

Tracing Beauty and Reflective Judgment in Kant's Lectures

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ABSTRACT. Following Paul Guyer, this paper traces two central concepts in Kant's aesthetics: beauty and reflective judgment. By looking both at the lectures on anthropology that Kant gave in the winter semesters between 1772 and 1796 and at his lectures on logic, we can see the development of these central aesthetic concepts. Examining the student lecture transcriptions can thereby help us understand the development of the aesthetic theory that Kant would eventually present in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790).

I. Introduction

This paper looks at the development of key concepts in Kant's aesthetics in the anthropology and logic lectures leading up to the third *Critique*. What were Kant's early views of beauty and judgment, and how did they evolve in the years before the *Critique of Judgment*, the *Kritik der Urteils-kraft*?¹ By looking at the student notes, we will see how, if at all, the concepts change in this crucial period of Kant's philosophical development.

Despite the sizeable and growing amount of scholarship on Kant's anthropology, including work by Werner Stark, Reinhard Brandt, Robert Loudon, Holly Wilson, and Allen Wood, to my knowledge no one has examined these lectures with these two notions in mind, and few Kant scholars – with the notable exception of Paul Guyer – have examined the lectures for its aesthetic concepts. Editors and commentators have noted the structural changes in the lectures as a whole, but they have done so mostly with respect to pragmatic and teleological concepts such as character and world citizenship.

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¹ For the third *Critique*, I use the following abbreviation: KU = *Kritik der Urteils-kraft*.

Moreover, classic German studies of the development of Kant's aesthetics such as works by Paul Menzer (1952), Alfred Baeumler (1923a, 1923b) and Otto Schlapp (1901) do not adequately address the lecture notes, if they do so at all. Menzer considers the lecture notes to be unreliable on the grounds that there are problems with dating and authorship (1952: 23, 207-208). While this may be truer of the editions that Menzer mentions (*Jäsche Logic* and *Menschenkunde*), the state of research on Kant's lectures has changed considerably. Of course, precise dating of a set of notes still remains a concern, and we must always keep in mind that Kant himself did not write the transcriptions.² However, due to the painstaking work of Werner Stark and Reinhard Brandt, more lecture notes in anthropology have become available. In particular, passages of interest to aesthetics have emerged, and I will therefore discuss these.³

I examine published lectures in volume 25 of the Academy Edition⁴ and in the English translation of several of these student notes found in *Lectures on Anthropology* (Kant 2012).⁵ For sake of convenience, I will use the published German notes found in the Academy Edition and their English translations, focusing on the latter when possible since they will be more accessible to readers of English. (Note that several lecture notes remain unedited and unpublished; the Academy Edition contains only some

² We must remember that these notes are not verbatim recordings of Kant's words, but student notes written and prepared afterwards (*Abschriften*), sometimes years afterwards, rather than during the lecture itself (*Nachschriften*).

³ In *The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom* (2009: 55), I regretted lacking the space to explore the development of Kant's aesthetics. I here begin to do this, and the anthropology lectures are a good place to turn.

⁴ Kant's works are cited by volume and page number in *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German, then Berlin-Brandenburg) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter), 29 volumes, except for quotations from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which are cited by the customary use of the pagination from its first (A) and second (B) editions. The traditional Academy Edition (Akademie Ausgabe = AA) volume and page numbers are reprinted in the margins of most recent editions and translations of his writings.

⁵ This volume contains excerpts from several lectures and includes all of *Friedländer* and *Mrongovius*, and it is part of *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (Cambridge University Press, 1992-). All quotes from the anthropology lectures are from Kant 2012, with the exception of quotes from Guyer 2003, which are his. I have occasionally altered the translation found in Kant 2012. Whenever Kant 2012 does not translate a passage, the translation is mine.

of the lectures.) In discussing the development of Kant's theory of beauty and judgment, I will not distinguish judgments of beauty from those of *taste*, and do so for ease of expression and style.⁶

Paul Guyer's work is excellent for understanding the development of Kant's aesthetics, and here as elsewhere I am much indebted to his analysis, but there is much more that could emerge from an examination of the lectures. To begin, let us first review the dates of Kant's lectures on anthropology. The lecture notes contained in volume 25 of the Academy Edition are as follows (with course dates in parentheses):

1. *Collins* (1772-73)
2. *Parow* (1772-73)
3. *Friedländer* (1775-76)
4. *Pillau* (1777-78)
5. *Menschenkunde* (1781-82)
6. *Mrongovius* (1784-85)⁷
7. *Busolt* (1788-89)

2. Judgments of Taste

What is Kant's theory of beauty and taste in the *KU*, and how did Kant arrive at it? Guyer provides a useful framework here. He holds that there are three main stages of development of Kant's theory of aesthetics and its eventual connection to a moral teleology, driven by Kant's teleological vision that he got sometime around 1788, the main impetus for writing the *KU*. Kant's famous letter to Karl Reinhold of December 1787 would give the impression that Kant's theory underwent a sudden revision, but examining Kant's lectures shows that the matter is not so simple. According to

⁶ Here I follow Zuckert 2007.

⁷ Guyer skips over this key lecture, Mrongovius, which I translated in Kant 2012.

Guyer, the key innovation in Kant's thinking is the connection Kant created between aesthetic and moral themes, allowing him to make aesthetics part of his moral teleology (Guyer 2003: 153).⁸

In the first stage, as seen in the *Collins* and *Parow* lectures in the early 1770s, Guyer maintains, "Kant had already arrived at the idea that a judgment of taste is based on an immediate yet universally and necessarily valid feeling of pleasure in an object, a response that in some sense could even ground an *a priori* judgment" (2003: 138). However, Kant understood such a universally valid pleasure to arise solely from the harmony between the form of a beautiful object and the universally valid laws of human *sensibility*, as contrasted to human understanding and reason.

In the second stage, in the mid-1770s, Guyer continues, "Kant developed the theory that our pleasure in beauty is the product of a harmonious interaction between sensibility or imagination on the one hand and understanding on the other that is induced in us by a beautiful object" (2003: 138). On this basis, Kant developed his account of art as the product of genius as well as a classification of the arts. Still absent at this stage, however, was any connection between aesthetic experience and morality.

Finally, in stage three, "we suddenly find Kant prominently characterizing the harmony between imagination and understanding that is central to both aesthetic experience and artistic creativity as a form of freedom" (Guyer 2003: 139). This connection to freedom occurs in Kant's *Busolt* lectures in the late 1780s.⁹ This move allows Kant to write the most novel parts of the *KU*, particularly the sections on the dynamical sublime and the experience of beauty as the symbol of the morally good as evidence of the freedom of the human agent, the interpretations of the intellectual interest in natural beauty, and genius as the source of artistic beauty. This was taken as evidence of nature's hospitality to human freedom and allowed him to connect the Critique of the Power of Aesthetic Judgment to the Critique of the Power of Teleological Judgment. Kant could then unify aesthetics into his overarching vision of teleology (Guyer 2003: 157).

Guyer describes Kant's theory of the judgment of taste as containing two elements. The first is a *logico-linguistic* analysis of the claims of an aes-

⁸ Cf. Guyer 1993 and 1998, and Zammito 1992.

⁹ *Busolt* should also be compared to *Reichel*, which adds to and completes the missing parts in the former.

thetic judgment, according to which a person who claims that an object is beautiful is claiming that the pleasure that she takes in the object is one that can reasonably be expected to occur in any other properly situated observer of the object. This is the thesis that judgments of taste claim universality. The second is a *psychological* explanation of the causes of such a pleasure, which explains why such an expectation is reasonable (Guyer 2003: 139). It is in the latter, psychological aspect that Kant's theory changes the most after the mid 1770s. In the *Collins* and *Parow* lectures from 1772-73 Kant argues that our pleasure in beauty is occasioned by the harmony between an object and the laws of our sensibility alone (Guyer 2003: 142).¹⁰ The laws of sensibility are taken to be just as objective as the laws of understanding, and for this reason, Kant argues, the claim to universality is warranted. Kant does not yet talk about a "deduction" of taste (Guyer 2003: 143). Kant argues that beautiful objects are ones the spatial or temporal forms of which make it easy for us to grasp them as wholes. This claim can be seen in *KU*'s assertions that "all form of the objects of the senses . . . is either shape or play," and that "the charm of colors or of the agreeable tones of instruments can be added" but are *not* part of the pure judgment of taste (*KU* 5: 225).

I now present Kant's main claims regarding taste (*Geschmack*), found in the *Collins* lecture (AA 25: 174-204). The following is merely intended to show how some of Kant's claims are interrelated – it is not meant to be an argument.

1. A judgment of taste is a sensible judgment of intuition that follows a principle of sensible comprehensibility according to laws of sensibility, and it sets the power of cognition into activity (assumed).
2. A judgment of taste is in a sense subjective (from 1).
3. A judgment of taste requires the power of judgment and comparison (from 1).
4. Yet the judgment of taste is also objective since it has rules and laws (from 1).

¹⁰ Kant also refers to promoting "inner life" (*Collins*, 25: 181; cf. *Parow*, 25: 379), for according to his general theory of pleasure, the latter is the consciousness of the promotion of life, or activity, while pain is the consciousness of its hindrance or obstacles to activity.

5. The judgment of taste is distinct from a judgment of sense, which works by stimuli and is a merely private judgment, *and* a judgment of taste is distinct from a moral judgment (assumed).
6. A judgment of taste has universal validity (from 4).
7. A judgment of taste promotes our sociality and has a social motive (from 6)
8. Beauty makes sensible intuition easier and accords with the subjective laws of sensibility (from 1).
9. Beauty is thus pleasant (from 8).
10. Beauty promotes the inner life or feeling of life (from 9).¹¹

Kant maintains that “taste is a sensible judgment, but not a judgment of sense and of sensation, but of intuition and comparison, of receiving pleasure and displeasure through intuition” (*Collins*, AA 25: 177). He makes a standard eighteenth-century contrast between beauty and utility that might reveal the influence of Hutcheson, then adds: “Beauty and taste is intuition. Utility and insight is reflection. We will later consider what beauty or gratification in intuition contributes to the perfection of the human being” (*Collins*, AA 25: 177). (Note that he uses beauty and taste as synonyms.) Feeling is produced by stimuli (*Reizbarkeit*) and emotion,

yet about beauty merely as beauty I do not at all judge in accordance with feeling, but in accordance with appearance compared with feeling. To feeling belongs sense; to taste, the power of judgment. Feeling is therefore very easy to have, for only sense belongs to it. Taste is rare, for to it belongs the power of judgment (*Collins*, AA 25: 178).

In the *Collins* lecture, Kant connects taste to the notion that such judgments are universal or have universal validity:

¹¹ A further claim assumed by Kant is: the principle of sensible comprehensibility can be applied to the experience of several arts such as the visual arts, music, dance, and gardening. This interesting claim remains to be explored in another context.

What is supposed to be in accordance with taste must please universally, i.e. the judgment of taste is not made in accordance with the private constitution of my subject to be affected with pleasure by an object, but in accordance with the rules of universal liking (*Collins*, AA 25: 179).

Yet Kant allows for some exceptions. Hence “universal” is not used in formal logic’s sense of the term: “The art of cooking should also have universal rules: tasteful people know well how to encounter what pleases universally or for the most part” (*Collins*, AA 25: 179, my emphasis). Kant’s example of cooking is noteworthy, for in *KU* this gustatory example (e.g., the Canary wine) is an instance of a judgment of the agreeable, not of taste. However, here Kant’s point is merely that taste is subjective.

He then defines taste as “the *principium* through which human beings can enjoy a socially universal gratification” (*Collins*, AA 25: 179).¹² The reason for this is that taste has rules: “It has them, for taste is grounded in humanity, but one can arrive at them only through experience” (*Collins*, AA 25: 179-80). So on this view can there be disputes in taste? No, since they are not based on the laws of understanding. However, this does not imply mere relativism (‘to each his own’), for that would cut us off from the social elements that are the main benefits of taste in the first place. At the same time, indeed there can be disputes, if disputing in taste means only that one “wants to prove that our judgment of taste is supposed to be valid for others too” (*Collins*, AA 25: 180). “There is much in the *principium* of taste that is empirical, but the grounds of judgment are not merely abstracted from experience, but lie in humanity” (*Collins*, AA 25: 180). They lie in humanity in that the ground of a judgment of taste is the easy, hence pleasant, exercise of the human *sensible* faculty.

Here he contrasts judgments of taste and private judgments. Kant’s example of the latter is thinking the room is too cold or warm, where two individuals or subjects who perceive degrees of warmth are affected in distinct ways. He notes that the judgments are contrary, but not contradic-

¹² This can be compared with the *KU* sections on empirical and intellectual interest in the beautiful. Why Kant’s views changed here remains to be explored, but my current conjecture is that it was his encounter with Rousseau in the 1760s that changed them. The effect of Rousseau on Kant’s views of sociality in *aesthetics*, not social or political philosophy, deserves more examination than it has received.

tory. A judgment of taste is like this since it is subjective in that one is judging how one is affected, judging one's own sensations, but it is also universal: "In the same way, when someone holds this dish to be the best but it tastes differently to another, then both are right, for they are not talking about the object of eating but only about themselves as the subject, about how they are affected" (*Collins*, AA 25: 180-181). This counts as a distinction between taste and what is *below* it (the agreeable), but Kant also contrasts the judgment of taste with moral judgments about good and evil, a distinction familiar to readers of *KU*.

It is striking that he claims that sensibility has rules as much as the understanding has them, a view he would of course reject in the *Critique of Pure Reason's* famous footnote on "aesthetics" (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A21/B35). Here he instead claims:

Judgments about beauty and ugliness are objective but not in accordance with rules of the understanding, but of sensibility. Sensibility has its rules as much as understanding. Certain principles of taste must be universal and be universally valid. Thus there are certain rules of aesthetics: with them we must set aside stimuli and emotions (*Collins*, AA 25: 181).

The reason for this appears to derive from a kind of formalism of sensibility, or laws of representation – perhaps an idea Kant took from Euler.

This idea, the facilitation of sensible comprehensibility principle, is that the ease of sensation leads to an intensification of the feeling of life, hence to pleasure and a (positive) judgment of taste. Kant seems to think that an increase in the feeling of life leads to an increase in pleasure, and *vice versa*. Kant applies this principle to music as well, indeed to several of the arts (*Collins*, AA 25: 182). He continues to apply this principle of *Begreiflichkeit* to dance and gardening. The principle of sensible comprehensibility would unify the pleasures that are felt in the arts, and presumably, in giving them their *raison d'être*, it would thereby unify the arts themselves.

In the *Friedländer* (1775-76) and *Pillau* (1777-78) lectures, Kant moves to the second stage. The theory that he would henceforth hold is that the aforementioned pleasure in beauty is caused when a beautiful object induces a harmonious play between multiple cognitive faculties, namely sensibility and understanding. In Guyer's words, "Sensibility provides us

with a variety of materials, and then the mind sees what it can make of them” (2003: 147). In this period, the notion of a *free play* appears for the first time ever (*Friedländer*, AA 25: 560).

According to Guyer, “The key to Kant’s approach is his recognition that since aesthetic response involves understanding as well as sensibility, the several fine arts can be distinguished from each other by the particular ways in which sensibility and understanding are related in our response to them” (2003: 148). Kant uses the theory of how the two faculties are interrelated to distinguish oratory (*Beredsamkeit*) from poetry (*Dichtkunst*).¹³ Kant could not have made this distinction without his theory of sensibility and understanding.

In the *Menschenkunde* lecture, which was edited by Fr. C. Starke and published in 1831 (and in this sense stands apart from the other lectures), Kant uses the distinction between illusion (*Schein*), or appearance (*Apparenz*), and reality, to classify the forms of the arts. Painting and sculpture play with this tension.

By making a connection to morality, Kant moves to stage three. In connecting aesthetics to morality, the final end of nature, Kant combines aesthetics with a new, moral teleology. In the *KU* he does this in two main moments, the *intellectual interest* in the beautiful, and in his treatment of the *artistic genius*, conceived as a special art-producing talent and natural gift of nature that can express moral ideas in art, and his theory of aesthetic ideas that can represent the moral (Guyer 2003: 158).

In *KU*, these new insights into the connections between the aesthetic and the moral form three main groups (Guyer 2003: 154). First, Kant recognizes that art may have content, even explicitly moral content, without sacrificing the freedom of play between the imagination on the one hand and understanding and/or reason on the other. This is dependent beauty (§16), which, Guyer rightly notes, still counts as a kind of beauty. Second, Kant argues that aesthetic experience can reveal to us something about our own capacities of morality, without sacrificing what makes it distinctively aesthetic. This is seen in the ideal of beauty and theory of mathematical and above all dynamical sublimity. Finally, Kant suggests that the

¹³ On poetry as “play” as opposed to oratory as serious work, a view that survives in *KU*, see Guyer’s essay on the anthropology lectures in a volume I am editing, *Reading Kant’s Lectures* (Clewis, forthcoming, 2015).

experience of beauty in both nature and art can be understood as evidence of the fit between nature and our own objectives that is the fundamental regulative principle of his teleology.

3. Reflecting Judgment

I now turn to the notions of determining (also translated as "determinate") and reflecting judgment in Kant's lectures. I examine the act of judging (*Beurtheilung*), judgment (*Urtheil*), and the power of judgment (*Urtheilskraft*) in the lectures on anthropology, though I will also refer to Kant's lectures on logic. Needless to say, this is only a beginning, and there is much more to be said about the development of the notion of judgment in Kant's lectures.

According to the lecture notes, Kant distinguishes wit as a capacity for making connections from judgment as a capacity to draw distinctions and discern differences. In *Parow*, he entitles a section, "On Wit and on the Power of Judgment" (*Collins*, AA 25: 132; cf. *Parow*, AA 25: 341):

Understanding and reason are the higher powers of the soul. Understanding is the capacity to judge. Reason is the capacity to infer. The understanding is the capacity to judge *a posteriori*. (*Collins*, AA 25: 147; cf. *Parow*, AA 25: 351)

The healthy understanding is thus merely the capacity to judge *in concreto*. (*Collins*, AA 25: 156; cf. *Parow*, AA 25: 359).

The judgments of beauty and the good are distinguished in that the former apply only to humans who have a unique kind of sensibility, whereas the latter holds for any rational being:

Judgments of beauty are universal for human beings. The judgments of the good are universal for all rational beings, wherever and whatever they may be. Angels or rational creatures in other planets: but the beautiful should not please them, for they can have other laws of sensibility (*Collins*, AA 25: 198).

In the section in *Friedländer* entitled, "On the obscure representations of the soul," Kant characterizes preliminary (*vorläufige*) judgment as a kind

of searching, which at first glance might make it look like Kant is distinguishing between determinate and reflective judgment:

In addition, preliminary judgments also belong to the obscure representations. Before an individual passes a judgment that is determinate, he already passes in advance a preliminary judgment in obscurity. This leads him to search for something (*Friedländer*, AA 25: 481).

While there may be some aspects of such preliminary judgment that make it sound like reflective judgment, especially if one follows Hannah Ginsborg's "pre-cognitivist" reading of reflective judgment, I do not think Kant has this in mind. After all, preliminary judgment seems rather sinister. Kant says that it raises the danger that one will incline toward superstition and the mystical, whereas he never characterizes reflective judgment in this manner.

A crucial section on judgment in *Friedländer* is "On Wit and the Power of Judgment" (AA 25: 515-16).¹⁴

A fine wit is one that can notice the smallest similarity, and a fine power of judgment is one that can notice the slightest dissimilarity...In short, wit summons up all the cases, and looks for a supply of preliminary judgments. A preliminary judgment is a basis for judging about things, but which is not sufficient. However, to pass a determinate judgment is proper to the power of judgment. Wit roams about, wherever it finds something, and thus is of service for invention. For that reason wit also leads to errors, for if it takes the insufficient bases for judging as determinate, it thus leads to error, which happens when one does not feel like thinking about wit and its preliminary judgments, and combining them with the power of judgment. The power of judgment however is of service for determinate judgment and for this reason it also prevents errors (*Friedländer*, AA 25: 516).

Here there is no indication that Kant distinguishes reflecting from determining judgment. Judgment is the ability to apply concepts in a given case,

¹⁴ On practical judgment, see *Friedländer*, AA 25: 631; 634f.; and 659.

the faculty of applying rules (*Friedländer*, AA 25: 537ff.), he claims, yet he gives no indication of the noted distinction. The power of judgment is the ability to apply the rules, to apply the universal to a particular. This would of course count as determining judgment. Although Kant uses the term reflecting and reflection, he does not mean this in any way that would connect to his aesthetic theory, but rather in the cognitive sense of reflecting as thinking: “The upper cognitive faculty is the faculty of reflecting on representations given to us” (*Friedländer*, AA 25: 537).

The fragmentary lecture notes, *Pillau* (1777-78), which covers only the faculty of cognition, is organized as a commentary on the relevant paragraphs in Baumgarten’s *Metaphysics*. It has little to add on the issue of reflecting judgment. In Kant’s comment on Baumgarten’s section entitled, *Perspicacia* (§§572-578), which appears in G. F. Meier’s translation as *On acuminous [scharfsinnigen] Wit* (§§426-431), one finds much of the same thing as in earlier lectures. There is no significant development. The power of judgment is a “capacity to subsume whether or not something belongs under a general [*allegemeinen*] concept.” Judging, he says, is a dry or tiresome business since it only restricts or limits the rule and “asks whether something were also sufficient to the rule” (*Pillau*, AA 25: 754-755). The power of judgment is the faculty of subsumption under rules (*Pillau*, AA 25: 773), Kant claims in the comments on Baumgarten’s §§606-609 (Meier’s “On the Faculties of Judgment,” in §§451-453). The kind of judgment at work here does not appear to be anything other than determining judgment.

In *Mrongovius* (1784-85), we find more of the same distinctions in the section “On Wit and the Power of Judgment” (*Mrongovius*, AA 25: 1262-1272). In the section “On the Higher Cognitive Faculty,” we find the familiar distinctions among understanding, judgment, and reason (*Mrongovius*, AA 25: 1296). Accordingly, it appears that Kant still lacks a conception of reflecting judgment. It is not until 1788-89 that Kant would make this notion a key part of his aesthetics.¹⁵ Before concluding this all-too-brief survey, however, I would like to mention the lectures on logic.

In *Logik Dobna-Wundlacken*, stemming from Kant’s lectures in summer

¹⁵ *Busolt* and *Reichel* thus deserve to be examined for what they reveal about the development of the concept of judgment, but such an analysis must be carried out in another version of this paper.

semester 1792, Kant presents what appears to be a novel account.¹⁶ The *Logik Dobna-Wundlacken* lecture notes contain claims close to the ones published about two years earlier in *KU*: Kant describes inductive inferences in a way previously not found in the lectures. He had discussed inductive inferences in logic lectures since at least the early 1770s, but in *Dobna-Wundlacken*, he adds that these inferences are based on the reflecting power of judgment.

Already in the 1780s Kant shows a distinction between reflecting and determining power of judgment. He calls induction from the particular to the universal a kind of reflecting judgment. It remains unclear that it is *aesthetic* rather than logical reflecting judgment, however. (Later emendations that were written sometime between the 1790s and Kant's death in 1804 are given in bold font.)

Inferences of the power of judgment go from the particular to the **[empirical]** universal **[are ways of progressing from the *individuis* to the *generibus*]**, from some things, which belong to a certain species [*Art*], to all of them, or from some properties, in which things of the same species agree, to the rest of them, insofar as they belong to the same principle. They are nothing but ways of coming from particular concepts to universal ones; thus, of the reflecting **[not determining]** power of judgment; therefore not ways of determining the object, but rather only the manner of reflection about the object, in order to arrive at cognition of it. **[are inferences to arrive at provisional, not determining judgments. – Analogy and Induction.]** (*Reflexion* 3200, AA 16: 709).¹⁷

We do not know if this was written toward the end of the 1780s, when Kant was writing *KU*, but since it comes from the 1780s, it is after the *Pillau* and *Friedländer* anthropology lectures (stage two). I have not found any evidence connecting the reflecting/determining distinction to the notion of freedom (the key concept in stage three), nor does Kant distinguish

¹⁶ For views going back to 1770s, see Kant, *Blomberg Logic*, AA 24: 280-281; *Logik Philippi*, AA 24: 469-470; *Logik Pölitz*, AA 24: 583; *Logik Busolt*, 24: 670; and *Wiener Logik*, AA 24: 938-939.

¹⁷ Erich Adickes estimates that this *Reflexion* comes from 1780-1789, while the emendations to the note are from 1790-1804. For this reference, I thank a person who remains anonymous to me.

teleological from aesthetic judgment in the lectures on logic or anthropology, probably because he did not consider it to be the appropriate place for such a discussion. Moreover, we find neither notions of intellectual interest in natural beauty nor genius as the source of artistic beauty, but instead find only what appears to be a description of kinds of cognitive judgment.

The *Jäsche Logic* (1804) was published in Kant's lifetime and edited by Jäsche on the basis of lectures that may have been given after 1790, although the dating uncertain. Kant claims that "we cannot and may not judge concerning anything without *reflecting*, i.e., without comparing a cognition with the power of cognition from which it is supposed to arise (sensibility or the understanding)" (*Jäsche Logic*, AA 09:76; cf. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A261/B317). What is striking about this reflecting is that it is second-order or meta-cognitive, a self-regarding reflection comparing a cognition with sensibility or understanding itself, not first-order reflection as it was in *Friedländer*. Kant's lectures on logic thus distinguish reflecting from determining judgment; however, it remains unclear whether "reflecting" is used in the sense of merely reflecting, aesthetic judgment as it is characterized in the third *Critique*.

As a concluding remark, if not proper conclusion, I wish to state that much more remains to be done with Kant's lectures, which contain many noteworthy passages on aesthetics and are waiting to be mined by scholars of the history of aesthetics.¹⁸ By looking at what Kant there has to say about beauty, sublimity, genius, life, fine art, the classification of the arts, judgment, and so on,¹⁹ the lectures can help aestheticians arrive at a better self-understanding.²⁰

¹⁸ Although I could not explore this here, Kant's anthropology lectures contain a theory of dependent beauty and impure judgments of taste.

¹⁹ These notions, crucial to Kant's aesthetics, have not yet been adequately analyzed and discussed – that is, not merely *quoted*, as Otto Schlapp tends to do with the concept of genius (e.g., Schlapp 1901: 395).

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