Bottura’s “Not-roast Guineafowl”.
*Three Arguments Supporting the Artistic Status of Cuisine*

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**Abstract.** In recent times, the debate surrounding the aesthetic status of food has gained increasing attention. While cuisine certainly produces an aesthetic experience, its possibility of constituting a genuine form of art is contested from several directions. In this short paper I advocate in favour of the possibility for food to hold an artistic status under certain conditions. Nonetheless, due to the length and the complexity of this topic I will not pursue abstract universal principles by means of general discourses. Instead, I will consider a single dish and elaborate the reasons for which it should be considered, on par with great paintings, sculptures or musical compositions, a genuine artwork. The considered dish is “Not-roast Guineafowl” by Massimo Bottura, a renowned chef who led his restaurant, Osteria Francescana, to first place in the world’s best restaurants list proposed by the British magazine *Restaurant*.

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In this paper I will present a single dish, “Not-roast Guineafowl” by the chef Massimo Bottura, advocating that its status is the same as that of a genuine work of art. This claim has a double implication: in the first place, it asks for a global re-evaluation of the status of cuisine and the act of tasting in the sphere of aesthetics. Too often, in the Western philosophical tradition, the pleasures of the table and the craft (or the art?) of cooking have been dismissed as inferior diversions, not worthy of conceptual analysis or even a debased pursuit since intrinsically tied to the most primitive beastly instincts.

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A second implication is a partial *mise en question* of the limits and the nature of works of art in general. May the borders of art’s definition stretch far enough to include only the highest cuisine or should they favour a more inclusive definition of art?

Our answer to this question partly depends upon our ethical attitude towards cuisine and food. There are, in fact, no contemporary moral philosophers who blame Giotto for having gilded his *Ognissanti Madonna* (1310) with boar-bone or ox-bone burnishes, and none who blame Michelangelo for having used rabbit-skin glue for coating his paintings, or other ancient or recent artists for having used such devices or other animal-based (rabbit, goat, marten, squirrel...) tools.

Neither is anyone criticizing those who enjoy these artists’ works at the Uffizi Museum or anywhere else. Yet, people who enjoy the cuisine of Michelin-starred non-vegetarian restaurants (or non-vegetarian restaurants in general) are often criticized.

To what extent are we willing to sacrifice our primary need for aesthetic satisfaction? And in the case where we are completely disposed to do so, would it be ethically justifiable to enjoy a museum in which ancient or contemporary works are created by means of animal-based components or tools? Should we not, driven by the inflexible coherence of any genuine ethical thinking, ask as soon as we enter a museum whether any of the artworks are prepared by means of animal-based components or tools, and thus abstain from entering, if that is the case?

If we are to remain ethically consistent, we should not be allowed, in the case of ancient artworks, to appeal to the fact that the rabbits used to make glue-coating for Michelangelo’s masterpieces are long dead. There is no ethical difference between a rabbit that died five hundred years ago for painting-purposes, and a rabbit put to death five hours ago for other purposes: Bottura’s not-roast guineafowls will be five hundred years dead in five hundred years.

For the moment I will leave aside these ethical questions: I simply wish to make a case for the potential relevance of presenting a dish as an artwork, and more generally for presenting cuisine as a form of art, in relation to our daily behaviour and our fundamental ethical assumptions.

In particular, this paper focuses on presenting a single dish as an artwork rather than elucidating a general theory of art in relation to the act of
cooking. The latter issue could only be properly addressed at book-length. Rather, I consider a single dish, namely Bottura’s “Not-roast Guineafowl”, and analyze its aesthetic implications to show its substantial affinity with the status of the so-called “canonic” or “major” artworks.

The present analysis takes into account three potential objections and three corresponding supportive arguments in relation to the artistic status of Bottura’s “Not-roast Guineafowl”. The first section of the paper is thus devoted to a brief introduction of the historical Western view on cuisine and the traditionally inherent lack of regard and philosophical consideration.

Next, Bottura’s “Not-roast Guineafowl”, is presented and described by considering its composition, preparation, and its position within the context of the gastronomic tradition of the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna. Following this presentation, I contrast the traditional disregard of cuisine which characterizes Western philosophy by offering three arguments supporting the aesthetic and artistic relevance of Bottura’s “Not-roast Guineafowl” (and, by extension, of similar and analogous creations).

1. *Contemptus Cibi: Classical Views on Cuisine and Food in Western Philosophy*

The art and craft of cuisine, unavoidably related to the realm of sensuous pleasures, has suffered in the history of Western philosophy from the associated controversial reputation. Already in Plato’s *Phaedo*, bodily pleasures are an obstacle on the way to true knowledge.1 In the *Republic* it is suggested that a rich and varied diet would be adequate to pigs, rather than humans.2 In the *Hippia Major*, the notion of beauty is presented as exclusively inherent to the senses of seeing and hearing.3

A better fortune for cuisine was not to arrive with the coming of Christianity. Gluttony is indicated as one of the Seven Deadly Sins, but it does not simply consist in exceeding the necessary quantity of food: the sin of gluttony is committed whenever one seeks delicacies and good quality

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1 Plato, *Phaedo*, 64c-67d.
3 Plato, *Hippia Major*, 297c-298a
food to gratify the “vile sense of taste”. But also whenever one stimulates the palate with overly elaborated recipes. In the Bible, the sons of Eli, high priest of Shiloh, are cursed to death for having cooked the sacrificial meat in a more sophisticated manner. Even an enthusiastic attitude towards food is a sufficient reason to merit divine punishment. An overly desirous attitude to food could even represent the worst of all types of gluttony because of its unwholesomeness, since “it is not the food, but the desire that is in fault”.

With modern philosophy, the moral contempt towards the sphere of taste and cuisine diminishes, being gradually replaced by intellectual reasons. According to Kant, for instance, any gustatory experience fails to be genuinely aesthetic; in fact, any authentic aesthetic experience must be disinterested, contemplative and reflective. In the view of the Prussian philosopher, the pleasure of taste is unworthy of philosophical consideration, not only because the drive to eat is not a disinterested one, but also because it is incapable of inducing contemplation or reflection which are, in Kantian aesthetics, essential conditions of the genuine aesthetic experience.

Remaining in the domain of modern German philosophy, it is relevant that even Hegel, preserving and conveying the Platonic and Judeo-Christian mark on the history of Western philosophy, dismisses bodily senses as lower mediums and therefore evaluates the sense of taste and cuisine as unworthy of artistic status, since their being unavoidably trapped in the material dimension, as opposed to those “genuine” or “true” arts, which tend to the “spirit”. Hegelian aesthetics is conditioned by the fundamental metaphysical prejudice according to which the physical is always defective in respect to the spiritual. On this ground, Hegel also disqual-

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5 1 Samuel, 2:12-36.
8 1. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, VII.
10 And which in turn, depends by the contestable metaphysical assumption that a distinction between “matter” and “spirit”, whatever it means, does make any sense at all.

ifies perishable objects from the domain of art, since lasting artworks are required to offer a glimpse of the incorruptible and eternal reality lying beyond the world of deceptive and transient phenomena.\textsuperscript{11}

This particular thesis, also known with the acronym CET (Consumption Exclusion Thesis), does not look very attractive nowadays, within a historical period in which most of philosophers (and most people) would agree that performances and temporary installations, for instances, can be effective artworks.\textsuperscript{12} The material persistence of an object does not necessarily make it “more artistic”, nor is the aesthetic experience derived by, for instance, observing a painting necessarily more intense than the one originating from watching a performance.

On the opposite, the Kantian objection inherent to the impossibility for the sense of taste to raise complex reflections and feelings, to defer to a higher degree of contemplative thinking, to vehiculate or represent articulate meanings still persists in the contemporary debate on the status of cuisine and on its possibility to be addressed as a form of art. More generally, the Western tradition of thinking in its entirety suggests that gustatory experience cannot offer a reflective aesthetic encounter.

It is undeniable that cuisine, if compared for instance to figurative arts and literature, does not possess an equivalent representational power, neither can it provide accurate and complex descriptions of reality. What is argued in the following pages is that, although cuisine cannot be equated to other “traditional” or “major” arts on the basis of transmitting or elaborating a meaningful configuration of concepts, there are particular cases (exemplified by Bottura’s “Not-roast Guineafowl”) in which a dish can actually raise a contemplative and reflective experience rightfully belonging to the sphere of aesthetic judgment.

\section*{2. Bottura’s “Not-roast Guineafowl”: Ideation, Creation, Composition and First Argument}

“Not-roast Guineafowl” is a culinary ideation of Massimo Bottura. A renowned Italian chef who recently led his restaurant, Osteria Francescana,

\textsuperscript{12} For instance, Christo’s landscape art or Kaprow’s performances.}

in the city of Modena, to first place in the world’s best restaurants list proposed by the British magazine *Restaurant*. The classification is widely considered an important source for determining the best fine dining worldwide. It is published yearly and presents the results of a poll voted on by international and highly esteemed chefs, food critics, restaurateurs and gourmards.

For several years, “Not-roast Guineafowl” has been among the classics in the menu of Osteria Francescana. The dish is inspired by a traditional dish of the Emilia-Romagna region, in which the restaurant is situated. The “original” dish would be the “roast Guineafowl”.

Guineafowl are native to the African continent and were introduced to Italy most likely by the Romans, becoming a relatively common dish especially in Northern Italy, mainly due to their adaptability and the limited costs required for their breeding. Particularly appreciated by the Langobards, the guineafowl, conveniently roasted, later became a classic Christmas dish, the appropriate gastronomic complement of a festive occasion. The rustic yet dainty flavour of roast guineafowl was then an infrequent delight to the low and middle class’ palate.\(^\text{13}\)

This classic recipe from the Emilia-Romagna gastronomic tradition is taken by Bottura in a cultural and historical perspective, and completely overturned to include chemical processes such as distillation in order to create a new work that proposes an audacious aesthetic reinterpretation of traditional flavours.

Before proceeding with my analysis, I must briefly expound on Bottura’s recipe. The cooking of guineafowl is optimized by using the entire animal. The thighs are stuffed with sauté giblets and laid on oil-flavoured spinach; the drumsticks are lacquered with balsamic vinegar and posed on a thick guineafowl broth; the roast breast on a mash tun of potatoes and truffle; the skin is caramelized and combined with chocolate liver paté and toasted bread ice cream.

To bring the dish to completion, the whole composition is sprayed with a distillate obtained by filtering a blended mixture of toasted guineafowl bones and herbs in a chemical distiller. This final passage is conceived,

\(^{13}\) This dish is also reported in Pellegrino Artusi’s *La Scienza in Cucina e l’Arte di Mangiar Bene*, a masterpiece among cookbooks of all times.
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as the chef claims, for the purpose of producing a “sensation of roast guineafowl”, an ephemeral impression which “perfumes the table with love, family, memories”.¹⁴

On the basis of the foregoing, I want to contest the common assumption that a gustatory experience is not able to raise contemplative or reflective judgments of serious aesthetic relevance. Contrarily, I argue that Bottura’s “Not-roast Guineafowl”, is able to provoke at least three different kinds of contemplative or reflective judgments: an objective judgment, inherent to the acknowledgment of the recipe’s position within the historical tradition of Emilia-Romagna’s gastronomy; a subjective judgment, inherent to one’s own personal memories and feelings; an inter-subjective judgment, concerning the perception of this recipe as a sophisticated conceptual and practical re-elaboration of a shared culinary heritage.

It is indeed not the first time that someone challenges what I characterized as the “Kantian objection”. The lawyer, politician and gastronome Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin presented in his *Physiology of Taste* a tripartite model of gustatory experiences, indeed more elaborated than Kant’s analysis:

The *direct* sensation is the first one felt, produced from the immediate operations of the organs of the mouth, while the body under consideration is still on the forepart of the tongue.

The *complete* sensation is the one made up of this first perception plus the impression which arises when the food leaves its original position, passes to the back of the mouth, and attacks the whole organ with its taste and its aroma.

Finally, the *reflective* sensation is the opinion which one’s spirit forms from the impressions which have been transmitted to it by the mouth.¹⁵

Nonetheless, in his *magnum opus* Brillat-Savarin refers mostly to subjective impressions inherent to the sphere of taste alone. For instance, he continues the passage with an oenological remark:

¹⁴ As specified in an online interview available online at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yHvUKH_QLM> [Accessed last time on October 25th 2016].
While the wine is in the mouth one is agreeably but not completely appreciative of it; it is not until the moment when he has finished swallowing it that a man can truly taste, consider, and discover the bouquet peculiar to each variety; and there must still be a little lapse of time before a real connoisseur can say, “It is good, or passable, or bad”.

And yet, tasting Bottura’s “Not-roast Guineafowl” is also able to induce an objective comprehension of the evolution of gastronomy in the Emilia-Romagna region; knowing the historical context of this recipe, which is lurking in the background, it is possible to perceive this dish not only as a refined organoleptic combination, but also as a conceptual re-interpretation of a century’s old tradition.

From an intellectual point of view, the aspects of this recipe show an intellectual effort which is far beyond the simple process of mixing ingredients or converting raw meat into cooked meat. It required working with concepts in addition to working with ingredients.

I would like to attempt a pictorial comparison, starting from the famous statement by Pablo Picasso: “It took me four years to paint like Raphael, but a lifetime to paint like a child”. It is not only this statement, but even Picasso’s entire mature production that is only understandable in historical terms. The systematic fragmentation of reality in a pulsating profusion of geometrical volumes acquires a wider and complete sense only in respect to Western history of art and its research for a veracious representation of beauty by means of symmetrical forms and harmonious proportions, whereof Raphael constitutes one among other major exponents.

At the same time, Bottura’s “not-roast Guineafowl” is concretely historicized within Emilian cuisine, both differing from it and deferring to it through an aesthetic experience which implies more than simple aesthesis.

There is also a second kind of reflective judgment that this recipe evokes, a subjective judgment concerning those partially inexpressible memories and feelings intrinsically tied to one’s own history. The episode of Proust’s madeleine is well known. The writer tastes a madeleine, a small cake typical of the French Lorraine region, and suddenly the past, with its burden of lost memories, materializes:

Once I had recognized the taste of the crumb of madeleine soaked
in her decoction of lime-flowers which my aunt used to give me (although I did not yet know and must long postpone the discovery of why this memory made me so happy) immediately the old grey house upon the street, where her room was, rose up like the scenery of a theatre to attach itself to the little pavilion, opening on to the garden, which had been built out behind it for my parents (the isolated panel which until that moment had been all that I could see); and with the house the town, from morning to night and in all weathers, the Square where I was sent before luncheon, the streets along which I used to run errands, the country roads we took when it was fine. And just as the Japanese amuse themselves by filling a porcelain bowl with water and steeping in it little crumbs of paper which until then are without character or form, but, the moment they become wet, stretch themselves and bend, take on colour and distinctive shape, become flowers or houses or people, permanent and recognisable, so in that moment all the flowers in our garden and in M. Swann’s park, and the water-lilies on the Vivonne and the good folk of the village and their little dwellings and the parish church and the whole of Combray and of its surroundings, taking their proper shapes and growing solid, sprang into being, town and gardens alike, all from my cup of tea.\footnote{Marcel Proust, \textit{Remembrance of Things Past} (1928). Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 2006, p.63.}

It is the taste of \textit{madeleine} which provokes this sudden resurfacing of time within the field of consciousness (“The sight of the little madeleine had recalled nothing to my mind before I tasted it”).\footnote{\textit{Idem}, \textit{ibidem}.} Similarly, the taste of “Not-roast Guineafowl” heralds concealed memories, which are awaiting a specific provocation to recover their consistency. In my case, for instance, childhood memories of Sunday meals at my grandmother’s farmstead, mostly in the joyful Christmas period, experiencing an eccentric mixture of palatal beatitude and sharp nostalgia.

In this regard, John Dewey’s aesthetic theory as it is expressed in \textit{Art as Experience} is of particular interest. According to Dewey, the real work of art consists in its effect within ordinary experience, and the highest form of experience operates towards a positive engagement of the self with the
world and their progressive and positive reunification. This is the beginning of art in Dewey’s view.\(^{18}\)

Furthermore,

An experience has a unity that gives it its name, that meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted by a single quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts. […] Art, in its form, unites the very same relation of doing and underdoing, outgoing and incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an experience.\(^ {19}\)

Thus, the greatest merit of artworks is the reunion of impressions, will and instinct following the discriminating action of consciousness. In this sense, few interactions are more successful than a pleasant meal. Whenever eating, the aesthetic involvement is undoubtedly intimate, in physical terms even more so than when admiring a painting or listening to a symphony.

All of the above are good reasons for acknowledging how Bottura’s dish not only arouses subjective feelings, memories and judgments, but even that these feelings, memories and judgments do possess profound aesthetic relevance.

Furthermore, there is a third kind of contemplative judgement that “Not-roast Guineafowl” can induce in its tasters. A judgement where the dish is perceived as a sophisticated re-elaboration of the collective gastronomic heritage to which the dish belongs. If those enjoying the creation do possess a reasonable knowledge of Emilia-Romagna’s culinary traditions, it will not be difficult for them to recognize “Not-roast Guineafowl” as an artwork whose objective collocation within a specific gastronomic context with subjective aesthetic features that refer to its inclusion in a dynamic inter-subjective cultural heritage.


\(^{19}\) J. Dewey, “Having an Experience”, *ibidem.*
3. Art as Technique and Self-expression: Second and Third Arguments

So far, I have argued in favour of considering “Not-roast Guineafowl” as a genuine work of art showing its capacity to inspire contemplative and reflective judgments of three different kinds: subjective, objective and intersubjective.

In this section, I develop two additional short arguments, the former inherent to the technique of the dish and the latter inherent to the possibility of its being “read” as a concrete expression of the chef’s ideas, values and emotions.

In the first place, it is worthwhile to carry out a short digression on the term “art”, whose original meaning both in Latin, *ars*, and in Greek *techne* indicated a practical ability or craftsmanship, a profession or expertise rather than, as it is considered today, an object of reflection and contemplation. Certainly, the semantic ambiguity of the term has led to several problems, since in today’s ordinary language we speak of an “art of painting”, “art of music”, but also about “art of living” and “art of seduction”.

Nonetheless, I believe semantic richness to be a potential resource rather than an obstacle; the semantic displacement of the term reveals an overall tendency within the history of Western philosophy, i.e. an axiological supremacy of the ethereal over the material, of the Platonic *idea* over the raw *hyle*, of the soul over the body in Christian theology, and so forth.

From this point of view, the original meaning of art as craftsmanship or profession would be easily applicable to the case of cuisine, not just because common sense suggests that the role of a chef is closer to a professional designation as opposed to the role of a painter, despite the fact that becoming a great chef, as with becoming a great painter, demands numerous years, often decades of tireless dedication and intense effort.

The difficulty inherent to the vocation of the chef (as it happens with the case of painters, musicians and others) is that the art of cooking truly requires an art in the etymological sense, a *techne*, that comes as a natural result of practice and training, to be combined with innate talent and inexplicable intuition.
Returning to our “Not-roast Guineafowl”, we can note that this dish includes five different cooking methods (breast, thigh, drumstick, skin and the bones to be later distilled), six different preparations (spinach, broth, paté, ice cream, mash tun, distillation), with several different tools and devices required for an intrinsically complex preparation, and finally, one needs rigor, precision and a refined aesthetic sense for the assembly.

In other words, cooking a perfect “Not-roast Guineafowl” is not merely the result of mechanical execution alone, exactly as the good score of a symphony alone will not prevent a poor orchestra from a poor interpretation. An excellent mastery of cooking techniques is an essential prerequisite for the realization of this dish, exactly as an excellent mastery of the instrument is indispensable for the rendition of a symphony.

We can now ask, on which basis should the cooking techniques be considered less artistic, or less difficult, than the practice of solfège, or mixing colours, or chiseling marble? I am certainly not stating that any form of art necessarily needs particular technical skills to be realized (think of Duchamp’s Urinal; or, to the plain cuts in Fontana’s provoking canvasses). Yet, is there not any artistic merit in developing highly refined techniques and in the fact of using them in order to produce aesthetic artefacts?

Whether or not we accept to recover the full etymological sense of the term “art”, we must certainly admit that the stunning manifestation of technical virtuosity revealed in “Not-roast Guineafowl” is a powerful argument supporting its artistic status. Furthermore, as in the case of other forms of art, the technical execution constitutes a reliable basis for an objective (or a not-completely-subjective) evaluation, thus challenging the generalist adagio “anything goes” argument.

A third and final argument in favour of the thesis that “Not-roast Guineafowl” deserves recognition as a genuine work of art mainly derives from the relationship between the dish and its creator. Like a great number of artworks (for example, paintings) “Not-roast Guineafowl” maintains a twofold connection with its author: an emotional connection as the expression of his creativity and personality, perhaps even of his memories and emotions, and a conceptual connection as the result of an astute process of ideation and experimentation.

As it is universally known, the relationship between author and work is crucial in Romantic aesthetics, since Romantic thinkers considered any
genuine work of art as an autonomous object produced by an individual genius, expressing a faultless synthesis of matter and spirit, immanence and transcendence, subjective and objective truth.20

Without necessarily maintaining this outdated set of dichotomies, we can nevertheless maintain that an expressive relation between creator and creation can account for a genuine aesthetic experience. The notion that some sort of veritable self-expression is at work in the creation of artworks is clearly formulated, among others, by Collingwood: “The artist’s business is to express emotions; and the only emotions he can express are those which he feels, namely his own”.21

From this point of view, “Not-roast Guineafowl” is an authentic self-expression of Massimo Bottura’s personal idea of cuisine and his creative flair, as well as an expression of the flavours of his home region that he acknowledged, interiorized and creatively re-elaborated.22

In this sense, “Not-roast Guineafowl” is obviously a material artefact expressing a subjective taste and experience, but it is also an aesthetic step towards an inter-subjective dialogue based on the gastronomic tradition of Emilia-Romagna, on its common reception, on its possible evolution, and on the shared heritage of memories and feelings evoked by the sense of taste within a given community. Thus, the artist “undertakes his artistic labour not as a personal effort on his own private behalf, but as a public labour on behalf of the community to which he belongs”.23

4. Conclusion

In this short paper I have argued that a specific creation of the chef Massimo Bottura is in principle comparable to several traditional “major” artworks and therefore possesses a genuine artistic status. If so, this supports the thesis that cuisine must be considered, under certain conditions, an authentic form of art rather than a limited instance of craftmanship.

22 For a more accurate analysis of the notion of “self-expression”, please see Green (2007).
The arguments I considered in favour of my hypothesis are: in the first place, that “Not-roast Guineafowl” is able to arouse not only sensuous pleasure and feelings, but also reflective and contemplative judgments of three kind: objective, inherent to the history of Italian cuisine; subjective, inherent to one's own memories and emotions; inter-subjective, concerning the awareness of the recipe’s inclusion within the shared cultural and culinary heritage of a given community.

In the second place, the complexity of the preparation of “Not-roast Guineafowl” requires an outstanding technical ability. The mastery of a wide set of skills and techniques, even if they do not on their own prove the artistic value of the dish, they nevertheless are skills that are characteristic of a great number of artistic practices.

In the third place, the recipe is a concrete self-expression of the chef's intention, philosophy of cuisine, feelings, technical skills, creativity and personality. Since self-expression is a relevant component in the process of art-making, and “Not-roast Guineafowl” constitutes a veritable and virtuous self-expression, it would not be excessive to consider it a work of art.

More generally, I believe the frequent reluctance to recognize cuisine as a possible form of art to be a consequence of a long tradition of thought in which the transcendent was esteemed more than the immanent, the ethereal more than the material, the intellectual more than the sensuous, the idea more than the hyle.

In effect, cuisine potentially shares several characteristics with other “major” forms of art, exactly as “Not-roast Guineafowl” does with other “major” artworks. Yet, the ephemeral nature of dishes and the low status of food, traditionally associated with the coarse, vulgar aspects of reality, still prevents the public from a necessary re-evaluation of cuisine as a potential form of art.

References


