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Kant on Human Beauty

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Abstract. The inseperability-problem is a touchstone for a theory of human beauty: If we see someone as a human being, we are aware of the human duality between the mere physical appearance and the character of the person, and exactly this awareness makes it difficult to perceive them separately. A Kantian perspective on human beauty embraces this problem. Kant formulates a character-expressionist theory of human beauty in the § 17 of his “Critique of the Power of Judgement”. The ideal of beauty is one of human beauty. A human being would be ideally beautiful if her outward appearance conformed to the aesthetic normal idea and was completed by the “visible expression of moral ideas.” This theory derives from Kant's view on dependent beauty and human perfection. Kant’s character-expressionist theory not only acknowledges the inseperability-problem, but adds a normative aspect to it. With reference to Kant’s moral theory, one can argue that human beings, as ends in themselves, should always be judged as dependent, never as free beauties. In this respect, human beauty takes a special position in Kant’s theory of taste.

1. Introduction

Beauty is only a side issue of the contemporary (analytic) aesthetic debate. But if one does not restrict aesthetics to art, beauty regains interest. Our society holds human beauty dear: Beautiful people tend to fascinate, the media are obsessed with them, and many women and men strive for personal beauty. Since the Nineteen Seventies, human beauty is also object of empirical investigations.¹ The empirical research on attractiveness tries to identify objective features of human attractiveness and investigates into the psychological, sociological, or economic effects of attractiveness. So the role which human beauty plays in and out of the philosophical sphere is very different.

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¹ See, e.g., Menninghaus (2003), chap. I/II.
This paper aims to (re-)approach the topic of human beauty philosophically and searches for a theory of human beauty. Inspired by Nehamas, the first section argues that the so-called inseperability-problem is a touchstone for a theory of human beauty: If we see someone as a human being, we are aware of the human duality between the mere physical appearance and the character of the person. Exactly this awareness hampers us in perceiving them separately.\(^2\) The second section turns to a Kantian perspective on human beauty and argues that Kant’s theory of human beauty can solve the inseperability-problem. According to Kant, human beauty is dependent beauty. This amounts to a character-expressionist theory of human beauty.\(^3\) We judge a human being to be beautiful if her outward appearance conforms to the aesthetic normal idea and we believe to see visible signs of a moral character. This character-expressionist theory does justice to the inseperability-problem and expands it by a normative aspect. It is not only psychologically challenging to judge human beings only based on their mere physical appearance; this would also be a wrong way to judge them. Human beings, as ends in themselves, should always be judged as dependent, never as free beauties. Insofar human beauty takes a special position in Kant’s theory of taste.

2. The Inseperability-Problem

If one searches for a theory of human beauty, it seems as if one first has to decide whether human beauty is only skin-deep or whether true beauty comes from within. In other words, one has to choose between a body-centred and a dualist theory of human beauty. A body-centred theory is a kind of formalist theory. It claims that human beauty solely depends on the visible physical features of a person. A dualist theory assumes that besides this beauty of the physical appearance a kind of inner beauty exists, that is, the beauty attributed to the character of a person.

Even before these theories are elaborated in detail, they are confronted with a major problem. Let us call it the inseperability-problem. Both theories assume that it is possible to perceive the mere physical appearance

\(^2\) See Nehamas (2007), pp. 53 ff.
\(^3\) Cooper (2008) calls it a virtue-centred theory of human beauty.
of a person. But think of an everyday situation in which you meet another person. Even if you try to concentrate only on her physical appearance, I assume, you rather quickly start to think about what kind of person she is. We have learned from experience to read certain facial expressions and gestures as expressions of the character of a person. We see the look in someone’s eyes, and this gives us clues to what kind of person she is, or at least we hope so. So, how someone appears to us does not only depend on bodily features, or as Nehamas says:

In other words, psychological and bodily features interpenetrate [...]⁴

Why is this so? If we see someone as a human being, we know that the body that we see is animated. This brings along the awareness of a kind of human duality. Seeing someone as a person means to be aware that she is more than her looks. We tend to distinguish between the outward appearance and the character of a person.⁵ And exactly this awareness makes it so difficult to focus on the mere physical appearance because we immediately start to look for visible signs of what kind of person someone is. In short, the appearance of a person never is a mere physical appearance.

The inseperability-problem does not claim that it is per se impossible to judge human beings only based on their visible physical features. Under certain circumstances, this might be possible. If I show you a photo of a nude person, standing in front of a monochrome wall, looking at you with the most neutral facial expression, you might be able to concentrate on her mere physical appearance. But such a situation is rather artificial and does seldom occur in normal life. So the inseperability-problem claims that it is challenging and hard to concentrate only on the bodily features of a person. Therefore, we barely judge human beings only based on their visible physical features.

If the inseperability-problem describes an observation about how we tend to perceive other human beings, how does this bear upon a theory of human beauty? Assumedly, a theory of human beauty should help to understand judgements like “X is a beautiful person” or “Person x is beautiful”. If a theory of human beauty analyses human beauty (at least partly)

⁵ This is not an ontological point. I neither argue for or against a reductionist project.
as mere physical beauty, it assumes that it is possible judge human beings only based on their visible physical features. But if this is only possible under exceptional circumstances, most of our statements about human beauty remain unexplained. Therefore, a theory of human beauty should embrace the inseperability-problem.

3. Kant on human beauty

What kind of theory of human beauty can solve the inseperability-problem? A Kantian perspective on human beauty can help to answer this question. Asking Kant for help in this respect might surprise. Kant barely speaks about human beauty, that is, about judgements of beauty whose objects are human beings, in his Critique of the Power of judgement. And secondly and more importantly, Kant states that judgements of beauty do not depend on concepts. One does not even have to have a concept of an object and can still judge it to be beautiful. But the inseperability-problem arises because we have a certain concept of a human being in mind and are aware that we see a human being. So how can Kant help to solve the inseperability-problem?

3.1. Free and Dependent Beauty

In the § 16, Kant mentions human beauty for the first time in his Critique of the Power of judgement. Human beauty is one example of dependent beauty. § 16 introduces the distinction between two kinds of beauty, free or vague and adherent or dependent beauty:

The first presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be; the second does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it.

6 Thereby, I am not committed to a subjective theory of human beauty. Even if one favours an objective theory of beauty, one should take the inseperability-problem seri-

8 See Kant (2000), 5:207.
10 See Kant (2000), 5:229.
At first sight, what Kant has said about judgements of beauty so far seems to contradict this statement. But Kant has only spoken about free beauty previous to § 16, and so no contradiction occurs. Nevertheless, it is unclear how a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with this concept can ‘enter’ into a judgement of beauty without destroying it.

§ 16 allows of at least three different interpretations of dependent beauty: an additive, a negative or external, and a positive or internal interpretation. According to an additive theory, judgements of dependent beauty are complex judgements. They consist of a judgement of free beauty and one of perfection. Or, in other words, an aesthetic, disinterested pleasure and an intellectual pleasure, that is, being pleased that an object fulfils a certain purpose, lead to a judgement of dependent beauty. If Kant says that neither perfection nor beauty gains by each other, this seems to support such an interpretation. But an additive theory has difficulties to explain how dependent beauty can be a second kind of beauty and not only a subspecies of free beauty and why ‘dependent beauty’ is not an aesthetically superfluous term.

An external or negative theory assumes that a concept restricts the free play of the cognitive faculties in the case of dependent beauty. Some forms of an object are incompatible with the object’s purpose. Although one would judge an object to be freely beautiful, one does not judge it to be dependently beautiful. The following passage suggests such an interpretation:

Now if a judgment of taste in regard to the latter is made dependent on the purpose in the former, as a judgement of reason, and is thereby restricted, then it is no longer a free and pure judgment of taste.

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13 See Guyer (2002a).
18 Kant (2000), 5:229; my italics.
The beginning of §16, however, chooses a stronger formulation:

"[...] the second [i.e. adherent beauty] does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it." ¹⁹

This speaks for a more intimate influence than a mere negative one.²⁰ Therefore, an internal or positive theory claims that the concept of an object and its perfection in accordance with it are necessary (although not sufficient) for a judgement of dependent beauty.²¹ So it is possible that one would judge an object to be dependently, but not to be freely beautiful. This leaves room for speculations about how the free play of our cognitive faculties functions in the case of dependent beauty.

Wicks, for example, analyses dependent beauty as “the appreciation of teleological style.”²² In the case of free beauty, both components of the free play of our powers of cognition, imagination and understanding, are free. In the case of dependent beauty, an object’s concept and purpose fixes our understanding. This still leaves room for a free play because how a purpose is fulfilled is not a priori determined.²³ This ‘dependent’ free play of our powers of cognition is bound to a special aesthetic pleasure:

Our pleasure in an object’s dependent beauty is thus grounded upon the free play of the imagination, but only in relation to how this free play illuminates the contingency of the object’s actual systematic structure in view of the object’s purpose.²⁴

Guyer criticizes that Wicks’ proposal presupposes a conscious recognition of objects’ contingency, which he describes as un-kantian. He objects that Wicks’ proposal is too intellectualised.²⁵ I suggest that Kant’s latter remarks on the aesthetic ideas can help to better understand judgements of dependent beauty.²⁶ The beginning of § 51 states:

¹⁹ Kant (2000), 5:229; my italics.
²⁰ See Wicks (1997), 389.
²² See Wicks (1997).
²⁶ For a similar idea, see Stecker (1987), p. 93.
Beauty (whether it be beauty of nature or of art) can in general be called the expression of aesthetic ideas: [...]27

An aesthetic idea is the counterpart to an idea of reason. An aesthetic idea is a “representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it.”28 No concept can be adequate to the intuition of an aesthetic idea.29

If something expresses an aesthetic idea, it triggers a kind of play of our powers of cognition.30 Our understanding tries to find a concept adequate to the intuition of the aesthetic idea, but it has to fail because no concept can ever be adequate to it. This failure brings one back to the intuition. But our understanding does not simply give up. Again and again, new concepts come to one’s mind, are tested and fail.

If one does not claim that this ‘search-and-fail-game’ or a free play of association has to be fully conscious, this description is compatible with how § 9 describes the free play of our powers of cognition. First, § 9 does not claim that no concepts are involved in the free play. All that is said is that “no determinate concept restricts them [i.e. our powers of cognition] to a particular rule of cognition.”31 Secondly, one can understand why our powers of cognition are in harmony in the free play.32 Our imagination and understanding are in harmony like two children playing on a seesaw. If our understanding tries to put the intuition under a determinate concept, it is on the ground, metaphorically speaking. But as soon as this attempt fails, it is thrown into the air by the imagination. But the seesawing is not stopped thereby. Rather new concepts come up, again and again, and keep the harmonious seesawing in motion. This picture also helps to understand why the free play is a self-sustaining activity,33 which animates our powers of cognition.34 So it is understandable why beauty should be

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30 See Kant (2000), 5:316.
33 See Kant (2000), 5:222.
an expression of aesthetic ideas.\textsuperscript{35}

To understand the difference between free and dependent beauty, it is important to see how § 51 continues:

\[\ldots\] only in beautiful art this idea must be occasioned by a concept of the object, but in beautiful nature the mere reflection on a given intuition, without a concept of what the object ought to be, is sufficient for arousing and communicating the idea of which that object is considered as the expression.\textsuperscript{36}

Kant draws the distinction between the beauty of nature and the beauty of art. It is difficult to generally equate free beauty with the beauty of nature and dependent beauty with the beauty of art.\textsuperscript{37} The examples of free and dependent beauties mentioned in § 16 comprise both natural objects and artefacts.\textsuperscript{38} Nevertheless, it seems legitimate to read the distinction drawn in the just quoted passage as one between free and dependent beauty because Kant describes the beauty of nature as free beauty and introduces beauty of art as dependent beauty in the § 48.\textsuperscript{39} It seems reasonable that § 51 refers to this description. If this is so, in the case of the beauty of art, that is, in the case of dependent beauty “this idea must be occasioned by a concept of the object.”\textsuperscript{40} This implies that the just described free play might not start without a concept of what the object is supposed to be in the case of dependent beauty. One must have a concept of the object in order to see something in the object, which brings a determinate thought, that is, concept to one’s mind.\textsuperscript{41} Under this concept one then un成功tly tries to put the intuition, but the intuition evokes new concepts, and the free play of our powers of cognition begins.

This interpretation is compatible with § 16’s remarks on dependent beauty. If a concept starts the free play, this is a kind of restriction because the concept, as the starting point, tends to form and to lead the free play

\textsuperscript{35} For a similar explanation, see Förster (2011), p. 140.
\textsuperscript{36} Kant (2000), 5:320.
\textsuperscript{37} See, e.g., Schaper (1979).
\textsuperscript{38} See Kant (2000), 5:229-30.
\textsuperscript{39} See Kant (2000), 5:311.
\textsuperscript{40} Kant (2000), 5:320.
of association into certain directions. In this sense, the free play becomes fixed. But the free play, once ‘in motion,’ is indistinguishable from the ‘normal’ free play. Therefore, we can understand why dependent beauty is a kind of beauty and why beauty does not gain by perfection.

3.2. The Ideal of Beauty

With this internal interpretation of dependent beauty in mind, let us turn to human beauty. If human beauty is dependent beauty, the concept of a human being and the perfection of a specific human being in accordance with this concept are necessary in order to judge this human being to be beautiful. § 17 makes clearer what this amounts to. This paragraph is the most informative with respect to human beauty.

§ 17 introduces the ideal of beauty. An ideal implies the maximization of concept. Hence the ideal of beauty can only be one of dependent beauty. And the concept of the ideal’s object has to sufficiently determine the object’s purpose. Therefore, the ideal has to be about human beings. Only the end of human beings is a priori determined enough because only human beings are ends in themselves.

The ideal of beauty requires the aesthetic normal idea, that is, the image of the average, standard human being. But the aesthetic normal idea is not sufficient. If the appearance of a person conforms to the aesthetic normal idea, “the presentation is academically correct.” It does not aesthetically please, it only does not displease. In other words, the aesthetic normal idea is necessary, but not sufficient for the ideal of beauty.

In order to please universally, something characteristic is missing in the aesthetic normal idea. What this is becomes clear if one bears in mind that the ideal of beauty is one of dependent beauty. Hence human perfection has to come into play. Something is perfect if it is what it is supposed to be. Human beings, as ends in themselves, are supposed to

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44 See Kant (2000), 5:233.
45 See Kant (2000), 5:234.
act according to their rational nature, they are supposed to have a good will.\textsuperscript{49} But the ideal of beauty does not consist in the moral, only in its visible expression. Otherwise, the ideal would not be one of beauty, but of perfection. So:

\begin{quote}
In the latter [i.e. the human figure] the ideal consists in the expression of the moral, without which the object would not please universally and moreover positively [...].\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

According to a minimal interpretation, all human beings express the moral because as human beings they are able to act morally. However, Kant adds that what counts as a visible, bodily expression of moral ideas only experience can teach.\textsuperscript{51} This supplement only makes sense if not all human beings display visible signs of the moral. Only some facial expressions or gestures count as the expression of the moral. In his Anthropology, Kant illustrates this idea further. In order to call someone ugly, bodily disfigurements are not enough.

\begin{quote}
We should not charge any face with ugliness if in its characteristics it does not betray the expression of a mind degraded by vice or by a natural, though unfortunate tendency to vice, for example a certain characteristic of a person who has the tendency of sneezing maliciously when he speaks [...].\textsuperscript{52}
\end{quote}

Formulated positively, in order to call a person beautiful, her outward appearance does not only have to conform to the aesthetic normal idea.\textsuperscript{53} One must also see visible signs of a moral character displayed in her outward appearance. So Kant defends a version of a character-expressionist theory of human beauty.

\textsuperscript{49} See Kant (1961), 4:414.
\textsuperscript{50} Kant (2000), 5:235.
\textsuperscript{51} See Kant (2000), 5:235.
\textsuperscript{52} See Kant (1996), 7:298.
\textsuperscript{53} Kant says that no actual human being ever conforms to the aesthetic normal idea (Kant (2000), 5: 235). Therefore, some aberration from the aesthetic normal idea must be allowed if one judges an actual human being to be dependently beautiful. What matters, is that her appearance does not displease and one see moral ideas visually expressed.
How does this relate to what has been said about dependent beauty in the previous section? The end of § 17 seems to explicitly support an additive interpretation of dependent beauty.\textsuperscript{54} It states that we can be greatly interested in the object of the ideal of beauty.\textsuperscript{55} If we see someone as a perfect, that is, a moral human being, we take an interest in this kind of perfection, and this might lead to an intellectual pleasure. The passage in question, however, mentions only one and not two kinds of pleasure. And another more important consideration speaks against an additive and also against an external, negative theory. Both theories have to allow that we would judge a human being as freely beautiful even if we had no concept of human beings and no idea of their perfection. But it is dubitable whether a certain facial expression would please aesthetically if we had no concept of a human being and no idea of human perfection in mind. An internal theory, in contrast, allows that a human being can be seen as a dependent beauty, although not as a free beauty, and can explain why this is so. We need to see someone as a human being and to have an idea of human perfection in order to be able to interpret certain facial expressions or bodily movements as expressions of a moral character.\textsuperscript{56} Otherwise we would not think, for example, of honesty, a thought, which starts the free play of our powers of cognition and leads to a judgement of dependent beauty.

3.3. Human as Dependent Beauty: A Moral Requirement

As a character-expressionist theory Kant’s theory of human beauty embraces the inseperability-problem. Although the beauty of a human being only depends on her outward appearance, human beauty is not mere physical beauty. Rather interpreting certain features as visible signs of a person’s character is necessary to judge a person to be dependently beautiful. Trying to focus only on the mere physical features would interfere with this. So the inseperability-problem is no problem at all if human beauty is dependent beauty.

Assumedly, Kant would even argue for a stronger version of the inseperability-problem. The inseperability-problem argues that seeing someone as a human being brings along the awareness of the human duality between

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} See, e.g., Wicks (2007), p. 390.
\item \textsuperscript{55} See Kant (2000), p. 236.
\item \textsuperscript{56} See Stecker (1997), p. 92.
\end{itemize}
the mere physical appearance and the character of a person. Exactly this awareness makes it so hard to perceive them separately. As we have seen, a character-expressionist theory of human solves this problem. The inseperability-problem by itself, however, does not determine signs of what kind of character positively influence a judgement of human beauty. Kant’s stronger version of the inseperability-problem, however, not only leads to a character-expressionist, but to a “moral character”-expressionist theory. It can be called the purposiveness-problem: Seeing someone as a human being brings along the awareness of what human beings are supposed to be, that is, of the internal purposiveness of human beings. If I see someone as a human being, I am aware that a human being, that as an end in herself, is supposed to be a moral agent. And it is psychologically challenging and hard to abstract therefrom.

Pursuing this line of thought helps to explain why Kant introduces the distinction between free and dependent beauty in the first place.\footnote{For a similar idea, see, e.g., Teichert (1992), p. 45; Wicks (2007), p. 62.} With certain types of objects, it seems to be psychologically challenging and untypical to abstract from their concepts and their internal purposiveness. We know what they are supposed to be; we know their purpose.\footnote{See Kant (2000), 5:229.} § 16 explicitly mentions human beings, horses, and buildings, and indirectly representational works of art as examples of such objects.\footnote{See Kant (2000), 5:229-30.} If this is true, if we have problems to abstract from the concept and purpose of these objects, dependent beauty can explain how we can still judge such objects to be beautiful. This is important because Kant aims to analyse judgements of beauty. If he could not explain how the purpose of an object can come into play without destroying judgements of beauty, he would leave many judgements of beauty unexplained. Therefore he introduces dependent beauty as a second kind of beauty.

So far the distinction between free and dependent beauty has been understood in a weak categorical sense: Although it is not per se impossible, it is rather untypical to judge certain types of objects as free, others as dependent beauties. But does Kant not imply a stronger distinction, namely a normative categorical distinction?\footnote{See, e.g., Guyer (1997), p. 221.} According to such an interpreta-
tion, some types of objects should only be judged as free, others as dependent beauties. However, the end of § 16 shortly mentions one way how to solve (some) aesthetic disagreements, and this solution speaks against a normative categorical distinction. Sometimes we aesthetically disagree because one judgement is one of free, the other of dependent beauty. If we recognize this, the disagreement is resolved.\footnote{See Kant (2000), 5:231.} If Kant had a normative categorical distinction in mind, he would have offered another solution, namely that only a judgement of free (or dependent) beauty is adequate for this type of object. So he seems to defend rather an optional categorical distinction. Although it might be untypical to judge certain types of objects as free, and others as dependent beauties, this would be still a legitimate way to judge them. We can choose whether we want to make a judgement of free or dependent beauty.\footnote{See, e.g., Crawford (1974), p. 114-115; Teichert (1992), p. 45.} If, for example, we have no concept of the end of an object or manage to abstract from it, we can ‘switch’ from a judgement of dependent beauty to a judgement of free beauty.\footnote{See Kant (2000), 5:231.}

However, the case seems to be different with human beauty. Kant’s Maori-example is one of a judgement of free beauty whose object is a human being.\footnote{See Kant (2000), 5:230.} But the supplement “if only it were not a human being”\footnote{Kant (2000), 5:230.} implies that this is not the right way to judge a human being.\footnote{Kant (2000), 5:230.} But what normative reasons speak against it? Kant’s moral theory can help to justify this normative claim. In order to judge a human being as a free beauty, one has to abstract from the concept of the end of human beings, that is, that they are ends in themselves.\footnote{See Kant (2000), 5:231.} But the second formulation of the categorical imperative demands never to treat human beings as a mere means to an end because they are ends in themselves.\footnote{See Kant (1961), 4:429.} Formulated positively, we are asked to treat human beings always as end in themselves. Regarding x in a certain way means to treat x in a certain way, especially if one forms a judgement based on how one regards x. Hence we should always regard human beings as end in themselves. But if so, we have to be always aware

\footnote{See Kant (2000), 5:231.}


\footnote{See Kant (2000), 5:231.}

\footnote{See Kant (2000), 5:230.}

\footnote{Kant (2000), 5:230.}

\footnote{Kant (2000), 5:230.}

\footnote{Kant (2000), 5:231.}

\footnote{See also Kant (1996), 7:298.}

\footnote{See Kant (2000), 5:231.}

\footnote{See Kant (1961), 4:429.}
that someone is a human being and what a human being is supposed to be. We are not allowed to abstract from this. But exactly this would be necessary in order to judge a human being as a free beauty. Hence, due to normative, moral reasons, human beings should always be judged as dependent beauties.\footnote{For a similar idea, see Wicks (2007), p. 62.}

If this is true, then human beauty takes a special position in Kant’s general theory of taste.\footnote{Schaper (1979, p.90) suspects, but does not elaborate such a special position.} Human beauty remains exceptional even if one defends a categorical normative distinction also with respect to other types of objects. If one argued, for example, that (representational) works of art should be judged as dependent beauties, the normative reasons could not be the same as in the case of human beings.\footnote{See, e.g., Stecker (1987), pp. 96-98; Allison (2001), p. 291-296.} Only human beings are ends in themselves and should therefore be judged as dependent beauties.

4. Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to sketch a Kantian theory of human beauty and to show that such a theory does justice to the inseperability-problem. The first section has argued that a theory of human beauty has to embrace the inseperability-problem: As we hardly can judge human beings only based on their physical appearance, human beauty should not be attributed to the mere physical appearance. The second section has turned to Kant’s perspective on human beauty and has worked out his character-expressionist theory. If we judge a human being to be beautiful, her outward appearance not only conforms to the aesthetic normal idea, but we believe to see bodily expressions of her moral character. This brings to mind a determinate thought. We unsuccessfully try to put the intuition under this thought, but thereby a new thought is evoked, and the free play of our powers of cognitions begins. This character-expressionist theory can solve the inseperability-problem. Although human beauty is bound to the outward appearance of a person, this appearance is not only physical. The character of a person expresses itself in her outward appearance. What we interpret as such an expression influences our judgements of
beauty. Additionally, the second section has argued that Kant not only defends a stronger version of the inseperability-problem, the purposiveness-problem, but adds a normative aspect to it: One must not forget or abstract from the concept of the end of human beings because human beings are end in themselves. Hence human beings should always be judged as dependent beauties, never as free beauties. These considerations secure human beauty a special position in Kant’s theory of taste.

References


Kant on Human Beauty


