

ESA 2016, BARCELONA

ABSTRACTS

KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

Lev Kreft **Dandy Socialism**

“It was a dark and stormy night...” That is how Edward Bulwer-Lytton started his 1830 novel *Paul Clifford*. “Le 13 décembre 1838, par une soirée pluvieuse et froid...” starts Eugène Sue’s novel *The Mysteries of Paris* after an introductory address to the reader. In between dark and stormy night, and cold and rainy evening, a new genre has emerged: melodramatic social(ist) novel together with new means of communication – novel-feuilleton printed in daily newspapers which was forced to disappear after Napoleon III. introduced a special tax for newspapers. This subtle form of censorship suggests that a genre believed to be melodramatically mediocre had an excessive aesthetico-political attractiveness.

Eugène Sue has been a star writer of the 19th century bestsellers in form of novels – feuilletons during the period between two revolutions of 1830 and 1848. His first novel *The Mysteries of Paris* appeared in *Journal des Debats* in 1842-1843, and immediately became a sensation and food for thought, translated in many major European languages. Afterwards he was nearly forgotten and hardly mentioned in company of “serious” writers of elite fine art. His temporary fame was confirmed by response of Bruno Bauer’s group of young Hegelians which found in Sue’s literary attractiveness philosophical solution for all mysteries and conflicts of the period. Marx’s criticism of their philosophical and political position in *The Sacred Family* includes lengthy and thorough criticism of their “philosophical” readings of the novel, of the novel itself and of their and Sue’s understanding of new bourgeois reality.

Can we, along with re-establishment of the context of *The Mysteries of Paris*, leave critique of ideology and literary critique of popular and mass culture behind to bring into the aesthetic field this melodramatic narrative of class society, and re-establish its politics of the aesthetic?

Christoph Menke **The Paradox of Ability and the Value of Beauty**

The decisive practical question of the project of enlightenment is the paradoxical relation between the growth of abilities and the intensification of power relations. Indeed, the question is whether ability and domination (or servitude) can be disconnected from one another at all. Are there any free abilities, any abilities of freedom? Or is the freedom of ability, that is, the ability of freedom, a paradox which can only be maintained and sustained rather than resolved?

The discourse of aesthetics, the modern theory of the aesthetic, offers the possibility for an investigation of this question. For it is in aesthetics, that is to say, in the domain of semblance, that the being of ability appears. But it appears here, from the

beginning and throughout, in an internally opposed and contradictory way. In the context of modernity, aesthetics, as theory and praxis, is the field of the struggle over what abilities (that is to say: 'subjects') are. This defines the debate about the concept of beauty.

Elisabeth Schellekens Dammann
What Do We Owe Beautiful Objects?

The relation between moral and aesthetic value in art has now long been discussed mainly in terms of the Moralism, Ethicism and Immoralism proposed by Noel Carroll, Anne Eaton, Berys Gaut, Matthew Kieran, and others. Does the moral perspective presented or embedded in a specific artwork influence the aesthetic or artistic value of that same piece? Most analytic philosophers answer that question in the affirmative. Though interesting and important, these questions are but one set of philosophical concerns that arise with regards to the moral value of artworks. A separate aspect of our moral relations with art has to do with whether we have specific moral obligations to artworks and, if so, on what grounds. What, if anything, do we owe beautiful objects? Is our moral obligation to a work determined by the moral perspective it offers or does our moral imperative towards it stem from some other normative source? In what terms can we best understand this moral relation to art? This paper will explore these concerns with a special focus on objects and sites of historical interest, including the ruins in Palmyra and the Parthenon Marbles.

ABSTRACTS

María José Alcaraz León
Is the cognitive value of fictional works unique?

Reflection on the nature and value of fiction has often paid attention to the possibility of acquiring knowledge through engaging with fictional works. The alleged imaginative character of fiction appreciation and the sort of emotional responses that fictions are able to prompt in the viewer have been frequently invoked in order to explain the peculiar cognitive value that fictions may possess. My aim in this paper will not be to offer an alternative account of the cognitive value of fictional works. Rather, I would like to question whether fiction as such possesses a specific kind of cognitive value. Although I think it is not unusual that fictional works possess this sort of value or that they can be vehicles for acquiring certain kinds of knowledge, I think that, quite often, the cognitive virtues that we attribute to fictional works do not have much to do with their fictional character as such. Rather, these values are grounded on the various properties that the different representational artefacts that can serve to produce fictional works possess. Thus, the idea I would like to defend here is that while I think fictional works can possess various sorts of cognitive value, this value is not intrinsically connected with the fictional nature of these works.

Robert Elliott Allinson
An Aesthetic Theory in Four Dimensions: Collingwood and Beyond

What I intend to suggest is that an aesthetic experience is not possible in the first place, unless it contains the following four elements: the first dimension is Kant's concept of disinterested pleasure; the second dimension is Collingwood's concept of the expression of emotion; the third dimension is the present writer's concepts of redemptive emotion; and, the fourth dimension is Plato's concept of Beauty as it appears in the *Symposium*. My thesis is there is no need to make an absolute choice among these differing dimensions, but rather that a complete theory of aesthetics can, in actuality, only exist with these four dimensions. It is not only that a complete theory of aesthetics requires these four dimensions; it is that the aesthetic experience itself cannot occur without the interaction among and within these four dimensions. The following discourse consists of the outlines of a trans-cultural aesthetic theory with these four dimensions.

James Andow
Expressive Injustice

We are artistic, creative, expressive beings. This is an important part of what makes humans valuable. We can be wronged specifically in our expressive capacities. In particular, inequality and prejudice can lead to situations in which our capacity for artistic expression is compromised. All this is to say, we can be subject to expressive injustice. This concept is articulated using the framework provided by Miranda Fricker's discussion of epistemic injustice—in its testimonial and hermeneutical forms. I argue that, like epistemic injustice, expressive injustice is a distinct and important form of injustice which is worthy of further philosophical attention. In particular, I push back against the tempting idea that the connections between expressive and epistemic injustice might run deeper and that the former might simply be a variety of the latter.

Adam Andrzejewski
Edible Art: A Case of Revolutionary Cooking

The main goal of this paper is to argue that food (resp. culinary dishes) might be a high form of art. I call this new emerging art form 'edible art'. The purpose of my paper is achieved in the following steps. Firstly, I shall recall arguments by E. Telfer and C. Korsmeyer stating that food could be only a lower form of art. Secondly, I argue that the existing debate on the food aesthetics lacks a careful analysis of the concept of art form. Then, three ways in which food can be art are analyzed and supported. Namely, (1) food as a physical medium for other art forms; (2) food as a lower art form, i.e. using artistic medium as the conventions for preparing culinary dishes; and (3) food as a high art form which requires the conjunction (1) and (2). In other words, is experienced and evaluated as food. Finally, I suggest that revolutionary cooking dishes are tokens of the high art form, which I define as edible art.

Cécile Angelini
Contemporary echoes of Kantian aesthetics

In the early 1990s, the *Esprit* and *Télérama* journals dedicated several issues to what was called a “crisis” in contemporary art, namely the supposed loss of normative criteria allowing one to judge and evaluate works of art. Following their publication, several French philosophers – among which Marc Jimenez, Jean-Pierre Cometti, Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Gérard Genette, Yves Michaud and Rainer Rochlitz – took part in a public debate which more or less explicitly centered around the *Critique of Judgment*, in terms similar to those employed by Kant himself in 1790.

Indeed, the art world has appeared divided since then: one side (which includes, among others, Jean-Marie Schaeffer and Gérard Genette) argues that judgment can only be subjective (left to each individual’s appreciation), while the other side (on which Rainer Rochlitz can notably be found) contends that judgment can be objective (by resting on impartial properties or criteria). Not only do these two antagonistic positions correspond respectively to the thesis and antithesis of the Kantian antinomy relative to the judgment of taste, they also exclude what allowed Kant to resolve this apparent aporia: the notion of common sense.

If, in its general outline, the current debate can thus be apprehended through the Kantian treatment of the issue of the aesthetic judgment, it is not limited to his framework of analysis, and those convergences and divergences will be highlighted here.

This presentation will therefore reexamine the issue of the judgment of works of art, by challenging Kantian aesthetics through contemporary artistic philosophical discourses and practices.

Alfred Archer and Lauren Ware
Beyond the call of beauty: on aesthetic saints and heroes

Many aestheticians and ethicists are interested in the similarities and connections between aesthetics and ethics. One way in which some have suggested the two domains are different is that in ethics there exist obligations while in aesthetics there do not. However, in a recent paper, Marcia Muelder Eaton has argued that there is good reason to think that aesthetic obligations do exist. We will explore the nature of these obligations by asking whether acts of aesthetic supererogation are possible. We will argue that there is good reason to think that acts of aesthetic supererogation (acts that go beyond the call of our aesthetic obligations) exist.

We start by outlining what moral supererogation consists of in order to see what would be needed for a given normative domain to include acts of supererogation. That normative domain must generate requirements and it must be possible to perform acts that are better (according to the given normative domain) than the acts that are required by that domain. We will argue that there is good reason to think that both of these criteria are met in the case of aesthetics. We will focus on three forms of aesthetic duty: the duty to protect artworks, duty to appreciate artworks and the duty to develop one’s aesthetic talents. We argue that all three are plausible sources of aesthetic duty and also that all three kinds of duty are plausibly capable of being surpassed.

We will finish by exploring some interesting parallels between moral and aesthetic supererogation that provide interesting insights into the relationship between moral and aesthetic exemplars.

Francisco Arenas-Dolz

When Art Purges the Emotions: Nietzsche's Lectures on Greek Tragedy and the Tragic

The aim of this paper is twofold. The first purpose is to provide a general presentation of Nietzsche's lectures on Greek tragedy and a systematic reconstruction, as wide as possible, of the sources used by Nietzsche in them. To do this, I will offer some historiographical indications in order to contextualize these lectures and I will present the main sources of Nietzsche's lectures, connecting them with other philological and intellectual productions of that time. The sources of these lectures come from different traditions: classical philology (Lessing, Schiller, Schlegel, Welcker, Müller, Bernhardt, Borberg, Dronke, Bode, Hartung, Kuhner, Ritter, Droysen, Vischer-Bilfinger, Schneidewin, Bergk, Heimsoeth, Roszbach, Westphal, Korn), literary criticism (Rapp, Gervinus Small Freytag, Schmidt), musicology (Lindner), law (Bachofen), and aesthetics (Vischer, Zimmermann, Yorck von Wartenburg). All these perspectives meet in Nietzsche's lectures and he offers an original symbiosis. All this will allow us to understand the way in which Nietzsche works and to establish some guidelines for distinguishing the degrees of intertextuality present at these lectures, as well as for attempting a reconstruction and a classification of the sources and a precise indication on the arrangement of them.

The second aim of this paper is to highlight the content of these lectures with the subsequent development of Nietzsche's philosophical and aesthetic ideas. In chapters 21 and 22 of *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche reconsiders the subject of the effect caused by tragedy, a subject that he had already approached in chapter 8 in relation to Dionysian ecstasy. What does the tragic effect consist in? Nietzsche indicates two essential components: on the one hand, the music, with its universal value; and on the other hand, the myth and its heroes, i.e. the main characters dominated by suffering, who appear as a sublime symbol. But in order for the effect of tragedy to be fully achieved, the spectators must have a specific attitude, they must be "tragic" spectators, which is to say Dionysian receptive listeners. It is clear that in Nietzsche's explanation of the effects of musical tragedy, the most important aspect is the Dionysian. In fact, the Dionysian magic stimulates the Apollonian impulses and puts them at its service. What is omitted from Nietzsche's pages is Aristotle and, in particular, his theory of tragic catharsis. Nietzsche found himself in the midst of an intense controversy concerning the concept of catharsis that involved many important figures of his time, many of whom Nietzsche read, positioning himself in favour or against them.

Zsolt Bátori
Categories of photography

In this talk I argue that Kendall Walton's system of the aesthetic property types of artworks serves as an excellent philosophical starting point when accounting for important aspects of the processes of interpreting and evaluating photographs. I suggest that this recognition is an often-neglected first step in interpreting and appreciating photographs, and I provide an account of photographic relevance on the basis of the discussed property types.

Walton suggests that we need to distinguish standard, variable, and contra-standard aesthetic properties. These properties are recognised *by us* in the specific socio-historical context of our art making and appreciating practices. Standard properties, like the motionlessness of paintings, establish the artwork status in a given category. Variable properties, like the presence or absence of particular shapes or colours in a painting, are irrelevant from the point of view of belonging or not belonging to a given category. Contra-standard properties tend to disqualify a work from a given category.

I suggest that the presence or absence of properties belonging to these types also influence the interpretation and evaluation of photographs. For instance, until about the nineteen seventies most photographers used black and white film simply because that was the technology readily available to them. By 2016, however, colour technology has been available for decades. Colour in photography has been established as a standard long ago. Opting for the now contra-standard property of black and white today carries extra meaning; the choice is to be noticed, and the contra-standard is to be interpreted. Another example is the practice of staged photography to create images that seem to record spontaneous moments. While this is acceptable (variable) in some photographic genres, like fashion or fine art photography, it is highly contra-standard (to the extent of being forbidden) in other genres, like photojournalism and wild life photography.

In my talk I use a number of further examples to demonstrate how we can incorporate the system of standard, variable, and contra-standard properties into an account of relevance for photographic interpretation and evaluation. The account applies to both artistic (fine art) and non-artistic photographic genre categories.

Jochen Briesen
Knowledge, Understanding, and Art

The question whether art is of any epistemic value is an old question in the philosophy of art. Whereas many contemporary artists, art-critics, and art-historians answer this question affirmatively, many contemporary philosophers remain skeptical. If art is of epistemic significance, they maintain, then it has to contribute to our quest of achieving our most basic epistemic aim, namely knowledge. Unfortunately, recent and widely accepted analyses of knowledge make it very hard to see how art might significantly contribute to the quest of achieving this aim. Hence, by the lights of recent epistemology, it is highly questionable whether art is of any epistemic value.

In order to hold on to the epistemic value of art, one has three options: (a) reject the recent analyses of knowledge that make the epistemic value of art questionable, (b)

accept the recent analyses of knowledge but argue that they are compatible with the epistemic value of art, or (c) find another epistemic aim (besides knowledge) and show that art is of significant help in achieving this aim. In my presentation I will consider option (c). I will argue that, at least with respect to pictorial art, option (c) seems promising. Building on insights and ideas from Nelson Goodman on the one hand and Thomas Nagel on the other we can identify a certain kind of *objective understanding* as an epistemic aim to which pictorial art makes a significant contribution. Thus, I will claim that, even (or especially) by the lights of recent developments in epistemology, everybody interested in the epistemic significance of pictorial art should concentrate on the epistemic aim of understanding, rather than knowledge.

Humberto Brito **Knowledge of people» as aesthetic knowledge**

There must be a way of describing what is being right about the difference between an act of cowardice and an act of indifference, even if they look alike. As Wittgenstein suggested, judgments like «He boasted from vanity» are true possibly as often as they are false. Truthful or not, they describe the agent as a certain kind of person: one whose actions (or many of whose actions) can be accounted relative to more or less fixed second-natural dispositions: ‘P did/is doing q so and so; p is so and so’. I shall call this type of judgements second-natural judgments. Is correctness in second-natural judgments simply a matter of luck? In other words, are we ever right about a person’s character? Assuming that sometimes we are, this paper discusses what being right about others is like. To clarify what correctness in second-natural judgments is like — if we may speak of something as a «knowledge of people» — I will build on examples from Charles Dickens’s *A Christmas Carol*, and I will argue that being right about a person resembles what Wittgenstein famously called «noticing an aspect». Finally, I will propose that «knowledge of people» is an aesthetic mode of knowledge.

Rudi Capra **Bottura's "Not-Roast Guinea-fowl": three arguments supporting its artistic status**

In recent times, the debate surrounding the aesthetic status of food has gained increasing attention. While cuisine certainly produces an aesthetic experience, its possibility of constituting a genuine form of art is contested from several directions. Jonathan Jones in an article that appeared in *The Guardian* in 2011 claims that food will never “equal great art” mainly due to its irreducibly sensuous nature, whereas William Deresiewicz presents a similar opinion in the pages of the *New York Times*. Elizabeth Telfer states on the contrary that there are excellent reasons for which we should consider cuisine a form of art, even if a minor one. Furthermore, this topic has also been explored in recent volumes and essays by numerous philosophers. In this short paper I advocate in favour of the possibility of food holding an artistic status under certain conditions. Nonetheless, due to the length and the complexity of

this topic I will not pursue abstract universal principles by means of general discourses. Instead, I will consider a single dish and elaborate the reasons for which it should be considered, on par with great paintings, sculptures or musical compositions, a genuine artwork. The considered dish is “not-roast guineafowl” by Massimo Bottura, a renowned chef who led his restaurant, “Osteria Francescana”, to second place in the world’s best restaurants list proposed by the British magazine *Restaurant*.

Brandon Cooke

The Ethical Status of Fictive Imagining

A fiction prompts us to imagine that what the fiction describes is the case. It also prompts to respond in particular ways. Sometimes, a fiction will describe an unethical act and prompt us to be amused or take pleasure in or feel some pro-attitude toward the fictional unethical act. On these grounds, many have claimed that a work that does this is itself ethically flawed. I argue that this is a mistake.

The view that it is wrong to pleurably imagine something unethical in the context of fictional engagement flies in the face of common sense. It flattens the ethical distinction between a children’s game of cops and robbers and the real thing, between delight in the fictional criminal’s successful heist and approval of real wrongdoing, and between the consensual role-playing of non-consensual sex and actual rape. It disapproves of our amusement at a fictional witty put-down, because enjoying actual ridicule is bad. The result is a kind of moralistic outlook that views pleasure in fictional bad behavior as disreputable at best, and (in Plato’s judgment) something to be avoided altogether.

Fictive imagining has a special ethical status. As long as it meets certain conditions (which I attempt to specify), there is no basis for condemning taking pleasure in fictively imagining unethical acts. Our engagement with fiction allows for imaginative activity that includes responding with pleasure or approval toward fictively imagined unethical acts, and fictions that do this are not thereby ethically flawed. By contrast, a fiction that is crafted to foster the uptake of extra-fictional unethical beliefs or attitudes is ethically flawed.

Exercising our capacity for fictive imagining is intimately connected to our psychological well-being. Given this connection, if ethics has some connection to well-being, then it turns out that a censorious attitude toward fictive imagining is itself unethical.

Willie Costello

What moralists in aesthetics must (and yet cannot) prove

Artworks would seem to be subject to moral appraisal: we are accustomed to talking about the moral character of a work of art, and we frequently criticize those artworks we find morally objectionable. What’s less obvious is whether such criticisms are (merely) moral judgments, or aesthetic judgments as well – that is, whether an artwork’s moral defects are ever also aesthetic defects. Many contemporary philosophers of art have claimed that they are – that, at least in some cases, our moral evaluation of a work of art has (or should have) a direct effect on our aesthetic

evaluation of that work. Call this thesis ‘moralism’. This paper challenges the most promising version of moralism on offer (the version popularized by Noël Carroll, Berys Gaut, and others), which claims that moral defects are aesthetic defects at least in those cases where the moral defect involves the *perspective* the work manifests, recommends, and/or endorses. I argue that, although moralists are correct to focus on this sort of moral defect (as it is the only sort of moral defect of potential aesthetic relevance), they have failed to show that it is the *immorality* of the perspective itself that we object to aesthetically in such cases. Until this is done, the case for moralism has not been made – and in fact, I contend, there are good reasons for thinking that it cannot be done at all.

David Davies

The role of generalization in art history

“How is a piece of criticism to be assessed, and what determines whether it is adequate?”. I take as a case study Michael Baxandall’s defence of the ‘inferential criticism’ of paintings. Baxandall maintains that to historically explain an artifact is to represent it as a solution to problems arising in a situation. But in the case of artworks the ‘problems’ usually arose in a creative process largely inaccessible to us. We must therefore ‘*posit*’ an intentional process issuing in the art object. But what constraints govern this ‘positing’ and how are they to be justified?

I first consider a different context in which we must reconcile the need for interpretation with the demands of explanation. Clifford Geertz insists that understanding other cultures requires ‘thick descriptions’ of cultural practices that, while offering a scientific analysis of them, preserves their significance for practitioners. This requires an intelligible frame in which to place a set of presumptive signifiers, a ‘frame’ itself justified by its ability to play this role in ethnographic interpretive practice. Thus we justify a theoretical framework for doing ethnography pragmatically: given a legitimate cognitive interest of type *x*, a given set of heuristic principles for arriving at interpretations is justified through serving that interest.

I argue that this conception of how we justify our interpretive practice also explains Baxandall’s approach to justifying inferential criticism. Baxandall provides conceptual foundations for inferential art history by identifying a set of heuristic principles to guide the inferential critic. Taken together, these principles can be seen as providing something like an ‘intelligible frame’ for arriving at ‘thick descriptions’ of works of visual art that posit not merely process, but a particular kind of process, where individuals act intentionally in an artistic problem-space. As with Geertz, we can defend this way of proceeding pragmatically.

Stephen Davies

Aesthetics in cross-cultural perspective

I subscribe to two intuitions about the appreciation of art that plainly are in tension. Artworks are embedded in culturally relative art-historical contexts and cannot be fully understood without an awareness of these contexts. Accordingly, art is not cross-culturally transparent. The second intuition maintains that artworks trade in themes

that are universally and perennially of human interest and shape these to cater to shared, biologically based perceptual systems. Accordingly, much art is cross-culturally approachable.

These intuitions can be reconciled, I think, by introducing some qualifications. To be fully understood and appreciated, art must be considered by cultural insiders with a relevant knowledge of its art-historical and wider cultural location. But much art can be understood and appreciated to a partial extent by cultural outsiders on account of its broader human appeal.

Matthew Decoursey

Dramatic Tension as an Aesthetic Category

'Dramatic tension' is an important term of reference in folk aesthetics. When people talk about narrative forms of art, they frequently use it as a term of evaluation: it is damning to say that a film or a play 'lacks dramatic tension'. And yet, despite recent publications about the aesthetics of theatre, the term seems to have no status in philosophy, remaining unrelated to other aesthetic categories. This paper will set out to right that deficiency.

My starting point will be a passage from Lessing's *Laokoon*, in which he asserts that the material limitations of painting and sculpture require careful thought about any dramatic scene to be presented. His view is that in the sculpture *Laokoon*, the moment of death is not the right one to portray. He claims that it is more effective to portray, as the sculpture does, a moment before the moment of death, since this provokes 'free play' (*freies Spiel*) of the imagination in the onlooker. This paper will argue that this observation can found a more general view of dramatic tension, and allows us to relate dramatic tension to the tradition of philosophical aesthetics. I will refine Lessing's formulation by arguing that dramatic tension requires focus as well as free play, and that the idea of focus that emerges from this inquiry can help us to relate emotion and imagination to the aesthetic force of dramatic artworks.

Damla Dönmez

Environmental Sublime: From Aesthetics to Ethics

This paper is about the concept of Sublime and its environmental ethical implications. I claim that sublime, as an aesthetic concept; is helpful to give us moral motivation for preservation of nature. We have a paradoxical relation with nature; we are both a part of, and alien to it. Hence, I claim sublime is a specific aesthetic concept that can help us unveil this paradoxical relation due to its peculiar dual character causing both pleasure and displeasure. For that reason, it can give insight how to adopt, adjust and accommodate to the environmental problems. First, with its displeasure effect, it can point to the "Otherness," of Nature and induce (1) humility and (2) respect and second, with its pleasurable effect, it can reveal our "Oneness," with nature and create (1) attentiveness/sensitivity and (2) compassion/love for Nature. The objections against sublime fall into four different categories, (1) epistemological, it is epistemologically inaccessible, (2) historical, it is an outdated concept that has no relevance in the contemporary agenda, (3) metaphysical, sublime is same with

religious experience, and (4) ethical, sublime is self-regarding, anthropocentric and creates distance with nature. Against these I defend sublime, (1) as a concept of language trying to bridge the gap between the world and us, (2) nature is the original sublime and it can never be exhausted, (3) ideas and feelings can have associations, but this does not undermine the fact that sublime is; aesthetic and secular, with no necessary dependence on a divine being and (4) does not create distance, but accepts the difference and commonality with Nature, and is not *anthropocentric*-centered on humans, but *anthropogeneric* - generated by humans.

Petteri Enroth

The Cruelty of Form? Notes on the Social-Theoretical Aspects of Adorno's Aesthetics

Adorno's aesthetic theory has received rather constant attention since the end of the 1990's. This newest wave of reception has moved away from the influence of post-structuralism, but still considerations on Adorno's social theory, an *a priori* condition of his theory of art, remain largely marginal. Paying attention to this social-theoretical background helps to clarify our understanding of the conditions, and hence of the scope, actuality and limitations, of Adorno's aesthetics. These limitations do not, however, so much ground a dismissal of his view of the essence of art in modern society as a continuation of it, and in any case offer useful points of departure for rethinking the sociality of art.

Adorno's first writings after his *Habilitationsschrift* were articles on the sociology of music, most notably "On the Social Situation of Music" (1932) and "On Jazz" (1936). These texts' terminology is very Marxist, but their analysis of music is not inherently premised on a theory of capitalism, but rather on anthropological and theological assumptions: the terminology seems rather superimposed on Adorno's argument to support his own aesthetic preferences. Logically, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947) seemingly socio-political analysis gives way to an anthropological perspective on the condition of humanity. This condition is not viewed by Adorno and co-author Horkheimer to be a matter of specific societies and politico-economic organization, but a matter of the corruption of reason in the history of civilization. Reason, as the attempt to identify that which is non-identical, is the common factor that runs through mythical constructs and organized religion all the way to modern science, and this has been reflected in human praxis, too, which has developed towards ever more rigid domination of both the inner and the outer world. Hereby, reason is equivalent with the domination of nature, both that within and outside subjects, and this is the immutable, anthropological matrix connecting all of humanity. After *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the writers' intention of producing another book that would provide both a more detailed material theory of the post-war, administered exchange society and a positive concept of enlightenment was never acted upon. Regarding such a positive concept of enlightenment, there are only hints in Adorno's writings to one notion: reconciliation with nature. Adorno never defined this highly important notion clearly, and hereby his cultural critique and negative aesthetics are foregrounded only provisionally.

This anthropological background is clear in *Aesthetic Theory*. For example, Adorno holds that ugliness in modern art is not something represented, but neither is it merely a matter of form in a simple sense. Rather, ugliness is in the foreground in modern art

because the aesthetic labour that brings the artwork into existence is itself something ugly because it is *cruel*: aesthetic production shares with production in the social sphere the “same utopian teleology”, one that is concerned with the arrangement of material into a whole, a closed totality. In short, the domination of nature is the common denominator of art and society: “As Nietzsche knew, art’s own gesture is cruel. In aesthetic forms, cruelty becomes imagination: Something is excised from the living, from the body of language, from tones, from visual experience. The purer the form and the higher the autonomy of the works, the more cruel they are. ... What art in the broadest sense works with, it oppresses: This is the ritual of the domination of nature that lives on in play.” (AT, 65) This connection with domination is also why, for Adorno, the impression of ugliness in industrial landscapes persists even when built according to the ideals of functional form. One senses the ugliness of the *principle* behind the landscape: “Ugliness would vanish if the relation of man to nature renounced its repressive character, which perpetuates ... the repression of man” (AT, 61—62).” Throughout *Aesthetic Theory*, artworks appear as instances of sensually mediated reason and therefore must become auto-critical assemblages of disintegrating forms; this is how they emphasize their own corruptness and anticipate redemption as reconciliation with nature, the non-identical.

In short, Adorno’s theory of modern art holds on two conditions. One, if we accept that the fundamental condition of modern social reality is a structure of reason that predates and transcends different forms of modern societies; and two, if we accept that the yardstick for the ethical progress of human thought and praxis is reconciliation with nature. This basic structure in Adorno’s thought brings forth specific possibilities for reassessing the sociality of art. First, if one questions the prevalence of dominating reason as the pseudo-transcendental foundation of societies, it becomes arguable that the principle of artistic labour is always-already compromised as a form of domination. Second, if one doubts the implicit link between a reasonable social reality and nature, then the negativity of artworks becomes undermined and their discursive aspects can be appreciated more delicately. In both cases, Adorno’s negatively grounded emphasis on the formal organization of artworks becomes arguable, and representation is allowed space as a valid aspect of art’s social character. This does not, however, in any way necessitate giving up the concept of autonomy that is, precisely because it is problematic, central in Adorno’s aesthetics. The concept of autonomy cannot be gotten rid of when dealing with artistic phenomena, no matter how social reality is understood.

Jonathan Fine

Before the Eyes of Others: Platonic Lessons in Beauty and Shame

What, philosophically, can we learn from the close connections between beauty and shame in Plato? In pursuing this question, I aim to explicate the distinctive *social* dimension of beauty in Plato and to suggest its potential implications for contemporary aesthetics. The social dimension of beauty (*to kalon*) resides in its role within practices of shame and honour: the concept governs how one conceives of and presents oneself in community and contest with others. This dimension of beauty, I argue, is fundamental to the aesthetic education at *Republic* 2-3: specifically, a fundamental reason one must learn to love beauty is that one must desire to *appear* and be admired as beautiful. This desire finds chief expression in shame and honour;

their ethical significance for Plato depends on his conviction that virtue is a *public* affair lived *before the eyes of others*. After I show how Plato makes vivid the relations between beauty, shame, and self-presentation, I suggest two ways this strand of thought may prove fruitful, despite or perhaps because of its historical distance, for recent attempts to reconsider the scope and nature of aesthetic experience. First, by not disentangling affective aspects of beauty from the performance of beautiful *deeds*, Plato offers the lineaments of a critique of dominant models of aesthetic experience which privilege the perspective of a (disinterested) spectator. Second, the emphasis on *beautification* in his account serve as a vital reminder that the concept of beauty pervades the everyday social world of cosmetics, dress, decorum and so forth – extending beyond realms of art and nature into our social, ethical, and political lives as a whole, lives lived in concert with others and before their eyes.

Ashley Fleshman

Between Realism and Expressionism: Lukács on totality in the work of art

In order to open a discussion concerning the intersection between social epistemology and Marxist literary aesthetics, this paper focuses on the 1938 exchange between Ernst Bloch and Georg Lukács with the intention of showing that the intellectual labor attributed by Lukács to realist authors is prefigured by Marx's methodological remarks on the critique of political economy in *Notebook M*. Lukács' Marxist-Leninist epistemological commitments lead him to articulate a theory of reflection and a method of critique which is consistent with Marx's own, but results in Lukács' claim that realist literature is the privileged site for the representation of the totality of objective reality and thereby the site of critique. Rather than simply dismiss Lukács' advocacy of realism as a consequence of his Stalinist affiliation, this paper takes seriously the connections between Lukács' epistemological claims and the Marxist aesthetics he is working to develop. Following this line of inquiry, I will begin by demonstrating the confluence of the realist author's appropriation of knowledge of the totality of social reality, as articulated by Lukács, with Marx's account of the method of historical materialism. Next, I will recount the nature of the objective totality of capitalist social relations as expressed by Lukács and Bloch in '38. Ultimately, I argue that Lukács' characterization of the dialectical unity of form and content in the artwork leads him to privilege realism over the entirety of literary modernism because, for him, modernism relies either upon externally imposed form or the insufficiency of immediate experience, like the classical political economists subject to Marx's critique. According to Lukács, realist literature is uniquely equipped to present the full richness of the totality of social relations to the reading masses as an immediacy to be effortlessly appropriated because it achieves the proper articulation of the dialectical unity of form and content.

Abel B. Franco

Architecture As Space for Our Happiness: The Intentionality of Our (Daily) Aesthetic Emotion Towards Inhabitable Spaces

This paper is about our daily aesthetic evaluation of architecture: about *what* we are evaluating exactly and *in reference to what*; and whether this should be of relevance for the philosopher of art (or of architecture). I will (attempt to) defend that our daily aesthetic evaluation of architecture *as architecture* is (1) an evaluation, not of objects (physical structures) or of relations among objects, but of *spaces* and *relations between spaces*—including non-contiguous and, very specially, *concentric* relations (spaces within spaces); an evaluation, in particular, (2) insofar as they (those spaces and their relations) appear to us as significant regarding their potential contribution to the realization of our current *ideal of living*. And (3) I will also suggest that, insofar as this evaluation is of an *emotional* nature, that emotional component could be what some philosophers of art have considered “aesthetic emotion” when it comes to architecture.

Regarding (1) I will defend that whether we enter (or inhabit) buildings (i.e. inhabitable spaces) or not, our relation to them depends not only (a) on what we *can do* in and with them (their *uses* and imagined possibilities of use), but also on (b) the fact that we *perceive* the building *in relation to other inhabitable spaces*. Regarding (2) I will defend that these “spaces” and “relations” are, in turn, relevant insofar as they are *perceived as good for* our (very personal, very unique and frequently changing) *ideal of life* (i.e. our happiness). I will appeal mainly to the analysis and explanation of our individual experience and behavior. What is behind the “I like this place to live in” is the question. And regarding (3), I will defend that the emotion we could call “aesthetic emotion” *towards inhabitable spaces* appears to be one that exhibits the very distinctive feature of being *very close* to our very *experience of its functionality* (for our happiness).

Nils Franzén

Aesthetic Evaluation and first-hand experience

As a number of theorists have noted, evaluative aesthetic statements presuppose that the speaker has had first-hand experience with the object. This is shown by the fact that statements like

(1) This lasagna is very tasty

(2) Dejeuner sur l'herbe is an exquisite painting

sound strange when combined with statements to the effect that one lacks first-hand experience of the object (“...but I haven’t tasted it/haven’t seen it). I call this phenomenon “the acquaintance inference”. In this talk, I suggest an explanation of the acquaintance inference dubbed “The alternative speech act view”. According to the suggestion, evaluative aesthetic statements carry *expressive* illocutionary force: they serve to express positive and negative attitudes of the speaker, evinced by the object of the judgement.

The explanation of the acquaintance inference in terms of rules for speech acts fits well with the linguistic evidence. The acquaintance inference resists explanations that appeal to both presuppositions and Gricean implicature. This has led theorists like Ninan (2014) to suggest that the phenomenon should be explained by the knowledge

rule for assertion. It is argued that the knowledge rule explanation fails, but that the general structure of the explanation in terms of norms for speech acts, is correct.

Manuel García-Carpintero
Norms of Fiction-Making. The Fictionality of Films

I defend a version of the *prescriptions to imagine* account of fiction from recent criticisms by Stacie Friend, focussing on the case of the distinction between fictional films and documentaries. Like Currie and the other writers, I propose to think of fictions as (results of) speech acts; unlike them, however, I adopt a normative characterization, assuming an Austinian account of such acts in contrast to the Gricean account in terms of communicative intentions that these authors rely on. Independently of the present dispute, a normative account fares better relative to the intentionalism/conventionalism debate about the interpretation of fictions, or so I argue.

Antoni Gomila
An interactionist view of the morality of music

This paper offers an answer to the question of the morality of music. There are many examples, from different times and cultures, of praising or forbidding some kinds of music for its moral standing (positive or negative). So the question is how is this possible --against formalism, which rejects that it is possible, and deems these attitudes as some sort of categorical error. As a matter of fact, it is even possible that the same music may be highly valued (by some, at some moment), and denigrated (by others, or at some other moment). This phenomenon of moral ambiguity is exemplified by the Argentinian march, «La marcha de San Lorenzo», which is played in military parades, was part of the soundtrack of the film «Hidden Agenda» by Ken Loach, and was used as part of the torture procedure during the Argentinian dictatorship. To account for this phenomenon, an interactionist view of the morality of music will be presented, whose main idea is that, while the formal properties of music do not determine a moral dimension, the intention and the context in which its performance takes place, do provide it with such a dimension. A slightly different way to express this idea is to say that one and the same piece of music may convey different moral attitudes depending on some relational properties of their respective performances, which have to do with the pragmatic factors involved (context, intention, common knowledge).

Eran Guter
Toward an aesthetics of new media environments

In this paper I suggest that, over and above the need to explore and understand the technological newness of computer art works, there is a need to address the aesthetic significance of the changes and effects that such technological newness brings about

considering the whole environmental transaction pertaining to new media, including what they can or do offer and what users do or can do with such offerings, and how this whole package is integrated into our living spaces and activities. I argue that, given the primacy of computer-based interaction in the new media, the notion of ‘ornamentality’ indicates the ground-floor aesthetics of new media environments. I locate ornamentality not only in the logically constitutive principles of the new media (hypertextuality and interactivity), but also in their multiform cultural embodiments (decoration as cultural interface). I utilize Kendall Walton's theory of ornamentality in order to construe a puzzle pertaining to the ornamental erosion of information in new media environments. I argue that insofar as we consider new media as conduits of real life, the excessive density of ornamental devices which is prevalent in certain new media environments, forces us to conduct our inquiries under (...) conditions of neustic uncertainty, that is, uncertainty concerning the kind of relationship we, the users, have to the propositional content mediated. I conclude that this puzzle calls our attention to a peculiar interrogatory complexity inherent in any game of knowledge-seeking conducted across the infosphere, which is not restricted to the simplest form of data retrieval, especially in mixed-reality environments and when the knowledge sought is embodied mimetically. I suggest that this puzzle calls upon us to consider what would be a viable logic of virtual discovery.

Peter Hajnal

Medium and materiality: a particularist approach

Developing a proper account of the relationship between the medium of a visual work of art and its materiality remains one of the most intractable problems of philosophical aesthetics. Efforts on the part of philosophers and art-historians to tackle the disturbing cleavage within our way of treating art typically fail to present through concrete instances how works of art exemplify – in a theoretically pertinent way – the mutual interdependence of materiality and their abstractly defined medium. Some of the most interesting treatments of the relationship of materiality and medium in recent years have been put forward by scholars intent on reviving the Hegelian account of painting ((Pippin 2014) and (Podro 1998)). We propose enriching this discussion relying on two further thinkers who have made important contributions to the theory of artistic media along neo-Hegelian lines: Stanley Cavell and Georg Lukács (d.1973). Pairing the work of these two thinkers inspires a view of the medium as both experimental and self-reflexive in its most important instances, i.e. in those instances when it is intrinsic to the meaning of concrete works of art that they are equally “about” the medium in an aesthetic and a material sense.

It will be argued that, for instance, it is just such an account of the self-reflexivity of the medium shared by Lukács and Cavell that allows for overcoming the artificial ideological separation of the aims of Quattrocento perspectivism and Modernism (even apparent in (Jay 1988)) in favour of a “naïve” approach. Such an account would also demonstrate that seminal works of Quattrocento and early Modernist art straddling the divide between sculpture and painting eloquently make it their agenda to refuse any understanding of the newness of their media that does not take into account their material mode of existence.

Nora Heinzelmann
Value judgements in the brain

This paper aspires to make contributions to two disconnected debates in philosophy and the sciences, respectively. Both debates are concerned with the nature of value judgements.

In philosophy, the debate can be roughly sketched as follows. Kant argued that a truly aesthetic judgement arises from a disinterested pleasure about the object of evaluation. Such an aesthetic judgement is thus, according to Kant, essentially different from a mere “judgement of the agreeable” about, say, the prettiness or ugliness of another human being’s appearance. Kant explicitly distanced himself from Hume who believed that an aesthetic judgement is an expression of a sentiment of approval or disapproval.

This is not the only way in which Kant differentiated himself from Hume. Hume also thought that moral judgements were, similarly to aesthetic ones, expressions of approval or disapproval. In contrast, Kant argued that truly moral judgements were made out of reverence for the moral law and thus, again, essentially different from aesthetic judgements.

In the sciences, there has been an ongoing debate about the nature of values or reward signals that guide human behaviour and decision making. A predominant view holds that the human brain processes all kinds of values as one integrated signal. It is still unclear precisely how it does that. However, some researchers have argued that specific brain regions such as the OFC are selectively engaged in aesthetic judgement making. In a similar vein, dual-process theorists of moral judgement have suggested that there are different kinds of moral judgements which are processed by two distinct systems in the brain.

To make contributions to both debates, my colleagues and I conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study. We showed participants pictures of art which depicted more or less morally salient actions. Whilst undergoing brain scanning, participants rated the beauty or ugliness of the pictures and, separately, the moral goodness or badness of the action depicted.

We found that similar regions are active when people make aesthetic and moral judgements, respectively. This seems to indicate that Hume, rather than Kant, was right. It also lends support to the view that the brain uses one single system to process different kinds of values.

Marina Hervás Muñoz
Phenomenological approach to sound art: on some problems in Salome Voegelien’s attempt

Nowadays it seems that there is a primacy of a phenomenological position when it comes to understanding sound art projects, from both artists and theoreticians. However, it seems that neither the concept nor the works are clear on what phenomenology means in sound art. Until today, it was also not demonstrated why this framework could be more adequate for understanding what is happening in creations through and with sounds. In this text we attempt to approach the ideas collected in Salome Voegelin’s book *Listening to noise and silence* (2010), as it aspires to develop – as she suggests in the subtitle- a philosophy of sound art. In

general terms, Voegelin attempts to translate some of the most important contributions of classical phenomenology to sound art. She theorizes on the possibility of the “sound-in-itself”, which comes “before [the] distortion by rationality and knowledge”. She tries to base her theories on reception and the primacy of the subject. For our analysis, we will focus on three topics, namely: listening, materiality of sound and time. Therefore, this paper has two main aims. On the one hand, it will show some of the theoretical problems of this phenomenology of sound art. On the other hand, we will discuss about the primacy of the reception that she seems to have in her project. In contrast, we suggest an approach to sound art from the standpoint of an Adornian tradition (which is not reduced exclusively to Adorno’s works). That is to say that the proposal of this research is to relativize the role of the reception and think *from* the materiality of sound and its construction in sound art projects from a material perspective. It seems that a phenomenology approach prioritizes the subject pole and tends to forget the role of the object and the mutual relation between subject and object. We refuse the development of a framework which repeats some of the idealistic maxims, as it seems to be in this phenomenological attempt.

Xiaoyan Hu

The Notion of ‘Qi Yun’ (spirit consonance) in Chinese Classic Painting

‘Spirit consonance engendering a sense of life’ (Qi Yun Sheng Dong) as the first law of Chinese classic painting originally proposed by Xie He (active 500-535?) in his six laws of painting, has been commonly echoed by numerous later Chinese artists up to this day.

Tracing back the meaning of each character of ‘Qi Yun Sheng Dong’ from Pre-Qin till the Six Dynasties, along with a comparative analysis on the renderings of ‘Qi Yun Sheng Dong’ by experts in Western academia, I establish ‘spirit consonance’ as the rendering of ‘Qi Yun’. By examining texts on painting by significant critics in Chinese art history, and by referring to specific works by painters from the Six Dynasties up to the Yuan Dynasty, the merits and demerits of the different interpretations by Western experts are presented and the essence of ‘Qi Yun’ is explored. Once the painter successfully captures ‘spirit consonance’ as the essential character or ‘internal reality’ of the object, and transmits it into the work, ‘Qi Yun’ further implies the expressive quality of the work beyond formal representation. Additionally, the fusion of expressive and representative functions also leaves space for further explaining the aesthetic interaction among artist, object, work, and audience.

From the Six Dynasties onwards, Chinese painters have practised the expressive pursuit beyond representation on the basis of the unification of ‘Qi Yun’ (spirit consonance) and formal representation, although spirit consonance was valued more highly than formal likeness. Due to both expressionistic qualities and representative elements in either Pre-Yuan art or Yuan art, it would be hard to accept Loehr’s (1970: 287–296) periodisation of Chinese painting, according to which ‘a new, unprecedented, expressionistic art’ suddenly and drastically sprang up in early Yuan, and subjective expressionism in Yuan art allegedly replaced objective realism in Song art.

Gioia Laura Iannilli

Everyday Aesthetics: institutionalization and “normative turn”

On September 30, 2015, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* published for the first time online the entry “Aesthetics of Everyday Life”, authored by Yuriko Saito. This contribution is emblematic of the institutionalization process that Everyday Aesthetics, a subfield of aesthetics that has so far been considered “subordinate” to art- or nature-centred aesthetics, has recently undergone, and that seems to have released it from its ancillary role, by officially recognizing its “academic dignity”. Nevertheless Saito, who mainly provides a socio-ethical interpretation of the subject matter, almost completely neglects a critical trend that has been developed in recent years in the field of the aesthetics of everyday life and that stresses two main aspects that I believe greatly contribute to the understanding of Everyday Aesthetics: the will to systematize its methodological approaches through a recognizable nomenclature, and the necessity for a “normative-intersubjective turn” that would avoid the risk of trivializing the aesthetic. Aim of this paper is therefore to address the relevance of such critical trend, to clarify some contradictions that I believe emerge from Saito’s words, and to show how, while Everyday Aesthetics is finally undergoing a process of academic institutionalization, it is still needed to identify and make its core concepts intelligible, as well as to find a common theoretical ground on which to build its critical assessment, goals that, I maintain, only the “normative-intersubjectivist” positions are fruitfully working towards.

Alma Itzhaky

Prospective and Retrospective Judgment: on the Role of Aesthetic Judgment in Arendt’s Theory of Action

In a famous series of lectures on Kant’s *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, Arendt develops the political significance implicit in judgments of taste, that resides in their defining moments: the possibility of appreciation without interest and without a representation of an end; and the possibility of non-conceptual agreement between individual judgments. Combined, these structural elements ground the possibility of a discursive community, whose communality is not based on interest, and whose discursivity is not subordinated to universal truth judgments.

There remains, however, a considerable ambiguity as to the actual role of judgment in political practice, and to the relations between action and judgment. While Arendt believes that aesthetic judgment provides the only suitable model for the appreciation of political action in hindsight, it is doubtful whether such judgments can *guide* action. Despite some contrary statements on this point, she generally maintains that action does not ensue from judgment. The contingent and unpredictable nature of political action implies that its meaning can only be understood after the fact, and that political actors cannot be expected to make valid judgments about their own actions in real time. In other words, “political judgment” would be contemplative rather than practical, and judging would be the task of historians and storytellers rather than political actors. This account seems to contradict the constitutive role of action and the privileging of the actor’s point of view in her earlier writings. The paper will propose a solution to this difficulty, relying on the specific temporality of political action in Arendt. The retrospective, contemplative stance of aesthetic judgment

correlates to the temporality of action which is itself informed by aesthetic models. It therefore reaffirms the model of political action developed in the early writings.

Jèssica Jaques

A Philosophical Reading of Brillat-Savarin's *The Physiology of Taste*

In the last decade, the gustatory aesthetics has emerged as a rapidly expanding philosophical territory and academic discipline. The bibliography dedicated to the subject comprises dozen of titles that are giving substance to this hybrid territory at the intersection of philosophy, gastronomy, aesthetics, and practical relations. These texts, which have notably been proliferating since 2005, take Carolyn Korsmeyer's 1999 book, *Making Sense of Taste*, as their genealogical point of reference.

The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the gustatory aesthetics have an earlier origin. I use the term "origin" here not only in the archaeological sense, but also to designate the foundational conceptual apparatus of a given discourse. In this sense, I will propose a philosophical reading of Brillat-Savarin's *The Physiology of Taste (Physiologie du goût, ou Méditations de gastronomie Transcendante; ouvrage théorique, historique et à l'ordre du jour, dédié aux Gastronomes parisiens, par un professeur, membre de plusieurs sociétés littéraires et savants, 1825)* as the originary text of the contemporary gustatory aesthetics (as some philosophers have already pointed out: Roland Barthes, Michel Onfray and Carolyn Korsmeyer)

To this end, I will adduce some of the main Brillat's inputs to contemporary gustatory aesthetics.

1. The creation of a philosophical field
2. The claiming of physicality, orality, language and the reviled senses for the philosophical tradition, as well as of aesthetic synaesthesia.
3. The claim for the centrality of the body in philosophical accounts.
4. The recuperation of the platonic link between desire and the non-metaphorical use taste (the *Banquet* tradition).
5. The claim for a link between desire, absence and writing.
6. The claim that conviviality constitutes a variation of *fraternité* and of the Kantian *sensus communis*; disinterestedness, a variation of *liberté*; and the ethological dimension of nutrition, a variation of *égalité*.

László Kajtár

Intentions and Functions in Interpreting Narrative Art

Anglo-American philosophy of art has become dominated by the debate between different camps of intentionalists. They share the main tenet that works of art have to be interpreted with reference to intentions. In this paper, I make some distinctions that are important in carving out a qualified position in this discussion. I distinguish between narrative interpretation (what is going on in a story) and functional interpretation (why). I then concede that narrative interpretation indeed has to take intentions into consideration, however, I argue that functional interpretation does not. To substantiate this argument I distinguish between a narrow and a broad conception of communication based on the centrality of information and claim that artworks are

broadly communicational. Artworks have no simple purpose like the narrow sharing of information. If there are a multitude of possible purposes and most importantly, if artworks have no easily identifiable main purpose, then functional interpretation is not intentional.

Johan Kalmanlehto

Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's philosophy of art and the aesthetic experience of video games

Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's philosophy focuses almost entirely on the question of the subject and its deconstitution. I will provide an interpretation of his thought and introduce it to the notion of the subjectivity of a video game player. By examining Lacoue-Labarthe's account on the theatrical presentation of the self, I will propose that the self of a video game player cannot be stably located neither to the game-world nor the real world, because the subject is fundamentally heterogeneous and multiple. I will focus on Lacoue-Labarthe's text "Diderot: Paradox and Mimesis" (1989), in which he inspects Diderot's "Paradox of the Actor" and its Platonic-Aristotelian presuppositions in regards of the relation between subjectivity and mimesis. According to the paradox, the actor's ability to properly imitate everything is dependent of having no proper identity of her own. Lacoue-Labarthe thinks that this corresponds to the subject's status as an empty place through which multiple self-presentations traverse and that this kind of the empty ability for presenting all forms is a fundamental characteristic of human existence. I will argue that the act of playing a video game affirms the deconstitution of the subject by providing an example of the splitting that happens in the performative act of gameplay.

Khafiz Kerimov

The Time of the Beautiful: Kant on Lingerin

The project of Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* consists in the completion of a systematic comprehension of human experience by investigating the feeling of pleasure and displeasure in connection with reflecting judgment. The general definition of pleasure in Kant's third *Critique* runs something like the following: pleasure is the consciousness of the causality of the representation in relation to the subject's mental state to maintain itself in that state. This is what is common to every kind of pleasure: the consciousness of the endeavor to maintain itself in the state of mind. Kant calls this maintaining of pleasure *weilen* or lingering. But the pleasure of taste is not the same as the pleasure of the senses: while the former is disinterested, the latter has interest in the existence of the object. This is why Kant claims that lingering over the consideration of the beautiful is not identical with lingering over the object that is agreeable to the senses. Thus, the goal of this paper is to distinguish between the senses of *weilen*. But to introduce this distinction, it is necessary to highlight the difference between the judgment of taste and the cognitive judgment. The cognitive judgment is restricted to the task of determinate cognition. Thus, when the cognitive goal is accomplished, the judgment is finished, has achieved its culmination. The judgment of taste, by way of a contrast, is not restricted to

determinate cognition, therefore, it is capable of maintaining itself indefinitely, without culmination. The German verb *weilen* suggests precisely lingering, tarrying as well as delay and deferral. The judgment of taste thus opens up an altogether different time, one that unfolds in the free play between the cognitive faculties, outside the guidance of the concept. Such is the original sense of *weilen*; such is the time of the beautiful.

Hannah Laurens

Functions as Essences: an Aristotelian Analysis of Aesthetic Objects

How can a painting be beautiful? How can a melody be yearning? How can a statue be powerful? This paper explores an Aristotelian analysis of aesthetic objects, proposing that the aesthetic features of an artwork relate to its material constituents as form or essence to matter. Such an Aristotelian analysis of artworks would dissolve the classic problem of how aesthetic properties relate to the natural properties of a work of art. It does so by suggesting that aesthetic properties should not be understood as properties at all, but rather should be understood as constituting the essence of the objects they belong to. If the 'aestheticity' of an artwork is its essence, then the ontological dependence relation is turned round. The beauty of a work of art does not depend on its natural properties or materialization, but its materialization depends on its form. And how matter depends on form is an ontological relation that is explained within Aristotle's metaphysics. But why think that an Aristotelian analysis of artworks is appropriate at all?

Before asking the *how* of art, we should start with the *why* of art. When aesthetic objects are created their aestheticity is no accidental occurrence. When material elements are combined the expressiveness of the product is its *raison d'être* and its specific materialization is of secondary significance. An Aristotelian framework does justice to the essentiality of an artwork's expressive power and the subordinate role of its material constitution. An Aristotelian analysis of aesthetic objects recognizes the aestheticity of artworks as essential. What an artwork is for, is what it is: its function is its essence.

Marguerite La Caze

Kant on the beautiful, ethics, and love

There are a number of arguments scattered through Kant's work that aim to establish a connection between love of the beautiful and morality. My goal is to connect the most significant of these to build a picture of his concern with the topic, and to assess the arguments for their insight and their revelation of complexity of Kant as a thinker in aesthetics and ethics. Love of beauty and its relation to morality is discussed in Kant's *The Critique of Judgement*, as love of the beautiful, which prepares us to love without interest, in a way which is analogous to morality. This love has a complex relation to moral feeling through our search for a natural and moral order. In *The Metaphysics of Morals* Kant discusses the question of whether we have a duty to animals and nature generally or to God. In both cases, he argues that we in fact have a duty to ourselves, which we must understand as love of the beautiful. What's

important for my discussion here is that a proto-moral disposition to love the beautiful is posited by Kant, a love of the beautiful that indicates the crucial, if not predominant role, of emotions in Kant's aesthetics and moral philosophy. Finally, I consider love of the beautiful's role in the application of morals in the *Anthropology*. The role of love in Kant's ethics and aesthetics indicates that the enlightened person experiences love of the beautiful.

Lior Levy

Dynamic Imagination: A New Perspective on Sartre's L'iminaire

Jean-Paul Sartre's conception of imagination in *The Imaginary* seems to focus on imagination as a conscious activity that enables humans to break off from the real, negate or transcend the factual. The emphasis on the nihilating power of imagination gave rise to numerous criticisms, from Paul Ricoeur's claim that Sartre neglects the productive dimensions of imagination, dimensions which become most manifest in the creation of fiction (Ricoeur 1991, 167), to Edward Casey's argument that Sartre's theory of the analogon, the object that mediates perception and imagination, introduces presence into the (allegedly) purified field of consciousness (Casey 1991, 149).

In an attempt to defend Sartre's conception of imagination, numerous scholars explore the productive dimensions at work in his theory (Stawarska 2005; Levy 2014). However, both those who criticize his conception of imagination and those who defend it from such critiques, understand Sartrean imagination along the lines of the distinction between presence and absence, reality and "irreality". In this respect, both critics and supporters understand imagination through the binary oppositions that seem to dominate *The Imaginary*.

This paper argues this opposition does not exhaust the meaning assigned to imagination in the text. Though commonly ignored, *The Imaginary* outlines an alternative to the binary model of imagining as transcending the real. My aim here is to develop this alternative and present an account of imagining as an activity that enables the person imagining to be attuned to the world as a field of possibilities, which transgress the distinctions between presence and absence, reality and irreality. To achieve this end, I focus on Sartre's discussion of impersonations and actors.

Errol Lord

Knowing What It's Like: How to Save the Acquaintance Principle from Copies, the Imagination, and Abstracta

It's a truism in the epistemology of aesthetics that paradigmatic aesthetic knowledge requires *acquaintance*--call this the Acquaintance Principle. Like most truisms in philosophy, the Acquaintance Principle has been subject to serious criticism. In this paper I argue that three of the most formidable challenges are fueled by the assumption that one must be acquainted with *the art object* that one's judgment is about. I argue further that we can overcome these three challenges by adopting a different view, which says we are merely required to be acquainted with the relevant

properties of the object. Since other objects can share properties with the original, this view allows us to avoid the problems.

Vladimir L. Marchenkov

The Shape of History in G. W. F. Hegel's Aesthetics

In this paper I focus on the interplay of three different themes in G. W. F. Hegel's aesthetics: the theme of progress, decline, and stasis in the history of the arts. The progressivist dimension of this history is especially evident in the steadily increasing spiritualisation of art's material component, beginning with the material masses of architecture and culminating in the imaginary worlds of poetry. At the same time, Hegel tells the story of art's decline from the perfect balance of idea and sensuous embodiment in Classical Antiquity to the predominance of concept at the expense its physical representation, ending in art's loss of pride of place to philosophy. And, finally, the simultaneous presence of all three major types of art, Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic, at any given phase of the history of the arts, where only the relative dominance of one type over the others changes, is a story of art remaining essentially unchanged through the ages that is also woven into the fabric of Hegel's philosophy. Apparently contradictory as they are on their surface, these themes complement one another in Hegel's thought and their different shapes correspond to the key moments in the dynamics of Hegelian dialectical method. I trace the correspondences between the threads of Hegel's historical account of art and elements of his logic in order to understand how the two parts of his system lend support to each other. My ultimate goal, however, has less to do with an analysis of Hegel's thought as such than with an attempt to make sense of the contemporary situation in the history of the arts. I apply a Hegelian lens to Arthur Danto, Giorgio Agamben, and Jacques Rancière's similar attempts in order to illuminate the peculiarities of current thinking about this history.

Teresa Marques

Aesthetic predicates. A hybrid dispositional account

This paper explores the possibility of developing a hybrid version of dispositional theories of aesthetic values. On such a theory, uses of aesthetic predicates express relational second-order dispositional properties. If the theory is not absolutist, it allows for the relativity of aesthetic values. But it may be objected to on the grounds that it fails to explain disagreement among subjects who are not disposed alike. This paper explores the possibility of adapting recent proposals of hybrid expressivist theories for moral predicates to the case of aesthetic predicates. Hybrid expressivist theories make no explicit commitment about the kind of property expressed by the predicate, but make explicit commitments to implicated (or presupposed) expressive content. It is argued that dispositionalism about the properties expressed by aesthetic predicates, combined with expressive implicatures (or presuppositions), can account for aesthetic disagreements even in cases where subjects are not relevantly alike.

Jonathan Maskit
Everyday Aesthetics, Urbanity, and Climate Change

I pose this question: is there an unavoidable tension between an aesthetically fulfilling form of life and that form of life's ecological impact?

I consider two aspects of any form of life: its possibilities for aesthetic satisfaction and its ecological impact. Aesthetic satisfaction can be discussed in relation to particular experiences or for the form of life as a whole.

This holistic investigation opens the door to a comparative everyday aesthetics in which different (possible) forms of life are evaluated against each other, which requires some sort of normative principles. Ecological impact must also be confronted today. Can we change *how* we live without making our lives worse?

I next consider two forms of life: pre-war style urbanism (still found in many parts of the world) and post-war style suburbanism (which characterizes many contemporary cities). Pre-war style urbanism is characterized by a dense cityscape of multi-story buildings with multimodal transportation options: trains and subways, trams and buses, and pedestrian and (often) cyclepaths. Automobiles too are there, although the relationship between the car and the city is deeply problematic. Post-war style suburbanism is characterized by single-family homes on individual lots with workplaces in office parks and strip malls with private automobiles as the dominant transport mode.

Urban life is generally far more ecologically efficient than suburban. Yet, despite this efficiency, it offers a far more aesthetically complex and desirable lifestyle. The city offers experiences with alterity and novelty. It is also richer with the kinds of cultural institutions often pointed to when we think of aesthetic experience. Finally, dense cities are far more likely to produce culture than are less dense forms of life. For these reasons and others, at least some forms of ecologically less-impactful everyday life turn out also to be aesthetically richer and more fulfilling to live.

James Camien McGuiggan
'Artistic Delight' in Collingwood and Proust: Is It an Artistic Value?

Perhaps one of the most common and natural claims about art is that 'delight' or 'beauty' is among its core values. This is expressed particularly eloquently by Proust ('Chardin,' in *Contre Sainte-Beuve*) and David Foster Wallace (1993 interview with Larry McCaffery). However, it is emphatically and categorically denied by Collingwood (in his *The Principles of Art* (1938)), and in this talk, I attempt to arbitrate between Proust and Wallace's, and Collingwood's, positions. I argue that the most significant difference between the two accounts is that Collingwood's is more abstract. Proust attempts to capture our intuition concerning the artistic value of delight/beauty by saying that 'artistic delight' involves (the artwork, or us via the artwork) 'hoisting' pleasure in unlikely objects to our consciousness. So, for instance, we value Chardin (*inter alia*) because of how he makes us aware of pleasure we subconsciously take in humble domesticity. Collingwood differs on only one point: he thinks that the value lies entirely in the 'hoisting,' not also in the 'pleasure;' the artistic value would be the same in an artwork that was 'unpleasant,' as for instance in Picasso's *Guernica* or Dix's *Großstat*. I will defend Collingwood's position on the

grounds that our critical judgements of art such as Dix's *Großtat* accord with Collingwood's theory. In the final section of the talk, I will offer a 'conciliation': Collingwood's theory is not made objectionably brutal by its denial to delight of artistic value, because there does remain some room for delight in it: the artistic activity of 'hoisting' of emotions to consciousness is as such pleasant, and this pleasure can reasonably be called aesthetic.

Ivan Milić and Javier González de Prado Salas

An invitation to beauty: A double speech-act account of aesthetic statements

The paper offers a semantic and pragmatic analysis of statements of the form 'x is beautiful' as involving a double speech act: first, a report that x is beautiful relative to the speaker's aesthetic standard, along the lines of naive contextualism; second, the speaker's recommendation that her audience comes to share her appraisal of x as beautiful. We suggest that attributions of beauty tend to convey such a recommendation due to the role the aesthetic practices play in fostering and enhancing interpersonal coordination. Aesthetic practices are driven by a disposition towards the attunement of attitudes and aesthetic recommendations contribute to forwarding such attunement. Our view is motivated by an attempt to satisfy the following set of desiderata: to account for (i) the experiential nature of aesthetic judgments, (ii) disagreements in aesthetic debates, and (iii) the normative aspirations of aesthetic discourse, as well as to avoid appealing to (iv) error theory and (v) realist ontological commitments.

Regina-Nino Mion

Kant and Husserl on the aesthetic experience of pictures

It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl's aesthetics is nothing but a repetition of Kant's ideas on aesthetics. In my presentation, I endeavour to show that Kant and Husserl explain differently the aesthetic experience of pictures (paintings, photographs, also movies, etc). The difference is in the way Husserl explains 'neutralization' in aesthetic experience. For Kant, the judgment of taste must be without any interest in the existence of the thing ('disinterestedness'). For Husserl, however, the suspension of all existential attitudes must take place twice in aesthetic experience. As a result, Husserl argues for a double neutralization.

Neutralization (or neutrality modification) is the suspension of the positing of the world or a strict suspension of all existential attitudes. In pictorial experience (image consciousness), Husserl distinguishes the 'appearing image' from the 'depicted subject', and claims that the appearing image is neutralized (it is "a nothing", "a nullity") but the depicted subject is not always neutralized – we posit the existence of the depicted subject in documentaries and pictures of real-life persons. Now, the aesthetic attitude differs from 'normal' pictorial experience in this way that the depicted subject must also be neutralized. Thus, Husserl introduces a double neutralization.

There are two outcomes of the double neutralization. First, it provides an explanation of how documentaries and pictures of real life world are to be experienced

aesthetically, and, at the same time, it keeps the distinction between the experience of documentaries and fictional depictions. Second, it brings out the importance of non-analogising moments in the aesthetic experience of pictures, that is, moments that do not belong to the depicted subject but to the appearing image instead.

Annelies Monseré

How to argue for the ‘art’ in ‘popular art’

Popular art has been receiving more and more philosophical attention in recent decades. One issue that, unsurprisingly, often recurs is whether or not instances of popular art, such as comics, videogames, rock songs and films, potentially count as instances of art. This paper sets out to evaluate the way in which philosophers of art argue for the art status of certain popular art forms. In other words, are the arguments philosophers use to defend their art status sufficient and adequate?

There are mainly two ways in which philosophers of art have argued in favour of the art status of popular art: (1) by showing that such instances come out as art under recent definitions and theories of art and; (2) by debunking arguments against their art status. I argue that both strategies are unsatisfactory. The first strategy is based on several problematic assumptions, most notably, (a) there is broad agreement over the adequacy of proposed definitions of art and (b) definitions offer us tools for identifying art. The second strategy provides us insight into our current concepts of art, but fails to provide principled reasons to accept certain instances of popular art as art.

How, then, should one argue in favour of the art status of popular art? I will defend a different, normative, approach to this issue. Rather than suggesting that our current concept of art includes instances of popular art, I maintain that the defender of popular art should give reasons why it is important to include these artefacts in the domain of art.

In defending this position, I do not only hope to contribute to the debate on popular art, but also to the broader project of defining art.

Ancuta Mortu

Marginal attention and the aesthetic effect of inconspicuous art

Many authors have established a strong link between selective attention, the frontiers of art and aesthetic experience (Wolff, 1738/1756; Lessing, 1767-1769; Beardsley, 1958), arguing that works of art help us fix our attention and give us a privileged access to meaningful properties of the world. Nevertheless, art hasn’t always had the function to be maintained within focal attention, much less to evoke aesthetic feelings. In various settings, it was merely meant to provide the backdrop for activities that were not driven by an aesthetic urge. The main claim of this paper is that we should leave open the possibility that forms of art that do not impose themselves as such upon the observers may eventually have an aesthetic effect in the long run. How could such forms of what Munro (1957) calls “inconspicuous” art trigger an aesthetic experience? This also brings into question the relevance of faint or peripheral forms of attention for aesthetic appreciation and challenges most of the

theories available in philosophical aesthetics on the topic. The aim of this paper is to give an account of this marginal attention and of the conditions under which it can become a potential cause of aesthetic experience.

Caterina Moruzzi

An Alternative Account for the Ontology of Musical Works: Defending Musical Stage Theory

Established theories in musical ontology focus on only one of the *desiderata* for any adequate theory about the nature of musical works and resort to revisions and epicycles to address the others. The type-token model can explain the repeatability of musical works but it struggles to account for their epistemological grasp and creatability. In turn, Musical Perdurantism fares better than the type-token approach in certain respects but it still fails to overcome essential *desiderata*. The core of this essay is devoted to my proposal of a novel account for the ontology of musical works: Musical Stage Theory. I argue that the identification of musical works with single temporal stages/ performances accommodates at face-value the most commonsensical beliefs we hold about music, providing at the same time a profitable background for the analysis of an independently important *desideratum* in musical practice: the idea of authenticity.

Vítor Moura

Testing the Blending

Some cognitive accounts of the experience of theatre audiences (e.g., Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; McConachie, 2008) have been using the notion of “conceptual blending” in order to describe the way spectators combine distinct objective elements of a given actor – his voice, walk, gestures, or his overall persona – in order to build up their concept of the fictional character that is being played. This is both an exercise connected to the very core of human cognition, based on the ability to combine different perceptions and turn them into abstract concepts (Edelman & Tononi, 2000), and a deeply entertaining practice, already discernible in games of role-playing played by children after two years old. Theatrical blending is highly selective: each spectator chooses which characteristics of the actor belong to the conceptualization of the fictional character and which do not (e.g., by actively “ignoring” the fact that the character dies at the end of the play or by integrating the actor’s persona outside the current stage role). Blending is also a dynamic process and both actors and spectators will often oscillate in and out of their respective blends. For instance, spectators often abandon their actor / character blend so that they may better admire this actor’s vocal or gestural prowess.

This paper intends to measure the plausibility and the explanatory traction of the notion of “conceptual blending” as an account of theatrical experience. First, by assessing its novelty as a new definition of what is specific to theatre as an art form. Second, by placing theatrical blending side by side with other theories of art that portray artistic representation as a kind of “shuttle” or “fusion” between configuration

and content. Thirdly, by stating the contribution that the notion of blending may bring to the *vexata questio* of aesthetic experience.

Néill O’Dwyer

Death and Ecstasy: reflections on a technological sublime

Kant divides his aesthetic taxonomy of ‘the sublime’ into two categories: first, there is the ‘mathematical’ type, and secondly, the ‘dynamical’ genera, which is akin to scandal. The success that sublime experience sustained throughout twentieth century art can be primarily attributed to repeated attempts to scandalise. This paper is responding to Bernard Stiegler’s proposal that, in contemporaneity, the phenomenon of scandal is rendered obsolete. Such a postulation indicates that the demise of the dynamical sublime must submit to the ecstatic ascension of the mathematical type, that is, to the relationship between magnitude and the imagination. This paper offers cogitations on *why* the mathematical sublime becomes incredibly important to aesthetic experience in the digital epoch.

McCormick and Dorin (2001) argue that the ‘computational sublime’ operates on the basis of an inability to comprehend the speed of computers’ internal operations, and because they occur at a scale and in a space vastly different to the realm of direct human perception. This paper contends that what must be added to their hypothesis is the problem of machinic evolution qua Bernard Stiegler. There is a groundlessness introduced by digitally engaged art that gathers a sublimity founded on *the speed of technical evolution*, wherein the deceleration of biological human evolution gives way to an acceleration in the technical milieu that begins to map unthought possibilities and unknown dimensions within the ontogenetic reality of technicised poiësis. Digital-cultural works foreground the idea that the techno-human is subjected to a loss of nature and humanity, which bears the brunt of a transcendental pressure. This dehumanisation is modulated by an accelerating progressive destiny of technical prosthesis and the possibility for self-actualisation through technicised evolution, which is empirical in its reach but cannot be simply reduced to biology, anthropology or mechanics.

Michael O’Hara

Tracing the Invisible

In his seminal essay, ‘Eye and Mind’, Merleau-Ponty grounds his discussion on painting through the body. This leads toward a reconsideration of the visible and its reciprocal relationship with the invisible that pervades Merleau-Ponty’s last great unfinished work *The Visible and the Invisible* (2003). This relationship between both is articulated initially through his engagement with painting that generates an evocative response and late deconstructive reading of Merleau-Ponty by Jacques Derrida. In *Memoirs of the Blind* (1993), Derrida also marks the borders of this threshold between the visible and the invisible and turns to drawing as an art form that articulates an inherent blindness constantly at work in vision. This paper interrogates the particular deconstructive reading of Merleau-Ponty by Derrida through both philosophers’ engagement with the visual arts.

In this paper, I will articulate Merleau-Ponty's notion of the *chiasmatic* relationship between the visible and invisible to deflect the deconstructive critique of Merleau-Ponty. For Derrida, the 'trace' of drawing is always haunted by an ambiguity, the aporia at the heart of vision itself. I contend that such an ambiguity is already articulated by Merleau-Ponty inherent in the visible, marked by the opacity of the body; "[...] the untouchable of the touch, the invisible of vision, the unconscious of consciousness (its central punctum caecum, that blindness that makes it consciousness [...]) (Merleau-Ponty, 2003, p. 255) I will argue it is an ambiguity never fully explored in Derrida's deconstructive analysis of Merleau-Ponty. For Merleau-Ponty, the visible is not traced after the fact, as it is for Derrida, but reborn out of the spread of the invisible. While Merleau-Ponty insists on embodiment as the disclosive force between the visible and invisible, Derrida remains on the side of textual surface.

Panos S. Paris

On the Possibility of Moral Beauty

Although both formative of aesthetics as a discipline, and crucial in the development of ethical thought, very few philosophers today take seriously, and hardly any accept, the moral beauty view, according to which the moral virtues are beautiful, and the moral vices ugly character traits. The moral beauty view is said to tread on loose talk or rest on a category mistake. The assumption underlying these claims is that objects like the moral virtues and vices simply cannot be beautiful and ugly. I think that this assumption is mistaken and misleading. Instead, I argue, if an object has form, then it can be beautiful or ugly; virtues and vices have form; therefore, virtues and vices can be beautiful or ugly: moral beauty and ugliness is possible.

Mariagrazia Portera

A missing piece in Evolutionary Aesthetics' puzzle: epistemological and methodological remarks

A lack of empirical evidence has been frequently ascribed, as one of its main shortcomings, to Evolutionary Aesthetics. According to more than a few scholars, aesthetics and the arts are topics where a set of very different hypotheses about their evolutionary significance are in competition, with none clearly established as superior to all others. But is this lack of "clear evidence" a mere question of contingency (to be overcome in the future, as long as the knowledge of our evolutionary origins increases) or is it - at least partially - somehow intrinsic to the topic (the evolution of the aesthetic and the arts)? Which level of evidence Evolutionary Aesthetics, as an interdisciplinary research program, *can* and *is allowed* to aspire to? Once one admits that, in Evolutionary Aesthetics, the relevant facts will be settled by empirical studies on human evolution, how to escape the risk of unilateral reductionism (or, on the other hand, that of a mere, frankly extrinsic, juxtaposition between philosophical issues and scientific/biological issues)? The paper aims at sketching the outlines of an epistemological and methodological discourse on Evolutionary Aesthetics, under the

assumption that such a discourse might contribute to reduce the degree of haziness in the field.

Aviv Reiter

Kant on Fine Art, Genius and the Threat of Nonsense

Wittgenstein's private language argument claims that language and meaning generally are public. It also contends with our appreciation of artworks and reveals the deep connection between originality and the temptation to think of original meaning as private. This problematic connection of ideas is found already in Kant's theory of fine art. For Kant, the beauty of art is adherent, for judgments of (most) artworks presuppose identifying the content they are meant to convey. But if artistic beauty requires identifying what the artwork expresses, what makes judgments of it reflective rather than determinative? The answer lies in the notion of genius, the capacity to envision original and inexhaustible meaning. This capacity explains how the identification of the content presented in an artwork does not exhaust it and indeed allows for endlessly productive reflection upon it. But true originality comes at a high price: the assumption of meaning visible to the artist alone. For Kant conceives of the capacity of imaginatively envisioning original content as prior to and independent of finding the artistic means of communicating this content to others. This leaves us with the question of whether we can conceive of art as both original and meaningful without succumbing to privacy.

Alan Roberts

Humour Is A Funny Thing

This paper considers the question of how immoral elements in instances of humour affect their funniness. Comic ethicism is the position that each immoral element negatively affects funniness and if their cumulative effect is sufficient, then funniness is eliminated. I focus on Berys Gaut's central argument in favour of comic ethicism; the merited response argument. Noël Carroll has criticized the merited response argument as illegitimately conflating comic merit with moral merit. I argue that the merited response argument, and hence comic ethicism more generally, is vulnerable to Carroll's criticism only if the comic ethicist fails to distinguish between three closely-related but distinct concepts; humour, amusement and funniness. By providing separate accounts of these three concepts, I explain how Carroll's criticism is unsuccessful. In summary, by accepting my distinctions between humour, amusement and funniness, it becomes clear that comic ethicism is the right position.

Salvador Rubio Marco
Expressiveness, Ineffability, and Comparisons

The basic claim of the thesis of ineffability is that works of art possess expressive qualities that cannot be captured by literal language, or by any language at all, literal or nonliteral.

The distinction between descriptive (or semantic) and communicative effability (after Kennick) seems to provide a solution and concedes a practical power to comparisons (and other kinds of indirect descriptions) in order to communicate about expressive qualities or nuances.

On the other hand, many scholars (Spackman and Roholt, for example) think that expressive qualities can be captured *demonstratively* by means of predicative expressions involving demonstrative concepts, even if they remain *descriptively* (or *semantically*) ineffable. Both seem to accept at the same time that comparisons are implicitly demonstrative.

The contextualist framework which is really adequate for those kinds of indirect descriptions (as comparisons, paradigmatically) points in the right direction in order to find a solution to the question of ineffability. The alternative view appears in its revealing power when we try to explain the meaning of musical understanding in terms of “hearing something (a chord, a rhythm, a tune) endowed with expression” (Marrades).

Comparisons become a watchtower in order to adopt a right approach concerning expressivity, meaning and understanding in art. The effort to support the option of a communicative effability allows us to slip out of a reductionist view about the role of comparisons and therefore about expressiveness.

My main criticism of the predominant way of approaching the question of ineffability in contemporary analytic aesthetics is that it has been ballasted by the obsessive idea of *capturing* (in terms of a *semantic* comprehensive ambition, very common in cognitivist approaches). That obsession disappears when we think in terms of Wittgensteinian *aspects*, or in general from more contextualist approaches (such as De Clercq’s *kinds of awareness*).

Miguel F. Dos Santos
Why art cannot be defined -- classically

In recent years, there has been a revival of the project of defining art, standardly understood as the project of providing what might be called a classical definition of art: a biconditional formula whose logical connectives behave according to the rules of classical logic, whenever the truth value of a given (well-formed) formula can be settled classically. In this paper, I argue that this project cannot succeed. ‘Work of art’ is too vague to admit of a classical definition.

Gabriele Schimmenti

Abstract: The young Marx between the end of art and the future of art

Although the young Marx does not develop a coherent aesthetic theory, the aim of my paper is to underpin the influence in a certain respect of the Hegelian "end of art" theory within his early writings – almost until 1842. I will proceed with the following steps: *a)* i will discuss the categories of "end of art" and "future of art", providing *b)* a short sketch of the differences between Hegelian and Left Hegelian theories, *c)* analyzing the distinctive features of the young Marx's considerations about art. It will be showed how his aesthetic conceptualization depends on the Hegelian conception, which affirms that Greek beauty can not return in modernity. Furthermore I will try to show the differences in some respects between Marx's and Left Hegelians' theory of art.

Lisa Katharin Schmalzried

Aestheticians' Problem with Sexual Attractiveness

The empirical research on attractiveness often uses "beauty" and "sexual attractiveness" synonymously. To equate human beauty with sexual attractiveness or at least to assume an intimate connection between both is *prima facie* not too far-fetched. Clive Bell, e.g., observes: "This 'something,' when we find it in a young woman, we are apt to call 'beauty.' [...] With the man-in-the-street 'beautiful' is more often than not synonymous with 'desirable' [...]" (Bell 1913, 15) For aestheticians, however, sexual attractiveness or better the apparently close connection between sexual attractiveness and human beauty poses a problem. Acknowledging an intimate connection interferes with the traditionally accepted unity thesis. According to this thesis, all (genuine) judgements of beauty have the same meaning irrespective of whether they refer to human beings, animals, landscapes, artworks, or any other type of object. The unity thesis breaks down if at least part of the meaning of a judgment of human beauty is that the person in question is sexually attractive because—with few exceptions—human beings are only sexually attracted to other human beings. So, it seems as if aestheticians must choose between two options. Either they defend the unity thesis, but then it can be only a coincidence that (many) beautiful people are sexually attractive; or they defend an intimate connection between human beauty and sexual attractiveness, but then at least human beauty has to be different from other kinds of beauty. The first aim of this paper is to show that both options are equally unsatisfactory; the second that a third option analysing beauty partly in terms of loveliness can reconcile both former options. Hereby, this paper presents an argument in favour of a theory of beauty standing in the tradition of Plato.

Ulrich Seeberg

Wenn die Welt klar wäre, gäbe es keine Kunst - Camus und der Mythos des Sisyphos

Camus' Diktum „wenn die Welt klar wäre, gäbe es keine Kunst“ besagt, daß die Lebensbedeutung der Kunst Ausdruck und zugleich Affirmation einer Absurdität ist. Die Frage nach dem Sinn des menschlichen Lebens läßt sich weder ignorieren noch auch durch eine Erklärung beantworten. Anders als die Frage nach dem Sinn einzelner Ereignisse in der Welt bezieht sich die Frage nach dem Sinn des Lebens auf den Menschen, insofern er überhaupt um sich und um eine Welt weiß. Da sich aber der Mensch, der nach etwas fragt oder etwas erklärt, von demjenigen unterscheidet, wonach er fragt oder was er erklärt, und da sich die Frage nach dem Sinn des Lebens gerade auf ihn selbst bezieht, insofern er um sich als jenen weiß, der sich von den Dingen und Ereignissen in der Welt, nach denen er fragt, unterscheidet, läßt sich die Frage, wozu er selbst in der Welt da ist, wenn sie einmal gestellt worden ist, weder durch eine Erklärung beantworten noch auch zurücknehmen. Camus macht aber darauf aufmerksam, daß diese für den Menschen unerklärliche Situation nicht einfach nur schlechthin dunkel ist, sondern daß vielmehr um diese Unklarheit eigens gewußt wird. Die Aufgabe der Kunst besteht daher darin, die Absurdität der Situation, nach dem Sinn des Lebens zu fragen ohne darauf eine Antwort geben zu können, in ihrer freiheitlichen Dimension zu vergegenwärtigen. Das Anerkennen der Unerklärlichkeit der Welt bedeutet, sich von der Illusion zu befreien, daß der Sinn des Lebens geklärt werden müsse, ehe es gelebt werden könne, und stellt darin zugleich eine entschiedene Bejahung des Lebens dar.

Pieter Shmugliakov

Heidegger's Conception of Art and Cavell's Hollywood

Probably no thinker of the twentieth century had invested art with greater philosophical significance than Heidegger, famously posing its essence as the advent of truth and describing its operation as “opening up the world” of an historical people. The reverse side of these grandiose claims is the fact that the question regarding methodological relevance of Heidegger's doctrine to the art of our age remains open. Indeed, one of the ideas most consistently associated with Heidegger's philosophy of art is the twofold placement of art "in the highest possibility of its essence" at the Western humanity's Greek origins and in the future overcoming of the contemporary "age of being." In this paper I tackle the general question of methodological relevance in its specified and extreme version, which regards the applicability of Heidegger's conception of art to photography and film – media he himself didn't regard as artistic, since they appear to be the exemplary manifestations of the modern understanding of beings, which the artistic event – would it take place in the modern age – is destined to overcome. My first task in the paper is to situate photography and film in the context of some of Heidegger's central theses about art and modernity. My second task is to show that, despite Heidegger's explicit disregard of photography and film, his philosophy of art both enables and calls for a critical engagement with them as media of true art. My further claim is that Stanley Cavell's philosophical engagement with Hollywood – starting from the exploration of the ontology of film in *The World Viewed*, and proceeding to the analyses of particular genres in *Pursuits of Happiness*

and *Contesting Tears* – is a direct continuation of Heidegger's project, sharing its basic methodological assumptions and answering its most profound promises.

Mario Sluga

Fiction Film: A Non-Intentionalist Account

In their influential accounts of the distinction between non-fiction and fiction in cinema scholars such as Carroll (1997), Ponech (1997), and Plantinga (2005) have argued that the stylistic conventions play no role in deciding between the two. Instead, authorial intentions are crucial for the distinction between non-fiction and fiction. My intervention is twofold. First, I argue that there is at least one class of films which are necessarily fictional – CGI films which represent entities which do not populate the actual world. Second, I demonstrate that the intentionalist model miscategorises a number of films, for instance early cinema films dealing with biblical themes. I conclude with an alternative which takes the broader cultural context into the equation. Although on occasions, intention and style alone can define fictionality of film, I argue that most often the status of fiction hinges on the interplay of a number of factors including intention, film style, reception, and, most importantly, institutional framework. In other words, films' fictional status may change over time. To cite just one example, whereas we nowadays treat Méliès' trick films such as *Four Troublesome Heads* (1898) as fictions, late-19th-century contemporaries both billed and construed them as “documentary” *recordings* of magic theatre performances.

Niklas Sommer

Beauty, Grace and Morality in Schiller's *On Grace and Dignity*

According to standard interpretation, Schiller's discussion of grace provides the theoretical and systematical framework for Schiller's attempt to refute Kantian ethics. Since the harmonious state of grace requires a balance between reason and sensibility, duty and inclination, Schiller is able to bring forward the claim that in order to reach that desired state, the predominance of reason must be relinquished.

I shall, however, argue that this interpretation misrepresents both the textual basis and Schiller's systematical concern in his essay *On Grace and Dignity*.

Schiller develops his conception of grace as *moving beauty* in contrast to the purely sensual *architectonic beauty*. The essential difference lies in the fact that grace is an accomplishment which can solely be realised by the subject itself. For grace - as a condition of the subject - is the effect of the moral capacity of reason. Grace is thus attained when an agent's moral purpose originating in the sphere of reason passes into his natural movements. What Schiller seems to indicate is that the more an agent cultivates his moral agency, the more it is going to agree with his sensual nature; thereby producing a beautiful soul the appearance of which displays grace.

It is therefore not to deny that Schiller touches on the moral aspect of Kantian philosophy if he addresses the dualism of duty and inclination, in order to elaborate his concept of a beautiful soul. However, as Schiller seems to conceive of the same as the effect of the cultivation of moral ideas, he cannot intend to confute Kant's theory pertaining to the foundation of ethics. For the Kantian separation of duty and

inclination which lies therein must already be accepted in order to conciliate the systematical divide. Therefore a close reading of the text strongly suggests that Schiller's concern lies elsewhere.

Robert Stecker

Artifacts: Function and Appreciation

In this paper, I ask: what is the role of function in appreciating artifacts? I will argue that several distinguishable functions are relevant to the aesthetic appreciation of artifacts, and sometimes more than one of these must be taken into account to adequately appreciate these objects. Second, I will claim that, while we can identify something we might call functional aesthetic value or functional beauty, the aesthetic properties that contribute to this value neither need to enhance the object's performance of its primary function nor manifest that function. There are broader criteria for what properties are relevant to functional beauty. Finally, I suggest that the aesthetic appreciation of artifacts may contribute to a larger appreciative project: the understanding and evaluation of a way of life, or social or cultural practices in which the artifact plays a role.

Jakub Stejskal

What Is Post-Formalism from the Point of View of Aesthetics?

This paper represents an outline of a theory of merited response to visual art objects that is informed by art-historical post-formalism. Post-formalist art history 'looks at what people in the past *did* with [artworks], what they used them to do, in order to infer the network of aspects that the things had for them' (Davis 2012:§ 5). Post-formalist art history aims primarily at explaining the look of pictures, what it is, or was, like to see them. But from the point of view of aesthetics an equally, if not more important question is, what it is, or was, like to respond to them in a merited way. Developing conceptual tools for the understanding of various historical scenarios of such merited responses to visual artefacts must be an indispensable part of any truly post-formalist aesthetics. In this paper, I explain the motivations behind post-formalist art history and why such an art history requires a corresponding aesthetics; I introduce and explain basic features of the proposed aesthetics; I explain the difference between post-formalism and formalism; distinguish post-formalism from anti-formalist semanticism; and exemplify post-formalist principles on an example derived from Melanesist anthropology.

Paul Stephan

Nietzsche's Non-Aesthetics: Nietzsche's Radical Critique of Traditional Aesthetics

Nietzsche is not the radical aestheticist he is often presented to be. While Christoph Menke demonstrated in his study *Kraft* (2008) that Nietzsche's philosophy can be understood as an experiment in viewing the world with the eyes of an artist, i.e. as a play of forces, this presentation wants to explore what it could mean to view art itself from this perspective, i.e. art as something non-artistic. Insofar as this is exactly Nietzsche's perspective on art, Nietzsche should be read as a radical opponent of the institution of art and aestheticism as its corresponding ideology.

From the *Birth of Tragedy* onwards, "art" signifies for Nietzsche the creative production of new values, truths, perspectives ..., i.e. art is essentially the art of lying, the realm of pure appearance. It is exactly this sphere in which the production of any values takes place in the first instance; therefore, it is nonsensical to judge art by any of those values. Art is, essentially, a strictly non-moral enterprise that always transcends any given norms. This production is interpreted as the play and actualisation of certain forces. In original art, forces of life affirm themselves and intensify their own force. This is always understood as an act of violence: The world is appropriated from a certain perspective and adapted to it.

There remains only one criterion for the judgement of art: Those objects that support our own power are good, those that weaken it are bad. This does not imply an aesthetic subjectivism, however: Objects that might contradict our own forces at first glance might be supportive in fact and vice versa; the strength of a force constitutes itself in its ability to appropriate others.

Joanna Straczowski

What Is Wrong With the White Cube? On Kant's Theory of Disinterestedness and the Aesthetics of the White Cube Gallery

White walls, what do we associate with them? The hallways of hospitals and mental institutions, unfurnished, uninhabited, empty apartments, open-space offices, restrooms and... art galleries. Specifically the concept of the white cube gallery has been predominant in the way modern cultural institutions have been designed over previous decades. In 2015, *The Guardian* journalist and art critic Jonathan Jones laments this state of affairs in his article 'White Cube galleries are beautiful. They bore me rigid'. His frustration is not only generated by a certain out-datedness of this particular style of art display; Jones furthermore contends that it is not the most stimulating way to present art. The white cube has become a means to an end, he claims, to bestow further 'verification' of artistic value upon objects. Similarly, Brian O'Doherty published his critique of the white cube aesthetics in a collection of essays in *Artforum*, already in 1979. Still, what is wrong with the white cube? Is the critique of such galleries warranted? In this paper, I evaluate the criticism brought up against the modern aesthetics of the white cube gallery and I argue that the design of such exhibition spaces is influenced by Immanuel Kant's notion of disinterested pleasure. By excluding all influences and distractions of the external world, white cube galleries are an attempt to empirically represent disinterestedness and to create 'a space devoid of all interests'. Yet, I also contend that the notion that a clinical, white

space is better suited to elicit disinterested aesthetic experiences is indeed misguided and it may even be at odds with Kant's aesthetic theory and the *sensus communis* to which aesthetic judgments appeal, according to Kant.

Elena Tavani

The Status of Image in Installation-Art Practices

My talk asks whether we can vindicate a sense of installation art beyond 'experience economy' (Foster) and also beyond any 'prescriptive approach to art' (Bishop). The advent of social practice in art (under names as relational aesthetics, new public art etc) marks a move toward a reconsideration of the productive and receptive terms on which the artwork occurs, though it doesn't lead very often to examine the changing nature of 'image' in those practices.

I try to address multimedia and relational installations in order to focus their specific *image-character*. According to this sight, installations have the opportunity to offer themselves not only as a park for performing arts or as a meeting place where to produce 'social images', but rather as a technical and aesthetical opportunity for a re-organisation and re-arrangement of virtual and material data and images in one single environment., in which the technical attitude of life and the artificial life of the programme can *meet* and not simply blend in favour of the programme. The outcomes of this encounter are nothing but obvious. The 'programmed' nature of installations with their technological arrangements usually produce huge amounts of information and images to deal with in a quasi-automatic way, including of those that are more socially targeted to the 'relational' realisation of the installation.

As an alternative, I look for the *character of image* of installations as distinct from the concrete images – technical, as well as social and relational – that they produce in the first place. This choice may be partly supported by what Theodor Adorno called "experience of images" (1970), partly by Gottfried Boehm's suggestion to not consider images as 'bodies' alone, but also as "actions and forces" that they generate and that can claim their own value (2006).

With two case-studies I suggest that "orientation" can be considered as the very concern in the moving images of installation art, related not only to spatial- and localization practices, but first of all to bio-political emergences.

Enrico Terrone

To Be Assessed. Peter Strawson on the Definition of Art

In his paper 'Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art', Peter Strawson outlines a definition of art that can be summarized as follows: an individual is a work of art if and only if its criterion of identity is the totality of features which are relevant to its aesthetic appraisal. Strawson's account has been, so far, largely overlooked in the debate about the definition of art. I will defend a version of Strawson's account by spelling out and trying to amend its basic components; namely, 1) *the criterion of identity*; 2) *the merit-conferring features*; and 3) *the aesthetic appraisal*. Finally, I will address some objections that can be raised to a Strawsonian account of art.

Cristina Travanini
Aesthetic Value Judgements and the Challenge to Objectivity

Art, as a practical declination of the complex way in which human beings interact with their surroundings, might be defined as a borderline territory between individual, subjective taste and the claim for universal value judgement. Focusing on the interplay between emotions and cognition in art appreciation, we shall deal with questions about the nature of our aesthetic value judgements. While rejecting any account of ‘objectivity’ as correspondence to objects, we might look for a weaker approach to the question of aesthetic value, one that sees objectivity in the common exercise of rational, logical and emotional abilities within a certain form of life. We shall explore the pragmatist position outlined by John Dewey about art experience, as well as Hilary Putnam’s claim to an “objectivity without objects”, which rejects any special realm of universal properties. In order to avoid mysterious entities we are probably uncomfortable with, we might admit a sort of realism “with a human face” also in the aesthetic domain. Since the discourse about aesthetic value seems to cling to emotions, which are necessarily subjective, we shall demonstrate the plausibility of an “emotional” account of aesthetic value judgements which does not renounce to objectivity, *contra* any kind of relativism and emotivism. The challenge is to recognize that our aesthetic judgements claim objective validity and, at the same time, they are dependent on a subject of experience who ‘feels’ and ‘experiences’ the values in question.

Luis Eduardo Duarte Valverde
El net.art metalingüístico visto desde los juegos de lenguaje de Wittgenstein

El principal propósito de esta comunicación es explorar algunas de las principales dificultades que plantean la comprensión y experiencia en relación al arte contemporáneo. Para esto, seguiremos la propuesta de Yves Michaud, denominada *relativismo objetivo*, en el que, a partir de los juegos de lenguaje de Wittgenstein ofrece una posibilidad de salida a la actualidad del problema del juicio estético, justo en una época como la nuestra, en la que el arte presume de sus más cuestionadas ausencias como la desdefinición, la pérdida de estética y aun, de su carácter antiartístico.

Esto lo llevaremos a cabo a partir de una revisión del denominado net.art metalingüístico que corresponde a la primera etapa de esta joven expresión, para así, verlo desde algunas de las condiciones de funcionamiento de los juegos de lenguaje de Wittgenstein en consonancia con las consideraciones de Hume en *sobre la norma del gusto* y algunas de las principales tesis de la denominada estética analítica.

La intención de esta ponencia será entonces una aproximación al net.art metalingüístico, específicamente en la obra del colectivo JODI considerado con frecuencia como uno de sus máximos exponentes, para verlo desde algunas categorías de los juegos de lenguaje de Wittgenstein como las descripciones suplementarias, perplejidades, ver cómo, parecidos de familia y forma de vida, que nos permiten un acercamiento a la comprensión y experiencia con esta práctica artística. Esto, no solamente con el propósito de explorar una pluralidad de significados, formas de habitar y resignificar experiencias estéticas con la red como medio y lenguaje con su

gramática propia, sino, además, buscando posibilidades de participación y evidenciando características de marcada herencia vanguardista.

Connell Vaughan

Building Careers and States: Vandalism and Iconoclasm in the Digital Age

Not only is vandalism increasingly subject to digital documentation, but the aesthetic nature of vandalism itself is different as a result of the digital. No longer is vandalism a local destructive act, it has become an act performed primarily for broadcast to global markets. Digital space, I argue, is a domain of economics, the artworld and nation building where vandalism is employed as a transnational brand. This paper outlines two ways in which digital media is strategically used by vandals.

The aim of the first strategy is career development, the latter is state formation. In the first case I demonstrate how the employment of the digital by street artists is vital to understanding the art world institutional recognition of graffiti as street art. In the latter I illustrate how the deliberate digital documentation and subsequent broadcasting of the destruction of cultural heritage by Islamic State (IS) forms an aesthetic strategy of a nascent state and not simply blind iconoclasm but iconoclasm in the service of state formation.

Both career vandalism and state vandalism are deployed with a coherent strategy built on directed digital communication. While digital documentation and broadcasting may seem antithetical to the spirit of graffiti and especially radical Islam, the digital offers the vandal the freedom to be a darling of the artworld, a jihadi, art dealer etc.

In both cases, instability (aesthetic instability in the artworld and political instability in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere) opens a space into which the savvy use of digital media allows for great commercial, career and institutional opportunities. Yet, just as digital documentation fans vandalism it undermines its potency, eliminating the possibility of complete destruction. Vandalism, no matter how ideological is *ceaselessly commercially compromised*.

Iris Vidmar

Challenges of philosophical art

This paper is concerned with the connection between art, in particular literature and film, and philosophy. My basic question is how to understand claims such as the one made by literary critic in reference to Nathaniel Hawthorne's *The Minister's Black Veil*, when he proclaims that "in this tale and in others Hawthorne tests the proposition that human identity is contingent and circumstantial, rather than an inherent essence – that is, not identity at all". These kinds of claims, which not only see art as coming together with knowledge seeking disciplines but as capable of philosophizing, raise the question of whether indeed there is a category of philosophical art. Drawing an analogy with religious, pornographic and erotic art, I offer an array of challenges that philosophical art sets to aestheticians, the crucial of which is determining whether or how a work of art is or can be philosophical, or whether its 'philosophical' character is imposed upon it. My crucial concern is determining whether the fact that an artwork is in some sense philosophical has

implications for the identity of that artwork, and I then proceed to show how this concern relates to artwork's interpretation and appreciation, and in the case of literature, even classification. On my view, those who advocate a strong liaison between art and philosophy tend to ignore the relevance of this question and I end by showing that this ignorance leads to unsatisfying conclusions regarding philosophical art.

Alberto Voltolini **Seeing-in is no seeing-through**

In (2015), Newall has expanded a suggestion of Kulvicki (2009) that Wollheim's (1980, 1987, 1998) seeing-in is a perception of transparency: the picture's subject that it grasps is seen *as standing behind* what is also grasped in that experience, namely the picture's vehicle. In this respect, seeing-in is twofold, as Wollheim maintained. Yet unlike Wollheim, its twofoldness consists in that one has a perception of a blended whole out of which one separates perceptual properties belonging to the vehicle and those belonging to the subject, just as in any perception of transparency in which one perceives a blended whole out of which one separates perceptual properties belonging to the transparent medium and those belonging to the object seeing-through it. Granted, it is not the case that the perceiver sees *that* the subject lies behind the vehicle. Rather, this perception is illusory, for it is just the perception of that subject *as lying behind* that vehicle. Yet that illusion is not delusory, for the perceiver has no corresponding belief.

I agree with Newall on these last points. Yet Newall's account does not provide the right phenomenology of seeing-in.

First, in seeing-in one does not perceive the subject as standing behind the vehicle. Rather, one (knowingly) illusorily sees a whole three-dimensional scene whose elements are such that some of them are seen as located *precisely where* the picture's vehicle is, whereas some others are seen as located behind those elements.

Second, when a transparent medium changes its colour, there is a change in what one overall sees that one then attributes to a change in the perceptual properties of the medium. Yet in seeing-in there is a change that one directly grasps in the mere perceptual properties of the vehicle leading one's overall experience of the picture to change. Indeed, the perceptual properties of the subject, as seen in the picture, are impermeable to the perceptual properties of the vehicle.

Eva Weber-Guskar **Neither wonder nor admiration: Awe as an aesthetic emotion**

What is the role of awe in aesthetic experience? By investigating this question I restrict myself mostly to fine arts, that is: mainly to pictures (and installations). To answer the question I will advance in the following steps. Firstly, I will give an account of the emotion of awe in general, starting from premises from a contemporary theory of emotions. Here I propose to understand awe as the feeling of being humble yet elevated in front of something that is above all normal standards so that you cannot grasp it immediately. Secondly, I will sketch two different ways in that the

role of awe in aesthetic experience has been presented recently (by Jesse Prinz and Kendall Walton) and I will discuss them critically. One aspect of this discussion is my critique on their understanding of awe – Walton conceiving of it as similar to admiration, Prinz conceiving of it as a kind of wonder. This gives me the opportunity to, thirdly, develop shortly my own account. I defend a pluralistic account of aesthetic experience in which awe is one important emotion among others in a process of aesthetic experience with different stages without being the core of aesthetic appreciation.

Katarzyna Wejman

Imagination as synthesis and transformation – the reinterpretation of Kantian conception of imagination

The aim of my paper is to reinterpret the Kantian conception of imagination in context of Gilles Deleuze's deliberations which will allow us understand imagination as power to transform the images according to the rule of difference. I will focus on the Deleuzian interpretation of Kant's synthesis of experience, on the relation between imagination and time and also on the cinematographic movement of images, i.e. synthesis in a shot and montage.

Cognition requires the work of imagination in synthesizing variety. Variety is apprehended and reproduced as one temporal and spatial object. The fusion of apprehension and reproduction defines the necessity of the relationship between the present and the past. At least the object is recognized. Deleuze differentiates the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction from the synthesis of recognition: the first two are passive, unconsciousness and there are a dimension of work of difference, and the last one imposes identity and preserves The Same in the floating reality through referring to the notion.

Passive synthesis of imagination creates the living present, contracts images into one moment and anticipates the future one, so that what is repeated refers to each other and is differentiated. The repetition does not substitute the earlier images but in the contraction gives them continuity. The work of imagination is something more than the operation of the cinematograph as Henri Bergson wanted to see it. The course of images which appear in the cinema via moving camera, montage, shots free from film screening, become independent of the static cinematograph. The movement of imagination is fulfilled in shots and between images during montage. Shots ensure passage from one aspect of the object to another aspect – they represent change caused by movement. Montage determines the order and the relationship of images – combines them by cutting and confronting them with each other. It schematizes the order of the images so that they get a temporal meaning.

This movement of images is far from the synthesis of the object of knowledge in the unity of apperception. The task of the film imagination will be pure movement and change, dynamics and play of images (the movement-image and the time-image). Disclosure in movement of successive views, passage of one image into another show synthetic aspects of movement whose main principle is differentiation and formation. The imagination from the power of creating images (*Einbildungskraft*) can become the power of their transformation (*Ver/umbildungskraft*)

Tanya Whitehouse
“Ruin Porn” and the Aesthetic and Ethical Functions of Architecture

In this paper, I briefly describe the urban architectural ruins of Detroit, Michigan and the various aesthetic activities (sometimes called “ruin porn”) they have inspired. Then I answer the following questions: How should we interpret ruins like these and the complicated aesthetic works based on them, and what should we do about the structures themselves, if anything? Should we preserve them, demolish them, or leave them in their ruined state? If their functions or associations can change, does that have any bearing on our assessments of these structures and the aesthetic projects they make possible?

I argue that our answers to these questions can be productively influenced by knowledge about the functions of these sites and the way those functions can shift. In making these claims, I consider ideas put forward by philosophers and architects, including Adolf Loos, Immanuel Kant, Allen Carlson, Andrew Ballantyne, and Roger Scruton. When the function of a site changes, possibilities for aesthetic gratification and exploration creep in along with the ruination (and perhaps this has always been true). If, I argue, these aesthetic interests are great enough, and a building’s original function or functions general enough, these considerations may justify a new life or new use for a building. Art made under such circumstances may not be as ethically problematic as the “ruin porn” term implies. But I also claim that while buildings can be used for different purposes, some of their functions or associations never entirely disappear, and when these are truly ethically suspect, perhaps our new uses or preservation of buildings should be, too.

Ken Wilder
Michael Haneke’s *Caché* (Hidden) and Wolfgang Iser’s Blank

This paper will consider Austrian director Michael Haneke’s 2004 film *Caché* (*Hidden*) within the remit of Wolfgang Iser’s notion of the ‘constitutive blank’. While Haneke’s film exploits the well-known film device of the ellipsis, it goes much further in that the use of the blank is structural. Not only does that which is ‘hidden’ taint human relations throughout the film, but *Caché*, in its radical indeterminacy (to the very last shot), illuminates Iser’s contention that it is through blanks that negations gain their productive force, such that negativity is transformed into an enabling structure. The paper will engage a close ‘reading’ of the film itself, utilising clips and film stills. In so doing, a secondary theme will be to consider Haneke’s particular use of the blank in Cavellian terms, as a ‘staged’ withdrawal of *acknowledgment*. Here, empathic projection, as a means of identification with the other, is problematised. The film might thus be seen as consistent with Stanley Cavell’s exposition about skepticism about ‘other minds’, a theme he argues underlies Shakespearian tragedy, but which he also applies to certain Hollywood films. However, in *Caché* the mechanism itself is ‘staged’: a laying bare made apparent through Haneke’s foregrounding of the conditions of the film’s existence (its conditions of access). Haneke’s indeterminacy deliberately sets out to problematise the spectator position, both ontologically (drawing attention to the mechanisms of film) and by evoking our own complicity in the events as they unfold. We are again and again forced to question the ‘staging’ of scenes in relation to a fixed camera position, where an

uncertainty persists as to whether this apparatus is, or is not, internal to the film's diegesis.

Cato Wittusen

The inflection of modernism in André Bazin's criticism

Recent years have seen renewed interest in André Bazin's troublesome relation to cinematic modernism. Traditionally, his notion of cinematic realism was perceived as a strong rejection of modernism; his lack of enthusiasm toward the excessive *mise en scène* in German expressionism and the practice of montage in Soviet cinema is often taken to bolster this view. Bazin's alleged antimodernist outlook also relates to his ontology of cinema, discussed, for example, in "The Ontology of the Photographic Image" and "The Evolution of the Language of Cinema" (Bazin 2005). His ontological and evolutionary remarks on cinema are often taken to constitute a naïve medium essentialism.

In this paper, I address two recent attempts at problematizing the view of Bazin as an antimodernist. I discuss the thoughts of Dudley Andrew in *What Cinema is!* (2012) and of Daniel Morgan in "Bazin's Modernism" (2013). Both contend that there is an inflection of modernism in Bazin's aesthetic realism. They also concur in rejecting the dominant view that Bazin was a medium essentialist and that cinema on account of its photographic basis represents and resembles reality. I relate my discussion of these authors' arguments to Bazin's "Discovering Cinema: Defense of the (New) Avant-Garde" and "Reflections on Criticism" (Bazin 2014), both recently translated into English. To my knowledge, the term "modernism" does not figure frequently in Bazin's writings. However, Bazin's notion of the "new avant-garde" is relevant to understanding his take on the nascent modernism in cinema that would eventually grow into full-fledged 1960s cinematic modernism. I also discuss Bazin's film criticism with an eye to Clement Greenberg's and Michael Fried's modernist art criticism. The juxtaposition between Bazin and the modernist critiques might, as Morgan argues, help us problematize the unproductive opposition between modernism and realism in cinema. However, as I will argue, the comparison may also clarify significant differences concerning their views on criticism and the spectator's role as far as contribution to meaning is concerned.

Josko Zanic

Generality in Fiction

The paper investigates the nature of general statements that can be extracted from a work of fiction, where the relevant statements are considered to be those that can be projected from a work of fiction to the real world. The form of these statements is given as 'an F typically has G'. It is argued that this extraction is guided by an assumption that at least some properties ascribed to a character in a work of fiction are such that the character is particularly representative of the property in question. A distinction is drawn between two kinds of general statements extractable from fiction, and this distinction is elaborated along six dimensions: extractability, source of justification, role in aesthetic value, intra-work indeterminacy, inter-work clash, and cognitive value.