

## **Schematizing without a concept? Imagine that!**

While concluding the exposition of the judgment of beauty, Kant writes: “Everything flows from the concept of taste as a faculty of judging an object in relation to the free lawfulness of the imagination.”<sup>1</sup> The aim of this paper is to elucidate the free but lawful activity of the imagination in judgments of beauty. I will argue that this activity is different in *kind* from the law-bound activity of the imagination in theoretical judgments.

By cashing out this difference as a difference in *kind* I mean to suggest that the aesthetic activity of the imagination is not derivative from, or parasitic on, the theoretical one. Rather, they are on par, or as one might now put it, the two exhibit a “family resemblance.” If this reading is correct, one cannot argue, as some have,<sup>2</sup> that the imagination’s freedom from laws in aesthetic judgment is simply a *failure* to apply concepts and laws. Rather, it is a success since it amounts to the achievement of being adequate to the special form of beautiful objects.

I will propose that the aesthetic activity of the imagination be different from the theoretical because of what is required in order to unify the forms of beautiful objects and to attribute necessity to them, and by so doing to be adequate to their beauty. I am going to argue that in order to achieve this adequacy the imagination must, first, unify every beautiful object in a “holistic” and “singular” manner and not in the “compositional” and “general” manner that it employs in theoretical judgments, and second attribute to it “individual” rather than “general” necessity.<sup>3</sup>

## I.

Our knowledge of the free lawfulness of the imagination is restricted to a handful of for the most part obscure characteristics that he attributes to it. We are directed to think that this lawfulness is free because it cannot be explained by means of any determinate “law” or “rule,” be it general rules of artistic criticism, or concepts, which Kant regards as those representations that provides *rules* for the unification of other representations. More specifically, the aesthetic activity of the imagination is lawful but “without a law”<sup>4</sup> in at least two different senses. First, in contrast to “the rule-bound character [*Regelmäßigkeit*]” of the activity of the imagination in theoretical judgment “that leads to the concept of an object,”<sup>5</sup> the lawful but free activity of the imagination in aesthetic judgment does not *result* in a concept or concept-predication.<sup>6</sup> For reasons that I hope to make clearer below, aesthetic judgments of the form “x is beautiful” do not, according to Kant, predicate the concept “beauty” of the object,<sup>7</sup> even if they do employ and attribute to the object various different concepts.<sup>8</sup> Second, the activity of the imagination in aesthetic judgment is also not *governed* by any of the determinate concepts or laws of the understanding.<sup>9</sup> In contrast to theoretical judgment, where the imagination is guided by the concepts and principles of the understanding,<sup>10</sup> in aesthetic judgment “the understanding is at the service of the imagination and not vice versa.”<sup>11</sup> Moreover, while in theoretical judgments the imagination is responsible for the schematism of concepts, in aesthetic judgments it “schematizes *without* a concept.”<sup>12</sup>

How should we think of this difference? I suggest thinking about it in the following manner. In theoretical judgments, the imagination unifies sensible representations in a *general* and *compositional* manner that corresponds to the nature of concepts. In aesthetic judgments it unifies sensible representations in a *singular* and

*holistic* manner that corresponds to the form of beautiful objects. Moreover, while in theoretical judgments, the imagination schematizes *concepts*, in aesthetic judgments it schematizes the lawful nature of the understanding as the source of unity and necessity *in general*, but neither any specific concept, nor even the understanding's *conceptual* nature, that is, its nature as the source of *a certain kind* of unity and necessity. I turn now to support this reading by introducing first the unifying and the schematizing activities of the imagination in theoretical judgments.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant takes himself to have established that theoretical cognition, including perception, is possible only if what is received by the senses is unified and constrained by one of the pure concepts or laws of the understanding.<sup>13</sup> Kant stresses that this required unity cannot be merely arbitrary, private, or in the language of the third *Critique*, lawless. Rather, it has to be *lawfully* unified<sup>14</sup> by an act that he calls *a priori* synthesis according to a law.<sup>15</sup> Rather than in sensibility, the provenance of this act lies in the categories, the pure forms of the understanding's activity. In addition, it is the fundamental condition of all cognition.<sup>16</sup> Accordingly, if cognition is to get off the ground, the understanding and sensibility must cooperate

Kant regards the possibility of this necessary cooperation as demanding a special explanation. Since the categories are intellectual and not sensible, if they are to constrain sensible representations, they must be "construed"<sup>17</sup> in sensible terms. And if sensible representations can be experienced only as unified by the forms of the understanding, they must be recognized in terms of the understanding. What can serve for this task? Kant's answer appeals to the transcendental imagination, in particular, to the transcendental imagination as the author of the "figurative synthesis" (*synthesis speciosa*) and the schematism of concepts.<sup>18</sup>

The transcendental imagination is suitable for this task in virtue of two of its central features. First, for reasons that I will not go into here, Kant regards it as both sensible and intellectual.<sup>19</sup> Second, rather than the capacity to form images,<sup>20</sup> the primary

function that Kant seems to attribute to the transcendental imagination is to enable recognition: it allows the mind to recognize or construe the sensible manifold in terms of the understanding, and the concepts of the understanding in sensible terms.<sup>21</sup> In theoretical judgments specifically it enables the mind to recognize sensible representations in terms of pure or empirical concepts, and those concepts in spatiotemporal terms. For example, the imagination is responsible for our capacity to recognize a certain sensible representation as the kind of thing that is a dog, but not a person, and thus fit to stand under the concept of a dog. At the same time, it is the key to our capacity to regard the pure concept of substance, not only as indicating a representation that can only be the subject but not a predicate in a judgment, but also in sensible terms, as “the persistence of the real in time”.<sup>22</sup>

When it “schematizes a concept”<sup>23</sup> and unifies sensible representations by the “figurative synthesis,” then, the task of the transcendental imagination is precisely the task, which Kant takes to be necessary for any cognition:<sup>24</sup> the task of rendering concepts in sensible terms, and reversibly, of recognizing the sensible manifold as falling under some concept.<sup>25</sup>

One lesson that we can learn from this exposition is that the role of the imagination in theoretical judgment is at least in part recognitional. On my view, this is true also in aesthetic judgments. However, the recognitional role of the imagination in judgments of beauty differs from its role in theoretical judgment in that, although it appeals to the lawfulness of the understanding *in general*, it cannot be understood in conceptual terms for reasons that I now turn to explain.

## II.

For Kant, the products of the transcendental imagination when it schematizes concepts in

theoretical judgment, the schemata, are not particular images of individual objects. Each schema is a pure representation of a “general procedure”<sup>26</sup> that is responsible for our recognizing *any* sensible representation that can fall under the corresponding concept. A brief review of Kant’s account of concepts will help to explain the general nature of the schemata.

Kant writes, “as to their form,” all concepts are general.<sup>27</sup> I take this to mean roughly that concepts are by their nature mediated representations that relate to objects through other representations.<sup>28</sup> The extension of a concept is general in the sense that a representation is a concept insofar as “other representations are contained *under* it, by means of which it is related to objects.”<sup>29</sup> The concept of a body contains under it representations like metal, wood etc., which are themselves concepts in that they contain under them other lower concepts (e.g., in the case of metal, the concepts of copper, tin and so forth). Concepts are also general with regard to their intension because they represent only general features that are, or can in principle be, common to the representations of several objects (even if, *as far as we know*, only one object falls under them). For example, the concept “body” holds together “descriptive” representations, in Kant’s terms, “marks” [*Merkmale*], like divisibility, extension, impenetrability, which are general features that are common to the representations of all the objects to which the concept is applicable.

Kant takes the generality of concepts to imply that there is no “lowest concept.”<sup>30</sup> Even though we are capable of referring to individual objects through concepts, intuitions and the singular use of judgments,<sup>31</sup> concepts do not represent particular objects *as* concrete individuals. They represent them only as realizing *general* features that characterize them as particular instantiations of possible general kinds.<sup>32</sup> And they can *refer* to concrete individuals only in virtue of their singular *use* and relation to the intuitions through which the objects are given, but not in virtue of their conceptual nature, which is necessarily general.

The form of conceptual generality equally characterizes the schemata of the imagination. The schema of a dog, for example, “signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four footed animal in general, without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit *in concreto*.”<sup>33</sup> The imagination’s rendering of a concept in sensible terms that Kant calls the schema allows us to judge individual objects only as realizing different general descriptions, but not *qua* individuals “*in concreto*.”<sup>34</sup> However - and here comes the reason why the imagination’s activity in aesthetic judgment *must* be different in *kind* – Kant argues that beautiful objects must be judged *as* concrete individuals.<sup>35</sup>

Beautiful objects, for Kant, *should not* be judged *merely* on the basis of the general descriptions under which they might fall.<sup>36</sup> Notice that he never argues that we *cannot* judge them in such a way, as instances of some general kinds, be it the set of sunsets, paintings, experimental novels or even beautiful objects in general. We *can* judge beautiful objects in such a way. In fact, according to Kant, we have to judge all the objects of fine art according to certain general descriptions that are contained in certain concepts, like the concepts “church,” “painting,” and “symphony.” Nevertheless, if, rather than judging an object to be a beautiful *rose*, or a beautiful *church*, one judges it to be a *beautiful* rose or church on the basis of a general concept that indicates just what this object has in common with all other beautiful objects, or all the beautiful objects of the same kind, one’s judgment is not aesthetic, but “logical” or “theoretical.”<sup>37</sup> For reasons that I cannot go into here, Kant holds that if we judge beautiful objects *only* logically or theoretically by imaginatively recognizing only what this beautiful object has in common with others according to concepts, the results would be devastating: “all the beauty in the world would be denied [*weggeleugt*].”<sup>38</sup> Thus, even though on Kant’s account, one can, in certain circumstances, use the imagination to recognize a beautiful object as manifesting certain *general* descriptions this use cannot be the basis for an *aesthetic* judgment.<sup>39</sup> In

order to *aesthetically* judge an object to be beautiful, the activity of the imagination must allow for the acknowledgement of this object as a concrete individual. For that reason, this activity must be different from the one employed in theoretical judgments.

Whether an object is recognized by means of the imagination as a particular instantiation or as an individual seems to matter to Kant not only with respect to whole objects, but also with respect to the features or aspects of objects. While the features of objects judged through concepts are general and in principle sharable by all the objects that fall under the same concepts, I think that Kant calls on us to regard the features or parts that constitute the beauty of an object not as general descriptions, but as singular features of an individual whole.

Take for example, Adolph Menzel's painting *Das Balkonzimmer*.<sup>40</sup> Only in light of this individual painting as a *whole* can one appreciate that, and why, the specific dull white color and rectangular shape of the reflection of the window on the brown floor is so utterly beautiful. Independently of this individual painting as a whole, the reflection is simply a dull white rectangle, and not necessarily beautiful. I think that there are two lessons to learn from this example: First, as "beauty-making features," the features by which we judge an object to be beautiful are singular, rather than general like the features of an object judged through concepts. Second, the unity of those features and the beautiful object as a whole is holistic, and not compositional as in the case of objects judged through concepts.<sup>41</sup>

To begin with, Kant argues that the empirical properties we predicate of objects in theoretical judgments are general,<sup>42</sup> and thus indicates that the empirical properties of a non-beautiful object can be legitimately attributed to this object independently of their relation to the other properties of the object and to the object as an individual whole. For example, "extension" can be attributed to every body independently of the specific way in which any individual body is extended. Being extended is a feature applicable both to the new crystal vase that my mom just bought me, and to Giacometti's bronze sculpture,

*Woman of Venice* independently of the way that each of them is extended. It is this concept “body” and the general mark of extension that it contains, rather the appreciation of the vase and the sculpture as two individual wholes, that render it possible to judge both the vase and the sculpture as extended bodies. The imagination, thus, does not need to recognize the individual body as a whole, in order to recognize its extension as the sensible manifestation of the mark “extension.”

In contrast, being a “beauty-making feature” is not independent of the beauty of the individual object whose beauty the feature constitutes. For example, the white rectangular shade of *Das Balkonzimmer* might not be a “beauty-making feature” in any object other than this painting, surely not in all other beautiful objects, all other paintings, or all other 19<sup>th</sup>-century realist paintings. This shade is not a mark of a term like “beauty,” the concept “painting” or the concept “19<sup>th</sup>-century realistic painting,” as extension is the mark of the concept “body,” and thus a feature of any body. Surely, even “extension” does not apply to the vase and to the sculpture in the same way. However, it does apply to *all* bodies simply by virtue of their falling under the concept “body,” while the white rectangular shade is not applicable to all beautiful objects by virtue of the term “beauty,” or to all the beautiful 19<sup>th</sup>-century realist paintings by virtue of the concept of their genre.

Second, I think that this example points to the different *manners* of imaginative unification and imaginative recognition in theoretical judgments and in aesthetic judgments. In theoretical judgments, the activity of the imagination is *compositional* in the sense that the recognition of the individual object as a whole need not precede the imaginative recognition of any of its features as long as it is guided by a concept. For example, if I have the concept of copper, I can, through my imagination, recognize any piece of copper that I intuit as hard, even if I do not experience the piece of copper as a whole, or the relation of its hardness to its color and its shape.

The imaginative activity in aesthetic judgment is different in kind because the “beauty-making features” of most of the beautiful objects we judge are recognizable *as*

*beautiful* only through the recognition of the individual beautiful object as a whole. It is hard to explain how we judge the white rectangular shade in *Das Balkonzimmer* as beautiful and as a “beauty-making-feature” if we do not appreciate how it complements and contributes to the other “beauty-making features” of the painting, for example, to the light that comes in from the window, the serenity of the painting, the allusions it makes and the other visual and so called “thematic” elements that make up its beauty. Such a white rectangle might not have been beautiful or a “beauty-making feature” in another painting, or on the shabby wall of my office. What justifies the judgment of it as beautiful is the recognition of the way it interacts with the other “beauty-making features” of the painting, and the painting as a whole.<sup>43</sup> I take that as a reason to think that the unities that we come to recognize through the aesthetic activity of the imagination are holistic and different in kind from the compositional unities of the theoretical imagination. I call the former holistic because in order to be recognized at all, the whole and the parts of a beautiful object must be recognized “all at once.”<sup>44</sup>

Now clearly, this reading is reconstructive. I do not intend to claim that Kant explicitly attributes holistic unities to the activity of the imagination in aesthetic judgment or to the form of beautiful objects. However, I think that his view of aesthetic judgment commits him to thinking about this activity and about this form as holistic, as the textual evidence that I now turn to review suggests.

First, the very idea of holistic unities is internal to Kant’s thought. Although he never refers to them by the name “holistic,” Kant introduces several forms of unity that are in many respect similar to the notion of holistic unity that I introduced above.<sup>45</sup> For example, the unity of the pure forms of sensibility<sup>46</sup> is holistic—in Kant’s terms, intuitive rather than conceptual—in the sense that the grasp of this form as a whole must be prior to the grasp of its parts, since those parts are realizable only in light of the whole.<sup>47</sup> In the second antinomy, Kant claims that the unity of space is strictly speaking a “*totum*” rather than a “*compositum*” “because its parts are possible only in the whole, and not the whole

through the parts.”<sup>48</sup> The third *Critique* presents further the form of organisms and the mental capacity required in order to judge it.<sup>49</sup> The judgment of this form, Kant claims, is based on the recognition not only of the whole as preceding the parts, but also as reciprocating with them, albeit, unlike in beautiful objects, in a *causal* manner.<sup>50</sup> Kant emphasizes that the general and compositional form of concepts, which he calls here “analytical universal,” cannot be the basis for judgments of this form. For concepts do not allow for a movement from the whole to its parts. The judgment of the special form of organisms requires a different mental capacity that goes “from the synthetically universal (of the intuition of a whole as such) to the particular, i.e., from whole to the parts.”<sup>51</sup>

Kant does not use the terms *totum*, synthetic universal, or holistic form to refer to the form of beautiful objects<sup>52</sup> or to the representation of the imagination in aesthetic judgment. Nevertheless, his various discussions<sup>53</sup> of the beauty of nature and fine art as characterized by a purposiveness of form and as expressive of aesthetic ideas,<sup>54</sup> and many of his other remarks about the judgment of beauty strongly suggest that the form of beautiful objects, which he explicitly relates to the form of organisms, consists of a holistic rather than compositional unity. For example, he writes that the form that we find and appreciate in objects we judge to be beautiful is characterized by a kind of “variety and unity” that allows the imagination and the understanding to interact freely.<sup>55</sup> A student of Kant cites him as claiming in one of his lectures from the period, “the power of the imagination...provides for the understanding a *whole* from the manifold of the object.”<sup>56</sup> The lectures on anthropology suggest further that the form of beautiful objects cannot be exhibited on the basis of the unity of the compositionally related marks of a concept. Instead, the features of a beautiful object have to be presented to the mind “all at once (*en masse*),”<sup>57</sup> as a whole. Although I cannot fully support this claim here, I also believe that Kant’s notions of purposive form and of aesthetic ideas indicate that the representations of the imagination both in the production of art and in the judgment of the beauty of nature and art are characterized by holistic unities.

If this is correct, then the imagination cannot unify the manifold of any beautiful object according to, or under the guidance of a concept, since the unity that we recognize through the latter is compositional. If it were guided by a concept, the imagination would be incapable of representing the forms of a beautiful object *en masse*, as a whole, just as it is incapable of representing in such a way the forms of organisms, which are characterized by a movement “from the whole to the parts.”<sup>58</sup>

### III.

Even though the unity of a beautiful object as it is formed by the imagination is singular, it is not merely contingent or arbitrary, but a *necessary* unity. In Kant’s terms, it is not lawless but lawful. I cannot support this claim in detail within the scope of this paper. Suffice is to say here that I take the necessity that characterizes aesthetic judgments to be different in *kind* from the necessity that characterizes theoretical judgments, just as the unities that the imagination recognizes and forms in each are different. While theoretical necessity is “general,” aesthetic necessity is “individual.”

By that I mean to suggest, in brief, that in theoretical judgment, the imagination enables us to recognize a sensible representation as having some features that necessarily bring it under a certain concept: the same concept under which *any* representation with the same features must fall. In aesthetic judgment, in contrast, we recognize by means of the imagination that the unity of the “beauty-making features” is necessary or inevitable to the beauty of *this* object. Imagine, for example, that we change - even only slightly - the particular shade of white in the curtain in *Das Balkonzimmer* and try to replace it with a lighter shade of white. If we do that, the beauty of the whole painting might be lost. When we judge the painting to be beautiful, we take this particular shade of white to be “necessary” for the beauty of the painting on the grounds that if it were replaced, the painting as a whole would be different, and perhaps not beautiful anymore, even if such lighter shade of white might make another painting beautiful. This phenomenon suggests

that the necessity of the unity of features that makes an individual object beautiful is an “individual” necessity “without a law.”

Perhaps, then, in claiming that in aesthetic judgment the imagination is lawful but without a law, and that it schematizes but without a concept, Kant means to suggest that it is akin to the theoretical imagination in that both consist of enabling the mind to exercise recognitional and interpretative capacities. In both cases, the imagination allows the mind to recognize and construe sensible intuitions in terms of something else, and in fact, in terms of the same “something else” – the lawfulness of the understanding. However, the aesthetic imagination differs from the theoretical imagination in that it does not facilitate the mind’s recognition of the sensible manifold in terms of any specific concept, but as exhibiting individual unity and necessity. This unity and necessity differ from the unity and necessity rendered by concepts, but like the latter they fit the understanding’s *general* requirement for lawful or necessary unities. This last point implies that the two cases are similar also in that in both the understanding is schematized. However, while in theoretical judgments, it is the concepts of the understanding that are schematized by the imagination, in aesthetic judgments, it is the general lawful nature of the understanding as such that is schematized. Here, rather than any concept, it is the understanding itself as the source of unities and necessities in general that is construed in the sensible terms of a concrete individual beautiful object. Both in aesthetic judgment and theoretical judgment, then, the imagination is lawful because it exhibits a *necessary unity*, as suitable to the lawful nature of the understanding in general.<sup>59</sup> However, both the unity and the necessity in each case are different in kind.

<sup>1</sup> *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, General Remark to section 22, 5:240. Citations to Kant's works are to the title or abbreviated title of the work, preceded by the volume and page number of the *Akademie Ausgabe: Kants gesammelte Schriften*, hrsg. von der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften [*Ak*] (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). Unless otherwise noted, citations from Kant's texts are quoted from the Cambridge University Press edition of Kant's works in translation, and are abbreviated as follows: *Critique of the Power of Judgment* [*CPJ*], ed. and trans. Guyer and Matthew (CUP, 2000); Citations from Kant's first draft of the introduction are also from this volume [*FI*]; *Critique of Pure Reason* [*CPR*], ed. and trans. Guyer and Wood (CUP, 1998). Quotes from this text are cited in the standard way, as *CPR* followed by the page numbers of both the first [*A*] and second [*B*] edition; *Lectures on Metaphysics* [*M*], ed. & trans. Ameriks and Naragon (CUP, 1997); *Lectures on Logic* [*L*], ed. & trans. Michael Young (CUP, 1992). Modifications to the translations are noted in the text. The translations of the citations from *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* [*Anth*] are mine

<sup>2</sup> The most notable view of aesthetic judgment as a failure to apply concepts is held by Beatrice Longuenesse. See mainly her *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, trans. Charles T. Wolf (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1998), p. 164, and "Kant's Theory of Judgment, and Judgments of Taste: a Review of Allison," in *Inquiry* 46:2 (2003): 143-163.

<sup>3</sup> I should note that I aim neither to explain nor to justify Kant's claim that the free play of the imagination and the understanding that underlies aesthetic judgment is the condition of "cognition in general" (*CPJ*, §9 5:217-18). This task belongs to a different paper. Here, I attempt only to describe the activity of the imagination in aesthetic judgment and explain in what way it is *uniquely* aesthetic (*CPJ*, §22, GR, 5:241). That should suffice in order to explain why, contrary to a notorious accusation, Kant's account is not committed to the absurd view that "everything is beautiful." For the presentation of this view as a problem for Kant, see Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, pp. 295-97, and pp. 322-24. For the claim that Kant's account is committed to this view, see for example, Reinhard Brandt, "Zur Logik des ästhetischen Urteils" in Herman Parret, ed. *Kants Ästhetik/Kant's Aesthetics/L'esthétique de Kant* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998), pp. 229-45; Theodore Garyck, "Sublimity, Ugliness and Formlessness in Kant's Aesthetic Theory," in *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 45 (1986): 49-56. For some rejections of this claim, see Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, pp. 184-92; and Hannah Ginsborg, "Lawfulness Without a Law: Kant on the Free Play of the Imagination and Understanding," in *Philosophical Topics*, 25:1 (1997): 37-83 particularly, 69.

<sup>4</sup> *CPJ*, §22, allgemine Anmerkung, §5:241.

<sup>5</sup> *CPJ*, §22, allgemeine Anmerkung, §5:242.

<sup>6</sup> See for example, *KU*, EE, 20:221, §5, 5:209.

<sup>7</sup> *KU*, §5, 5:209, §36, 5:288.

<sup>8</sup> Particularly, dependent judgments of taste and judgments about fine art. See mainly, *KU*, §16, 5:229-31.

<sup>9</sup> For example, *CPJ*, FI, VIII 20:222-25, E, VII, 5:189-92, §6, 5:211, §8 5:215, §9: 5:217, 219, §33, 4:284-85, §34, 5:286, §36, 5:287-88, §37, 5:289, §38, 5:290.

<sup>10</sup> Kant says, for example, that it "can thus determine the form of sense *a priori* in accordance with the unity of apperception [and] in accordance with the categories" (B152); and that it acts "in accord with a rule of unity according to concepts in general" (A142/B181).

<sup>11</sup> *CPJ*, §22, allgemeine Anmerkung, 5:242.

<sup>12</sup> *CPJ*, §35, 5:287.

<sup>13</sup> E.g., *CPR* A 97, B133-36, and in students' notes taken from his lectures on logic given in the early 1780's, edited as *Vienna Logic*, in *L* 24: 810.

<sup>14</sup> E.g., *CPR*, A 97, B-140-68, *KU*, 5:242.

<sup>15</sup> He describes it as an "act of putting different representations together and grasping [*begreifen*] what is manifold in them in one cognition" (*CPR*, A77/B102-3).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Kant formulates the problem by asking how intuition can be "encountered in," [*angetroffen werden*] or "contained under" [*enthalten*] pure concepts (A13-7/B176), or how the categories can be "exhibited" [*darstellen*] in sensible representations. For accounts of the schemata as forms of translations or specifications of the categories, see J. Michael Young, "Kant's View of the Imagination" *Kant-Studien* 79 (1988), pp. 140-64; Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1990), pp. 26-44; and Allison, *Transcendental Idealism* (Yale University Press: New Haven, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 2004), pp. 202-218.

<sup>18</sup> B151 and A137/B176-A147/B187 respectively.

<sup>19</sup> E.g., A 123, B150-54, A 137/B176-A147/B187.

<sup>20</sup> The schema should "be distinguished from an image [*Bild*]" (A140/B179).

<sup>21</sup> Kant claims, "[the imagination is] the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition" (B151). Young argues, and I agree, that this claim indicates that the imagination is capable of construing sensible intuition in terms of something else, i.e., what is "absent" from them. See "Kant's View of the Imagination," p. 143.

<sup>22</sup> *CPR*, A144/B183.

<sup>23</sup> A137/B176-A147/B187. Kant's expression is the "schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding" (*cPR*, A 137/B176). However, as is well noted, he leaves room for the schematism of empirical and mathematical concepts, from which he draws most of his examples.

<sup>24</sup> A146/B185. This is how the imagination allows for our representations to have sense and significance

<sup>25</sup> For example, in the transcendental deduction Kant argues that we cannot even experience the sensible representation of a house and the freezing of water if those representations are not constrained by the category of quantity and causality respectively. See, B162-63.

<sup>26</sup> "Diese Vorstellung nun von einem *allgemeinen Verfahren* der Einbildungskraft, einem Begriff sein Bild zu verschaffen, nenne ich das Schema zu diesem Begriffe" (A140/B179-80).

<sup>27</sup> *Jäsche Logik*, §5, 9:94. Cf. *Jäsche Logik*, §2: 9: 91, *CPR* A106, B94.

<sup>28</sup> *CPR*, A68/B93.

<sup>29</sup> A69/B94.

<sup>30</sup> *JL*, §11, 9: 97. Kant holds it is logically possible that we discover a lower or more specific concept for every concept (other than the concept of God). No concept is an ultimate subject of a judgment that can never become a predicate.

<sup>31</sup> Although Kant does not think that concepts alone are sufficient to do the work of referring, he holds that concepts *and* intuitions allow us to refer to particular things in space and time, and that concepts might have a singular *use*. The subject concept of any singular judgment, for example, refers to an individual object through a singular *use* of the concept, and the intuition through which the concept is given (see next n.). Nevertheless, Kant insists that our knowledge of those things – as necessarily discursive, i.e., knowledge through concepts – is restricted to grasping them as *in principle* those that can be particular instances of general kind. See for example, *CPJ*, FI, VIII, 20:227. For an excellent explanation of how concepts can be used as singular terms on Kant's account, see Manley Thompson, "Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology" *Review of Metaphysics* 26 (1972), 314-43.

<sup>32</sup> In tune with his definition of concepts in the lectures on Logic, in the *CPR*, Kant defines concepts as "[a representation] that refers to [an object] mediately by means of a feature that several things may have in common" (A320/B376-77). Although Kant's formulations are far from clear, his view of concepts as necessarily general and my use of it in this paper do not imply a view about metaphysical uniqueness, but about knowledge of and responsiveness to concrete individuals *qua* individuals. For Kant, a concept *can* refer to an object through properties that are unique to it as far as we can know (e.g., the concept of Caius, or other proper names, the concept of the number 12). He refers to those concepts as the subject concepts of singular judgments (A71/B96). Be that as it may, even those concepts are general in the sense that they do not apply to their objects *qua* individuals, but *qua* instantiations of general descriptions that can in principle be shared with other objects. Kant insists that it is only the use, rather than the form, of those concepts that is singular. The point is that it is only contingently true that the concept Caius applies only to Caius (while it is necessarily true that every event has a cause). According to Kant, it is always possible that we find another concept that refers to Caius more specifically and more uniquely than the proper name Caius. This is to say that as a concept, it necessarily describes Caius by means of a feature that is in principle general, i.e., that can in principle be applied to another object.

<sup>33</sup> A140-41/B180. This paragraph is obviously far from clear. One might ask, for example, whether Kant means that the *shape* of the four footed animal is general, or the specifying activity of the imagination, why Kant speaks of the schema here in terms of a *shape* and how this product of the imagination can help me when I experience a three-legged dog. These are all important questions, but I will not discuss them in this paper. Suffice it for my purposes to concentrate on the general nature of the imagination's procedure, both with respect to its activity and with respect to the products of this activity.

<sup>34</sup> From Kant's notes on aesthetics from the 1790s, edited in Ak. 16:161, Nr. 1935. See 2.24.

<sup>35</sup> From Kant's notes on aesthetics from the 1790s, edited in AA. 16:161, Nr. 1935.

<sup>36</sup> §8, 5:215, §30, 5:279.

<sup>37</sup> See for example, *CPJ*, §8, 5:215, §33, 5:284.

<sup>38</sup> *CPJ*, §58, 5:346.

<sup>39</sup> Kant's view of aesthetic judgments as non-cognitive is primarily the result of what might be taken as his narrow conception of concepts. Had he accepted a different notion of concepts, he might have admitted that aesthetic judgment can be cognitive. I am not trying to defend Kant's view of concepts, only the idea that beauty ought to be judged *qua* a particular individual. If there are concepts that can allow us to acknowledge concrete individuals *qua* the individuals that they are, and thus be responsive to their individual of value, then there is no reason to think that aesthetic judgment cannot be grounded in some kind of concepts. Nevertheless, even if that is possible, aesthetic judgment is still different *in kind* from theoretical judgment, primarily in that it requires a different kind of responsiveness. The former alone requires the acknowledgement of the value of an individual object *qua* individual, and that acknowledgement requires the recognition of norms that can be constituted only in and through the engagement with this individual. See section III below.

<sup>40</sup> 1845, located in the *Altenationalgalerie*, Berlin.

<sup>41</sup> I think that the relation between the features that constitute the beauty of an object and the object as a whole is different in such a way not only from the relation between the empirical properties of an object judged through concepts and the object of which they can be predicated, but also, on Kant's account, from the relation between the marks of a concept and the concept itself. Kant holds that the marks of a concept are unified in it by what he calls "analytical unity" (e.g., A79/B105, and mainly B133-34n.). This unity, according to him, abstracts from the differences between the different instances that might fall under the concept. It holds the marks together in terms of their commonalities – in virtue of being in principle sharable. In that sense, it is a general unity in which the parts (the marks of the concept) precede the concept as a whole. In this paper, however, I concentrate only on the difference between the features that constitute the beauty of an object and the empirical features of an object judged through concepts.

<sup>42</sup> "If, for instance, I think red in general, I thereby represent to myself a feature ... which is to be thought of as common to several." (*CPR*, B133-34n).

<sup>43</sup> Notice, however, that just as much as the recognition of any "beauty-making feature" presupposes the recognition of the beautiful object as a whole, so the recognition of this beautiful whole seems to presuppose the recognition of the interdependent relations of its "beauty-making features." If this is correct, the relationship between parts and wholes of beautiful objects do not easily admit of any priority order. Rather than simply preceding or being preceded by one another, the parts and the whole of a beautiful object seem to be on par. The judgment of a beautiful object is based on the imaginative capacity to see its parts and its whole as *reciprocating*, by both preceding and being preceded by one another.

<sup>44</sup> *Anth*, 7:145.

<sup>45</sup> For example, the distinctions that Kant draws between intuitive and discursive universality in *Reflexion* 6178, 18:481, between the analytical universal of concepts and the synthetically universal of the whole of intuition in *CPJ*, §76, 5:407 and between *totum* to *compositum* in A438/B466 are analogous in some respects to the distinction between what I call here the general and compositional unity of concepts and the holistic and singular unity that I attribute to beautiful objects. In a few other places in his corpus, Kant introduces the idea of a *totum analyticum* that is analogous to the holistic and singular unity I mention in the body of the text (see, for example, Kant's notes, edited as *Reflexion*, 3789, 17:293). Kant also mentions an analogous distinction in his much earlier "Inaugural Dissertation," §15, 2:405.

<sup>46</sup> That is, when he discusses space and time as forms of intuition, as opposed to any specific spatial and temporal objects.

<sup>47</sup> *CPR*, A25/B39.

<sup>48</sup> *CPR*, A438/B466.

<sup>49</sup> §64 ff.

<sup>50</sup> See mainly, *CPJ*, §64, 5:373-74. Rachel Zuckert points to a similar contrast between the causal relation between parts of natural purposes and what she calls the complementary relation between the parts of beautiful objects. See mainly, *Kant on Beauty and*

*Biology*, 222ff.

<sup>51</sup> §77, 5:407.

<sup>52</sup> Kant officially calls this form “purposiveness of form without a purpose.” On my view this expression refers to the holistic and singular form of unity that I am describing here. However, within the scope of this paper, I cannot support this reading of Kant’s conception of form.

<sup>53</sup> Here I can refer only to a few passages.

<sup>54</sup> I cannot support this claim by reference to the details of the text within the scope of this paper.

<sup>55</sup> *CPJ*, §61, 5:359.

<sup>56</sup> *Metaphysik Vigilantius*, *K<sub>3</sub>* (1794), 29:1012; [my italics].

<sup>57</sup> *Anth*, 7:145.

<sup>58</sup> *CPJ*, §77, 5:407.

<sup>59</sup> See *CPR*, A 97, B-140-68, *CPJ*, 5:242.