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Edited by Connell Vaughan and Iris Vidmar Jovanović

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To Be Performed: Recognizing Presentations of Visual Art as Goodmanean ‘Instances’

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ABSTRACT. If artworks are distinguishable as the kinds of things that not only elicit interpretations, but require interpretations in order to be presented to a public, then every artwork presentation reflects a particular interpretation, and is thus effectively a performance of that artwork. Visual Art interpretations, whose forms include exhibitions, reviews and discussions, entail time-intensive processes that attempt to understand: why an artist created something, how best to categorize it, or its influential status. That presenters invite spectators to experience artworks in whatever manner performers deem the best interpretation no doubt influences cognition, but are experiences of performances sufficiently concrete to count as “instantiations”? In order to demonstrate that “instantiation” and “instances” are applicable for visual art, I first employ the Presentation-Reception model (PRM) to show that jazz is a two-stage art form whose performers interpret works. By extension, I argue that all publicly presented artworks are “two-stage” art forms, including visual art. I then distinguish curatorial work as presenters’ performances from artists’ performances, thus framing curators as artistic directors (conductors, directors, or publishers). When treated like performances, exhibitions instantiate instances of the work in light of performers’ interpretations. I end with a discussion of the way curators, as well as the artworld more generally, employ visual art’s presentational

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histories as a kind notation, which helps them perform artworks. In the end, notationless visual art is no less performable than jazz music.

1. Introduction: Instantiating Interpretations \textit{qua} Public Performances

If artworks are distinguishable as the kinds of things that not only elicit interpretations, but require interpretations in order to be presented to a public, then every artwork presentation reflects a particular interpretation, and is thus effectively a \textit{performance} of that artwork. Visual art interpretations, whose forms include exhibitions, reviews and discussions, entail time-intensive processes that attempt to understand: why an artist created something, how best to categorize it, or its influential status. By contrast, nonart (billboards, car lots, or curated exhibitions) doesn’t warrant interpretations, unless one is testing whether something ought to count as art. Being nonart, one readily infers: what the billboard is advertising, that cars are positioned to sell or the exhibition’s multiple hypotheses. I imagine most readers having experienced artworks that required them to do something extra to see them as art. As it turns out, “extra something” involves developing an appropriate interpretation. On par with itches in need of scratching, the interpretive urge is often insatiable.

That presenters invite spectators to experience artworks in whatever manner performers deem the best interpretation no doubt influences
cognition, but are experiences of performances sufficiently concrete to count as “instantiations”? Thanks to Nelson Goodman’s *Languages of Art* (1968), “autographic” visual art, whether one-stage like painting or two-stage like prints, are considered ontologically distinct from “allographic” forms like performable scripts, scores, and texts. For example, Andrew Kania considers performances “different kinds of things from works of art,” since not all artworks require performances. He claims that jazz has only performances and sculptures feature only work, while classical music comprises both works and performances (Kania 2011, p. 400). To my lights, all three demand work and performance. To prove that all publicly presented artworks are “two-stage” art forms, I begin by framing jazz performances as interpretations indicative of work. Each visual art presentations request spectators to focus on different aspects of the artworks, so temporary exhibitions proffer instances on par with classical music concerts. When treated like performances, exhibitions instantiate instances of the work in light of performers’ interpretations. Moreover, notationless visual art is no less performable than jazz music.

Although Goodman sometimes called the printed copy of a score an “instance,” he mostly used this term to refer to an allographic work’s myriad performances, as I do here (Goodman 1968, p. 112). For coherency purposes, I reserve Goodmanean “instances” for second-stage performances, not copies of first-stage notations. Goodman’s referring to both as instances risks mixing apples and oranges.
Performances may vary in correctness and quality and even in ‘authenticity’ of a more esoteric kind; but all correct performances are equally genuine instances of the work. In contrast, even the most exact copies of the Rembrandt painting are simply imitations or forgeries, not new instances, of the work. Why this difference between the two arts? (113).

With this passage, Goodman identifies second-stage performances as “genuine instances of the work,” by which he means score presentations. Meanwhile, he claims that copies of one-step art forms such as paintings are forgeries. Although I recognize that copies of scores are not forgeries, the way copies of paintings are; I consider painting a two-stage art form, whose first stage is autographic, whereas its second stage is allographic (Pillow 2003, 372) since “all correct performances are equally genuine instances of the work.” New instances of works arise from interpretations that engender opportunities for fresh cognitive experiences, rather than twin copies of the work.

The twin hallmarks of Goodmanian “instances” are reproducible, yet unrepeatable. That is, instances are non-identical presentations (reproducible, yet unrepeatable), rather than “identical copies” of some underlying notation. In fact, the very notion of “instance” would be redundant, were it not for some confusion that prevents immediate
recognition of two presentations’ identity, linked as they are to the same notation. Since philosophers tend to split hairs over whether instantiations are: unique (jazz), identical limited (prints), singular unlimited (symphonies), or not at all (a painting experienced differently in consecutive exhibitions), the term performance seems most suitable. Curators’ performances invite spectators to see artworks as some interpretation. This elicits what Ludwig Wittgenstein termed “aspect-seeing,” since one sees something differently, even as one admits that it has not changed at all. Given each artwork’s numerous aspects, curators draw attention to aspects as evidence for their interpretations, not unlike filmmakers or theater directors staging each scene to direct the audience’s attention to the appropriate information.

In order to demonstrate that “instantiation” and “instances” are applicable for visual art, I first employ the Presentation-Reception model (PRM) to show that jazz is a two-stage art form whose performers interpret works; then distinguish curatorial work as presenters’ performances from artists’ performances, thus framing curators as artistic directors (conductors, directors, or publishers); and end with a discussion the way curators treat a visual artwork’s presentational history as a kind notation, which helps them perform it.
2. Jazz Interpretations

The two-step PRM accounts for the significance of reception and explains why neither appreciation nor presentation is sufficient for artworks to be received as art. Aestheticians have proffered various explanations for what Arthur Danto termed “the transfiguration of the commonplace” (Danto 1981). Most views focus on presentation, downplaying the significance of reception. Philosophical approaches that emphasize presentation include: 1) Platonic forms/essences (Plato/Heidegger), 2) Artworld theories/Baptism (Danto 1981), 3) Institutional Theory of Art (Dickie 2007), and 4) Intentionalism. On the other side of the spectrum is John Andrew Fisher’s “Realization Model,” which emphasizes reception, yet neglects presentation. Alternatively, PRM credits audience appreciation (reception) with jazz performers’ interpretations (presentation) of $m$, where $m$ might be a score, a jazz standard, another performer’s string of notes, a bodily gesture, a color, a hand signal, etc. I prefer interpretation to expression, since expression suggests that something has been conveyed (expressions of $x$), which likely require the audience’s further interpretation.

Musical performers charged with making jazz presentations happen are engaged in interpretative acts, whether they are performing “free
jazz” or interpreting scores. Although audience appreciation could be caused by some extraneous influence such as the whiskey imbibed during intermission, my focus here is listeners’ avowed appreciation of particular jazz performances. Although I accept Fisher’s view that listener appreciation signals a jazz work’s realization, my two-step model ties audience appreciation (reception) to performers’ particular interpretations (presentation) and leaves open the possibility that jazz performances are not “realized,” and thus remain nonart sounds.

Unlike classical music conductors, who don’t ordinarily perform instruments while conducting, jazz performers regularly signal their collaborators to: begin/stop musical numbers, encourage/discourage particular structural elements, and showcase/arrest soloists. Jazz musicians thus perform in expectation that they please/impress listeners, in the near-term hope that collaborators will afford them greater air time, with the long-term goal to be invited back, as their reputation as performers grows and their skills in responding to players’ signals improves. In fact, one might make the case that the singular goal of any jazz performance is the musicians’ success at impressing all listeners, including all performers, with their capacity to produce musical works on the spot, whether as soloists or accompanists. The jazz musician’s special skill is “fitting in,” that is, playing his/her part as an ensemble.

2 I thank Brazilian-jazz guitarist Henri Griendl and composer/conductor/guitarist Van Stiefel, Ph. D. for their invaluable insight into jazz performances.
For Fisher, a jazz realization is invariably unique, as opposed to merely singular (an instance of a musical work). By unique, he means that “the experience is genuinely of music-making-in-the-moment; the performance is heard as spontaneous as a whole even when also heard as partly structured by an external pattern” (158). Moreover, “[t]he performers respond to each other and to the music that has gone before —with the piece or the arrangement in their heads as well; they strive to play something in the moment appropriate to what has gone before and is going on in that moment” (159). Most important, “[h]earing that appropriateness is a key part of the listener’s experience of the moment-to-moment organic development of successful jazz performance” (159). No doubt, jazz musicians’ performances influence what listeners hear. Those performances that Fisher qualifies as “jazz realizations” succeed because audiences hear the performers’ interpretations of as works of art.

In privileging audience reception, Fisher’s Realization model effectively liberates musical performances’ dependence on extant scores, or “work.” Eschewing the music critic’s role, he remarks that “critical attention is not what makes a musical piece a musical work.” While “every musical work affords critical attention,” whether it actually “elicits critical attention depends on the interest of the listener...More central than critical attention is musical appreciation (emphasis mine): what gives musical pleasure, what do knowledgeable listeners attend to in jazz” (154). Alternatively, classical “composers came to see themselves as producing works that had the

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properties of ‘autonomy, repeatability, permanence, perfect compliance—
concepts associated with the work concept’” (Goehr 1992, p. 119; Fisher
2018, p. 155). To realize these properties, conductors supposedly adopted
the ideology of werktreue: faithfulness of the composer’s intentions
indicated by the score. I write “supposedly,” because Gunther Schuller’s
monumental Compleat Conductor, which compares hundreds of symphony
recordings to their scores, reveals performers veering from scores, making
werktreue an ideal, not reality (Schuller 1997).

2.1 Jazz “Works”

Although most philosophical accounts pace Goodman treat notations
availed by scores, scripts, and texts as arbiters of authenticity, Schuller’s
account suggests that performers, and not scores, drive musical
performances. One imagines some composer conducting his/her own score
requesting all sorts of tempos, dynamics, and breaths not visibly noted.
Would that make the performance any less authentic? Philosophy’s
excessive focus on scores qua musical works has overstated their authority,
enabling notions like “work-concept” to be perpetuated without reservation.

In contradistinction to Kania, who denies the existence of “musical
works in jazz,” Fisher (2018: 151), Julian Dodd (2014) and Young and
Matheson (2000) claim otherwise. Fisher notes David Horn’s definition of
“work” as crediting some identifiable author with the work’s originality and
thus potential for “status, rank, and canonization” (153). Fisher rightly notes that there’s nothing here that doesn’t apply to many musical works in jazz, and in fact, “jazz standards” are canonized, even those identified as “unauthored.” Moreover, the availability of software programs for transcribing audio recordings into notation renders obsolete David Davies’ limiting musical works to “actions, in particular the compositional actions of their composers” (Davies, 2004).

Additionally, jazz’s musical artifacts are a sort of composition, even if the only remaining artifact is a rather illegible, crumpled up song list, whose titles the performers consider familiar enough to be what Dodd calls “performable entities” (Dodd, 2014, p. 277). In this case, the performers effectively perform song lists, just the way conceptual artists implement instructions. And of course, jazz renditions may bear only passing resemblance to said titles and it often takes title awareness to trigger audience recognition, but this “thinness,” as Stephen Davies terms it (Davies, 2001, p. 20), is really only a problem for philosophers who tie authenticity to some ideal performance, which Schuller’s research complicates.

In lieu of an agreed upon song list, now imagine that the plan is for each performer to take turns initiating a song that he/she believes the others know, and then everyone else is supposed to join in and try to integrate their part. In effect, the baton is passed after every song. Those who don’t actually know the song still play along, trying not to stick out too much.
Surely Kania would dismiss this as exemplary of a musical work, but is the actual outcome so different than a classical music performance, whereby not all of the musicians are familiar with the conductor’s particular interpretation of some extant score? Soon after Paavo Järvi’s arrival, the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra’s second harpist Elizabeth Motter told me that working on a familiar score with a new conductor is like learning an entirely new composition. Thus, an extant score neither guarantees an adequate performance, nor garners audience appreciation.

Fisher notes that when it comes to jazz, the musical work is merely descriptive, but this seems like splitting hairs. Ever since Goodman (1968), scores are noteworthy because they exemplify “notated references,” which is effectively a description written with notes and rests, rather than words and punctuation. Does it really matter how jazz standards, let alone contemporary classical works, are written? If not traditional scores, they could be strings of emoji characters, graphic music scores (this is a huge field these days) (Sauer 2009). What matters most is that the listeners, which include the musicians, appreciate jazz musicians’ interpretations of some \( m \), making jazz, contra Kania, a work-performance tradition after all. As we shall see, this formulation also works for visual art, such that what matters most is that “spectators, which include the artists, appreciate the performers’ interpretations of works, \( w \).”

In sum:
1) A performance is a public presentation of a presenter’s interpretation(s) of a(n) artwork(s).

2) The performer(s) presenting his/her artwork-interpretations need not be the artist.

With jazz performances, interpretive processes often occur on the spot, while curators sometimes take decades to formulate their interpretations. I imagine classical music conductors carrying out several years of research and focused reflection, including repeat rehearsals in their mind’s ear.

3. Curatorial Work

Artists create artworks that await performances, and thus routinely collaborate with artwork presenters and/or curators to determine how best to perform them. Kania is right that performances and artworks are different kinds, though both are necessary, otherwise only artists ever experience their artworks. Like jazz performances, curated exhibitions present particular interpretations of visual art. Consider Marcel Duchamp’s assisted-readymade *Apolinère Enamelled* (1916-1917), which has been included in three wildly different exhibitions (a 1989 Los Angeles County Museum of Art exhibition that explored Dada/Surrealist text art, a 1996 Whitney Museum of American Art exhibition that re-introduced New York Dada and a 2012 Philadelphia Museum of Art exhibition that probed the boundaries
between art and life). Each exhibition invited spectators to focus on different aspects of the sculpture. Just as conductors invite audiences to hear works as they’ve interpreted them, these curators invited spectators to see *Apolinère Enameled* as $x$, where $x$ is either text art, New York Dada or the border between art and life. The physical experience of seeing $w$ as $x$ in an exhibition makes the instantiation concrete.

The notion of curators performing artworks on artists’ behalf avoids Rossen Ventzislavov’s thesis that “curating should be understood as a fine art” (Ventzislavov 2014, p. 83). To summarize curatorial work: 1) Curatorial work concerns artwork presentation, not artwork production, though curators sometimes physically produce and/or install artworks on behalf of artists. 2) Curators contribute cognitive value (novel reasons to appreciate the works), though not artistic value. 3) Curatorial work introduces temporary classification systems that rarely have lasting value. 4) The curator’s exhibition checklist requires someone to stage it, but it does not prompt interpretations the way conceptual art does. Thus, all artworks await interpretations, which consecutive performances manifest (Spaid 2016, p. 87).

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3 Although the original *Apolinère Enameled* (1916-1917) at the Philadelphia Museum of Art and its 12 replicas (1965) each has its own presentational history, I am treating these three (possibly distinct) objects as though they are coeval, since an interpretation belonging to one covers all. Even more amusing, the two that Schwartz produced expressly for exhibitions likely have greater provenances, yet they are probably in worse shape.
Some claim that the things themselves are the actors that motivate ongoing thoughts among: their owners, the various curators and conservators handling them, and finally the myriad spectators, all of whom contribute to how things are presented and eventually received (Monroe Beardsley 1982: 288-290; Jane Bennett 2009). Either way, that someone esteems something as art indicates that an interpretation is afoot. One could draw an analogy here between suspects, trials and verdicts, such that suspects, who arouse suspicion prompt prosecutors to present persuasive cases, yet juries still have the final say. Just as the verdict determines whether suspects are seen as innocent or guilty, the audience’s response to a particular presentation determines whether the presenter’s interpretation is convincing; independent of spectators’ admiration for either the objects/events on view or their particular presentation. Objects/events received as art inspire further interpretations, leading art lovers to value/protect/defend them, even though they may not personally appreciate them. Since artworks are “thought-things,” their significance extends far beyond subjective taste (Arendt 2000: 184).

4. Artist’s Performances vs. Presenters’ Performances

I thank Rossen Ventzislavov for bringing this analogy to my attention.
Several philosophers, most noticeably Denis Dutton, Gregory Currie, and David Davies have developed ontologies that characterize artworks, though not their presentations, as performances. In 1979, Denis Dutton noted that “As performances, works of art represent the ways in which artists solve problems, overcome obstacles, make do with available materials” (Dutton 1979, p. 305). Currie’s 1989 account proposes two theses: the Action Type Hypothesis and the Instance Multiplicity Hypothesis. With his first thesis, an artist “in composing or creating, discovers a certain structure –of words, of sounds, of colors, or whatever. …Not all action types of this sort are works of art; but all works of art are action types of this sort” (Wolterstorff 1991, p. 81). Currie’s hypotheses seem to resonate with my view that artworks, including visual art, are types that prompt myriad interpretations, and thus inspire multiple instantiations (Fedoryka 1991, p. 255). His describing works as “types of events” suggests that he considers each instance a token of that type. However, Currie uses instantiation to mean “twin” copies, rather than alternative interpretations that modify cognition. Thanks to Schuller’s extensive study, any notion of twin instantiations, let alone score resemblance, is sheer fantasy. Recall my notion of instances as reproducible, yet unrepeatable.

Davies aims to create a correlative position between artworks and instruments, whereby artists perform their artworks, the way musicians perform instruments. Davies’ *Art as Performance* (2004) thus challenges the
prevailing view that visual artworks are just static objects occupying space in galleries and museums, but his view doesn’t address presentation, let alone reception. In identifying artworks as “action tokens,” he characterizes artworks as “a ‘doing’ or generative performance” (Livingston 2016).

According to Michael Weh, Davies considers “[t]he artwork rather the performance that cumulated in bringing x into existence” (Weh 2005, p. 114).

Rather than being products of creative activities, Davies considers artworks to be “intentionally guided generative performances that eventuate in contextualized structures or objects...or events...performances completed by what I am terming a focus of appreciation” (Davies 2004, p. 98). So long as artistic directors are charged with presenting artworks, then audiences respond more to presenters’ performances, than those of originating artists, as Davies insists. No doubt, artists envision ways that future presenters will contextualize their works. With PRM, “performance completion” occurs during reception. If by “contextualized structures,” Davies means presentation, then his view could be a version of PRM, but his performer is an artist in the throes of making, whose performance ends before the first curtain call.

There are thus two main differences between Davies’ view and my own. Although artists’ intentions typically guide their works’ earliest instantiations, the vast majority of artworks outlive their authors, leaving future presenters to continue performing them. Although I respect artists’
intentions, I don’t see them as necessarily *driving*: the artwork’s performance. Artists often provide definitive reasons for their actions, but intentions change over time as artists gain introspection and distance. Some visual artists change their artworks’ hanging instructions, which are rarely inferable just by studying or handling them. In one context, the artist might say, “Yeah, go ahead, hang my painting over the doorway,” while in another context the artist might insist that his/her painting needs its own wall. It’s not that artists are mercurial. Rather, changed contexts either open up or close down performance possibilities. A painting slung over a doorway, or squeezed between two tiny pendants, might be afforded greater presence than if it has its own wall. Furthermore, artists have been known to re-title and/or backdate works.

Davies’ characterizing the artist-performer as aiming to be “appreciated and evaluated” seems suitable for performers whose livelihoods as jazz musicians, conductors, theater directors, or curators are “consciously guided in what [they] do by the exposed eye or ear of an intended qualified audience” (Davies 2004, p. 6). By contrast, when artists produce their artworks, they rarely know who their audiences will be, let alone where their artworks will be performed, but at least they have the pleasure of conceiving the work, even if they lack an opportunity to present it. By contrast, artistic directors responsible for presenting artworks in particular venues usually select and interpret the artworks with that venue’s audience in mind. Davies’ artist rather performs in his/her studio for
imaginary sites and audiences, just as Kania’s conductors sight-read scores for imaginary performances (interpretations absent performances). Absent live performances, Davies’ artist-performer never generates an actual instantiation.

According to Paisley Livingston, “Neither a particular agent nor a specific time is essential to the action type that is the work of art: someone else could discover the same structure at a different time yet instantiate the same work” (Livingston 2016). This actually corroborates point 2) above: the performer instantiating the work need not be the one who originated its structure. In contrast to those philosophers who characterize “making” as a performance, my notion of performances accounts for the fact that artworks are repeatedly interpreted “instances,” which are presented to a public who hopefully sees the artworks on view anew and thus feels compelled to interpret them differently. Moreover, changed venues counts as instances, since audiences respond differently to different contexts, such as when a painting is moved from a church to a museum, a boisserie remains on view while undergoing conservation, a rare film is projected at auction, or an installation featured in consecutive exhibitions is repeatedly reconfigured to fit the exhibition space.

Goodman problematically characterized visual artworks as never changing entities, though of course, when curators perform particular interpretations of artworks, they modify people’s experiences. Jerry Fodor notes that “Nobody, radical nativists included, doubts that what leads to
acquiring a concept requisition is typically *having the right kind of experience*” (Fodor 1998, p. 127). For example, the same Brice Marden abstract painting is experienced differently in a “landscape” exhibition than in a “stripe-painting” exhibition. Data gathered by vision scientists testing people experiencing actual exhibitions proves that exhibition features, such as information, seating, and recognizable artworks notably influence cognition (Kirchberg and Tröndle 2015, pp. 169-192). In 2000, Falk and Dierking found a “close causal relationships between [1] the physical context (alluding to the assessment of the exhibition itself: the choice of artworks; installation labeling; and didactics) and the scope of a contemplative experience, and between [2] the socio-cultural context (alluding to group dynamics: talking while visiting, visiting for social reasons; seating opportunities) and the social experience” (180).

5. Notationless Visual Art

For Goodman, scores, scripts, and texts are allographic, because they have the requisite *notation*. He claimed that the “allographic won its emancipation not by proclamation but by notation” (Goodman, 1968, p.122). Philosophers of Music such as David Davies, Jerrold Levinson, Stephen Davies, Darren Hudson Hick and Andrew Kania all offer strategies for defeating Goodman’s reliance on notation. They view everyday tools such as recordings, archived documents, artist and estate sanctions, printing
plates, molds and the like as capably authenticating instances. For them, notation itself is no longer the *sine qua non* of allographic scripts and scores, so visual art’s changed contexts that elicit novel responses are effectively performances. Visual art performances can finally be understood as requiring two-stage completion steps that offer legitimate instances, despite the absence of notation.

These days, many exhibitions feature exhibition copies; replicas or digitized versions that stand in when originals are unavailable, making it possible for one-of-a-kinds to be multiply instantiated, something that has been true for Sol Lewitt since 1968, the very year Goodman published his *magnum opus* (Pillow 2003). Not all second stages of visual art are allographic, and those that are may not be allographic in perpetuity. Sometimes, visual art is only fleetingly allographic, as some spectator imaginatively reperforms it, producing a chain of instances, some more authentic (faithful to the artist’s era and capacities) or well-performed than others. What is at stake is play, and the restricted play afforded autographic works should have been cause enough to suspect that visual art ought to have greater allographic capacities.

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5 When the Barnes Foundation could not lend their Van Gogh *The Postman* (1989) to MoMA for its 2001 exhibition “The Portraits of Joseph Roulin,” MoMA exhibited a life-size poster of this painting in its place. Another great example is Robert Smithson’s *Hotel Palenque* (1969-1992), which is a unique slide show, unlike its DVD version. Over one twelve month period, I saw it presented in six different exhibitions.
As already noted, each public presentation of an artwork (or performance) is an instance of that work, a detail that the artworld finds invaluable, otherwise auction house catalogues and artist’s catalogue raisonnées wouldn’t publish each artwork’s provenance, exhibitions and literature, the respective lists of owners, exhibitions and publications connected to this particular artwork. An artwork’s exhibition list is akin to its presentational history, no different than a score’s “performance” history or the myriad recordings that influenced later presentations. An artwork’s presentation history is thus a kind of “notation,” since curators routinely scour earlier reviews and past exhibitions to get a handle on how to interpret the artwork.

Philosophers since Goodman have strangely overlooked the role of curators, who routinely evaluate the most valid approach for interpreting and thus performing visual art for a public. When planning a performance, the artistic director’s particular interpretation takes numerous factors into consideration, some that go beyond notation. Authentic performances arise from instances that reflect performers’ fidelity to the artist, and the public’s appraisal of the work’s “appropriate interpretation” as a significant instance.

6. Conclusion
Long ago, Goodman categorized visual art as autographic because such artworks lack notated references. In this post-conceptual era, curators generate hypotheses that they aim to test on the public. Artists (or artwork owners) decide whether their work ought to be included or not. If they agree, they set certain limits that the curator must follow, limits that are sometimes more whimsical than intentional. There are numerous advantages to describing the curator’s practice as “performing the artwork.” Curatorial practice is durational. Unlike recordings, which preserve conductors’ interpretations in perpetuity, all that remains from a public exhibition are the check list and an exhibition’s narrative threads, which engender endless discussions for influential exhibitions. Sometimes, narrative threads gleaned by spectators stick and become art history. The rest survive as seldom-noticed catalog footnotes. It is thus the exhibition curator, and not the artist who is charged with performing visual art for some public.

Were Goodman to revisit his 1968 question, “Why this difference between the two arts [musical performances and visual art]?, he might genuinely be surprised by contemporary philosophers denying differences that were once so blatantly obvious to Goodman. Consider Goodman’s three notions- instance, notation, and forgery-resistance. These days, instances vary from “instantiations” (exacting performances of original scores and scripts) to “manifestations” (performances with minimal errors) to performances (barely recognizable performances or performances of arrangements). Whether a curator’s interpretation of visual art is helpful or
unhelpful, great or terrible, memorable or forgettable; his/her contribution approximates that of the “performance hero” whose greater fidelity to the artist’s original artwork wins points and garners esteem, even when he/she could not produce the work himself/herself (Derksen and Hudson-Hick). Because so few artistic directors “strict[ly] adhere to the [artist’s] creation,” notation has lost whatever authority it once held. Rather than split hairs between manifest and authentic performances, as Kania and others do, I credit presenters whose actions reflect their genuine concern for the artist as the first performer of the artwork they are charged to perform.

Whenever I describe curators as performing artworks, aestheticians roundly resist this possibility. Despite their resistance, I believe this position offers the best way to explain the curator’s role. Critics of this view consider the curator a mediator who facilitates artwork meanings, but they have difficulties imagining how curators could possibly perform artworks. If conductors decide the appropriate tempo, how loud to play the mezzo forte, or how dramatically to perform the crescendo, then the curator’s role is quite similar. The curator must decide how much space to allocate each artwork, which sometimes requires persuading artists to show: only part of a work, or a version in an altered scale or different medium. Sometimes curators not only have to figure out where to position the works, but they

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6 Variations of this paper have been presented at the European Society for Aesthetics (2019), American Society for Aesthetics-Eastern (2019), Dutch Association for Aesthetics (2017) and the American Society for Aesthetics-Eastern (2015).
must first figure out how to install/assemble them. Similarly, the curator determines how the artworks fit together, so that the exhibition prompts particular responses. Most important, audience reception includes the views of living artists, whose professional rapport ensures the performers’ next gig.

Artwork interpretations are hardly immediate: they involve ongoing, temporal processes which includes determining which artists are appropriate, which works are relevant, how to access the artworks, and how to stretch the budget so that one can produce a meaningful experience. Being temporary, artworks are eventually released to reappear as new instantiations. As Jennifer Judkins notes, the “curated display, just like the musical work, is ultimately revealed to the audience through time, as the audience picks and chooses their path through and around it” (Judkins 2019).

**References**


