, however rich, can substitute the sort of grounding that directly experiencing the object provides.

Markus and Gorodeisky (2018) have proposed a recent solution to the apparent dilemma briefly sketched above. Their strategy consists in distinguishing between aesthetic judgment and aesthetic belief and, then, in saying that while acquiring aesthetic beliefs through testimony is unproblematic, aesthetic judgment requires experiencing the object for oneself. That is, aesthetic judgment—but not aesthetic belief—requires AP.

In this paper, I will consider an alternative solution to the aforementioned dilemma. In order to articulate this solution I will also appeal to the distinction between judgment and belief proposed by Markus and Gorodesiky. However, I think that the right way to understand the AP is somehow different from the standard reading commonly accepted. The AP has been mostly conceived as a matter of directly perceiving the object or perceiving the aesthetic value of the object by oneself. In this sense, the AP has been mostly understood as a principle regulating the epistemic condition of the aesthetic judgment. The idea that one had to look for oneself in order to produce and aesthetic judgment invited a certain analogy between the ways we detect aesthetic value and the ways we become acquainted with certain phenomenal properties, such as, for example, flavours. One has to look for oneself to ascertain a particular object’s aesthetic value because there is no alternative way to come to know that the object actually possesses that value—in the same manner, one has to taste a particular fruit in order to come to know how it tastes. If I have never tried papaya I cannot fully endorse a judgment about its flavour.

However, I think this epistemic reading of the AP is incomplete unless we bear in mind what I think is one of the underlying motivations for the strong reading of the AP. This motivation has its roots in Kant’s view of the aesthetic judgment and it has to do with the idea that aesthetic judgment is something one has to arrive at autonomously. The AP encapsulates I think the idea that judging something aesthetically requires the exercise of one judgmental capacities and to freely determine—merely based on one’s experienced disinterested pleasure—whether a particular object merits aesthetic approval. This exercise can only be done first personally and that is why the AP seems a requirement for aesthetic judgment. This second dimension or reading of the AP is not so much related to the requirement of perceiving by oneself as to the fact of judging for oneself. The key idea is that the judgment is done autonomously and that it is radically first personal.

In my view, this way of understanding the AP has been partly disregarded when considering the alleged conflict between AP and AT. I think that if we pay attention to the autonomous aspect involved in the characterization of the AP we would properly recognise its full significance for our understanding of the aesthetic judgment. Of course, it may be perfectly rational to belief that James Joyce’s Ulysses is a great work of literature even if I have not read it myself, but judging that it is so requires that I read it. And it requires that I read it not merely because there might be flavours that I will not be able to savour unless I try them myself, but because it is crucial that it is oneself in the exercise of one’s capacities who determines that the work deserves one’s praise if a proper aesthetic judgment is to be produced.

“True Judges”: Depth of Justification and Aesthetic Dependence

Ole Martin Skilleås (University of Bergen)

I shall argue that the scope of aesthetic expertise of the Humean “true judges” has to be rather narrow in nature given the talents necessary to have ‘delicacy of taste’ in given art forms. This leads aesthetic experts of various kinds to be “true judges” (to use Hume’s term) only within rather narrow realms. So how can true judges pronounce on anything
beyond their narrow areas of expertise? This, I argue, is justified by the phenomenon of aesthetic dependence. Aesthetic dependence brings out the ways in which aesthetic attributions and judgments are only to be accounted for, and really meaningful, against the background of a community sharing practices, valuations and priorities. Aesthetic dependence can be a way of bringing out the community nature of understanding of aesthetic phenomena and of having aesthetic experiences.
**Friday 15:00-16:30 – Room 116**

**Aesthetic Artification as Cognification**

Gerard Vilar (Uniuversitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

In this presentation, the evolution of artistic research or practice-based research in the contemporary art world is defined as a process of artification of research. Artification in a strong sense is a phenomenon that goes back to Duchamp and his ready-mades. I propose to understand such processes as ‘cognification’ processes, consisting in transforming into devices for thinking whatever non-cognitive object or action. A classic example is the cognification of a shoebox by Gabriel Orozco at the Venice Biennale 1993. The artification of research in recent times shows that artistic research projects, besides being devices for reflection, can convey real knowledge about facts. Two examples are proposed, one by the German artist Hito Steyerl and other by the international group Forensic Architecture.

**Hegel and Irony**

Jason Yonover (JHU)

A major ambiguity sits at the core of Hegel’s philosophy. On the one hand (1), he strongly positions himself against a number of writers and thinkers that engage in irony, especially the Jena romantics; and on the other hand (2), Hegel’s dialectical thought happens to be full of ironic twists and turns such that Hegel seems steeped in irony himself. It is somewhat ironic that one might very reasonably begin to think even Hegel’s critique of the romantics itself relies on irony, such that insofar as he is critical Hegel is guilty of the same ironic subjectivity he claims to be rejecting. Although it has not been noted, Kierkegaard hints at this when he notes in his underappreciated dissertation On the Concept of Irony: “Indeed, Hegel looks down with immense scorn and superiority on those whom he often calls ‘superior people’” (265).

Initially, in Section I of this paper, I expand on this point. I emphasize how irony is associated with dialectic and point to Hegel’s obscure claim that dialectic is the “universal irony of the world” (LHP I 400). After reminding that dialectic is of course central for Hegel, I try to motivate the ambiguity described above such that it grows into a real worry. Is Hegel at odds with himself? If dialectic is crucial for Hegel, and if it is necessarily accompanied by irony, then perhaps Hegel is guilty of everything he accuses ironists of (moral weakness, decadently aesthetic practice, etc.). Although Hegel sees contradiction as productive in his logic and elsewhere, it would be a major issue if Hegel’s approach to philosophical thought itself were going to consistently mislead him.

In the remaining sections of the paper, I dispel the worry I have allowed to gather momentum, and I do so by further clarifying both (1) and (2) referenced above. I show that, properly understood, irony is at work in two importantly different senses here. First, in Section II on (1), I discuss Hegel’s tough polemics against the romantics, particularly Friedrich Schlegel, based on textual evidence available in the Lectures on Aesthetics and elsewhere. Throughout, I stress Hegel’s connection to Fichte here. Although the Jena romantics idolized Fichte in certain ways as they took him to have laid the theoretical foundation for their artistic pursuits, Fichte was, just like Hegel some years later, critical of aesthete tendencies amongst figures associated with the literary journal Athenaeum etc. Fichte, so concerned with action and bridging the gap between the theoretical and the practical, writes in The Characteristics of the Present Age that “certainly the right to free oneself from all bounds of authority and raise oneself to the law of reason is the highest right, and implicit […] but no one has a right to wallow in enthusiasm, groundless and without direction in empty space” (82).
In Section III, I proceed to discuss (2) in detail. I differentiate the sort of ironic practice under critique in Hegel (and Fichte) from the sort of irony in Hegel’s dialectical critique by discussing a wonderful case of such criticism in Hegel: his analysis of the “beautiful soul” in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The beautiful soul is clearly not what it understands itself to be—but more is at work, and I reference a passage in Hegel’s Aesthetics where he discusses contemporary theater in order to clarify this at best low-order irony where one is in error about oneself, i.e. where there is a bit of a discrepancy between one’s self-perception and the truth about oneself. The beautiful soul is rather a more extreme case: it is in truth the “opposite” of what it mistakenly thinks it is. The beautiful soul on Hegel’s definition aims to maintain its perfection by avoiding any action in the world, thereby eliminating the risk of developing dirty hands that would stain its purity. On Hegel’s analysis, this “shape of consciousness” in the Phenomenology really becomes rotten: it develops angst and consumption, and is ultimately dead; in other words, the beautiful soul turns out to be thoroughly “ugly”. Throughout this section, I emphasize the role of immanent critique in Hegel and his critique of the understanding, where Flay 1990 has helpfully hinted at the importance of irony. (Houlgate 1997 is also useful here.) I also draw a connection to one of many points where reference to Spinoza is helpful in Hegel—but one of many which has not yet been noted. It turns out that Spinoza is fond of critique that would show some view to be opposed to itself, once writing of a set of opponents: “So the weapon they aim at us, they really turn against themselves” (E1p15s | II/58/28f.)

I conclude that Hegel’s critique of irony and his engagement with irony are consistent and can coexist. Disambiguating the different senses of irony at work in this context and also dispelling the worry that Hegel is in tension with himself with respect to irony help us think about irony generally and Hegelian aesthetics and critique more specifically.